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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a genealogy of the emergence and deployment of Higher Education (HE) in modern 
China, in particular its role in the production and shaping of a variety of subject forms. By engaging 
both historical and contemporary materials connected to HE, I intend to display, in Foucault's words, 
an 'effective' history of the emergence and deployment of HE in modern China, the ways in which HE 
becomes a particular apparatus of social selection and personnel production, and also an important 
form of government, also the ways in which HE influences its subjects in understanding their own 
subject positions in relation to HE, to others and to themselves. 
In this thesis, HE is first understood as a complex apparatus made of a variety of components; each of 
these components — principle, system, curriculum, pedagogy, and campus, involves multiple power 
relations and cannot be reduced to a single power will. HE can be understood as a particular form of 
government over its targeted subjects. HE as such works through an assemblage of rationalities, 
authorities, technologies, choices and desires, all contributing to the production and shaping of 
particular forms truth, subject and ethics. Within this assemblage of HE government, all elements are 
not unified but rather open to struggles, changes and transformations. 
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Part I 
Setting the Theme 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
The Past and the Present 
Zeng Pul, a student at the School of Combined Learning (Tongwen Guan) in 1895, the earliest modern 
Higher Education (HE hereafter) institution in China, offered us a glance at the teaching and learning 
activities of early HE with a description of his experience at the institution. 
`When I started to learn French... Zhang Qiaoye who was then in Office in charge of Affairs of All Nations (Zhongli 
Yamen) suggested setting up special classes in Tongwen Guan to recruit students from administrative staff in 
government offices who had good training in Chinese classics to study foreign language. Hence, four classes were set 
up for English, French, German and Japanese respectively. This was actually a good idea, although its aim was only 
to train a few senor officials in translation. But against this good idea, the students recruited were either high-ranking 
officials or celebrity intellectuals who were mostly busy with other work and thinking highly of themselves, and they 
would not concern themselves with serious academic studies. Their attendance at school was very much like their 
attendance to government offices — they would sit down for a while, have a cup of tea and some casual conversation 
with one another, as a gesture of showing gratitude to their superiors' efforts to provide education for the talented. It 
was mostly awkward for the foreign teachers, who had no choice but to come to perform a monologue in lectures 
every day and then leave the classroom. After a while, the teachers became bored of such monologues and hardly 
showed up again. The special classes were then ended silently, having lasted for eight months or so. For my fellow 
classmates, I could say for sure that eight months was completely wasted, but for me it built the foundation of my 
French language skills(qouted in Wei, 1982, pp. 192-193, my translation). ' 
Criticism of the bureaucratic nonsense and the lack of serious scholarship in early HE institutions in 
late Qing2 are also applied to Peking Imperial University, the first modern university in Chinese 
history. According to Chen, after the abolishment of the Imperial Examination for government posts 
(Keju) as the route of socio-educational selection for bureaucracy in imperial China, the Imperial 
University became a site where government officials who had career setbacks and intellectuals from 
the previous examination system sought career opportunities. They largely wished to move up in the 
bureaucratic leadership after spending some time in this modern university. Since most of the. students 
in Imperial University were from bureaucratic or other socially advantaged backgrounds, they would 
bring their personal aides to class. 
`When the lectures were to begin, the personal aides would call out "master, please attend the class", and then bring 
in the stationery, tea sets and smoking pipes for their masters to their desks. When the lectures were over, these 
personal aids would call out "master, please go back to your residence", and then came into the classroom to clean up 
the desks.' 
I Zeng Pu later became a renowned critical intellectual, a novelist in Late Qing and the Republic. His novel Ni Hai Hua 
was among the best novels that criticised the bureaucracy in Late Qing China. 
2 The Qing Dynasty was the last dynasty of China, ruling from 1644 to 1912. It was followed by the Republic of China. 
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This was perhaps a rather accurate portrait of modem HE and its students in the early years. These HE 
institutions were invariably small in size, and intended to provide an elite form of education for 
talented minds. It is these early practices of HE where I start my investigation into the history of HE in 
contemporary China. 
The present is now haunted with a radically different portrait. In 2009, a book named Ant Tribe (Lian, 
2009), brought the attention of the media and the public to the unemployed or semi-employed and low-
income college graduates who live in China's rural-urban fringe. In the book, the term Ant Tribe refers 
to this particular group of college graduates who are likely between 22 and 29 years of age, working in 
jobs with low income and stability such as insurance promotion, electronic-appliance sales, advertising 
and the restaurant business, most of the time without contracts or social security benefits. 
The authors use this term Ant Tribe as they find much similarity between this group and the ant – first, 
ants are known to be among the most intelligent of insects, and members of this group are likely to 
hold a university degree or diploma which presumably proves their intellect; second, ants are 
collective insects, and members of this group are also likely to live collectively, though as a result of 
socio-economic difficulties rather than biological natures; third, ants are traditionally associated with 
certain good characteristics—such as industriousness, humility, and optimistism—the members of this 
group tend to display; and fourth, ants are likely to cause damage to the property/habitats of larger 
organisms if their colonies increase exponentially in size and number. The authors of this book 
highlight this final point and therefore call for attention to the Ant Tribe. This is perhaps more evident 
in the title of the research that the book is based on, Potent crisis: a study of regionally inhabited 
university graduates and the issues of social stability. Although the book adopts a humanistic 
perspective and is sentimental at times, the second section, analysing survey data, suggests that the 
research is determined by government control. It is perhaps better understood as sociological gaze into 
a group deemed a potential threat to social stability. It is a study of, from the Foucauldian perspective, 
the abnormal: against our normative perceptions of university graduates, these young people are not 
doing jobs that require high intellectual capacities, neither are they given desirable economic rewards, 
despite their possession of higher education degrees or diplomas. The Ant Tribe is now, according to 
the authors of this book, a particularly vulnerable social group, in addition to the other three socially 
disadvantaged groups – peasants, migrant workers, and laid-off workers. 
It would appear, then, that the portrait of university students in contemporary China is no longer 
centred upon bureaucratic nonsense and a lack of scholarship, but on a sense of bewilderment and 
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disappointment when facing the gap between dreams and reality, as one can see from this report 
(Caploe, 2011): 
`Liu Yang, a coal miner's daughter, arrived in Beijing this past summer with a freshly printed diploma from Datong 
University, $140 in her wallet and an air of invincibility. 
Her first taste of reality came later the same day, as she lugged her bags through a ramshackle neighborhood, not far 
from the Olympic Village, where tens of thousands of other young strivers cram four to a room. Unable to find a bed 
and unimpressed by the rabbit warren of slapdash buildings, Ms. Liu scowled as the smell of trash wafted up around 
her. 
"Beijing isn't like this in the movies," she said.' 
Often the first from their families to fmish even high school, ambitious graduates like Ms. Liu are part 
of an unprecedented wave of young people all around China who were supposed to move the country's 
labor-dependent economy toward a white-collar future'. The significant contrast between the two types 
of subjects displayed above, I argue, should not be regarded as the necessary outcome of the socio-
historical development of modern China from its prior feudal heritage and class privilege. But rather, I 
think it is a process that involves multiple power struggles, radical shifts and transformations—among 
those from lower classes ascendant during the process. It is a process that demands deeper 
investigation, which is what I propose to do in this thesis. 
Three Themes of Inquiry 
Over a century, university studentship has gone through tremendous changes, and so has HE itself in 
modern China. The HE system has grown from a cluster of language, military and technical schools in 
late Qing to an enormous collection of institutions, amounting to 2263 in 20083. The total enrolment 
number in regular HE institutions (HEIs) in 2008 reached 20.2 million, and that of graduates reached 
5.1 million in 20084. 
Though such statistics may be suggestive, it is my contention that they do not warrant simply, 
following the tradition of HE studies, the contrast between the elitist bureaucratic 'masters' and the lost 
generation of 'ant tribes' is a result of the transition of HE development from an elite phase to a mass 
stage, though this perspective could be rather convenient in explaining what is happening around HE 
3 Ministry of Education, http://202.205.177.9/edoas/website18/96/infol261474691589796.htm last accessed 11th September 
2011. 
4 Ministry of Education, littp://202.205.177.9/edoas/website18/89/info1261469797229789.htm last accessed 11th September 
2011. 
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and university studentship. My concern is not to what extent the changes in university studentship can 
be explained by the growth and evolution of the HE system. Instead, in presenting these two examples, 
I want to pursue research along two lines of inquiry. The first revolves around HE itself, and I want to 
move beyond the mere transformation of HE from language and technical schools to an enormous 
system and look into the ways in which HE, as an important social sector in the history of modern 
China, is assembled, shaped, and developed into what it is presented in contemporary discourses. 
In the tradition of HE studies, HE is most likely to be viewed as a system of institutions that vary in 
history, reputation, size, and function, or a learning stage different from early schooling in manifold 
ways, most noticeably in pedagogy and curriculum. These approaches are without doubt useful and 
productive, as they have rather successfully opened up spaces for scholarly investigation and built up 
associations with other disciplines — sociology, psychology, philosophy, economics, history, and in 
recent decades, management. However, I intend to eschew the pursuit of many of these approaches, 
though I will occasionally engage with them in the discussion to follow. For me, HE is not merely a 
system that accommodates a substantial amount of young students and acts as a ground for the 
emergence of this sub-social group known as the ant tribe; it is, more importantly, a form of social 
governance, an assemblage of technologies and techniques aimed to shape and direct the production of 
intellects at an advanced level for certain objectives which may vary in different historical 
circumstance. Therefore, in my engagement with the rise of HE in modern China, I will focus on the 
emergence and development of all sorts of technologies and techniques of HE apparatus in shaping the 
functions and outlooks of HE. 
My second theme focuses upon HE government. HE in my discussion is not merely a cluster of 
institutions or a period of learning experience, but a regime of truth about the educational 
characteristics of modern/contemporary human beings, a field of discourses and institutional practices 
that help to manifest, produce and promote such characteristics, an assemblage of technologies and 
techniques that are essential to understanding the ways in which one understands him/herself as a 
certain educational creature. To this end, I look into the invention and deployment of multiple 
rationalities, authorities, technologies and techniques, desires and choices aiming at the shaping and 
production of certain subjects and subjectivity connected to HE. 
My third theme focuses on the power-produced truth, subject and ethics of HE in modern China. In the 
discussion to follow, I intend to reveal first, the forms of truth that is produced, modified, and 
appropriated, the ways in which different forms of subject and subjectivities, such as the bureaucrats in 
Tongwen Guan and the Ant Tribe came into being, and aspects of ethics of HE as a form of relation one 
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has to oneself. It is important for one to bear in mind that the truth, subject and ethics from radically 
different historical periods may have more in common than they appear. This pbssible consistency in 
the truth, subject and ethics of HE might be due to the influence of cultural norms, or mere 
coincidences. 
In terms of the perspectives to be used in this thesis, I engage with the history of HE in modern China, 
but only to the extent that it bears on the question of the emergence of HE as assemblage of principles, 
systems, institutions, etc. and that of subjects that may, or may not, be historically varied and 
contextually different; I look at politics and policies of HE in the same fashion, aiming to explore the 
invention and deployment of certain technologies and techniques in relation to HE which make human 
subjects intelligible, practical and governable; I investigate subjects and ethics in discourses and 
fieldwork, to explore the invention and fabrication of such subjects and ethics via the deployment of 
HE, the ways in which subjects understand and formulate their relations with HE, with others and with 
themselves. 
By proposing my inquiry in this fashion, I am not suggesting that the history of HE can be reduced to 
its capacities to make human subjects governable. In following Rose (1996) in his discussion of 
psychology, I also argue that heterogeneous processes of organisational formation and expansion of 
institutions and systems do not necessarily have regulatory aspirations as their conscious aim or latent 
determinants. But, rather, this history is more intelligible with the relations between the problems of 
governability and the emergence and institutionalisation of HE taken into account. In this process, new 
forms of institutions are invented, along with new practices to be hosted in these institutions; new 
authorities are formulated, along with their relations with their respective subjects; new subjects and 
subjectivities emerge, along with their relations with institutions, authorities, and themselves. 
Research Questions 
As I state above, my discussion in this thesis is of two themes — the first on the ways in which HE as a 
particular social sector is assembled, and the second, how HE is deployed in the manufacturing and 
shaping of different subjects and subjectivities. I put forward following research questions accordingly. 
1. In what ways is HE as a social sector assembled from its apparatus components? What are the 
technologies and techniques that are invented, developed and modified in this process? 
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2. In what ways is HE invented and deployed as form government in the production, shaping and 
governing of its subjects? 
3. What is produced as the 'truth' of HE? And what are the forms of subject, and ethics produced 
in such a process? 
In my three analysis sections, I will address these questions accordingly. Part II focuses on the 
assemblage of HE apparatus components, Part III on HE as a form of government, and Part IV on the 
truth regime of modern HE, the formation process of HE subjects, and the ethics of contemporary HE 
in China. 
The Structure of the Thesis 
Though the primary focus of this thesis is subjects — subjects of HE, subjects of population 
management, of social engineering, of ethical formation — I think it is indispensable and beneficial to 
explore the objects of HE — principles, systems, institutions, curriculum pedagogy and space, and the 
ways in which these apparatus assemblage have been integrated into the assemblage of HE and during 
the process, turned into sites of various human technologies and techniques that aim to direct subjects 
of HE towards certain objectives. It is through the discussion of the apparatus components that my 
exploration of subjects and subjectivities could become salient and practical, that one can have access 
to the ways in which subjects of contemporary China find themselves inescapably included in the 
discourses of HE, and encounter the mundane practices of educational institutions — university 
campus, library, study room, high school classrooms — on a daily basis, without being necessarily 
aware of the technologies and techniques exercised upon them. Only by first examining the intended 
objects of HE can one become perceptive as to the ways in which subjects express their educational 
desires and ambitions with immediate reference to the requirements of a modern society, as if these 
desires and ambitions are a natural element of a grand social narrative of the educational nature of 
modern/contemporary beings; the ways in which subjects choose to become involved in various means 
of social engineering and selections such as the College Entrance Examination (CEE hereafter). 
Accordingly, the discussion in this thesis is made up of two projects — the apparatus components of HE 
and the subjects of HE. As I have roughly adumbrated, I choose to begin my investigation with the 
apparatus components of HE, not only in an attempt to set up the general background for the 
convenience of further discussion on subjects, but also with the intention to reveal the invention and 
deployment of HE as a process of institutional emergence and discursive formation, as a site where a 
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myriad of technologies and techniques have been invented, exercised, adjusted, abolished or sustained. 
In order to do this, my discussion of the objects of HE will include the following five perspectives —
the articulation of principles, the manufacturing of systems, the formulation of curriculum, the use of 
pedagogy, and the arrangement of space. 
But before I embark upon the investigation, I provide a brief history of HE in the Chapter 1, in which I 
will provide a brief socio-historical account how policies and practices may have varied from one 
historical phase to another, and how a modem HE system in China began to take shape across these 
phases. However, I do not intend to provide a comprehensive account of the history of modem HE in 
China, but rather to organize the historical materials in a way that would serve as a background of my 
further investigation in later chapters. 
In Chapter 2, I will put forward my theoretical framework, in which I will discuss my use of 
Foucauldian approaches, and their. relevance to the Chinese context. I will discuss my use of concepts 
including genealogy, technology and technique, discourse, subjectivity, etc. In this chapter, I do not 
intend to propose a formal theory for my inquiries, but rather I prefer to put forward a theoretical 
`toolbox' (Ball, 1993), an assembly of a number of dimensions along which my discussions are to be 
conducted. In Chapter 3, I discuss my methodology for the thesis. The main approach of my 
investigation is genealogy, and I introduce various sources of data I use in this thesis. I will also 
discuss the paradigm shifts in my previous stage of studies, including data collection in my fieldwork. 
I then explain why and how I decide to abandon my prior theoretical framework and take up genealogy 
as the main analysis approach. 
My analysis begins in Chapter 4, in which I will look into the principles of HE and the manufacturing 
of its systems. My discussion of the principles inspired by Ian Hunter's (1994) work Rethinking the 
School, in which he argued that the emergence of popular schools was based upon principles other 
than the moral ideals of full intellectual development or eventual liberation of human being. Instead, 
its emergence was closely related to transformation of pastoral care to pedagogy of modem popular 
schools. To follow the lead of Hunter, I also begin my investigation with the principles established, 
articulated, adjusted and developed out of the emergence of HE, the principles that defines the nature 
and scope of HE, shape the outlook and structure of its system, regulate its practices, organize its 
knowledge provision, and select its subjects and direct them towards certain objectives deemed as 
desirable. 
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In Chapter 5, I engage with the manufacturing of a HE system which now appears hierarchical in many 
ways. Externally, with relations to other sectors of schooling, the HE system is at the top of an 
educational pyramid; and internally, various institutions are ranked by their reputation, academic 
achievement, and specialties, and are in turn given different amounts of funding. It is perhaps facile to 
explain the formation and presence of such a hierarchy with reference to a philosophy of market 
competition and social evolution, which would suggest this hierarchy is a product of a meritocracy. I 
challenge this explanation of the presence of a hierarchy by showing that it is not generated by natural 
and rational social selection but policies and practices born out of certain historical contingencies and 
objectives of social engineering that shape the structure and appearance of such a hierarchy. 
In Chapter 6, I bring together the discussions of three other dimensions of HE apparatus — curriculum, 
pedagogy and campus. In my investigation of HE curriculum, rather than following the perspectives 
taken by either the sociology of education or New Sociology of Education, I look into the formulation 
of an appropriate curriculum for HE, the ways in which different components of knowledge are put 
together via various intellectual techniques in order to create space of government of HE and its 
subjects. In terms of pedagogy, I look into the deployment of pedagogy as intellectual techniques in the 
shaping and governance of teaching and learning practices in HE. Instead of seeking ways to modify 
and improve the pedagogy at work in contemporary China, or to devise an alternative, my focus is to 
analyse what has emerged as an 'appropriate' pedagogy for HE in modern China, the ways in which 
certain forms of educational practices and relations have been invented and assembled as the norm, the 
standard and the order of pedagogy. I engage with the 'Chinese learner' debate and the notion of 
`exemplarity', and look into the ways in which certain teaching and learning practices are introduced 
and established as legitimate and intelligible. In term of space, I explore the arrangement of modern 
HE campus. To this end, I engage with the underlying assumptions and logics of space configuration 
for HE, the ways in which certain spaces are assigned with specific functions and the ways in which 
these functional spaces are assembled together to be presented as an appropriate campus space. 
Chapter 4, 5 and 6 constitute an analysis of the apparatus components of HE, and in chapter 7, 8, and 
9, I will proceed with the second project of this thesis — HE as a means of government. Allow me to 
stress again that my separation of the discussion of the apparatus components from that of HE 
government, and that of subject and ethics is not to suggest that they belong to different domains of 
investigation, or should be carried out in different fashions. On the contrary, these three projects are 
inextricably entwined. The first project, my discussion often broaches subject formation, and in the 
second project, I make reference back to the discussion of the apparatus components. My discussion of 
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the government of HE is conducted in a similar way to that of the first project, and in the third part of 
this thesis I augment my inquiry practically by drawing on more data from my fieldwork in addition to 
historical resources and theoretically by acknowledging later developments in Foucault's thinking on 
governmentality and subject. My decision to separate these three projects is not merely for the sake of 
convenience, but in the belief that a fuller account of the subjects is made more intelligible in the light 
of the discussion of apparatus and government, that the subjects can be more visibly located in the 
power relations that is made of and, at the same time, making use of the numerous technologies, 
techniques, practices and discourses of HE. 
In Chapter 7, I will look into the notions of government and governmentality and how these notions 
can be useful to the inquiries in this part, and also how rationalities and authorities of HE government 
are invented, sustained or changed. In Chapter 8, I will focus upon the four categories of technologies 
of HE government, referring to the technologies of the population, the body, the social and the self. I 
will engage with the ways in which these technologies are invented and enforced, and also their roles 
in the formation processes of HE subjects. In Chapter 9, I look into the ways in which desires, rewards, 
and choices are used to govern HE subjects and to encourage self-governance. 
In Part IV Governing the Present, I look more closely into the contemporary HE system. In this final 
Part, I first bring together three theoretical tools - truth, subject and ethics. I use these tools to explore 
mainly my interview data and some other discursive materials. In Chapter 10 I investigate the power-
produced truth of HE - what forms of truth have been produced, how they are maintained or modified 
in discourses and practices, and how they are appropriated by HE participants. In Chapter 11, I 
summarise the various forms of HE subjects that are formulated in the history of modern China, either 
as products of historical consistency or historical contingency. In Chapter 12, I further investigate the 
formation process of contemporary HE subjects from the perspective of ethics, arid reveal the ethical 
substance, the mode of subjection, the self-forming activity and the telos of contemporary HE. 
In Chapter 13, the concluding chapter, I first examine the contribution and limitation of a Foucauldian 
frame to my inquiry in this thesis. I then discuss some criticisms of the current HE system in China as 
a form of resistance to the hegemonic accounts of HE. But these criticisms alone, I argue, are not 
sufficient if we want to bring changes to the current Chinese HE. HE in China is not a mere collection 
of institutions, but a concrete and complicated apparatus, a powerful form of government, and a 
hegemonic yet persuasive regime of truth. By looking at some new forms of HE practices, such as 
class videos from foreign universities on internet, and domestic experiments of summer school 
programmes, I explore the possibilities of alternative HE assemblage. 
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Higher Education in Modern China 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will provide a brief review of the history of HE in modem China, with reference to 
the general socio-political context of different historical phases, the rise and development of modern 
HE institutions, the influences of certain political and intellectual figures, the introduction and 
prevalence of certain policies and practices, etc. But I will organise my review in a thematic, rather 
than strictly chronological, manner. I will divide this review into a number of small sections and 
present them in a way that would serve as background information for my analysis by chapter. 
Allow me to first elaborate on my use of the term 'Higher Education'. This term may refer to various 
forms of educational activities conducted at many types of educational institutions in different 
countries and across different historical period (see Windolf, 1997 for instance). It is not my intension 
to make either a historical or international comparison of HE, but only to focus on its meaning in the 
Chinese context. The earliest defmitions of HE were borrowed from the Japanese model. For instance, 
the one that appears in the 1903 Kuimao Decreed of Education System refers to all educational 
activities conducted in advanced colleges (Gaodeng Xuetang), universities and postgraduate schools 
(Tongru Yuan) (see Chen, 2005). Some of the leading scholars working in HEIs in the Republican era 
also gave their respective interpretations, but the term HE was frequently used interchangeably with 
university education. Cai Yuanpei writes that 'university education is a further advanced form of 
education after secondary education; Fu Sinian understands HE as 'mainly academic education 
conducted in universities and other institutions of equal status, and it should also include some non-
academic activities such as student character building, all of which contribute to HE's basic function —
the acquisition, development and utilisation of what scholarship has to offer'; Zhuang Zexuan argues 
that HE is a form of education that 'aims to produce leaders of one country... and its participants 
should be intellectually superior to benefit from this form of education' (Cai, Fu and Zhuang, all 
quoted in Li, 2004, pp.100-101, my translation). Arguably, the variety of definitions in the Republican 
era is a result of the co-existence of multiple HE models and theories. 
However, the definitions of HE in the following eras tend to be predominantly shaped by the Soviet 
Model and the socialist mentality, which places an emphasis on personnel production and specialty 
training. For instance, Pan Maoyuan, a leading scholar in HE studies in China and the founder of the 
first research institute of HE in China, gives a defmition of HE in his 
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widely quoted Higher Education Studies - 'Higher Education is a form of professional education based 
on regular educations, and aims to produce personnel of various specialities' (1984, p. 84, my 
translation). A more recent defmition is given in Zhou Ji (2006, pp. 11-12)'s book, Higher Education in 
China. He writes, 
`China's higher education consist mainly of special course (or junior college) education, regular course (or 
undergraduate) education and graduate education, and includes education for academic qualifications and education 
for non-academic qualifications. Taking the form of full-time or part-time programs, it can also be delivered through 
radio, television, and correspondence, and by other long-distance means. Higher education for academic 
qualifications is conducted mainly by schools of higher education while the other institutions of higher education 
may undertake non-academic programs'. 
The HE system and the entire education system in contemporary China are illustrated in Figure 1. 
Although the term HE covers all educational activities above the level of secondary education, the 
focus of my inquiry falls primarily on undergraduate education conducted in universities and colleges. 
This is because the undergraduate sector plays the most significant role in the discourses and practices 
of HE in China. The most common expression related to HE in the public discourses is 'going to 
university' (shang daxue), meaning to study for an undergraduate degree. Also, in my discussion of HE 
system in Chapter 5, I will explore the system's hierarchical structure further. 
The span of a century or so since the late 19th century witnessed the fall of imperial China and the 
advent of its modem times. Historians (Ichiko, 1980; Pepper, 1987a; 1987b; 1991; Sun, 1986) tend to 
divide this span into several phases in accordance with the political regimes in power, including the 
late Qing Dynasty, the Republican China, and Socialist China, and post-socialist China. I outline below 
the development of HE in different historical phases, and also a process of HE development in China 
with reference to statistics. But now, I begin my discussion with the Imperial Examination, the 
influence of which upon HE in modem China is difficult to overstate. 
The Imperial Examination 
Researchers in China tend to trace the origin of universities in China back either to Taixue in the Han 
Dynasty or Shuyuan which largely came into existence in Song Dynasty. Neither assignation of origin 
is entirely justifiable. Taixue had more to do with education of high status social elites rather than 
providing education of a demonstrably higher level (Chen, 2002). Shuyuan lacked independence from 
5 The term 'regular education' in the Chinese context refers to primary and secondary education. 
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the government compared to its medieval counterparts of European universities such as Bologna, Paris 
and Oxford. 
Introduced in the Sui Dynasty (581-618 AD), the Imperial Examination, also known as Keju, were a 
centralised civil service examination which developed and matured during the Tang Dynasty, 
continuing until their 1905 abolition under the Qing Dynasty, a history (with brief interruptions, e.g. at 
the beginning of the Yuan dynasty) of 1,300 years (Chaffee, 1985; Lee, 1985; Li, 2005; Liu, 2002). 
During this extensive period, there were hardly any incentives from central or local governments 
during any dynasty to implement comprehensive schooling for populations. The governments found it 
sufficient to recruit talents from this examination system alone, and to promote teaching and learning 
in private channels such as Shuyuan and Sishu (family schools) via the Imperial Examination. Ideas of 
state schooling system did not gain popularity until the late 19th Century when popular schools were 
argued to be a major advantage of western societies over Chinese society and an essential reason of the 
triumph of the West in wars against China. 
The Imperial Examination was intended to be an open social selection system through which any male 
adult in China, regardless of his social background, could become a high-ranking government official. 
However, since the process of studying for the examination tended to be time-consuming and costly (if 
tutors were hired), most of the candidates came from the numerically small but relatively wealthy land-
owning gentry (Chang, 1955). Nonetheless, for most part of the imperial history, the Imperial 
Examination did contribute to greater social mobility in the society — from Song to Qing Dynasty, 
around 30% -45% of the final successors came from families with no prior history of civil service 
(Shen, 2002). The examination system also served to maintain cultural unity and consensus on basic 
values. The uniformity of the content of the examinations meant that the local elites and ambitious 
would-be members of those elites across the whole of China were taught with the same values and 
were likely to follow the ideological orthodoxy of the government — the Confucian Canon (Chaffee, 
1985; Lee, 1985; Li, 2005; Liu, 2002), which had been modified and manipulated by successive 
governments since Han Dynasty (206 BC -220 AD) (Huang, 1988). 
Late Qing 
The Qing Dynasty, ruling from 1644 to 1912, is the last dynasty of imperial China. 19th-century China 
was an era in which Qing control weakened and prosperity diminished, as a result of multiple factors 
such as massive social strife, economic stagnation and the conflicts between the Qing government and 
other nations in international trade, most noticeably the two Opium Wars with the Great Britain. The 
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Qing government took initiatives to bring changes to its socio-political system in order to cope with 
the foreign invasion and mass civil disorder. Education was given particular emphasis in such reforms. 
A number of modern HE institutions in technology and military training began to emerge, and the 
Imperial Examination was abolished in 1905 to enforce the implementation of a new state schooling 
system. This was after the first initiatives of a modern HE system made by the Qing governors before 
the very end of the empire. However, the efforts of late Qing governors were soon interrupted when the 
regime came to its end in 1911. 
Republican China 
The Republican Era, from 1912 to 1948, was far from being a unified phase. Between 1912 and 1916, 
the Nanjing government fought against Yuan Shikai, who had effective control of the Beiyang Army, 
the most powerful military force in China at the time. After Yuan Shikai's death in 1916, shifting 
alliances of regional warlords fought for control of the Beijing government until 1928 when the 
republic was nominally unified under the Chinese Nationalist Party in Nanjing, and was in the early 
stages of industrialisation and modernisation. The "Nanjing Decade" of 1928-37 was one of 
consolidation and accomplishment under the leadership of the Nationalists. But most nation-building 
efforts were stopped during the full-scale War of Resistance against Japan from 1937 to 1945, and later 
the Chinese Civil War between the Nationalist and the Chinese Communist Party between 1945 and 
1949. 
As Wang (1966, p. 362) usefully pointed out in his intense discussion of the Chinese intellectual and 
western influence in the pre 1949 era, one major feature of Chinese education during that period is 'its 
frequent revision more or less in accordance with the background of the educators'. The first major 
influence is from Japan. The Imperial University, for instance, was founded in 1898 after the pattern of 
the University of Tokyo. 
The second major influence came from Europe. The most noticeable figure that introduced European 
model to China was Cai Yuanpei, perhaps among the most frequently cited figures of a liberal tradition 
of HE in China. Cai was trained in Germany and France, and took up the chancellorship of Peking 
University in 1917. Cai's idea of university education and the practical reforms that he carried out 
were regarded as widely influential for his promotion of university autonomy and academic freedom, 
both which are the essence of modern universities. Through his leadership as Chancellor of Beijing 
University, Cai carried out many practical reforms that had a profound impact on the development of 
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higher education in China. He is well remembered for his accomplishments in the stimulation of 
creative scholarship and pure research, and in the reorganisation of university administration based on 
the principle of democracy. 
After the establishment of a new Nationalist government in Nanjing (Nanking) in 1927, Cai Yuanpei 
attempted to apply his experimentation of university autonomy in Peking University to the whole 
higher education system. He proposed to set up a university council to manage the educational work 
but at the same time stay independent of the nationalist government. The proposal was initially 
accepted but soon abolished (Hayhoe, 1996). The Ministry of Education was founded in 1928 instead 
and regulated by the central government. Instead of supporting academic freedom, the new regime was 
eager to direct university towards its own political agenda — university education aiming at practical 
objectives of nation building, which was in a similar way that their counterparts in the late Qing 
Dynasty experimented. This was reflected in a tighter control of school administration and curriculum, 
for instance, the introduction of compulsory military training and 'Party Doctrine' course, the 
standardisation of curricula, etc. However, this plan was met with vigorous resistance from university 
staff and students alike. 
After the outburst of war caused by the Japanese invasion in 1937, a large number of universities were 
forced to move to the hinterland and Hong Kong. This is probably the first and only time in which 
educational resources in the hinterlands surpassed those in coastal areas. The Nationalist government 
initiated a number of policies to support academic work during the wartime, but also intended to exert 
total control over the university education. This was still strongly opposed by university staff and 
students, as for now the idea of academic freedom and university autonomy had become an 
indispensable part of institutional practices and discourses in HE. One example is the famous 
Southwest Associated University, a combination of Qinghua University, Peking University and Nankai 
University. Comparatively little interference from the central government enabled the university to 
operate with considerable autonomy. Throughout the wartime, the university produced a high quality 
of scholarship in various disciplines and educated a group of intellectual leaders (Hayhoe, 1996). 
An important alternative to the university education under the Nationalist regime is the Communist 
form of higher education — Kangda, or the Anti-Japanese Resistance University (Pepper, 1996). 
Founded in 1938, it offered short-term courses (six months or so) to young people in military and 
strategic affairs. The curricular focus was on Marxism and military strategy, but also included 
philosophy and history. Kangda was rather distinctive for its open access, combination of labour and 
academic studies, and political education at the core of its curriculum (Hayhoe, 1996). 
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China under State Socialism 
The period between 1949 and 1966 witnessed a strong influence of state socialism in the model of 
Soviet Union. In 1966, Mao and his allies launched the Cultural Revolution, which would led to a 
major upheaval in Chinese society. After Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping quickly came into 
power and initiated China's transition from a planned economy to a mixed economy with an 
increasingly open market, or in the official term by the Communist Party of China 'Socialism with 
Chinese characteristics'. 
Zhou (2004), in his book The State and Life Chances in Urban China: Redistribution and Stratification, 
1949-1994, suggests dividing this period into three stages. The 1949-1965 period was marked by 
nation building, centralisation and economic development, often characterised by 'rushed growth'. But 
this was also a period with notable political fluctuations and campaigns. The 1966-1979 period covers 
the most controversial movement in the history of modern China — the Cultural Revolution, and its 
immediate aftermath, during which Mao's idea of socialism was executed to an extreme by radical 
policies and political campaigns. This is a period that now bears the blame for its destructive effects to 
the 'order' and 'healthy development' of educational system (Liu, 2005) despite its possible 
achievements, in particular at the elementary level (Pepper, 1996). The 1980-1994 period was the 
post-Mao era when the radicalism in the previous stages was abandoned, also best known for the 
`Open Door' policy and the economic reform introduced by Deng Xiaoping. It marks a thorough 
rupture from the state socialist redistributive system in the previous stages and the emergence of 
market economies and market mechanisms that led to new rules of resource allocation and opportunity 
distribution. 
China as a socialist state (though its current status becomes rather controversial) was greatly based on 
the political logic that `(a)llocative as well as redistributive priorities are decided through political 
processes structured by the monopolistic party-state (Zhou, 2004, p. 7)'. It favours heavy industry over 
consumer goods in the economic arena, and its reward system cares more about political status and 
loyalty than human capital (employable skills or educational qualifications). 
These three significant features were rather evident in shaping the modern outlook of the Chinese 
higher education system. One of the most important changes during this span was the introduction of 
the Soviet Union model as authoritative reference, in place of the American and European models. 
Also, there were also strong influences from the early Communist form of higher education — Kangda, 
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the Anti-Japanese Resistance University. But later on these influences became intertwined and it was 
rather difficult to distinguish one from the other. Even after the Soviet Model was dropped officially by 
the end of the 1950s, it somehow remained an internal reference to policies initiated by the Communist 
Party though without being given credit (Pepper, 1996). 
The Soviet model was characterised by a 'classless' education system, featuring 'a disciplined 
classroom-oriented academic format designed to produce loyal citizens capable of maintaining the 
bureaucratic institutions and heavy industries upon which the Soviet Union's centralised planned 
economy was built (Pepper, 1996, p. 163)'. The Kangda model was similar in its aim to train 
bureaucratic personnel but was more rural oriented and favourable towards the working class, and also 
recognised for its willingness to sacrifice quality for quantity, which well suited the government 
agenda from 1958 onwards when the Great Leap Forward started. The Soviet model and the Kangda 
model overlapped in the mentality of higher education in their aims to produce loyal intellectuals, 
which greatly explains their immediate acceptance and popularity in the new regime. Moreover, 
private universities nationalised in 1952-1953, were put under the control of Education Ministry. 
These early reforms were designed and carried out under the socialist ideology to reduce the disparities 
between rural and urban areas, and between manual and mental work. The socialist state, in order to 
achieve that goal, was to open educational opportunities to the working class, and reduce the wage 
difference between manual and mental work via a unified wage standard. Armed with the rigid control 
and robust intervention, the Communist Party was able to greatly accomplish these two missions, in 
particular the latter half of the period starting with the Great Leap Forward. Political criteria were 
forced on the admission process of university education to enlarge the proportion of students of 
worker-peasant origin and to suppress the advantage of the intellectuals, and also manual work was 
introduced into university curriculum to raise the proletarian consciousness among university students. 
These principles were further strengthened during the Cultural Revolution era. As a result, the worker-
peasant class was offered better educational opportunities, at the expense of those of the intellectual 
class. 
Between 1966 and 1976, the period was marked by widespread social and political upheaval, the 
nation-wide chaos and economic disarray engulfed much of Chinese society. The ten-year span is best 
known as the Cultural Revolution, launched by Mao Zedong on May 16, 1966, who alleged that liberal 
bourgeoisie elements were dominating the party and insisted that they needed to be removed through 
post-revolutionary class struggle by mobilising the thoughts and actions of China's youth, who formed 
Red Guards groups around the country. Although Mao himself officially declared the Cultural 
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Revolution to have ended in 1969, the term is today widely used to also include the power struggles 
and political instability between 1969 and the arrest of the Gang of Four as well as the death of Mao in 
1976. 
There is a rich literature on political, economic and educational dimensions of the Cultural Revolution 
(Bettelheim and Ehrenfeld, 1974; MacFarquhar et al, 1997; Robinson, 1968; Zuo, 1991). The most 
distinctive feature in education during this period was the abolition of formal education, in particular 
the key institutions marked by elitism and selectivity, in favour of open access to education for the 
broad mass of peasants and workers. Admission to higher education was based on political and social 
class rather than academic merit. And also to reduce the rural and urban disparities in educational 
resources and economic development, an enormous group of educated youth were sent down to rural 
areas to 'receive education from the proletarian class' and provide aids for rural modernisation. 
The Cultural Revolution is now regarded as destructive towards higher education (Liu, 2004; Wu, 
2004) — a considerable proportion of institutions were shut down and the rest were taken over by the 
Worker-Maoist propaganda teams; the majority of the faculty were sent down to rural areas for 're-
education' and there were hardly any regular educational activities, etc. This radical backlash was 
arguably due to the extreme conflicts between the political elite and the educated elite, which extended 
itself from the early thought reform to the Anti-rightist campaign and to the Culture Revolution (Liu, 
2004). 
The Reform Era 
1979-1994 was a period of firm departure from the Maoist socialisation towards first commodity 
economy up to 1992 and then market economy from 1992 onwards, marked by a swift removal of the 
policies and exercises in the Cultural Revolution era that were now labelled as 'extreme leftist' and 
regarded as 'destructive toward the regular social order and economic development' (Ministry of 
Education, 1984). The economic reforms in the post 1992 era further introduced the market 
mechanism to both the public and private sector of Chinese organisations. By the mid-1990s, a 
considerable proportion of the public enterprises had been transformed into relatively independent 
corporate entities, and their obligation to the state was via taxation. These changes also introduced new 
mechanisms of reward and sanctioning practice. As Wu and Xie (2003, p. 425) argue, 
`One of the principal structural changes following the post-socialist transformation has been the gradual 
replacement of the state by the market as the principal agent of social stratification. This dramatic change 
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has led some theorists to predict an increasing in the importance of market credentials (such as education) 
and a decrease in the importance of political attributes as determinants of earnings in transition 
economies'. 
Though credentials are increasingly valued, it is not to say that political attributes have lost their 
attractions. On the contrary, the biggest winners tend to be those who are in possession of both. It is 
particularly interesting to look at the case of a large group of government cadres who resigned from 
their posts and entered the market in the mid-1990s, known as those who 'jumped into the sea'. Unlike 
the early entrants in the 1980s who were mainly in the low tiers of the social hierarchy, those who 
jumped into the market had absolute advantages in both human capital (such as education) and 
political capital (such as party membership) both of which received positive returns in the reform era 
(Bian and Logan, 1996; Ma and Abbott, 2006; Nee, 1996; Walder, 2003), and have been strengthened 
over time (2000). In other words, it is now possible for the transformation to happen from human 
capital and political capital into more measurable economic rewards, and those who jumped into the 
sea were the first group to enjoy the benefits of the rise of meritocracy in China. Furthermore, a model 
of social hierarchy suggested by a group of sociologists at Chinese Academy of Social Science (Lu, 
2002; 2004)still regard the possession of political resources as the major determinant of one's social 
status. 
In the post-socialist period, mechanisms of distribution in state socialism were gradually eroded and 
economic returns to higher education began to rise and vary significantly among different social 
groups. There now exist a number of theories explaining the connection between economic 
transformation and social transformation, but one message is clear — socio-economic transformation 
has led to, primarily, an increasingly unequal distribution of educational opportunities. The World 
Bank report on poverty reduction in China (Datt and Chaudhuri, 2009) points out that in the year 2000 
participation in higher education per 100,000 was 18 times higher in urban sector than in rural sector, 4 
times in secondary level. 
With regard to educational reforms, the most noticeable are the resumption of the hierarchy of urban-
based key schools, and the nationally unified college entrance examination featured as selection based 
on academic merits, and a gradual withdrawal of government support in rural education. Urban school 
system (both primary and secondary level) enjoyed reliable government support and rural school 
systems were left to rely on their own resources in townships and counties, without any higher-level 
public assistance. Even within the city school systems, students were distributed into the regular 
schools and key institutions under an intertwined influence of families' cultural capital, social capital 
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and economic capital (Li, 2008). The 1985 reforms, best known for the introduction of 'Nine Year 
Compulsory Education', were also marked by some important changes or trials in higher education, 
including giving more decision-making power to institutions, the enrolment of self-supporting 
students, the expansion of university disciplines, and reform of course content and teaching methods, 
etc. The 1994 reforms were marked by with the introduction of partial tuition fee and the cancellation 
of graduate placement scheme, suggesting an end to the state socialist higher education system and the 
advent of market competition era. 
The Growth of HE System 
As briefly mentioned above, the late Qing government made some early experiments and effort in 
establishing modem HE institutions. In coping with the diplomatic crisis starting from 1860, the 
Interpreter's College was set up in 1862 to provide language training for future diplomats. Similar 
language institutes were set up in Shanghai, Guangzhou (Guangfang Xuetang, 1863 and 1864) and 
Hubei (Ziqiang Xuetang, 1893). Two other forms of institutions were also set up in a similar manner —
one is colleges for ship manufacture and conducting, such as Chuanzheng Xuetang in Fujian (1866) 
and Shuishi Xuetang in Tianjin (1880); the other was Army Colleges, such as Wubei Xuetang in Tianjin 
(1885), and in Hubei (1895), Lujun Xuetang in Guangdong (1887) and in Nanjing (1895). After the 
traumatic defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, the language institutes and special colleges were 
deemed as insufficient for personnel production (He, 1931). 
Nonetheless, the early institutions were invariably small in scale, and there was hardly a system in 
place. The growth of modem HE institutions and the emergence of a system were made possible in the 
Republican era. According to the Leagues of Nations' Report (Becker et al, 1932), a review of 
education in China commissioned by the Nationalist Government, by the 1930s, there were mainly 
three kinds of institutions recognised by the government as universities — National universities, 
Provincial Universities, and Registered Private Universities. The first kind was supported by the 
National Government, the second by Provincial Government, both of which were under public control. 
Over 90% of the total expenditure of these institutions was supplied by the government, and their 
Presidents were appointed by a public authority. In comparison, only three private universities received 
public funding in the year 1930-1931 and over 50% of their income was derived from tuition fees. 
Data of the ratio of three kinds of institutions throughout the pre 1949 era were not available, but a 
snapshot of the 1931 can be useful. The report (pp. 141- 142) calculated 59 universities and a total of 
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33,847 students — among them 15 were National with 11,572 student, and 17 Provincial with 5,910 
students, and 27 Private with 16,365 students. Students were rather equally divided in the public and 
private sector, 34% in the National Universities, 17% in the Provincial and 48% in the Private (Becker 
et al, 1932; Orleans, 1960; Wang, 1966). Private institutions, therefore, made a significant sector of the 
system given their capacity and diversity, but all of them were nationalised by the Communist 
government in 1952-1953, and largely disappeared from the later system until the late 1990s when 
private institutions (Minban Daxue) were again allowed (Pepper, 1996; Wu, 2004). 
There were also a large number of colleges not included in the report as they were not officially 
recognised, but were believed to have accommodated a substantial proportion of students - the report 
calculated 59 universities with total 33,847 students in 1931, and Wang (1966) reported 108 
institutions and 43,528 students in 1932. The different was still considerable with the possible 
expansion taken into account. 
After the Communist party came into power in 1949, HE institutions had a rapid expansion. Figures 1 
and 2 display the growth in number of higher education institutions (HEIs), enrolment and graduates 
between 1952 and 1994 (data from 1949 to 1952 are not available). The trends in the figures were 
fairly consistent. Between the late 1950s and 1962, there were rapid rises in all three as this was during 
period of Great Leap Forward, accompanied by a radical expansion of higher education in both 
institutions and student population. But these rises were followed by drastic falls in the early 1960s, as 
a result of economic backwardness and a criticism of Mao's radicalism in the Great Leap Forward, and 
then a further drop in enrolment till 1970s for the Culture Revolution shut down a large number of 
institutions and total enrolment for three years. The numbers of institutions and graduates remained 
low during the 1970s when only a small number of worker-peasant-soldier students were enrolled. 
Numbers of students and institutions had a rapid increase in 1997-1998 when formal education was 
resumed, and reached a plateau in 1985 when graduate employment became less favourable. But the 
number of graduates kept rising because of the time lag between enrolment and graduation. 
In 1998 China was to some extent affected by the Asian economic recession. Approximately at the 
same time, the higher education system started expanding at an unprecedented rate, both in the number 
of entrants and also of institutions. Since the government's decision to initiate the expansion in 1998, 
the gross enrolment rate in HE has increased to from 10.5% in 1999 to 23% in 2007, with the student 
population rising from 4.15 million to over 27 million (Ministry of Education, 2008; MoE, 1999). The 
official account regarding the sudden implementation of the expansion was to first delay the entry into 
the depressed labour market and increase the employability via formal education of university age 
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cohorts, and second to boost the economy by encouraging educational investment and school 
construction (Ministry of Education, 1998). 
The rapidity of the expansion is clear in the number of new entrants and also in the number of 
institutions. From 1994 to 1998, the number of entrants had a marginal increase from 900 thousand to 
1084 thousand, but the number multiplied almost four times from 1 million 597 thousand in 1999 to 5 
million 659 thousand in 2007. A similar trend can be applied to the growth of institutions, the number 
of which doubled from 1041 in the year 2000 to 1908 in 2007 (China Statistic Bureau, 2008). The 
gross enrolments ratio in higher education, hence, rose from 4.3% in 1994 to 23% in 2007. 
Conclusion 
In the first part of this chapter, I explain the inquiry of this thesis. I put forward three questions and 
propose to address them in three analysis section, Part II on HE apparatus, Part III on HE government, 
and Part IV on the truth, subject and ethics of HE in modern China. 
In the second part, I make a brief introduction of HE in modern China. I first elaborate on my use of 
the term 'Higher Education' in the Chinese context. Then I trace out the development and growth of 
HE system in modern across different historical phases. The past century or so witnesses a most radical 
socio-political changes in various perspective, during which modern HEIs emerged and gradually 
developed into a huge system of institutional diversity and student intakes. But the rise of modern HE 
in China is not a unified process, but rather within different phases various policies and practices were 
introduced to shape and direct the process. Nonetheless, the growth of HE system in modern China has 
been most noticeable, in particular after the recent rapid expansion from 1998 onwards. 
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework 
Introduction 
This thesis makes use of a number of conceptual tools introduced by Foucault and other scholars such 
as Nikolas Rose and Mitchell Dean. I engage with these concepts and tools in this chapter, including 
power, discourse, technology, genealogy, apparatus, subject and subjectivity, government and 
govenamentality. My discussion of these tools is not to suggest a new theory of subject or subjectivity, 
but to explore the usefulness of these tools to my investigations of the assemblage of HE and the role 
of HE in the making of subjects and subjectivities in modern China, in both the history and the present. 
Through his political and conceptual work, Foucault concerns himself essentially with 'the nature of 
the present' (Foucault, 1998; Rabinow and Rose, 2003; Youdell, 2011). In seeking the constitution of 
the present, he makes 
`the attempt to try to trace, in very concrete and material forms, the actual history of those forms of rationality that 
comprise our present, the ways of thinking and acting with which they have been caught up, the practices and 
assemblages which they have animated, and the consequences for our understanding of our present, and of ourselves 
in that present'(Rose, 1999, p. X). 
Foucault not only helps to visualise how the detailed workings of the forms of thoughts and practice 
came to formulate and shape our contemporary existence and experience, but also bring our attention 
to the questioning about the certainties of our present, with regard to our knowledges, our identities 
and our conducts (Burchell, Gordon and Miller, 1991; Gutting, 2003; Rabinow and Rose, 2003). In his 
writing, new meanings are given to words that were once familiar to us- such as truth, knowledge, 
power, technology, discourse, practice (Dreyfus, Rabinow and Foucault, 1982). And these very words 
are made into new conceptual tools that have since been widely used in social sciences and humanities. 
In the past few decades numerous studies have tried to apply Foucault's thoughts to the domain of 
educational studies. Ball (1990, 1993, 2002) is among the first to introduce Foucault to sociology of 
education through his studies of educational policies, social class and school choices. Youdell (2005, 
2006, 2011) brings together Foucault and Butler in her ethnological studies of inequality and subject 
formation in contemporary schools. Perryman (2007, 2009) brings together Lyotard's `performativity' 
and Foucault's 'normalization' in her study of school inspection. Vincent (1997,1998) applies 
Foucault's thought in her studies of social relationships in school and family settings. Olssen uses 
Foucault's idea of governmentality in his study of knowledge capitalism (2004b, 2006), and also 
establishes a dialogue between Foucault and those from other schools of thoughts such as Marx, 
Hayek, and Popper (2003a, 2003b, 2004a). 
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In this thesis, I will make use some of these tools - such as genealogy, apparatus, government, subject 
and ethics. I will explore them in turn. 
History and Genealogy 
How should one write a history of HE? Should one write down in chronological order the founding of 
institutions that are regarded as significant and influential? Should one focus on the sequence of events 
that shape the structure and the outlook of the HE system? Should one pay attention to the policy shifts 
across different historical periods? Should one be concerned with the political and intellectual figures 
that establish the doctrines and norms of HE? Should one engage with the culture, the tradition, and 
the social memory of HE? 
There is no easy answer to questions like these; and, I believe, neither is there a correct one. In fact, 
researchers can, as many have so done with their studies, approach the history of HE by employing 
more than just one of the perspectives mentioned above, with their own respective emphasises. Some 
are interested in 'what actually happened', while some may be more curious about 'why things 
happened in the way they did'. To follow the tradition of sociology, my concern, apart from these two 
perspectives, is to look at 'what has emerged out of what happened' — the invention or introduction of 
new ways of thinking and acting upon ourselves and others, may it be a human technology, a 
discourse, a pattern of being, a new form of subjectivity, etc. To this end, I now discuss the approach of 
genealogy in the Foucauldian frame. 
Foucault's work offers us a new perspective in understanding history. In his understanding, history is 
not the march of progress towards certain goals or purposes, but marked by improvisational inventions 
and borrowings in the face of pressing demands. Genealogy refuses the uniformity and regularity of 
history, but rather it is intended to show traces of the influence of power on truth by exploring a plural 
and sometimes contradictory past. Following the lead of Nietzsche, Foucault employed the approach 
of genealogy to explore the effect of history on the present, most distinctly in Discipline and Punish 
(Foucault, 1977a) and The History of Sexuality, volume one (Foucault, 1998). In the former, he 
discusses the role of modern prison system in disseminations of modern disciplinary practices. In the 
later, he focuses on the emergence of a science of sexuality, and the emergence of bio-power in the 
West. Such a genealogical approach tend to understand historical phenomena 'not as realisations of 
underlying principles or developmental laws, but as contingent assemblages put together under "blind" 
historical circumstances (Hunter, 1996, p. 147)'. 
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In Nietzsche, Genealogy, History (Foucault, 1977b), Foucault elaborates upon the principles of 
genealogy. Hence, instead of search for Ursprung (the German equivalent of "origin"), Foucault argues 
that other two phrases used by Nietzsche, Herkunft (descent) and Enstehung (emergence) are most 
accurate in presenting the true objective of genealogy, as 
`(g)enealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity that operates beyond the 
dispersion of forgotten things; its duty is not to demonstrate that the past actively exists in the presents, that it 
continues secretly to animate the present, having imposed a predetermined form to all its vicissitudes. Genealogy 
does not resemble the evolution of a species and does not map the destiny of a people. On the contrary, to follow the 
complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the 
minute deviations — or conversely, the complete reversals — the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations 
that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being do not 
lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority from the moment it stops being pious (Foucault, 
1977b, p. 146).' 
This said, the search for descent should therefore be not in an uninterrupted continuity, but rather in 
Entstehung (emergence). Emergence should be understood as a product of 'a particular stage of force', 
or 'the entry of forces ... their eruption, the leap from the wings to centre stage' (p148-150), to become 
the new focuses of interest and control. Another important dimension of genealogy that is connected to 
emergence is that, once certain forms and practices of power is established as a response to some 
historical contingencies, they may also spread into other domains of a society, and are later established 
as a norm. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1977a) traces the spread of discipline as a novel form 
of government from modern prisons to other social domains such as schools, army and hospitals. 
Some studies have used this tool into educational settings. In Foucault and Education- Discipline and 
Knowledge (Ball, 1990c), a collection of a number of educational studies using Foucauldian tools, 
Dave Jones (Jones, 1990a) uses genealogy to explore the emergence of urban schoolteacher and 
Richard Jones (1990b) looks into the emergence of physiology in post-Revolutionary France. A major 
work of genealogical investigation in education is done by Ian Hunter(1994) in his Rethinking the 
School. In this book, Hunter argues that the principles underlying the assemblage of modern popular 
schools follow neither the Marxist argument of social equality nor the Liberal stance of full intellectual 
development, but should be understood as historical imperatives to cover contingences such as 
uneducated urban populations. 
The perspectives of genealogy can be very useful to my inquiries in this thesis. As I will show in the 
chapters to follow, the assemblage of HE apparatus in China, for instance, has witnessed a number of 
cases that can be best explained in the genealogical frame. With regard to its idea of emergence, the 
39 
most noticeable case would be the fact that the introduction of HE to China from foreign examples was 
a response to a historical contingency of a pressing demand of the time - defeats in warfare and foreign 
invasions. This genealogical approach underlies my inquiries throughout most parts of this thesis. 
However, it should be noted that my hybrid approach will inevitably include some more 
straightforward or conventional history. This is especially needed in my introduction of HE in China 
and the context and history of its development. 
Power and Discourse 
Perhaps the most important contribution of Foucault's work to social sciences and humanities is his 
notion of power (Dreyfus, Rabinow and Foucault, 1982). In exploring the constitution of the present, 
Foucault suggests a different perspective to look at the relations between power and subject. He writes 
(p. 90), 
`By power... I do not mean "Power" as a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the 
citizens of a given state. By power, I do not mean, either, a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to violence, has 
the forms of the rule. Finally, I do not have in mind a general system of domination exerted by one group over 
another, a system whose effects, through successive derivations, pervade the entire social body. The analysis, made in 
terms of power, must not assume that the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a 
domination are given at the outset; rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes.' 
Therefore, Foucault argues (p. 93), 
`power is not an institution, not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that 
one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.' 
In Foucault's understanding, power is not a mere hierarchy of domination and subordination, but a web 
of relations. In this web, 
`Power is everywhere: not that it embraces everything, but that it comes from everywhere ... Power is not something 
that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is exercised from 
innumerable points, in the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations (Foucault, 1998, pp. 93-94)'. 
Foucault suggests a third form of power, disciplinary power, in addition to two other forms of power in 
our conventional understanding, judicial power, power that is embedded in law, and sovereign power, 
power of the state or monarch that is used to impose their will over the ruled (Foucault, 1977a). This 
disciplinary power works through our mundane daily practices, among persons and institutions, 
through, not necessarily repression and coercion, but also through discourses. 
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In Foucault's understanding, discourses are 'systems of thought composed of ideas, attitudes, courses 
of actions, beliefs, and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the world which they 
speak' (Lessa, 2006, p. 285). Discourses as such can 'produce and regulate the world in their own 
terms, rendering some things common sense and other thing nonsensical' (Youdell, 2006, pp. 34-35). 
Discourse is not a single set of unified codes, but ranges from 'a regime of truth' — what appears self-
evident and is taken for granted, to 'disavowed' or 'subjugated' knowledges — which are not speakable 
or intelligible(Foucault, 1998; Youdell, 2011). Neither is discourse stable or unchanged. Certain 
discourses may prevail as truth at certain geographic settings, within certain historical periods, but they 
are subject to challenge, modification, refutation, and abolishment. Therefore, discourse shapes but 
not determines subjects — it is always liable to resistance and change, and alternative discourses can in 
turn prevail. Foucault writes, 
`We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an 
effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing 
strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it 
fragile and makes it possible to thwart it.(Foucault, 1998, p. 101)' 
There have been a large number of studies that make use of the notion of discourse and the approach of 
discourse analysis in both education studies and China studies. With regard to the former, Ball (1990a; 
2006) develops this tool into his 'policy sociology'; Popkewitz and Brennan (1998) put together a 
number of essays that apply the notions of power and discourses and others to issues in educational 
settings. Baldwin (1994) discusses the keyword 'quality' and its role in shaping the discourse of higher 
education, noting how students are understood as customers in such a discourse. With regard to the 
latter, Dikotter (1992) explores the discourse of race in modern China and argues that ideas about race 
are indigenous in China; Murphy looks into the discourse of suzhi in rural China that aims to 
accelerate demographic transition, restructure the education system and professionalize labour 
markets, etc.; Kipnis (2006) also looks into the formation of the suzhi discourse from three 
perspectives — a linguistic history, a genealogy of related discourses and an analysis of contemporary 
text. I will particularly look into the discourse of suzhi in later chapters. 
Apparatus 
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The notion of apparatus or dispositif is one the most powerful conceptual tools introduced by Foucault. 
Social theory tends to separate the work on institutions, classes and cultures from that of ideas, 
ideologies, beliefs and prejudices, but with the idea of apparatus, Foucault is able to cut across all these 
categories, to look for different elements, associations and relations. In his studies of prisons, clinics, 
schools, Foucault practices a new form of research that aims to analyse the articulations of these grand 
complexes in the mundane practices of such apparatuses (Rabinow and Rose, 2003). He summarises 
the meaning of the concept 'apparatus' as follows: 
`What I am trying to pick out with this term is, ... a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements 
of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 194).' 
The elements that comprise of a given apparatus can be very much anything — in the light of my 
discussion of other conceptual tools, one can understand the formation of such apparatuses as an 
assemblage of relations of forces, multiple discourses and performatives, various technologies, and 
heterogeneous subjects and subjectivities. In Foucault's understanding, these elements are 'joined or 
disjoined by a strategic logic and a tactical economy of domination operating against a background of 
discursive formation (Rabinow and Rose, 2003, p. 11)'. Foucault also calls for attention to, not only 
the emergence but also the further development and deployment of apparatuses - such apparatuses are 
initially formed and put to work in response to a 'strategic imperative' in a given historical situation —
`crises, problems or perceived challenges to those who govern'(Rabinow and Rose, 2003, p. 11), for 
instance, the apparatus of the prison was invented to tackle the problems of criminality (Foucault, 
1977a), the apparatus of sexuality to address the issues of reproduction and physical desire (Foucault, 
1998), and the apparatus of mass schooling to cope with the crisis of large uneducated populations in 
industrial cities (Hunter, 1994). But what is important is that, such apparatuses, once formed, can be 
applied to other situations using the same general rationality, and become, that is, a technology of 
power. As Rabinow and Rose further elaborate, 
`What may have begun, for example, as a rather ad hoc assemblage of ways of thinking and acting, making use of 
elements that were to hand, linking them in new ways and turning them to new ends, in order to attempt to deal with 
a problem such as that of urban crime may turn into a way of thinking and acting applicable to other problems and 
populations, at other times and in other places. The apparatus can be rationalised and the techniques turned into a 
generalizable technology. Further, despite the initial intention that an apparatus will respond in a targeted way to a 
particular problem to achieve a specific strategic objective, diverse and unplanned effects can and do result. These 
too can play a role in extending the network of the apparatus (Rabinow and Rose, 2003, p. 11).' 
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Therefore, in my genealogical study of HE in modern China as an apparatus, I will go beyond the mere 
rise and fall of particular institutions and changes and shifts in the educational policies in the 
emergence of HE system in China in the past century or so, and I will not look for a developmental law 
hidden behind a historical (dis)continuity that, once discovered, can shed some lights on the future 
development of HE in contemporary China. I intend to interrogate the extent to which HE is first of all 
a historical response to a national crisis in scientific and technological disadvantage and the absence of 
knowledge production and provision for modern societies, then a challenge to the construction of a 
modern civil society, and then a plan to mobilize massive populations for economic production in a 
market economy. Also, I am concerned with the general rationalities that have been extracted from 
such an apparatus and turn HE into an assembly of human technologies, technologies that establish HE 
as a major owner, regulator, producer and distributor of educational knowledge at an advanced level, 
and technologies that greatly determine not only how teaching and learning are conducted within HE 
institutions, but also in other sections of popular education, and technologies that to a great extent rule 
over one's intellectual competence, moral and physical fitness, and hence life chances in contemporary 
China. 
Subject and Subjectivity 
With regard to the notion of the subject, there have been a number of positions in the tradition of 
philosophy and social sciences. Descartes, for instance, argues that humans are endorsed with minds or 
rational soul (Zonabend, 1984), and some later perspectives taking this stance, such as phenomenology 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Schutz, Walsh and Lehnert, 1972), empiricism (Davies, 2003) or rational choice 
theory (Boudon, 1974; Goldthorpe, 1996), suggest that the subject is an originator of its own ideas and 
values , or endowed with essential properties such as rationality. In comparison, those who follow the 
tradition of structuralism reject these general presumptions of the subject as a free and autonomous 
individual, but instead understand the subject as a construct. Althusser (1977), for instance, insists that 
subjects are constituted by ideological practices, meaning that the acquisition of one's identity is 
largely determined by a whole series of unconscious practices, rituals, customs and beliefs produced 
by institutions like schools, families and churches, or in his terms 'ideological state apparatus'. 
Foucault rejects two conventional ways in which we understand power and subjectivity — first, power 
has been understood as constraints that dominate, deny, and repress subjectivity; second, political 
power is largely understood in terms of oppositions between 'the state' and 'private life', with 
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subjectivity located within the latter. Within regard to the first interpretation of power, Foucault 
suggests that instead we can analyse the role of power in the construction, modification, and utilisation 
of human beings as subjects; and with regard to the second stance, Foucault suggest that power 
traverses all practices, and via these practices that range from general social policies to nuanced bodily 
movements, subjects may become ruled and directed by others but also have come to direct or regulate 
their own conduct (Rabinow and Rose, 2003). 
In summary, within this Foucauldian frame, one is offered a new perspective upon the relations 
between power and subject — first, power works through, and not against, subjectivity, and subjectivity 
does not lie outside power but is formulated by power; second, political power, does not necessarily 
suppresses individual autonomy, but can also have subjectivity as a resource for certain strategies and 
tactics (Rabinow and Rose, 2003), and subjects can be turned into regulators of their own conducts 
without repression and coercion; third, power is not exclusively exercised by the dominant but instead 
should be understood as a web of relations. 
The idea of subjectivity, according to Youdell (2011, p. 42), can be understood as 'a subject's sense of 
their own subject-hood, their recognisability to themselves as well as their constitution and recognition 
as a subject in and to the social world'. As Rose (Rose, 1999, p. XII) suggests, one can approach the 
notion of subjectivity from four perspectives — first, ontological, in terms of spirit, soul, habits, 
emotions, will as individualised and collectivised in various ways; second, epistemological, as 
knowable through, for instance, observation, testing or confession; third, ethical, as the desirable 
characteristics that one should seek to formulate, indigenous, moderate, independent, fulfilled, 
civilised; and fourth, technical, in terms of what one should act upon oneself towards certain objectives 
such as self-evaluation, self-improvement, or self-reform. 
A genealogy of subjectivity should not attempt to trace a unified or linear march, as it is not a matter of 
a succession of epochs (for instance, in the case of modern China, from Imperial, to republican, to 
Communist/socialist, and to post-socialist), but a process of 'assembling subjects' that is 'complex, 
variable, material, technical, the confluence of a whole variety of different shifts and practices with no 
single point of origin, or principle of unification' (Rose, 1999, p. XX). It is a process that is a matter of 
language, truths, norms and techniques of the self. In such a process, human subjects are located 
among various apparatuses, and are accorded with various capacities that are not confined by or 
unified within individual bodies and minds. Rose writes 
`a human being is constituted through devices, gazes, techniques, which extend beyond the limits of the flesh. These 
are not capacities of an isolated and self-contained individual but are localised in particular spaces such as offices, 
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bedrooms, classrooms, libraries, churches. They are assembled together in apparatuses such those of ... schooling 
within its classrooms, desks, partitioning of days and hours, regimes of assessment and examination, space for work 
and sport... Within these apparatuses, the contemporary subject is accorded all kinds of new technical possibilities, 
of perception, sensation, motivation, emotion, pleasure and dissatisfaction, and self-reflection (Rose, 1999, p. XX).' 
Government and Governmentality 
The notion of government in a Foucauldian tradition is different from what our contemporary polity 
suggests. It does not refer to various political regimes in power, or the group of representatives within 
political positions. Nor does it mean governing through law-making, the police, or decisions in 
governmental organisations and so forth. To Foucault, these are perhaps the 'empirical activities' of 
government, or what government may surface as (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1991, p. 6). In a Foucauldian 
frame, the concerns of government lie in the shaping of human conduct at both a collective and an 
individual level. By making reference to a notion of government of Europe in the 16th century, 
Foucault (1982, p. 221) explains, government 
`designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed: the government of children, 
of souls, of communities, of families, or the sick. It did not only cover the legitimately constituted forms of political 
or economic subjection, but also modes of action, more or less considered and calculated, which were destined to act 
upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of actions of 
others.' 
Foucault's idea of government enables one to include the domain of the mundane, of the everyday 
lives of the ordinary in analysis. The analysis of government is not only confined to the discussion of 
policies and other political practices, but also how human conducts are shaped by the exercise of 
government, and how different kinds of subjects are formulated in such a process. From this 
perspective, what underpins the different forms of government is the belief that human conduct can be 
`regulated, controlled, shaped and turned to specific ends' (Dean, 1999, p. 11). Hence, government can 
be understood as 'the conduct of conduct'(Barry, Osborne and Rose, 1996), the ways in which the 
conduct of individuals and groups can be directed, though not necessarily determined (Anozie, 1982; 
Aronowitz and Giroux, 1991; Ball, 2003; Dean, 1999; Rose, 1996). Dean further articulates this notion 
of government. He writes (1999, p. 11), 
`Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and 
agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seek to shape conduct by working through 
our desires, aspirations, interests, and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively 
unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes'. 
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Dean's definition is most useful in that it maps out the dimensions of government. As he explains, 
there is first of all a dimension of rationality, or logic in government, which may be manifested in the 
management of population or economics; second, the exercises of government should not be 
understood as carried out solely by central government, but instead it involves multiple authorities and 
agencies, may they be local governments, discursive agencies or subjects themselves; third, the 
analysis of government can be made possible by focusing on a variety of technologies and techniques 
that aim to shape human conducts, which may surface as health campaigns and education campaigns, 
TV programmes that teach one how to dress properly for social occasions, and books that teach one 
how to manage one's own finance situation, etc; fourth, to analyse the effects of government, one can 
examine how new choices of human activities are introduced and promoted, new desires and 
aspirations fostered, new beliefs introduced, may they be desires for higher education or life-long 
learning, aspirations to keep oneself updated about everyday news events, fears of terrorist attracts and 
alerts of suspicious behaviours in any public spaces, or beliefs in social mobility via quality education 
and hard work. 
Also, in his discussion of modern forms of government, Foucault further introduces his idea of 
governmentality, by which he refers a particular way in which modern forms of political thought and 
action address the problems that can and should be addressed by various authorities. The concept of 
governmentality refers to 
`the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics, that allow 
the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population'(Foucault, 1979, p. 
20). 
According to Foucault, governmentality has since the end of absolutist monarchies in the 18th century 
underpinned all modern political rationalities, 'insofar as they similarly construct the tasks of 
authorities in terms of the calculated supervision, administration and optimisation, of the forces of 
society, rather than in terms of the maintenance of power per se (Jeffreys and Sigley, 2009, p. 3)'. The 
ultimate aim of 'government', as these political rationalities designate, is to manage the condition of a 
population, which can be achieved via the effective management and regulations of its wealth, health, 
education, its capacity to labour and to reproduce, etc. The notion of governmentality draws attention 
away from the state as an apparatus of control to a variety of forces and knowledges that are intended 
to regulate the lives of individuals and populations within particular national territories. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discuss some major theoretical concepts that are helpful in my investigation. I first 
discuss the idea of genealogy, which underlies this thesis. I then discuss the core of Foucault's 
theoretical tools, power and discourse, and how these two concepts can attribute to my research. The 
other three theoretical tools help to organize my thesis —Part II of thesis resolves around the apparatus 
components of HE, and Part III around HE as a form of government and govemmentality, and both 
two parts, and also Part IV of the thesis are closely related to my investigation of HE subjects and 
subjectivities. In the beginning of Part II and Part III, I further discuss their respective frameworks. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
In this section, I explain the methodology of this thesis. This thesis deploys a genealogical approach 
and I gathered my data from a wide range of resources and documents. 
Genealogy as a Nontraditional Research Tool 
Genealogy is a nontraditional research tool — it does not have a clear blueprint for one to follow 
(Meadmore, Hatcher and McWilliam, 2000). Genealogy bears the label of 'anti-history' (O'Farrell, 
1989), as it is the present rather than the past that becomes the object of inquiry; it does not intend to 
uncover what may be behind the themes, or to search for a general causality, but rather to identify 
clues (Donzelot, 1979) of the present problems in 'the surfaces of events, small details, minor shifts 
and subtle contours' (Dreyfus, Rabinow and Foucault, 1982, p. 78). Genealogy is present oriented — it 
ask questions such as 'What is happening now? What is this present of ours? How have we become 
what we are and what are the possibilities of becoming 'other'?' Tamboukou (1999, p. 215). These 
questions create unexplored areas of investigation. The use of historical data in genealogy is aimed to 
destabilize the conceptual foundation of the present understandings (McCallum, 1990). As such, 
genealogy starts with 'questions posed in the present, investigating the terms in which those problems 
are currently understood, and tracing the line of descent that led to problems being posed in these 
ways' (Meredyth and Tyler, 1993, p. 4). Genealogy imposes 'specific and definite questions in the 
present tense', and investigates past practices to reveal their 'foreignness', and therefore unsettle the 
legitimacy of the present and open it up for reexamination and further enquiry (Meadmore, Hatcher 
and McWilliam, 2000, p. 464). In order 
`to achieve this present orientation, it is necessary for historians of the present to reproblematize the very 
starting points of their intellectual endeavour by dismantling the key conceptualisations that seem most 
fundamental and natural to particular truths about the world, themselves, and the subject. In so doing, a 
genealogy is also a politics. Through genealogical investigation, present problems can be examined 
through a new lens, outside traditional modes of inquiry in the social sciences'(Meadmore, Hatcher and 
McWilliam, 2000, pp. 464-465). 
From this perspective, genealogy can be most useful to my analysis, as I am primarily concerned with 
the present problems of HE in contemporary China in terms of the ways in which HE is understood as 
the ultimate goal of one's intellectual pursuit, as primary ruler of one's intellectual competence, as the 
shaping force of one's overall life chances, etc. I intend to unsettle the assumed significance of HE, 
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and explore the process through which the subjects of HE are 'gradually, progressively, really and 
materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, 
thoughts' (Gordon, 1980, p.97). 
Genealogy as Open Methodological Projects 
As Tamboukou and Ball (2003) point out, although Foucault suggests genealogy as a research project, 
he refuses to frame it in any closed theoretical or methodological systems, and his own (genealogical) 
work also goes beyond the existing system of research theories and methods. Not surprisingly, 
Foucault's work has been subject to criticism from practitioners of mainstream social and political 
theory for this 'absence' of recognizable methodologies. But those who use a Foucauldian frame of 
research tend to argue that this absence of clear methodologies instead opens a wider space in which 
one can collect and engage data outside an existing system and therefore explore questions that have 
not been tackled before. Tamboukou (1999, p. 215) concludes in her excellent review of Foucault's 
genealogies , 
`Foucault's originality lies in his strategic use of different discourses and approaches in the writing of his 
genealogies. Each reading of these genealogies reveals hidden layers of attentive and detailed research of 
an immense variety of data. Rather than following methodological principles, Foucault's genealogies 
create a methodological rhythm of their own, weaving around a set of crucial questions... (and they) do 
not offer methodological 'certainties'. They persistently evade classification, but they do inspire the 
writing of new genealogies to interrogate the truths of our world.' 
This methodological rhythm, identified by Tamboukou, sheds some interesting light on the question of 
`how to do a genealogy'. First of all, genealogy, as Foucault notes, 'requires patience and a knowledge 
of details, and it depends on a vast accumulation of source material' (Foucault, 1977, p. 139). In his 
genealogical work, Foucault engages with a 'polymorphous and diverse map of documents and 
sources' (Tamboukou and Ball, 2003, p. 14), and he is 
`careful with minor textual details, scrupulously citing his examples, commenting on their structure, 
following the "order of their discourse", comparing and juxtaposing them, tracing their repetition, 
recurrence or even disappearance in relation to the era, the philosophical school or even the historical 
personalities they were adopted by (Tamboukou, 1999, p. 214)'. 
Genealogical texts in Foucault's work are usually 'short and dense', and although he himself is 
persistently against categorisations, Foucault 
`turns out to be exceptionally effective in forming structures, groups and categories and placing them in 
an order. His genealogical texts are full of meticulous diagrams, sketches and outlines that systematise 
the route of his thought and his findings. (Tamboukou, 1999, p. 214).' 
49 
A Map of Data 
As Tamboukou (1999) points out, the objects of rigorous genealogical analyses are largely socio-
historical phenomena, and in the case of this thesis, the emergence and deployment of HE. To this end, 
I follow the lead of Foucault, and engage a 'map' of documents and resources in my genealogy of HE 
in modern China. This map of data is intended to transverse a gap between the past and the present, 
between 'macro-level analysis of education systems and education policies and micro level 
investigation, especially that which takes account of people's perception and experience' (Brownlie, 
Feniak and Schnellert, 2006, p. 359). My historical perspectives leads me to a variety of policy 
documents from relevant periods over the time scale under scrutiny, and my concerns with the present 
directs on my attentions to contemporary discursive materials of various kinds, such as university life 
guides and student dossiers. 
Therefore, I choose from a wide range of data, including existing literatures, policy documents, news 
reports, TV programmes, research projects, publications and readings on contemporary HE, and 
personal dossiers, etc. My selection of these documents is in the belief that by integrating their 
contents I can trace and lay out the power relations, competing discourses, institutional emergence, 
discursive formation, and subject positions of HE in modern China. I put them into the following 
categories for the sake of convenience. 
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Categories 	 Types 	 Examples 
Existing Literature 	 General History of 	 Hayhoe (1996) China' Universities 1895-1995 
Education in modern Pepper (1996) Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th-Century 
China 	 China 
Yang (2003) The Struggled Sunrise 
Period History of 	 Education sections from Cambridge History of China, late Qing 
Education in modern (Ichiko, 1980) the Republican Era (Sun, 1986), Communist China 
China 	 (Pepper, 1987; Pepper, 1991), and Contemporary China (Zhou, 
2006) 
He (1931), University Education in the past 35 years, late Qing to 
mid Republican; 
Others 	 Prybyla (1975), HE during the Cultural Revolution period 
Huang (1988) and Liu and Li (2006), Imperial China 
Original Texts 	 Policy Documents 	 He and Wu (1998) Important educational documents of People's 
Republic of China 1949-1997 
Political Speeches 
	 Cai (1993) Inauguration Speech of Chancellorship of Peking 
University 
Reports 	 Becker et al (1932), the League of Nations Report 
Zhou (1959) First Report on the Work of Government 
Regulations 
	 University Regulations of Morning Exercise, Dormitory and Self 
Study; National Regulations of HE enrolment and Campus Design 
News Reports 
  
Hegemonic 	 Articles from People's Daily and Guangming Daily on HE 
Alternative 	 Articles from Southern Weekend and Frozen Point on HE  
Documents in Student Annual Review Form, Self Assessment Form, and Bodily 
Dossiers 	 Qualification Form 
 
   
    
    
Personal Dossiers 
  
    
Websites 	 Sections on HE in portal HE section at Sina, www.sina.com.cn 
websites 	 and Sohu, www.sohu.com 
Popular publications University Life Guides Ren and Zhang, (1996) Essential Lessons for Perfect University 
connected to HE 
Cramming Materials 	 Sandian Yice series 
Interview Data Group interviews 	 Discussions of reasons of participation in HE 
 
Others 
 
Research Projects 	 Students' Affairs Research Branch of China Higher Education 
Association, Key studies of students' affairs of 2011' 
  
  
Online materials 	 Campus pictures from university official websites 
Table 1, Data Categories 
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The table above does not serve as an exhaustive list of all my data, but it does show the most important 
categories used in this thesis. My interrogation of these data is intended to explore HE in modern 
China as a 'regime of truth', to establish an 'effective' history of HE apparatus, and to reveal the role 
of HE as a form of government in the manufacturing of different subjects and subjectivities. For now, 
allow me to further elaborate my use of these data. 
1. I engage with a large number of existing literatures to present both historical continuities and 
ruptures in the development of HE, especially the work of general history and period history of 
HE, in particular that of Pepper (1996) and Yang (2003), both of whom have put together 
valuable collections of documents and provide insightful comments on the development of HE 
from historical and political perspectives. For me, these literatures are not merely references to 
support my argument, but also 'traces' through which I further explore the emergence and 
deployment of HE. 
2. I also go back to some original texts of policy documents, regulations, and reports, in order to 
gather a wider range of data beyond the conventional types of evidence for historical and 
political studies. For instance, I reveal the uses of technologies of the population and the body 
in certain university regulations and national regulations. 
3. In order to display competing discourses of HE, I resort to two types of news reports, which I 
term `hegemonic' and 'alternative' for the time being — the former refers to newspapers under 
direct supervision of the central Government such as People's Daily, and therefore can be 
regarded as a reflection of hegemonic voices of HE; the latter refers to newspapers that are less 
rigidly controlled by the central Government and are more likely to post criticisms and critical 
reflections on social and political issues in China. Thus, I call them 'alternative' voices. 
4. To closely examining the production of individual subjects of HE, I look into a particular form 
of government, personal dossier system, and I analyse certain files in student dossiers which I 
gained access to; my discussion of the technologies of the social and the self in Chapter 8 is 
largely based on these files. 
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5. To bring out a fuller account of student subjects and subjectivities, I analyse the interview data 
from my fieldwork. 
6. To further engage the prevailing discourses of HE in post-socialist China, I look into website 
sections on HE, popular publications such as university life guides, and also cramming 
materials for the CEE. 
7. To reveal the ways in which university students are turned into subjects of a new knowledge of 
HE, I look into some research projects on university students in this regard. 
8. To engage the ways in which HE campus is arranged, I examine the images of campus spaces 
on university websites and some images from the book covers of cramming materials. 
Early Fieldwork and Shifts in Research Design 
The focus of my PhD research has undergone some radical changes over the years. In 2008 I 
conducted my pilot study, and the research design back then was to detect possible mismatches 
between student expectations of HE and their actual experiences. I have chosen four universities in 
Beijing to conduct the pilot. But after a number of group interviews, I realised that the concept of 
student expectations was more complicated than I expected, and my previous theoretical framework 
based on economic rationality could not properly explained the data I collected from the interviews; 
for instance, students from various backgrounds almost invariably show little concern over the 
economic returns to their investment in HE. 
During the academic year of 2009, I took a completely different approach to the concept of student 
expectation. First, the modified research focused only on student expectations, and excludes student 
experience from the inquiry. Secondly, the research adopted mainly a socio-historical perspective, 
rather than an economic perspective. I wrote an extensive review of HE development in modern China, 
with a particular focus on the changes in university studentship in different historical periods. I made 
use of the theory 'social memory' and further developed a framework called 3-E, namely Entrance 
(enrolment in universities and subjects), Experience (teaching, learning and socialization) and Exit 
(employment and social mobility), in order to categorize the changes among university students. In 
the empirical part, students' social backgrounds are to be employed as a major variable in both 
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questionnaire survey and interviews. Thirdly, I determined that higher education expansion would not 
be discussed as a mere context but as a particular event that reshapes the structure of the higher 
education system. The focuses were upon two issues, first, the nature of student expectations of HE 
with regard to the choices, operation and benefits of HE, and the extent to which and why these 
expectations vary across different social cohorts. (family residence and parental occupation, etc.) in 
contemporary China. 
To this end, I conducted both quantitative survey and qualitative interviews to collect data in Beijing. 
The reasons were its advantage in higher education resources, particularly the diversity and quality of 
higher education institutions, and its equally diversified student group. Beijing hosts some of the top 
universities in China. In 2008, there were in total 82 universities in Beijing, with 36 supervised by the 
central government, 36 by the Beijing Municipal Government, and 10 private institutions. 8 Beijing 
universities out of a nationwide total of 39 were included in the 985 Project, and another 26 
universities out of a nationwide total of 107 were part of the 211 Project (Beijing Municipal Education 
Commission, 2009). In 2002, Beijing enjoyed 12.88% of the total governmental expenditure in higher 
education in China, triple of its share of undergraduate enrollment at 4.33%. Moreover, the privilege of 
higher education resources in Beijing is also shown to local students - the transition rate between 
secondary education and higher education was as high as 75% in Beijing, and gross enrollment rate in 
higher education reached 52% in 2003, almost triple of the national figure at 17% (Wang and Zhu, 
2003). Most importantly, HEIs in Beijing, in particular the best universities, tend to be more inclusive 
than those of other regions in term of recruitment of non-local students. Though there is evidence of 
local protectionism in recruitment policies toward local students (Zheng, 2001), key institutions in 
Beijing accommodate the highest proportion of non-local students. Between 2002 and 2006 Peking 
University only recruited 12% of its total entrants from Beijing, even fewer in Qinghua Univerity, 
China Renmin University and Beijing Normal University. Between 2000 and 2002, the average rate of 
local entrants in Ministries-affiliated institutions was 44.76% - the ratio in Beijing was only 18.98%, 
the lowest nation wide. In comparison, the ratio in Shanghai was 56.99% (Ye and Wu, 2006). In this 
regard, the student sample in Beijing will be less biased than that of other cities, and makes a fine 
representation of the national data. 
Four universities are chosen for their different degree of academic selectivity, and data were collected 
from the first -year and the final- year students in October 2009. Students in two faculties were chosen 
for both group interviews and survey study— Economics and Finance, and Humanity. Two classes of 
students (approximate 60 in total) were randomly chosen in each faculty. One group interview is 
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conducted with 3 students in each class, chosen for their family residency (rural/other urban/Beijing). 
In total, there were 651 copies of valid questionnaires, and 16 focus group interviews. However, only 
the qualitative data are used in this thesis as the quantitative data are not compatible with the analysis 
in the analysis approach taken in this thesis.. 
As I went on this the analysis, I gave up on the previous socio-historical framework as it proved 
insufficient in explaining a high degree of consistency in student expectations of HE across different 
social cohorts. In order to understanding this research finding, I decided to go back to the notion of HE 
itself, and conducted further investigation into the meanings of HE in modern China. From June 2010 
onwards, I started to restructure my thesis in a Foucauldian frame, and gathered data from a wider 
range of resources. Eventually, I decided to rewrite most of the chapters to include what I thought 
would be more interesting and useful to my project of understanding the role of HE in the history of 
modern China, also how HE influences the ways in which students understand their subject positions 
in contemporary society. To this end, I decided to take the approach of genealogy, and only make use 
of the interview data in this thesis. Also, because the interview data had been collected before this 
second shift of research design, I only use them as a form of 'discursive material' additional to other 
data. Although the interview data made the previous hypothesis obsolete, their validity remained. They 
are still valuable resources for my current research on student subjects and subjectivities. The 
questions of the interviews were closely related to my overall research question in the current thesis. 
Therefore, the interview data only required a different approach of interrogation. I framed them in my 
genealogy together with other forms of data. 
From January 2011 onwards, I became interested in the personal dossier system, and how it can be 
understood as a particular form of government in both socialist China and post-socialist China. I 
contacted a senior administrator at one of the fieldwork universities, and managed to negotiate access 
to 10 copies of student personal dossiers with the permission of both the senior administrators and the 
chosen students. These students allowed me to use the contents of their dossiers with a condition of 
confidentiality. I also gained permission of all the interviewees to use the interview data for my 
research. All the participants in my fieldwork remain anonymous in this thesis. 
Interview Data 
Although the quantitative data from my fieldwork will not be used in this thesis, I will include, as I 
mention above, the qualitative data from my interviews. These data bear great relevance to my 
genealogical investigation in Part II and III. First of all, it was the themes that emerged out of these 
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Variables 
'University Tier 
Year 
Household 
interviews that inspired me in conducting a comprehensive investigation into the various components 
and perspectives of HE apparatus and government. Secondly, my engagement of interview data in 
Chapter 10 reflects upon my findings from the genealogical investigation, and also supplement these 
early findings with further contemporary evidence and relevance. More importantly, as the notion of 
HE subjects lie in the heart of this thesis, my discussion of interview data serves to portray the 
contemporary subjects in a vivid and persuasive manner. 
Table 2, Variables in Interview Data 
Categories 
Tierl, Key, 985 Project 
Tier 2, Key, 211 Project 
Tier 3, Regular 
Year 1 
Year 4 
Economics related 
Foreign Language 
Beijing 
Other Urban 
Rural 
These four listed above, as I will show in the following chapters, are among the most significant 
variables of my research, and arguably, the HE system in contemporary China. My choices of them are 
underpinned by the followings assumptions: 
1, University Tier 
As my discussion in the following chapters, in particular Chapter 5, will show, the HE system in 
contemporary China is a hierarchical system made of institutions with (presumably) different academic 
competence and enrolment selectivity. Tier 1 institutions are known as members of the '985 Project', 
Tier 2 as members of the '211 Project', and Tier 3 as regular institutions. The Tier 1 institutions are 
also known to be the most selective and tend to choose among the highest achievers in the CEE, the 
national entrance examination for HE, tier 2 less so, and tier 3 being the least selective among all. 
2, Year 
By year here I mean the year of study in HEIs. A university degree usually takes 4 years to complete in 
contemporary China (except for a small number of particular specialties such as medical degrees, 
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which may take up to 5 years). Students in Year 1, by the time of my fieldwork, have just started their 
HE courses, and have fresher memories of their previous understandings of HE. Students from Year 4, 
in comparison, are likely to have better understandings of HE after their 3 years of experiences, and 
may also be more concerned with the job market for HE graduates. 
3, Specialty 
The meaning of 'specialty' is similar to 'subject' in British terms, or 'major' in American terms. As my 
discussion in Chapter 9 will show, the choice of one's specialty is given great attention in 
contemporary China. Some specialties are considered more likely to lead to better life chances 
(higher salaries, higher job security, higher welfare benefits, higher social status, etc.), and some are 
less so. Therefore, the former is called 'hot' specialties, and the latter 'cold' specialties in China. 
4, Household 
After the reform era, there is now a considerable disparity in educational resources among different 
regions, in terms of both HE and pre-HE. Beijing is perhaps among the most resourceful across the 
countries; other urban areas less so, but are still significantly more resourceful than the rural areas. The 
household policy, introduced in the high socialism era to control migration from rural to urban areas, is 
now still in effect in contemporary China. Hence, one's access to educational resources is very much 
decided by one's household registry, which is very difficult to change. 
In total, there were in total 48 participants in my interview, and I conducted interviews with them in 16 
groups. Three interviewees from each group were doing the similar specialties in the same faculty at 
the same institutions, but they are from different household backgrounds - one is from Beijing, one 
from other urban areas, and one from rural areas. There are a number of reasons behind this 
arrangement. First of all, I chose the form of group interviews rather than individual interviews 
because I had the impression that students in China were more comfortable in a group than as 
individual interviewees from my pilot study in 2008, in which I used both approaches; once a member 
of the group started to talk, others would follow naturally, and as they went on, the interactions among 
the group members could bring out more depth in conversation. Secondly, I chose interviewees in the 
same group from the same faculty is because that interviewees would feel more comfortable to be 
around with people they knew from their daily lives, those from the same faculty, in most of the cases, 
the same class (the smallest academic unit in HEIs). Thirdly, I use household registry as the basic 
variable since the data I collected from my pilot study, both interview and survey, indicated that this is 
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the most significant variable in students' understanding and expectations of HE. Putting interviewees 
from three different household backgrounds is together more likely to bring out differences in 
students' understanding of HE, or their HE subjectivities. This was proven effective in the fieldwork. 
Interview Data Analysis 
All the interviews were transcribed into Microsoft Word documents, and I imported these documents 
into NVivo for coding. All the texts were not translated into English in the analysis, except the sections 
that I quoted them in Part IV. I organised all transcripts by interview questions rather than any smaller 
units. When I analysed the texts, I organise responses from all interviewees by questions in NVivo, and 
coded the texts with a number of keywords. 
Research Ethics 
Two types of data used in this thesis required the participation of human respondents. The first type is 
documents from student dossiers. For these documents, I acquired written consents from the Head of 
Student Affairs at the chosen institution, and also the individual students whose the dossier materials 
were used. The students were given written confirmation from me stating that their names and any 
personal information would not appear in my thesis, and I would only analyse the materials included in 
the dossiers and quote certain sections. When I eventually decided to use materials from one particular 
participant, known as Mr Y in later chapter, I made another contact with him, and informed him about 
my use of his materials, and he agreed to be quoted in this thesis. 
The second type is the interview data. I acquire written consents from all my interviewees that stated 
they were willing to participate in this research, and agreed to be quoted in my thesis. Their 
confidentiality was ensured by using numbers instead of their actual names in my quotes, and I also 
sent them my transcripts of their respective interview sessions to ask for their confirmation to be 
quoted as such. All interviews were conducted in Chinese, the native language of all interviewees and 
the interviewer. All interviews took place in relaxed, friendly settings, such as campus cafés, guest 
rooms of student halls, and small meeting rooms of the faculty. With the permissions of the 
interviewees, all the interviews were recorded in audio, and I also took notes on site. 
•58 
Limitations and Contributions of the Research 
In order to conduct genealogical research, one must deal with an extensive and diverse collection of 
historical materials. Although I struggled to collect as many original documents as possible, my 
designs could only be partially realised due to the lack of data on students' accounts of HE in previous 
era, among other relevant input either lost, buried or seriously degraded during the strife existent 
throughout China in the first half of the 20th Century. It is also important to note that few prior studies 
pertaining to student subjectivity in China exist for reference, which was perhaps a result of the 
absence of social sciences throughout the age of state socialism and their slow development until 
recent two decades in China. 
Moreover, my fieldwork was carried out prior to the paradigm shift for the thesis, so the data could be 
not used to prove or disapprove any assumptions I had. I therefore used them as additional discursive 
materials to the other forms of data I collected in my three analysis chapters in Part IV. The interview 
data contribute the analysis with regard to the ways in which certain 'truth', subjects and ethics are 
produced through HE. In the future, I will continue with this research if possible, and try to conduct a 
fieldwork that draws upon my findings in this thesis, either in the fashion of stereotype interviews, or 
ethnology. I believe one can certainly benefit from an in-depth participant observation of HE students 
in contemporary China. 
Furthermore, as a researcher, my perspectives of the study and selections of materials are inevitably 
influenced by my own experience of HE in China. The year of my enrollment in HE, 1999, was the 
year when a massive expansion of HE began. After the high pressure of the CEE preparation and 
turmoil in the enrollment process which almost cost me the chance of getting into a key university, 
comes the shock of the over-populated campus, heavy schedules, close monitoring, and bewilderment 
of what counted as HE, and what I was supposed to do for the next four years. My personal doubts of 
the HE system were reflected in my interview questions, and also in my general inquiry into the 
history of modern HE in China. While this may call into question my 'objectivity' as a researcher, I 
would also argue that as an 'insider' of the system, my experiences provide me with particular 
perspectives that are perhaps largely unknown to those from a different educational tradition—
particularly the mundane but pervading governmental intrusion such as the regulation of morning 
exercises and evening studies, protocol for dormitory maintenance, etc. My research training in the UK 
provides me with different perspectives from my counterparts who receive their training in China and 
tend to conduct studies following certain conventions such as policy studies or comparative studies. 
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For instance, in a seminar at a research institution best known for its leading role in HE studies in 
China, a senior researcher (who was also a high-ranking administrator of the university) told me that if 
he were my supervisor, he would have discouraged me from doing this research of student subjectivity 
as it had little value. 
However, I believe that the value of this thesis rests upon the fact that it looks into what people have 
taken for granted, in terms of how they understand HE, what it means to receive HE, and what one is 
entitled to expect from HE, among other touchstone concepts. In addition to a comprehensive review 
of the emergence and deployment of HE in modem China, I also explore the shaping of HE subjects 
and subjectivities, a domain that remains to be further explored in future studies. To acquire better 
understanding of and bring changes to a system that has for long been caught in a dilemma between 
control and cultivation, I suggest that we examine Chinese HE from perspectives that are perhaps most 
familiar to the insiders, and in ways that are most alien to them. 
60 
Part II 
The Will to HE 
Framework for Part II 
The Will to HE 
The title for Part II of the thesis is a reference to the subtitle of Foucault's (1998) first volume of The 
History of Sexuality — the will to knowledge. In this volume, Foucault looks into the deployment of 
sexuality as a technique of power, and also the invention of social science disciplines in our attempts to 
understand sexuality and to govern populace and individuals in the lights of such knowledges. Such a 
will to knowledge, therefore, can be understood as certain rationalities upon which the introduction, 
development and utilisation of certain disciplines are based and certain knowledge practices are 
rendered intelligible and productive. Such rationalities aim to render human subjects — their minds, 
emotions, and bodily practices — more comprehensible, and consequently more governable. This 
approach has been further explored by Rose, who looks into the emergence and deployment of 
psychology as a particular discipline that centres upon the contemporary self (Rose, 1985; 1996; 
1999). 
My borrowing of the phrase is not to suggest that I will study HE as a particular discipline, neither will 
the approach of sociology of scientific knowledge underpin my investigation in this part, though this 
approach will be used in my analysis of the formulation of HE curriculum. As I mention in the 
introduction chapter, I will explore HE as an apparatus — an assemblage of components, relations of 
forces, multiple discourses and various technologies. Nonetheless, the logic and stance underpinning 
the will to knowledge is very much applicable to my investigation of the emergence, development and 
deployment of HE as such an apparatus. By using the will to HE as the title, I concern myself 
primarily with a dual-process in which HE is assembled according to certain rationalities upon the 
governance of populations and individuals, and HE serves as both the support and instrument of these 
very rationalities, such as HE in the service of the needs of society over those of individuals, etc. 
However, I am not suggesting that these rationalities, mechanisms, mentalities are prior to the 
emergence of HE, and HE should be understood as their manifestation, or (partial) realisation. Rather, 
as I will show later in the chapters to follow, these rationalities are born out of the responses to certain 
historical contingencies in which limited technical means and resources were available — for instance, 
the building of state schooling system was aimed at providing eligible candidates for the Imperial 
University in late Qing as the university could not recruit enough Students from the members of 
aristocracy and governmental offices, but later it was established as a consensus and rationality that the 
primary aim of the schooling system is to cultivate and select students for higher learning, a principle 
that is much visible in contemporary China. 
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In the chapters to follow, I aim to trace and display this will to HE in modern China, by exploring the 
establishment and deployment of the rationalities that underpin this will. My investigation covers five 
major apparatus components of HE, including principle, system, curriculum, pedagogy and space. I am 
not suggesting that these five components constitute the complete assemblage of HE, but rather they 
are what I believe the most significant dimensions in the complex and constantly changing existence of 
HE, significant not only as in that they represent the traditional interest of academic inquiries into HE, 
but that they are also the fields where the most tangible operations of technologies and techniques of 
power can be located and displayed. 
HE apparatus 
 
1, Principle 
2, System 
3, Curriculum 
4, Pedagogy 
5, Campus 
Table 3, Components of HE Apparatus 
By principle, I refer to the political articulation of the aims, objectives, priorities, approaches, and uses 
of HE across different historical periods, principles that are not prior to the establishment of HE as an 
social apparatus to cultivate, discipline, select, and distribute members of the populace but emerge out 
of an assemblage of the technical means available to the multiple forces — social, economic and 
political, and parties of interests — the state, the political parties, the public and the academia. By 
system, I primarily refer to the assembly of HE institutions that may vary greatly in tradition, size and 
mission, an assembly that is subject to political efforts in forms of legislation, construction, 
adjustment, and supervision; I will also look into the relations between the sector of pre-tertiary 
education and the sector of HE. By curriculum, I refer to collections of educational knowledge from 
various disciplines and specialities that are rendered appropriate for advanced learning in HE 
institutions. By pedagogy, I refer to the ways in which teaching and learning are conducted to achieve 
certain desirable objectives. And by campus, I refer to the ways in which university campus is 
assembled from a variety of spaces that are assigned with different functions. I organise my discussion 
in Part II of this thesis according to this framework in Table 4 above. 
My sequence of discussions is not to suggest causal relations or lines of significance among the five 
components, that the principles determine the shape of the system, and the system determines the 
curriculum and pedagogy, etc. It is perhaps better understood in the descending sequence of abstraction 
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in notions, with principle being the most abstract component, and the descending sequence in the 
degree of locality of power operations, with pedagogy as the most local centre of power relations, the 
most immediate field where the apparatus of HE are joined with subjects of HE. However, I am not 
primarily concerned with the internal relations among the components of apparatus. But rather, by 
engaging with these components, I intend to provide a coherent account of the technologies and 
techniques of power at work, the rationalities and mechanism that formulate the discursive and 
material presence of HE, and the will to HE that underpin the projections and understandings of HE in 
modern China. 
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Chapter 4 The Articulation of Principles 
In this chapter, I will explore the principles of HE that emerge out of the responses to certain historical 
contingents in modem China, most noticeably the national salvation in the late Qing, the building of 
modem state in the Republican era, and the production of manpower for industrial and technological 
construction under state socialism. To do so, I adopt a genealogical approach. As Hunter 3(1994, pp. 
xvi-xvii) suggests, 
`(n)egatively defined, this approach refuses to treat the historical and technical organisation of the school system as if 
it were the expression — partial or otherwise- of an underlying principle or tendency of development... It eschews, 
for example, such deep origins for the school system as the aspirations of democratic communities or the 
depredations of capitalist ruling classes. To construe the approach more positively, we can say that this genealogy 
concentrates instead on the contingent circumstances in which the school system came into being, and on the 
available cultural techniques, institutions and modes of reflection from which it was assembled. The picture that 
emerges is thus not one of the school's appearance as the partial manifestation of an underlying principle, but of its 
improvised assemblages as a device to meet the contingencies of a particular history.' 
I suggest, if we are to understand the complex of demands and expectations upon HE in contemporary 
China, we need to first of all trace out and display the actual principles at work before we can 
confidently set out to seek the alternatives to these very principles. But seeking the alternatives is not 
what is intended in this chapter; I intend to save it for the final chapter of my thesis. Therefore, here I 
limit my discussion to the articulated principles in different historical phases alone. I begin my 
discussion with the two concepts central to this chapter, articulation and principles. 
Articulation 
My use of articulation follows the lead of Laclau and Mouffe (2001), who particularly in their 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategies, develop Gramsci's theory of articulation. For Grasmsi, articulation 
refers to the process by which particular classes appropriate cultural forms and practices for their own 
use. Instead of focusing on class struggles, Laclau and Mouffe, place the notion' of articulation in 
relation to discourse, and understand articulation (and especially hegemonic articulation) as attempts to 
define meaning within a discursive field, as acts to both modify and fix identities. The practice of 
articulation is manifested most visibly in efforts made to create a partial fixity of meaning around what 
Laclau and Mouffe call 'nodal points' — a nodal point being a privileged element that gathers up a 
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range of differential elements, and binds them together into a discursive formation, such as democracy 
and its political elements - to 'suture' the open character of the social. They write, 
`we will call articulation any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a 
result of the articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we will call 
discourse. (2001, p. 105)' 
Hence, I suggest that we can also treat HE as such a nodal point where a range of articulatory struggles 
take place. These nodal points may refer to for instance the focuses, means and ends of HE, all of 
which will be dealt with in the following section. Hence, once such nodal points are identified, one can 
seek to trace out the articulation of HE principles, the efforts that aim to create meanings around the 
belief and practices of HE, and attempts to direct and sustain the development and deployment of HE. 
Furthermore, Laclau and Mouffe bring together Gramsci's notion of hegemony and Foucault's notion 
of discourse together to understand the process of political articulation — the process by which certain 
political ideas and forms become hegemonic. Hegemony here refers to these ideas and forms that 
prevails in socio-political fields and are accepted as common sense by those who are not likely to 
benefit from these ideas and forms. Hence, through the process of political articulation, particular ideas 
and forms become hegemonic. However, Laclau and Mouffe do not regard hegemony as merely 
ideological trick, as entirely negative. On the contrary, they argue that hegemony serves as 'a 
fundamental discursive condition for the socio-political' (Youdell, 2011, p. 26). Mouffe further argues 
(Mouffe in Carpentier and Cammaerts, 2006, p. 967), 
... hegemony is transformed by articulation. You cannot understand the idea of hegemony ... independently of our 
thesis about the discursive construction of reality and the social. Or to put it in a Gramscian sense: common sense is 
always something which is the result of political articulation. Reality is not given to us; meaning is always 
constructed. There is no meaning that is just essentially given to us; there is no essence of the social, it is always 
constructed. The social is always the result of a hegemonic articulation; every type of social order is the product of a 
hegemony as a specific political articulation'. 
Therefore, hegemony as such, is not an oppressive and problematic social practice, and hence is not to 
be overcome. Rather, hegemony describes the multiple and heterogeneous meanings and discourses 
that formulate our contemporary understanding of society and ourselves. What one should aim at is a 
struggle for hegemony, a struggle over which principles, ideas, mechanisms should be established as 
hegemonic over others. Mouffe (Mouffe in Carpentier and Cammaerts, 2006, p. 967) explains that 
`hegemony is positive in the sense that, if we accept that there is no order, if we did not have any kind of hegemony, 
we would be living in complete schizophrenia. There would not be any form of meaning, any form of order. In other 
words, the question is not to get rid of power. Power is constitutive for the social; there is no social without power 
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relations. Now, any form of order is a hegemonic order, but of course there are some forms of order that are more 
democratic than others. Power relations are constructed in different ways. A democratic society in which there is 
accountability is a form of order and it is a better form of order than an authoritarian regime'. 
To understand the process of political articulation as inevitably hegemonic, and also hegemony as a 
condition of discursive struggle, Laclau and Mouffe not only open up the idea of hegemony and 
discourse, but also expand the scope of their application in social studies. The articulation of principles 
of HE, therefore, can be understood as ongoing struggles in the discourses of HE with regard to its 
focuses, means and ends, as a result of multiple propositions stating why and how their respective 
systems of belief and practices serve to underpin the establishment, development, and adjustment of 
HE in order to achieve certain objectives in social, political and economic domains. Such articulatory 
practices can be found in discursive materials including government propaganda and policies, 
university regulations, prevailing citation from political authorities and figures. At different historical 
stages in the history of modern HE in China, different propositions appear as hegemonic in terms of 
their influence in public discourse, policy decisions, and daily practices. Such struggles for hegemonic 
articulation are perhaps most visible at the time of regime changes or massive socio-political 
movements, as is the case of modern HE in China. A series of rapid and radical social changes in the 
past century or so have also brought with them a set of principles of HE that seemingly differ greatly 
from one another. These principles request loyalty to different regimes and ideologies, embracing 
different understanding of the role of HE in grand socio-political agenda, proposing different systems 
of HE institutions, endorsing different forms of HE pedagogy, and formulating different structures of 
HE curriculum. But perhaps these historical distinctions are overrated. With a closer look, one may 
find traces of some similarities among these principles, for instance their almost unanimous focus on 
the collective rather than the individual, and also an equally coherent emphasis on knowledges that are 
practical and immediately relevant to the socio-economic development of the nation. In the following 
sections, I will trace out the articulatory practices over the principles of HE, with regarding to the 
statements, changes and shifts and the under-recognised coherence in the hegemonic principles 
established. 
Principle 
What I mean by principles in this chapter are various propositions that serve as the foundation for 
systems of belief and practices in conducting HE towards certain desirable objectives. These 
propositions manifest through three correlating factors — first, the focuses of HE, by which I mean the 
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formation of subjects that are rendered as priorities of the time, the most desirable, the ideal forms of 
subjects for certain socio-political settings, may they be personnel for diplomacy and military needs, 
liberal individuals cultivated by modem universities, citizens of a modem state, or technocrats who are 
equipped with both political loyalty and professional expertise; second, the ends of HE, by which I 
refer to the objectives that HE is set to achieve, may they be the production of special personnel and 
national salvation, or the cultivation of leaders for various industries, or the promotion of 
egalitarianism in educational access, or the accumulation of human capital for global economic 
competition; the third, the means of HE, by which I mean the ideological, curricular, and pedagogical 
approaches and arrangements that are believed to best facilitate the realisation of the objectives 
identified, may they be a combination of Confucian doctrines with modern scientific and technologic 
disciplines, or the liberal or general forms of teaching and learning that encourage an appreciation of 
various fields of studies, or the penetration of party doctrines into curriculum, or the removal of all 
humanity and social science disciplines and the domination of science and technology. As the analysis 
in the following sections will show, in different historical periods, a number of principles cohere 
around their own sets of focuses, ends and means of HE, and their propositions surface as varying 
greatly from one another, mostly resulting from the radical shift in the political regimes and their 
corresponding strategies and practices in HE. But underneath these seemingly varied propositions, one 
might find much similarity hidden in the principles articulated across the history of modem HE in 
China. 
First of all, with regard to the focuses of HE, one of the central issues is whether HE in modem China 
should primarily serve the development of individual or the development of the collective. Here, by 
the notion of the individual, I refer to its liberal interpretation — a human subject with his or her 
faculties to be cultivated and developed. The ideas of the collective, in comparison, tend to vary 
greatly in different historical periods. Essentially the collective is various forms of personnel, 
personnel that can be immediately deployed for national salvation in the late Qing to cope with to the 
all-around challenges at hand, social, economic, political, and military, for national building in the 
Republican era to play the role of the leaders in various industries and governing bodies, for national 
reconstruction under state socialism to transfer knowledge into socio-economic development, and for 
national strengthening in the post-socialist era for the development of a market economy. 
Second, the articulation of the ends of HE has been closely associated with, though not necessarily 
determined by, the needs of various political regimes and their respective socio-political environment; 
the late Qing is a nation ruled by an imperial regime, and then in the first half of the Republican era, a 
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modern society that aims to transform its residents into citizens, and in its second half, a nation at war 
that requests HE to follow the order of the party-state, under state socialism, a new nation that is in 
great need of technocrats to facilitate its scientific and technological development, and also an 
egalitarian society that emphasises primarily promoting educational opportunities among the working 
class; in the post-socialism era, a country that bases its competence in a global economy upon the 
accumulation of human capital. It is within a small window period in the first half of the Republican 
era that one could find the hegemonic principles of HE in the primary service of the individual, 
promoted by a group of liberal reformists such as Cai Yuanpei. 
A related dimension of the ends of HE is the articulatory struggles surrounding the practicality of HE, 
meaning to what extent HE should make immediate and direct contribution to the needs of the nation/ 
state, may these needs be defined as military, socio-political, and/or economic, and to what extent HE 
should be devoted to the production of practical knowledge and personnel that is immediate relevant to 
such needs. Corresponding to the focuses of HE, the modern history of HE in China is dominated by a 
utilitarian mechanism, that HE should be concerned primarily with the needs of the nation/state and 
should accordingly give more attention to disciplines that can most immediately make a direct 
contribution to fulfil such needs. 
Third, with regard to the means of HE, two repeating themes emerge out of the articulations — one is 
the curricular preference among disciplines and the other is the pedagogical deployment of certain 
ideologies. For the former, one would also find that science and technology disciplines have been 
given overwhelming attention throughout the century or so. In the late Qing, science and technology 
were largely understood as the essence of the advantages of Western countries over China, most 
evidently in their powerful military equipment, and HE institutions mainly began with the teaching of 
such disciplines until the end of the imperial China when there was a widening consensus that the 
strength of western countries actually lay in their socio-political system. Hence, in the first two 
decades of the Republican era, social science disciplines such as politics and education were given 
much more attention, but when the central Nationalist government came into power, attempts were 
made to promote science and technology disciplines, which were believed to make more a concrete 
contribution to national building. Under state socialism, social science and humanity disciplines were 
largely removed from HE curriculum as they are of 'no use to the proletarian mass' (Pepper, 1996) and 
were gradually reintroduced after the Cultural Revolution. Nonetheless, science and technology 
disciplines still predominate HE institutions in contemporary China. 
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A second dimension with regard to the means of HE is a combination of a systematic imitation of 
foreign HE models and the pedagogical deployment of ideologies. From a genealogical perspective, a 
society only has a limited number of cultural techniques for the construction and management of its 
HE system and institutions. In the case of HE in modern China, there have been two sets of techniques 
constantly at play — one is to imitate the models of HE in foreign countries, and the other is to direct 
and regulate HE curriculum and pedagogy with certain ideological patterns (Chen, 2002; Orleans, 
1960; Pepper, 1996; Wang, 1966). 
For the former, educators and governors of HE in late Qing favoured the German and Japanese models 
as the two models were believed to emphasise discipline and obedience over individual needs, and the 
dominant ideology was Confucian canon, which was obviously the safest and the most immediately 
available and relevant choice to the maintenance of socio-political order in imperial China (Chen, 
2002); in the first half of Republican China, it was the idea of liberalism and democracy introduced 
from western societies that prevailed in academia, and HE system was under the influence of European 
models first but was later dominated by the American model, which was due to the shifting influence 
and contribution of returned students from first European countries such as Cai Yuanpei and then U.S. 
such as Hu Shi (Wang, 1966); while in the second half, the systematic hybridity remained largely 
unchallenged but in terms of ideology, the Nationalist government intended to lead HE to comply with 
its own party doctrines. There attempts were largely resisted by academia which was then much in 
favour of liberalism and democracy (Yang, 2003). As soon as the Communist party became the ruling 
party of the nation, the HE system was first adjusted to the Soviet model, which led to the 
nationalisation of all HE institutions, abolishment of almost all social science and humanity 
departments and disciplines and emphasis on the production of technocrats. The system was again 
adjusted to the model of Anti-Japanese University, a kind of institution for the Communist party to 
train its own cadres with its own party doctrines, in order to prioritise the cultivation of political 
loyalty over that of other skills and expertise (Pepper, 1996); in the post-socialist period up to now, in 
terms of the model, the HE system may be understood as of greater institutional diversity and of much 
bigger scale, and the tight control of the central government seems to have loosened. In term of 
ideology the influence of party doctrine as the authoritarian ideology becomes less robust but remains 
significant and so far other alternatives are not encouraged among HE institutions. This pattern echoes 
what is known as the neo-liberalism with Chinese characteristics (Harvey, 2005), meaning an increase 
of institution autonomy in the finance and department structure, but under the ongoing supervision of 
the party-state and within the tolerance of the authoritarian ideology which remains largely unchanged 
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and unchallenged. The influence of neo-liberalism will be further discussed in the next Part of the 
thesis. 
Articulatory Struggles 
The past century or so witnessed a most radical and rapid change in political regimes in modem China, 
each with its own principles of higher education. At the first glance, these principles may differ greatly 
from one another, with regard to their respective focuses, means and ends. Nonetheless, a number of 
themes emerge out of the articulation of these principles, which rather cohere across the various 
historical stages. 
I now begin my discussion of the various principles articulated across the history of modem China 
with the late Qing. The emergence of HE in modem China is not a result of an ongoing social 
evolution, but rather an unprecedented historical crisis in diplomacy. As briefly mentioned in Chapter 
1, the late Qing was facing challenging from both exterior wars and massive civil disorders. The 
defeats in a series of wars and the subsequent diplomatic affairs forced the Qing government to reflect 
upon its own education system. As He Bingsong summarises (1931, p. 1, my translation), 
`the so-called "national crisis and deep adversities" is very much related to the defeats in diplomacy. After China's 
defeat in the Opium War and the signing of the Nanjing Treaty in 1842, and the invasion of British and French 
troops into Beijing in 1860, the Qing government was entirely incompetent in coping with the exterior challenges. 
All the diplomatic affairs were handled by a group of interpreters. Without proper training and being materialistic, 
these interpreters more than often turned trivial matters into major negotiations. Therefore, there emerged some 
general understandings in China that first, interpreters were not to be trusted and there was an urgent need to 
produce personnel in interpretation; second, there was an urgent need to produce personnel for ship manufacturing 
and military and naval forces, to defend the nation from the overwhelming forces of the western troops. Therefore, 
the educational reforms of the late Qing started with these two perspectives.' 
Hence, some educational experiments were carried out at small scales, including the establishment of 
several institutions for interpretation, military and naval training, and ship manufacturing since the 
1860s onwards, the establishment of the first modem university, the Imperial University of Peking in 
1898, and the abolishment of the Imperial Examination in 1905. The discourse of education at this 
time, as He argues, was 'to produce personnel to handle the critical moments' (He, 1931, p. 2), 
personnel that is capable of, for instance, handling immediate issues in international affairs, political 
conflicts, reforms in military forces, personnel that is capable of sustaining the life of the falling 
empire for the time being. According to the reformists such as Zhang Baixi, Rong Qin and Zhang 
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Zhidong (1903), the establishment of a new public schooling system and the abolishment of the 
Imperial Examination system were therefore understood as unavoidable, as it was only a new system, a 
new set of educational principles, a new collection of disciplines that could save this nation from its 
humiliations and sufferings. These experiments were not without criticisms and resistance, as there 
were concerns that the introduction of foreign models of education would lead to the degeneration of 
the traditional educational practices in China, and hence threaten the political foundation of the empire. 
But towards the near end of 19th century, even the most conservative members of the government and 
the gentry literates would agree that though the development of the military forces and the growth of 
economy were vital to the immediate survival of a falling empire, the establishment of schools and the 
production of talents were the only means available to national salvation(Liu and Li, 2006; Yang, 
2003b). 
In late Qing, the process of its hegemonic articulation was most visible through such discourses around 
the role of education in national salvation, struggling between the conservatives who defend the 
conventional schooling approach, and the reformists who advocated the establishment of HE 
institutions and a new public education system. The hegemony of the reformist understanding of 
education was achieved upon a recognition shared by the regime and the public of China's severe 
disadvantage in science and technology against its unexpected foreign intruders, and also a quick and 
perhaps inaccurate conclusion that the development of national strength lies in the advancement of 
science and technology and the latter can be achieved by an immediate transplantation of scientific and 
technological institutions after foreign models. Embedded in the establishment of the early HEIs was 
the late Qing's ambitious design to turn the cause of suffering, the technological forces of the intruders, 
into the cure for the damage, into the means of national salvation. 
The Imperial University was patterned upon Japanese universities, and its regulation the Charter of 
Imperial University for Royal Permission (reprinted in Yu and Tang, 1991, p. 339, my translation), can 
be seen as an early attempt to articulate HE principles. It says, 
`(the charter proposes) to establish the Imperial University for recruit graduates from senior schools; and to establish 
a Tongru Yuan (graduate school, to be set in Imperial University) to recruit graduates from the Imperial University. It 
is the principle of the University to follow the imperial decrees, set right course of development and produce general 
talents. The University should take it as its objectives to produce abundant personnel with various specialties for 
employment, and the Tongru College has its aim to advance academia in China on a daily basis, to produce new 
knowledge for publication, to invent new pieces of technology for the use of the public.' 
But, for the late Qing regime, the production of personnel was not merely about the instructions of 
skills and knowledge of a small number of disciplines, the formulation of aptitude — it is also about the 
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instructions of ideologies and socio-political norms, the formulation of attitude. In the case of Imperial 
University, HE should be aimed at promoting Confucian orthodoxy and loyalty towards the empire. 
The Re-scheduled School Charter (reprinted in Yu and Tang, 1991, p. 939, my translation) states, 'it is 
the basic principle for any forms of schools to foster loyalty and filial piety, to be based on Confucian 
Classics, to set the spirits of students pure and upright.' 
Here, the objectives of HE in the late Qing may surface as the production of personnel and the 
production of knowledge, but they are vested with particular focuses — in the short term to produce 
personnel with certain specialties to cope with immediate threats on the empire, and in the long term, 
to catch up with the west in science and technology and to build a larger intellectual reservoir to 
perform efficient service to the Empire. The means to realise such objectives, can perhaps be best 
described a combination of, on the one hand, a resort to the superficial presentation of modern science 
and technology such as military weapons and HEIs, and on the other hand, the pedagogical techniques 
of Confucian orthodoxy that endorses loyalty to the falling empire. But as the later reformers realised, 
the essential disadvantages of China to its foreign intruders, did not lie in its scientific and 
technological backwardness, but in its socio-political structure. The imperial form of governance could 
no longer cope with the challenges of the time, and the Confucian orthodoxy that had been in the 
service of the imperial regime was also incompetent in producing personnel of the modern age. 
The most important transition in education system was completed under the late Qing regime — the 
establishment of modern HE institutions, the formulation of the state schooling system, and the 
abolishment of imperial examination system, all of which lay the foundation for the future 
development of modern education in China (Chen, 2002). However, despite the endeavours of the late 
Qing reformists, the empire could not be simply saved by a small number of HE graduates. The 
challenges to the bureaucratic system of imperial China from both outside and inside led to revolutions 
across the country, and the Qing government was by the time extremely vulnerable after exterior wars 
and civil disorders. The Empire came to its end in 1911. At that time, the number of HE institutions 
was small, and the state schooling system was largely under developed, but the designs and efforts of 
the late Qing government and the public did initiate new discourses upon the significance of HE for 
national survival and development, in particular its practical uses in producing personnel to cope with 
immediate crisis, and this idea remained the central position in throughout the struggles over the 
hegemonic articulation of principles. 
The articulatory struggles in the Republican era are mostly carried out between two streams of 
understandings over the uses of HE, the liberal, represented by then educationists and scholars such as 
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Cai Yuanpei, then Minister of Education and Vice Chancellor of Peking University, and the 
authoritarian, represented by the officials in the Nationalist Government founded in 1927. Between 
1911 and 1927, the country was caught up most of time in civil wars among warlords, and HE 
institutions were able to develop without much government intervention. Liberal reformists were able 
to establish and manage their institutions in ways such that notions of academic autonomy, liberal 
education, the full development of human faculties were most appreciated and fostered. In other 
words, the liberal stance of HE was the hegemonic principles articulated and in circulation. But from 
1927 onwards, the newly founded central government intended to strengthen its control over HE by 
promoting its Party doctrine among HE institutions. HE was requested to follow the design of the 
Nationalist Party, and be primarily in the service of the demands of the Nation state rather than the 
individuals. The authoritarian stance was forcefully resisted by the liberal intellectuals. 
Cai was offered the post of the Minister of Education in 1912. Under his guidance, the Act I of the 
laws governing colleges and universities was announced in 1912, (reprinted in Su, 1985, p. 640, my 
translation), which states that 'the objectives of colleges and universities are to instruct (students) in 
advanced learning, to train knowledgeable experts, and to meet the needs of the nation.' 
According to the Act, HE should ultimately be in the service of the nation. Even a liberal reformist as 
Cai could not afford to establish the full development of human subject, as the liberal understanding of 
HE would prefer, as the primary objective of HE, but rather, it is still the collective good to which HE 
should seek to contribute. Nonetheless, Cai did make great efforts to bring liberalism and democracy 
into university administration since he took the post of the Vice Chancellor of Peking University in 
1917. This was achieved by giving authorities to academics - for instance, the Executive Committee 
was organised among the faculty deans as a legislative body and the Professors' Committee was set up 
as an academic body to supervise curriculum, and fostering academic freedom, which for Cai, is best 
reflected in the widest diversity of commitments and attitudes on campus. The most praised policy of 
`freedom of thoughts' (Vol. 3, p. 271) — that a university should accommodate various schools of 
thoughts and theories - under his chancellorship is still quoted in contemporary discourse of HE 
management in China. 
Cai (1984, p. 177, my translation) also believes that education should first of all focus on the 
development of individuals, and in turn these educated individuals can make contributions to the 
society, and education should not be dictated by any political forces. He claims that 
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`education is to help the taught obtain the abilities to develop the intelligence of mind, and perfect personal traits that 
contribute to the culture of humankind; but education is not to make the taught a special instrument used by others 
who have some other kind of purpose.' 
Cai's emphasis upon nurturing individuality was widely echoed by other liberal educators, such as 
Jiang Menglin, Cai's successor as the principal of Peking University, who argues that HE should foster 
`sound individuals' and contribute to 'the evolution of society'. This emphasis of individuality was 
also shared by Pan Guangdan, then director of Office of Academic Affairs at Qinghua Univerity, who 
argues that HE should foster character building among individuals via liberal education, rather than 
blindly following the needs of the society (see Yang, 2003, p. 67). 
After the Nationalist government was established in 1927, however, the liberal form of HE was 
directly challenged by the newly founded party-state. One of the priorities in the political agenda of the 
Nationalist government was to establish itself as the authoritarian regime for the nation, and this would 
include a tighter control of HE system and the academia. The means immediately available was again, 
not surprisingly, party doctrines. In May 1927, Jiang Jieshi, then the president of the government, 
announced his idea of `partyism education', and to govern the nation by the party and party doctrines. 
This was followed by Hu Hanmin's criticism of the prevailing liberalist understanding of education, 
who argues that 
`education must not be without an underpinning ideology, a sole ideology... We are now guided by the Three 
People's Principles (Nationalism, Democracy and the People's Livelihood) in our endeavour to salvage, construct and 
govern the nation, and hence, education should not be left outside the realm of the nation. Education should therefore 
be subject to the sole guiding ideology, the Three People's Principles, and no others; otherwise, there would be no 
ideology at all'(Hui in Yang, 2003, p. 68, my translation). 
Another historical contingency, the Sino-Japanese War between 1937 and 1945, was used to justify the 
governmental control of HE. Wu Junshen (1983, pp. 23-24), the then Director of HE Office, argued 
that, 
`The state and the society has invested in higher education, so it is necessary to have certain regulation over the 
sector to ensure the objectives of the state and the society. The wartime is of course different — any given country 
would put some constraints over the freedom of any sectors of state affairs. The Chinese higher education system is 
no exception during the wartime. It is therefore sensible and necessary for the government to set up a certain degree 
of regulation over higher education during the wartime'. 
Chen Lifu, then Minister of Education, also supported Wu's argument, and stated that education during 
the wartime should be education for 'the sole purpose of national salvation'(Yang, 2003). It was 
nonetheless difficult to assess to what extent the Nationalist Party was successful in their articulation 
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of HE principles against the liberal educators. But the link between HE and national salvation was 
strengthened during the times of Japanese invasion. For instance, in 1927, a song written to celebrate 
the 20th anniversary of Peking University is still themed upon the encouragement of assiduousness and 
elitism — 'treasure your studentship and do not age in vain; with natural authenticity, all are outstanding 
figures at their best ages; once cultivated, (one will be) youngster with knowledge and integrity', while 
in 1939, the school anthem for Western Union University (which was made of Peking University, 
Qinghua University and Nankai University) was written very much in patriotic tone — 'a lengthy 
humiliation (will end) and a reconstruction will begin at the most difficult time, asking for talents and 
heroes; ... in the face of multiple misfortunes, one is worried with the future of the nation, and should 
be motivated yet patient, and inspired by the preceding sages' 6. 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) became the ruling party of China in 1949, and has since been in 
possession of monopolistic control of the national affairs, with education being a significant part of its 
agenda. With regard to the articulation of HE principles, the CCP, in order to establish its hegemonic 
account of HE, needed to engage with different principles from both outside and inside the party. From 
the outside, the party launched a series of political movements targeting the intellectual community 
from the previous era, in order to establish itself as the sole authority over the directions of educational 
development and policymaking. From the inside, the articulation of HE principles is closely associated 
with the struggles for governing power between the two factions of the CCP, known as the radicals and 
the moderates who held fundamentally different views in the goals and approach to national 
development and in educational policies (Tsang, 2000). The five decades under the Communist regime 
bears witness to a series of tumultuous shifting currents in HE principles and practices, in forms of 
national experiments in HE at an unprecedented scale in human history. 
From the outside, two main approaches can be identified in the Party attempts to replace the prevailing 
belief and practices in the inherited HE system with its own principles - central control over all HE 
institutions and political movements to suppress intellectuals who disagree with the party. In a 'learn 
from the Soviet Union' movement (between 1950 to roughly 1956), the CCP on the one hand 
reconstructed the HE system in accordance with then Soviet model, with emphasis on central control 
and heavy industry, and on the other hand launched concurrent campaign for 'thought reform' among 
the intellectuals. The thought reform intended to promote among the intellectuals a new orthodoxy 
based on the canons of Marx, Lenin and Mao Zedong, and to refute and 'correct' the intellectual 
community's 'misperception' of itself as the modern successor of China's traditional ruling elite 
6 From http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/ALIP:**, accessed on 15th May, 2011, my translation 
76 
(Goldman, 1981). Deputy Education Minister Qian Junrui made an authoritative statement at the very 
start of the Thought Reform that 
`If teachers at HE remain adhering to a reactionary ideology of the Anglo-American bourgeois, or stubbornly to his 
own individualism, objectivism or sectarian views, and not subject to concrete transformation, all efforts in HE 
reforms, such as the departmental adjustment, curriculum reform, improving pedagogy, etc., will be difficult to carry 
out and implement, and all decisions and regulations on HE reform will inevitably become mere paperwork ... (and) 
it will be extremely difficult, even impossible for the country to complete the grand mission to cultivate a large 
number of senior personnel in the service of national construction (Qian, 1951, my translation).' 
In other words, in order to establish the CCP's HE principles hegemonic, to implement an overall 
reconstruction of the HE system in the Soviet model, and to enforce party doctrines on HE pedagogy 
and curriculum, it is important to eliminate resistance from the intellectuals who were possessing a 
hegemonic account of HE dominant in the previous era. Subsequently, the proposed HE reform was 
conducted immediately and swiftly, as discussed in the next chapter. At the end of the First Five Year 
Plan, Mao in 1956 initiated the Hundred Flowers Campaign to ask intellectuals for their opinions on 
the CCP and the national development under the party guidance. Mao was under the impression that 
intellectuals were essential and sympathetic to communist development, but he was astonished at the 
out-pouring of criticisms of the party and its policies by the intellectuals in 1957. With regard to the 
HE reform in particular, the assembled educators at a Beijing symposium of university leaders put 
forward two major complaints. First, without a careful screening of candidates, the drastic rise in 
student number and the enrollment of students with 'uneven attainment' inevitably harmed the quality 
of HE, and the authorities were advised to review whether such a large number of HE graduates were 
necessary to the ongoing national construction. Second, inadequate attention was paid to the socio-
economic situation of the nation, and the legacy of Chinese HE before the recent reform, and to the 
individual character and preference of students (Tsang, 2000). 
However, the Hundred Flowers Campaign was soon ended by Mao, and was followed the Anti-
Rightists Campaign which led to the denouncement and persecution of a large number of intellectuals. 
Criticisms aired by the intellectuals were dismissed. The provisional regulations introduced in 
September 1956 to lessen controls over HE institutions were soon abandoned as they were 'obvious 
mistakes', as students were not enthusiastic about independent study in their free time, and political 
lessons were neglected. Furthermore, the speech given by Jiang Nanxiang, then the principal of 
Qinghua University, was put forward as an authoritative rebuttal from the party, in which he dismissed 
the old system for being costly and elitist, unable to produce a large number of personnel needed for 
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the national construction, and the needs of the state manpower should prioritize over the concerns of 
student individuality. He says 
`objective needs (of the state) come first, individual wishes and special capabilities are born and developed on this 
objective foundation, and individual wishes are not immutable' (Jiang, 1956, my translation). 
After the anti-rightist campaign, there appeared little room to hold resistance to the hegemonic 
principles set by the authoritarian party, and the Soviet-style centralisation and uniformity of 
curriculum and pedagogy became the main feature of HE system, even after the end of the Cultural 
revolution and a decade of countervailing influences from the West during the 1980s. 
From the inside, the Party itself shifted between two sets of principles held by two factions within. The 
radical faction, led by Mao Zedong and others, prioritizes the achievement of political consciousness 
and ideological devotion to communism, and hence continuing class struggles and revolution to 
transform the social relation of production lie at the centre of national development and communist 
politics and ideology should be placed at the core of social life. For this faction, HE, like other sector 
of state schooling, plays a key role primarily in political and ideological development of the Chinese 
people and society, in fostering a love for communist ideals (the making of 'redness'). The radicals 
oppose stratification and elitism in education, and believe that education should be concerned with the 
promotion of social equality and socially oriented goals. 
In comparison, the moderates, led by Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and others at various times, 
prioritize the material and moral improvement of people's lives, and hence economic and technical 
development, rather than political and ideological agenda, should be at the heart of national 
construction. In this regard, HE should be primarily concerned with transferring human input into 
production and supporting the development of science and technology, and HE institutions should be 
devoted to the transmission of skills and knowledge (the making of 'expertise') as well as the moral 
development of the learner. With regard to the concern of social equality, the moderates prefer 
stratification within HE in order to prepare a diversified workforce, and to do so, key schools and 
universities are to be established as model institutions and it was proposed that competitive 
examinations were to be set at every level of schooling to achieve educational selection and the 
preparation of the elite. 
With regard to the articulation of HE principles, the 'two-line struggle' between the radical and 
moderate factions from 1949 onwards has been focusing upon three enduring issues — political/ 
ideological development versus education for economic development, education for social equality 
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versus education for efficiency, 'quantity versus quality' of the intellectual community, to be enlisted 
them in national construction versus their suppression as the enemy of the state. 
Here I provide a brief historical review of the articulatory struggles between the two factions. In the 
first Five Year plan, the party policies seem to balance between the two factions. Lu Dingyi (1950, pp. 
4, 7), the Minister of Propaganda, claimed that 
`our work (of education and culture) focuses on two objectives: first, to move the ownership of education and culture 
industry from a few people to the massive working class; second to integrate education and culture industry into 
serving the objectives of national recovery and development in production and construction...The government of 
People's Republic of China decide to prioritize the development of education for workers and peasants, to produce 
new forms of intellectuals from worker-peasant origins'. 
However, as later experiments showed, the two objectives later proved to be almost incompatible. In 
pursuance of the first aim, HE would have to expand itself to accommodate the large population of 
workers and peasants, and at the same time lower its admission requirements for worker and peasants 
on a massive scale, as their general lack of schooling would be an obstacle to learning at HE level. In 
pursuance of the second aim, HE would need to prioritise quality over quantity to achieve better 
performance if it remained an elite system for the time being and recruited those with better 
educational preparation, students who are likely to come from traditionally advantaged social 
backgrounds, such as urban middle class. 
As this plan prioritises the first objective, the pursuit of the second objective was much less successful. 
In 1955 Li Fuchuan, then chair of the State Panning Commission pointed out in the 'Report of the 1St 
Five-Year Plan' that, firstly (reprinted and translated in Bowie and Fairbank, 1962, p. 511), 
`the shortage of scientific and technological personnel is now apparently a huge obstacle to our advancement. One of 
the major political tasks we must accomplish in the first and second Five-Year Plan is to produce a large number of 
engineering technical staff, skilled workers and personnel with specialties in various domains who are loyal to the 
national and the socialist enterprise and equipped with modern scientific knowledge. 
and therefore, 
`(we) should first focus on the improvement of quality and at the same give considerations to quantity in the 
education of cadres in higher education institutions and middle technical colleges. The tendency to go after numbers 
only and ignore quality is clearly not in the interest of the state plan of construction... Apparently, the quality of 
students can only be improved gradually. Proper conditions for improvement should be created enthusiastically, but 
not with rush or too high a standard, or a forced unity. There, however, must be a bottom limit, such as ... being 
intellectually able to keep up with the class. It is impossible or very difficult to turn students who do not meet these 
minimum requirements into useful construction personnel.' 
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However, this stress on quality was equally short-lived as the previous stress on quantity. After the 
Anti-rightist campaign in 1957, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council issued the 
"Directive on education work' (1958, p.1), which proposed a even more ambitious plan of quantitative 
expansion in education - 'we will spend 15 years also to promote universal higher education, and 
another 15 years to attend to the work of quality improvement'. 
This plan was part of the Great Leap Forward campaign during 1958-1960 led by Mao Zedong. The 
campaign was intended to accelerate the move towards communism. During this brief period, the 
political and ideological function of education was prioritised over acquisition of expertise for 
economic production, and the promotion of social equality was set as a key goal for national 
development, with a substantial expansion of access to education for peasant and working-class 
children. But Mao's ambition was hit by a sharp economic decline and in 1960 he relinquished control 
of national affairs to Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Liu and Deng abandoned the egalitarian approach 
to education, but instead reversed the expansionist policy in education and put forward a dual system, 
with regular schools (full time) for the elite and work-study schools (part time) for the mass. 
Dissatisfied with Liu and Deng's policies, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966 and regained 
control of the party again. During the decade between 1966-1976, Mao returned to the earlier emphasis 
on collectivist production, ideological and political conformity, and egalitarianism, and at the same 
time purged his political opponents and further oppressed the intellectual community. With regard to 
educational policies, the pendulum swung back towards political loyalty and social equality. HE was 
largely at a halt during the period and majority of HE institutions were closed. 
After Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping gained paramount leadership in the CCP two years later 
and immediately started to reverse Mao's policies, and introduced his twin policies of reform and 
opening up to the outside world, which led to a rapid and sustained economic growth and a clear 
improvement in the living standard in the 1980s. Also, the party attempted to reduce its antagonism 
with intellectuals and from the 1990s onwards (Tsang, 2000) the intellectual community appears to 
have largely distanced itself from socio-political realms and instead devoted itself to either academic 
pursuits or joined the think tank to serve the party (Fewsmith, 2008). 
With regard to HE, the CEE was soon resumed to select the elite few for HE, and so was the dual 
system of keypoint institutions and the regular ones. Concerns for social equality were dropped as a 
highly stratified education system prevails, and the persistent major goal of HE has been to produce a 
mix of skilled personnel for the developing economy. But, nonetheless, the demand for political loyalty 
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Principles 
Historical stages Means 
Focuses 	 Ends 
Model 	 Dominating Ideology 
 
Personnel for the 	 German and 
mmediate national crisis 	 Japanese National salvation 	 Confucian canon Late Qing 
 
 
Liberal development of 
individuals, who would 
Knowledgeable experts in turn make 
in the service to the 	 contribution to the 
needs of the nation 	 socio-economic 
development of the 
nation in general 
 
Republican China, 
before 1927 
European and Liberalism and 
American Democracy 
  
Republican China, 
1927-1948 
National development 
under the guidance of 
Personnel in service to 
the newly founded party party doctrines, and  later national salvation 
at the time of foreign 
invasions 
state 
Hybrid 
Nationalist Party 
doctrine 
Social equality in HE 
access, and the 
development and 
political and ideological Anti-Japanese 
consciousness of the 	 University 
people 
Moderate - technocrats 
for national 
reconstruction 
People's Republic 
of China (P.R.C), 
1949-1966, two-line 
struggle Scientific and 
technology 
advancement, the 
improvement of 
material beings of the 
people 
Radical -intellectuals 
from worker-peasant 
background Mao's egalitarianism 
Soviet model 
Technocracy of Soviet 
style 
   
HE in a halt Cultural Revolution, 
    
 
1967-1978 
  
  
Neo-liberalism with Personnel for socialist 
market economy 	 Socialist modernisation Hybrid 	 Chinese 
characteristics 
Post-socialism, 1979 
  
onwards 
 
  
Table 4, Prevailing HE Principles in Different Historical Periods 
persists. In 1998, the Higher Education Law of People's Republic of China was issued. The discourse 
of the use of HE remained largely unchanged in term of personnel production, but it emphases more 
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that HE should serve the needs of economic development. 
'Article 4, Higher education must implement the educational policy of the state, serve socialist modernisation, 
integrate itself with production and labour to train those educated to be builders and successors of the socialist cause 
with all-round development of morality, intelligence and physique.' 
`Article 5, the task of higher education is to train senior specialised talents with innovative spirit and practical 
capability, develop science, technology and culture and promote socialist modernisation'. 
From these two articles, one can see that the principle of HE coheres with the dominant themes in the 
previous decades - the focus of HE remains upon the collective — 'senior specialised talents', and the 
authoritarian ideology remains largely visible in terms such as 'social cause' and 'social 
modernisation', and the emphasis upon science and technology stays prevailing. Some might argue 
Article 4 introduces a discourse of personal development — 'all-round development of morality, 
intelligence and physique', but one should also pay attention to the condition of such development —
the socialist cause. In other words, this is not the kind of 'full and complete development' as the liberal 
tradition would expect, but rather a kind of development that is allowed and endorsed within certain 
ideological pattern, or as I have mentioned earlier in this chapter, under the guidance of `neo-liberalism 
with Chinese characteristics'. 
I hereby make a summary of the prevailing principles in various historical stages in the following 
figure. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I trace the articulatory struggles of HE principles in modern China. This genealogy of 
HE principles concentrates on both the contingent circumstances in which HE principles were 
established in modern China, with its limited cultural techniques, institutions and modes of reflection 
at disposal, and also the articulation of principles that underlies the development and deployment of 
HE, principles that later establish themselves as rationalities of HE in contemporary China, 
rationalities that struggle for hegemonic articulation of the means and ends of HE. The picture that 
emerges is thus a combination of one of HE's improvised assemblages as a device to meet the 
contingencies of a particular historical moment and one of HE as intended projects of government of 
population. 
Despite the discussion above, it would still be difficult for me to even attempt to suggest a HE 
principle that best suits contemporary China. In fact, I intend not to be too closely involved with such 
an ambitious project, which in itself requests another intensive study. My task in this chapter is limited 
to the exploration of the emergence, development and deployment of HE principles of modern China, 
to make these principles visible and intelligible. 
In the regard of alternative principles, Chen (Chen, 2002, pp. 37-38) puts forward a possible direction 
based on his historical review of Chinese HE in the past century. He writes, 
`perhaps one day, the university ideal of Cai Yuanpei — the tradition Confucian and Mencius sprits, combined with 
characteristic building of Britain, specialised and condense research of German and France, civic duties to the society 
of the U.S — can be realised; but before that happens, scholars may be advised to comprehensively engage with how 
to coordinate between western styles and China's traditional sprits, governmental conduct and popular academia, 
humanistic cultivation and vocational preparation, university size and teaching quality, liberal thoughts and the 
harmonious coexistence of different schools, and also the structure, subject, function and duty of university'. 
At this point, I will not further explore the feasibility of Chen's suggestion, but I will return to this 
issue in my final chapter. In the next chapter, I will discuss the construction of HE systems in modern 
China. 
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Chapter 5 The Construction of Systems 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I discuss the articulations of HE principles in modern China, by using a 
genealogical approach. I trace out the difference and similarity among these principles that emerge out 
political struggles, and display certain rationalities of HE that seem to cohere across the historical 
development, around for instance the role of HE serving the needs of the state and individuals, the 
association between HE disciplines and socio-economic growth. In this chapter, I will also make use 
of the same approach to explore the constructions of HE systems in this same historical span from the 
late Qing to the contemporary. My concern is not primarily about the establishment of various 
institutions at different historical stages, but the rationalities behind the emergence of the notion of a 
HE system, and the rationalities that shape the contemporary structural appearance of this system. I 
also look into the formulation of the connection between the pre-HE sector, the primary and secondary 
school system, and the HE sector, and the rationalities that underpin this connection. 
Systems 
By systems, I am referring in this chapter to two respective structures — first, the particular 
characteristics of the HE system marked by a diversity of institutions in terms of their history, 
traditional focuses of disciplines, academic reputation, finance and other socio-political variants such 
as whether they are recognised by the government as keypoint universities; second, the complete state 
education system in modern China, meaning a entirety of the primary and secondary sectors and the 
HE sector, with a particular focus on the connection between the pre-HE sectors and the HE sector. 
With regard to the HE system alone, the focus of my genealogical exploration is upon two issues —
first, the emergence of a system of HE, meaning the historical contingence in which various 
institutions were organised into a fairly coherent structure that can be called 'a system', and the 
organisational rationalities that rise out such a contingence and their effects on later development of 
HE; second, the formation of an internal hierarchy among various HE institutions within a system, in 
terms of their academic, financial organisational and political statuses, and the standard and practices 
that are used to legislate, regulate, diversify, and rank the institutions to make this hierarchy possible 
and sustainable. 
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With regard to the educational system as an entirety, I want to explore the emergence and development 
of public schooling in modern China as a socio-political response to a number of historical 
contingencies, and in particular the rationalities of the connections between the pre-HE sector and the 
HE sector. As the following analysis will show, HE has always been prioritised over the primary and 
secondary sectors in modern China — not only did the establishment of HE institutions precede public 
schools, but also it enjoyed sustained privilege in the form of investment and status over the regular 
sector. Due to the insistence on education as a response to immediate crisis, HEIs, to use a pertinent 
turn of phrase, were given priority, while the regular sector was viewed as a turgid, amorphous, overly 
long-term developmental matiere subtending HEIs. Furthermore, it bears noting once more that the 
establishment and development of the regular sector in China was to better serve the former, the 
production of properly qualified candidates for HE. 
The Emergence and Development of HE System 
From the very beginning, the government initiatives in education in China did not begin with the 
bottom of an educational hierarchy but rather the top — a number of special colleges and a university 
were created before any serious planning of a comprehensive regular education sector. HE was 
prioritised as it was believed to be able to perform more immediate and relevant services to 
governments. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, in coping with the diplomatic crisis starting from 1860, the 
Interpreter's College was set up in 1862 to provide language training for future diplomats. Similar 
language institutes were set up in Shanghai, Guangzhou and Hubei, and two other forms of 
institutions were also set up in a similar manner — one is College for Ship Manufacture and 
Conducting, and the other was Army College. After the traumatic defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 
1895, the language institutes and special colleges were deemed as insufficient in personnel production 
(He, 1931). For instance, Li Duanfeng in his Advocate of School Promotion pointed out five reasons 
why the early institutions failed, 
`one, the institutions primarily teach western languages, but does not cover the principles of proper 
governance and origins of economic development; two, subjects of studies are not specified and students 
are not specialised; three, the institutions are not equipped with proper facilities and do not send members 
abroad for learning, and therefore the education offered ended being impractical; four, students are mostly 
grown-ups rather than young pupils; five, there are only a few institutions in the whole country, with a few 
dozen students in each one. Even if every student was qualified for service, it was far from being sufficient 
to govern the country, not to mention the fact that students are mostly underachievers. (summarised by He, 
1931, p. 530, my translation).' 
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In the light of my discussion of HE principles in the previous chapter, one can see Li's criticisms are 
targeted upon the principle of the early HE in these institutions — the means of HE, the teaching of 
western languages alone, the insufficient teaching resources, and the impractical contents of such 
education, the ends of HE, the small scale of HE that failed to produce a personnel large enough for 
governmental needs, and the focuses of HE, adults rather than youngster, and a lack of specialisation in 
training. For Li, these experiments were not sufficiently higher education of a kind that would fulfil the 
needs of the government, neither were these institutions sufficient in their sizes or ability to produce 
personnel that was most urgently needed. The late Qing government subsequently decided to build 
modern universities. In 1898, a proposal for a metropolitan university was made, permitted and carried 
out, and a graduate school was also included. This leads to the establishment of the Imperial 
University, later transformed into Peking University, and several other metropolitan universities were 
established before the end of the Qing Empire. However, all these modern universities were invariably 
elitist in nature as their students were mainly aristocrats and government officials and their curriculum 
only include a few modern disciplines. The overall achievements of these universities were regarded as 
extremely low, which is reflected in the quote of Zeng Pu at the beginning of this thesis. 
The National Provisional Educational Conference convened by Cai Yuanpei in 1912 listed three targets 
for HE in China —`it needed to be built into a well-articulated system, extended to reach all parts of the 
country, and brought up to modern standards' (Cohen and Goldman, 1992, pp. 369-370). This was a 
significant moment for HE, because, first, as a discourse it reached a higher degree of abstraction as a 
unique form/stage of educational activities subject to certain standards; second, HE could be 
established as a coherent and integrated national system, led and regulated by certain administrative 
organisations. The establishment of a national system would make it possible and perhaps more 
convenient for various political forces to exert their influences. As the subsequent development of HE 
in modern China shows, the discourse of a HE system is not a mere linguistic convenience for a cluster 
of institutions; on the contrary, it is the most useful administrative unit and tool for governmental 
controls over all forms of HE activities. 
Some failed attempts of Cai Yuanpei can help to illustrate my argument. Despite Cai Yuanpei's 
endeavour to foster academic freedom in the early years, the government's attempts to monitor and 
control the entire HE system never stopped. An important step in the securing of central government 
leadership over HE was taken in the form of a newly ascendant nationalism in China — an 'educational 
rights recovery' campaign, a campaign that aims to eliminate the influence of Catholic education 
approaches on HE pedagogy and curriculum in private universities. As a result, all foreign-founded 
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Christian colleges and universities were requested to register with the Ministry of Education, and the 
heads of such schools or colleges must be Chinese nationals. This campaign was largely successful, 
and 
`by 1933 all the major Christian universities and colleges had completed registration with the Nationalist 
government...Thus, in spite of local problems ... these institutions were brought into the formal structure 
of China's educational system. (Cohen and Goldman, 1992, p. 389)' 
It was after such a forced integration was completed that we then could claim the birth of a system. 
The naming process was only a start. It was the integration that mattered. In the case of this HE system 
under the Nationalist regime, we have seen that first an abstract system of HE was firstly established 
with certain aims and standards, and gradually this abstract system as a discourse was turned into an 
institutional organisation by including the institutions that it named and targeted. Once this abstract 
system was integrated into the state machine as a public sector, it was unavoidably subject to 
government intervention and regulations, so were all the institutions that were included in that very 
system. 
Another policy also contributed to this process — the strengthening or creating of national universities 
across the country. These universities were brought under the direct supervision of the Ministry of 
Education. Qinghua University, for example, was designated a national university in 1928, and soon it 
was transferred from a preparatory school for US colleges into a regular four-year university, and was 
placed under the sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. In 1931, the University of Chengdu, 
Sichuan University and Chengdu Normal College were amalgamated into the National Sichuan 
University, and it was also ordered by the Nationalist government that the salt revenue of Sichuan 
Province government should be appropriated for this new university. The development of national 
universities also gives rise to a new rationality of HE administration, that there should be a number of 
national institutions that are subject to the direct supervision of a central government, in order to set up 
examples of HE principles and practices that are authorised and supported by central governments, and 
hence establish some ground for governmental authority. Hence, nationalizing universities becomes a 
useful approach to enforce governmental influence on HE. The effect of this tool reached its peak 
under the Communist regime when all HE institutions were nationalised and placed upon central 
control, and it was not until the 1980s that local governments and universities themselves were given 
more administrative powers. 
By the 1930s, there were mainly three kinds of institutions recognised by the government as 
universities — National universities, Provincial Universities, and Registered Private Universities. The 
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first kind was supported by the National Government, the second by Provincial Government, both of 
which were under public control. Over 90% of the total expenditure of these institutions was supplied 
by the government, and their Presidents were appointed by a public authority. In comparison, only 
three private universities received public funding in the year 1930-1931 and over 50% of their 
operating revenue was derived from tuition fees(Becker et al, 1932a). Most historians of education in 
China would agree under the Nationalist regime there emerged a HE system of notable scale and 
diversity (Chen, 2002; Hayhoe, 1996; Pepper, 1996). 
The Emergence of Public Schools 
Before a proposal of a state schooling system, the majority of educational activities had been carried 
out in private, in forms of Sishu (home schools with private tutors) and Shuyuan (examination halls). 
The general philosophy of this educational strategy, as Zhang Zhidong pointed out, was that 
government throughout Chinese history had only recruited ready-made talents from the public but 
made no attempts to educate the uneducated. Zhang then further argued that the Imperial Examination, 
though being capable of serving the government at peaceful times, must be subject to substantial 
changes at that critical stage of a national crisis. A directive for a state schooling system was issued in 
1904, modelled after the Japanese system, which transferred local shuyuan into modern schools, and 
the Imperial Examination was officially brought to an end at 1905 in order to give way to the new 
system(He, 1931). 
Judged by mere number, Late Qing was perhaps more successful in the promotion of a schooling 
system than in the building of modern HEIs. In 1904, the number of schools was 4,222, with 92,169 
students, and in 1909 the number of schools increased to 52,34, with 1,560,270 students (King, 1911). 
However, it was still of a small scale. The growth of the regular sector under the Nationalist regime 
was also limited. There were 8,839,434 pupils in primary school in the 1929-1930 academic year, 
approximately 21% of 41.4 million children of the 6-9 age cohort. In 1949, the enrolment rate of 
primary school was 25.0%, the secondary only 3.0% (Pepper, 1987a, p. 186). A full expansion of the 
regular sector would have to wait till the 1950s under Mao's guidance of Educational Revolution. 
The emergence of a state schooling system in the late Qing was accompanied by an increasingly 
prevalent understanding that the recruitment of intellectuals should expand from the royal elites to the 
general public. It was less due to an increasing awareness that the education of general public was vital 
to the nation building, but more to a concern with a lack of supply to the top of the educational 
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hierarchy, not to mention a space for proper selections. On August 4th, 1898, Sun Jiading, then Minster 
of Education Affairs (Guanxue Dachen), asked for the Emperor's permission for the urgent 
establishment of state schools in five cities to ensure a supply of candidates for the Imperial University, 
Emperor Guangxu granted his permission in his reply as this plan would help to 'recruit young 
scholars in and outside the capital in education and promote general talents for the selection of the 
Imperial University' and therefore these schools 'should go parallel with the Imperial University and 
fulfil the intentions of talent fostering (qouted in Qian, 1999, p. 46, my translation). 
The example of Tianjin University also sheds some light on the early connection between HE 
institutions and the pre-HE schools. 
' It was realised that middle schools must be established throughout the Provinces as feeders to the 
Tienstin (Tianjin) University and provincial college. Dr. Tenny, president of the university, began their 
organisation in some of the fu and chou (zhou) cities, and by the spring of 1904 had 14 such schools 
organised, with an average of about 50 students in each school.... The Chinese examination halls (shu 
yuan) were reconstructed for these middle schools, and as a rule are very suitable and commodious. 
Former students of the Tientsin University were intrusted (entrusted) with the teaching in these schools, 
and were very successful, often showing much enthusiasm in the work.(King, 1911, p. 41)' 
This example of Tianjin University exemplifies the transformation of an old private system to a new 
public schooling system (shuyuan to middle schools), and also the role of HE in the creation of this 
very new system. From the beginning, HE did not just precede the establishment of a state schooling 
system, but also created a demand of the public school system — on the one hand, the state schooling 
system was to ensure the regular supply of talents to be selected and subsequently serve the nation, and 
supplied the state schooling system with teaching faculty. An initial alliance between HE and the state 
schooling was therefore formed, but this was only one single case rather than an example of a massive 
practice. Nonetheless, the rationality established was of an educational hierarchy in terms of the 
functions of sectors— the pre-HE sector serving the HE sectors, public schools producing and preparing 
candidates for the selection of universities and colleges. As we can see from the following discussion, 
this rationality has not been subject to serious challenge ever since. 
Therefore, the emergence and development of the pre-HE sector was more to do with supplying the 
HE sector with candidates than the cultivation of a broad range of citizens. This rationality still rang 
true under the Communist Regime. A meeting of the chairmen of the various administrative-region 
cultural and education committees set out the major tasks to coordinate educational development with 
the 1st Five Year Plan, including 'the appropriate development of secondary schools in order to 
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guarantee the quality and numbers of students for the tertiary level' (Pepper, 1987a, p. 208). From the 
end of 1950s onwards, continuous efforts were made to further expand primary and secondary 
schooling, mostly with the support of Mao Zedong himself. After his political triumph over the 
moderate faction, as mentioned in the previous chapter, he continued to be devoted to expanding the 
pre-HE sector. Mao's educational evolution, and the later Cultural Revolution, shifted the focus of 
education from the small group of technocrats to a general population, hence the pre-HE sector 
enjoyed tremendous development while the HE sector was largely suspended. However, it would be 
mistaken to take the Mao era as a discursive continuity rather than a rupture. Post-Mao, all his 
achievements in the development of the regular sector were eradicated from the public discourse. 
However, soon after his death and the moderate faction led by Deng Xiaoping came into power, the 
secondary section in particular was subject to rapid reduction. In 1983, Jiang Nanxiang, then Minister 
of Education, in his response to the criticism about the soaring competition for university admission 
after a sharp reduction of senior secondary schools, seemed to have already taken it as an established 
fact that 'the purpose of secondary schooling was to prepare for college (Jiang in Pepper, 1987b, p. 
586)'. This belief still holds true in contemporary China, which I will return to in my discussion of HE 
subjects in later chapters. 
The Privilege of HE 
The discussion above displays an organisational privilege of the HE sector in terms of its relationship 
with the pre-HE sector —schools are designed to produce and prepare candidates for the selection of 
HE institutions. Another dimension of the privilege of the HE sector is the fact that it has received 
more attention from the government and educators alike than the pre-HE sector. Cai Yuanpei, as the 
most influential figure in education in the early Republican era, was also more devoted to HE than the 
public school system. In a number of occasions he mentioned a conversation between then Deputy 
Minster of Education Fan Weilian and himself (quoted in Fu, 2005, my translation), 
`I was holding the opposite view of educational cycle. Fan said "if primary schools are under-developed, 
how could we have good middle schools? Without good middle school, how could we have good 
universities? So, step one should be the regulation and development of primary schools". I said, "without 
good universities, where can we find teaching faculty for middle schools? Without good middle schools, 
where can we find teaching faculty for primary schools? So, step one should be the regulation and 
development of universities".' 
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Also, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the radical faction of the Communist regime led by Mao 
emphasised the public school system, but the moderate faction emphasised the HE sector, and it is 
largely the influence of the latter that shapes the outlook of HE in contemporary China. 
This largely coherent emphasis on HE is evidenced in government investment on various educational 
sectors. As Wang (1966, p. 364) listed, 
`In 1931, for instance, the proportion of the yearly expenses per pupil in Chinese primary schools to that 
in Chinese universities was about 1:200 as compared with 1:8 in European countries. In 1936 the 
expenditure on higher education was ten times larger than in 1912, with almost the same number of 
students; the expenditure on secondary education increased by less than ten times during that period, 
with a 500 per cent increase in the student body; the expenditure on primary education increased six 
times, with a 600 per cent increase in the student body. Thus the stress on higher education continues.' 
This imbalance was continued under the Communist regime. The following chart shows a distribution 
of government funding in the two sectors. 
Year Education Investment 
HE 	 pre-HE 
Education Infrastructure 
HE 	 pre-HE 
1953-1957 29.87 70.13 52.37 46.73 
1958-1963 29.84 70.16 44.21 55.79 
1964-1965 23.51 76.49 33.45 66.55 
Table 5, Distribution of Government Investment in HE and Regular Education, from Fu (2005, p. 510) 
Yang (2003) argues that in all developed countries, the share of the HE should not be higher than 20%, 
but the proportion had been much higher than this figure, in particular in education infrastructure 
investment - the HE sector was apparently a higher priority. The imbalance was perhaps more obvious 
in the yearly funding of students. In 1952, the funding among primary, secondary and HE was on the 
ratio of 1:15: 112. Yang argued that normally the ratio will be lower in more developed countries - in 
the 1980, this ratio in the UK was 1:1.94: 6.25, and in France 1: 1.78 : 2.67. 
Year Primary Secondary HE Ratio 
1952 7.40 110.48 830.00 1 	 : 14.93 : 112.16 
1953 15.28 83.91 958.30 1 : 5.49 : 62.72 
1962 18.70 78.71 645.10 1 : 4.21 : 34.50 
1965 19.96 88.89 917.68 1 : 4.45 : 45.96 
Table 6, Yearly Expense on Students (in RMB), from Ministry of Education (1984, p. 4) 
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Another example that indicated the priority of HE over the regular sector is how, during the Sino-
Japanese War between 1937-1945, HE was kept from severe interruption through great endeavours of 
the government and HEIs themselves. As Sun (1992, pp. 411, 414) described, 
`by 1938 the academic community had accepted the continuity of its education task as essential for 
China's future. In the midst of major military upheavals and population dislocation, the leading 
universities and colleges chose the strategy of moving to safer locations in the interior. The migration of 
dozens of institutions of higher education — involving the various stages of planning the move, negotiating 
for quarters in the target locations, the financing and logistics of physically moving faculty, students, staff, 
books and equipment, and the preparations necessary for the travellers en route — was a stirring saga in 
itself. Its execution demanded determination, organisation skill, coordination and adaptability. The 
academic community accomplished it within the first year of the war and the process brought modem 
education into the less-developed hinterland. 
... No one questioned the propriety of expending human energy and material resources in such long-
distance, large-scale moving: clearly the institutions of higher education were a most valuable national 
resource and therefore, as a matter of course, must be saved so far as circumstances permitted.' 
The Shaping of a Structural Hierarchy 
In this section, I look into the process by which a structural hierarchy in the educational system came 
into being. By a structural hierarchy, I mean a descending order in the size of primary, secondary and 
higher education, an educational pyramid. This is achieved by two steps — first, the connection 
between the pre-HE sector and the HE sector needs to be established, a connection that links the 
production of HE candidates in the former to the selection and admission in the latter; second, the 
shaping and adjustment of the accommodation capacities of various sectors, to establish an educational 
pyramid and to intensify the competition for the next level of education, and eventually the access to 
HE. 
Under the Nationalist regime, according to the Act I of the laws governing colleges and universities in 
1912, graduates from middle school could directly go to HEIs for the preparatory courses without 
examination, and those who completed the preparatory courses could immediately continue their study 
in regular HE courses. But it would be mistaken to take it as a sign of a smooth transition between the 
two sectors, not to mention the introduction of an examination procedure by the modified Act I in 
1917. In reality, the transition from the regular sector to the HE sector was far more difficult than one 
would expect. First, there were a small number of the positions available; for instance in 1928 there 
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were only around 90 students recruited by Qinghua University(Su, 2000, p. 160). Second, the 
academic requirement of HEIs were claimed to be too high; Shanghai Jiaotong University used the 
standard of its own affiliated middle school in its admission examinations, making it extremely 
difficult for students from other schools to match the requirement(Yang, Zhu and Zhang, 1992). 
Furthermore, there was an inconsistency between middle school curriculum and examination contents; 
for instance English was used as the examination language but it was not requested as the instruction 
language for middle school education (Yang, Zhu and Zhang, 1992, p. 574). Though a centralised 
college entrance examination and a standard curriculum were later experimented with by the 
Nationalist government to improve the consistency between two sectors, they were all largely 
unsuccessful because of the resistance of the students and faculty and the interruption of the Sino-
Japanese war (Pepper, 1996). 
The connection between the pre-HE sector and the HE sector was made possible under the Communist 
regime by two approaches, first the introduction of a centralised approach of supervision over 
education, by using standard national curriculum and a unified college entrance examination, and 
second a repeated adjustment of the size and shape of the two sectors via robust educational policies. 
In December 1950 the People's Education Press was set up by the Ministry of Education and 
Publication Administration Office to take charge of the composition of a standard curriculum for all 
subjects in the regular education sector. In April 1954, a 12-year standard curriculum was completed. 
Also, the college entrance examination as a form of national and standardised selection mechanism 
was introduced in 1952 and was promoted on a national scale from 1959 onwards (Baidu, 2008). 
Though both practices were interrupted during the cultural revolution, the curriculum replaced by 
Mao's political writings and the entrance examination suspended, they were both resumed immediately 
afterwards, and remain largely unchanged till today. The combination of these two practices made it 
possible for the regular sector to correspond to the requirement of the HE sector and therefore much 
easier for teachers and students to make proper preparations for the entrance examination. But at the 
same time, this would indicate a change in the power relation in two perspectives: first, by creating the 
bond between the two sectors, the standard curriculum entrance examination, the state immediately 
takes away the selection authority from HEIs; at the same time HEIs, via the introduction of standard 
curriculum and examinations, penetrated into the regular sector and created a new set of pedagogical 
practices. This will be further discussed in the next two chapters. 
I now discuss the step in the shaping of structural hierachy. Compared with its predecessors, the 
Communist regime was much more ambitious and to some extent more successful in the construction 
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and development of the regular education sector in term of state planning and management. This 
massive expansion in the regular sector was made possible by the participation of the public - min-ban 
(run by local residents in Communes) schools predominated in the rural areas. The primary objective 
of these schools was literacy training and partly political as in propagandizing land reform and other 
event topics. The number of students in primary school rose from 24 million to 64 million from 1949 
to 1957. However, this rapid growth was still regarded as insufficient. Mao wrote at the end of 1955 
that 
... the scale and speed of China's industrialisation and the scale and speed of the development of science, 
culture, education, public health and so on can no longer be carried out entirely as was first intended; these 
should all be appropriately expanded and accelerated. (translated and quoted in Pepper, 1987a, p. 212)'. 
According to the new twelve-year programme for agricultural development adopted in 1956, the goal 
of universal compulsory primary schooling in rural China was to be realised within 7 to 12 years. This 
was an ambitious plan — the gross enrolment rate of primary school in 1956 was only 52%, and 78% of 
the total population was still illiterate. However, the development of the regular sector was sustained 
and accelerated in the following two decades under Mao's guidance. In 1976, the gross enrolment rate 
in primary school was 95% and slightly dropped to 93% in 1979, and the net enrolment rate of 
secondary school in 1979 was 46%, much higher than other developing countries at that time. 
But it would be mistaken to treat that this pyramid pattern of transition rates as a result of a natural 
development. In fact, it was again a result of an intended adjustment. The attempt to build up proper 
connections between sectors began in 1953, as Zeng Zhaolun (1953, p. 12)summarised the 
achievement in HE within the first three years of the new regime, 
`the new school system on the one hand singled out the importance of education for the working people 
and the worker and peasant cadres in all grades of schools, and on the other hand stresses that proper 
connections and relations should be maintained between all grades and categories of schools, the new 
pedagogical system preserves harmony and unity within the educational system'. 
In reality, such harmony and unity was still difficult to achieve. At that time, primary school was far 
from being able to accommodate the total school-age population, but secondary school offered more 
positions than the number of graduates from primary schools, and yet again the supply of secondary 
school graduates was insufficient to meet the demands of HEIs. In 1956, the majority of the graduates 
of senior secondary schools were able to enrol in HEIs, and so could graduates from junior second 
proceed to the senior level. In this regard, Zhou Enlai, then Premier, stated in the First Report on the 
Work of Government, 
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`After liberation... higher education institutions and secondary specialised schools recruited a large 
number of students. This gave rise to the situation in recent years that almost all those graduating from 
senior secondary schools could proceed to higher education, and most graduates from junior second were 
able to continue to senior level ... But, it should be pointed out that this situation was temporary and 
abnormal, and it will gradually become normal after some proper arrangement of the state. This year, 
higher education institutions and secondary specialised schools will reduce their enrolments according to 
the plan... Therefore, from now on, on the one hand there will be more graduates proceed to higher 
level; on the other hand there will be more graduates from primary, junior and senior secondary schools 
who take part in labour work. In this way, it is therefore possible to increase the number of labour 
workers with education and culture, and to expand the group of intellectuals. This will be a normal and 
healthy phenomenon, and will also be a long lasting phenomenon from now on' (Zhou, 1959, p. 516). 
Zhou's statement was particularly important in understanding the discourse of the connection 
between two sectors. A normal system, according to ZhOtt, would be a system that was capable of 
educating, selecting and distributing manpower, and proper connections between all grades would 
mean both a process of inclusion and exclusion, and as educational needs among different 
individuals are bound to differ, an educational system should also be designed to divide the 
population and select people for different educational ends and social positions. Hence, an 
educational hierarchy among grades must be established, not only because it was useful, but it was 
normal, the way it supposed to be - the society needed not only intellectuals, but also worker and 
peasants with proper educational preparation. 
Another change to the shape of the hierarchy began in the immediate aftermath of the Cultural 
Revolution. Secondary schools were subject to a sudden reduction, as the previous policies in 
educational revolution 'were said not only to have tried to universalize schooling prematurely but 
also to have sought to unify education in a manner inappropriate to China's needs and level of 
economic development' (Pepper, 1991, p. 579). The new policies led to a drastic and deliberate 
decline in the number of secondary schools, in particular senior secondary. Within the five years 
between 1978 to 1982, the number of students in secondary schools decreased by one third - 20 
millions from 65 million 45 million, and approximately two thirds in senior secondary (Pepper, 
1991, p. 581). 
The educational hierarchy was further narrowed and sharpened as the net result of this new stage of 
educational development. Educational resources were to be concentrated for the few, while more 
would receive less. The competition was hence made even fiercer. 
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The Hierarchy within the HE System 
In this section, I will explore the shaping of an internal hierarchy within the HE system, among various 
HE institutions, and the rationalities that are introduced to diversify and rank these instructions, the 
approaches by which a hierarchy is understood as reasonable and necessary. 
As mentioned previously, the system took shape in the 1930s under the Nationalist regime, a system of 
high institutional diversity with various academic objectives. But it was nonetheless a small system, 
and it would be very difficult to claim the existence of a hierarchy — some private universities, such as 
Nankai and Yanjing, were equally competitive, if not more so, as the national universities, such as 
Peking University and Qinghua University (Chen, 2002). 
It was actually under the Communist Regime that an internal hierarchy began to take shape. This was 
first the result of two strategies — first the reconstruction of HEIs in the Soviet Model, and second, the 
construction of a dual track between the regular institutions and the key institutions. 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the principles of HE under the new Communist regime directs 
that HE was to serve two objectives, the cultivation of intellectuals of working class background, and 
the production of personnel for the national reconstruction and socio-economic development. The 
attempts made in realising these two objectives lead to two sets of educational policies, as my 
discussion in the previous chapter shows. 
The first set of policies, the reorganisation of existing HEIs in the Soviet model was conducted in the 
belief that a Soviet system would better serve the second objective. Accordingly, all higher education 
institutions were reorganised into three types — first, comprehensive universities, formed by arts and 
science departments from large universities with all liberal arts college eliminated; second, 
polytechnics, with a number of applied science faculties in a single institution, formed by the 
remaining departments, schools and colleges of the old universities or merged with existing institutions 
of the same kind; and third, specialised colleges, each with an individual faculty, built under the 
assumption that narrower specialisation provided the most efficient training. By December 1953, the 
reorganisation was largely completed. The system now had 14 comprehensive universities, 39 
polytechnic and 129 specialised colleges. 
Though Mao himself wanted to eradicate the differences among these three types of institutions, he 
might have succeeded, it was exactly this categorisation that the HE expansion in the 1999 was based 
on, with comprehensive universities at the very top, institutions upgraded from polytechnics and 
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specialised colleges at the second tier, and with newly established two-year colleges at the very 
bottom. In other words, this categorisation of institutions along the Soviet model later becomes a 
rationality to diversify and rank institutions. 
The second set of communist polices led to some new forms of institutions being introduced to the 
system in pursuance of the first objective, including people's universities for the HE sector and 
worker-peasant short course middle schools for the secondary sector. These two forms of institutions 
are aimed at creating an alternative route for educational transition to the traditional one that is 
considered by the radical faction as elitist and bourgeois, to make sure that students from working class 
background, presumably disadvantaged in their academic preparation and performance in schools, can 
have their own route of educational progression. Qian Dunsheng (Qian, 1949, my translation) stated in 
his summary of the First National Conference on Higher Education in 1949, 
`This new education is national, scientific and public...its aims to serve the people, primarily 
workers, peasants and soldiers, and the current revolution battles and constructions... (we will) 
establish people's universities, and produce personnel for construction. This is the starting point 
of a completely new higher education system. (We will) at the same time establish some worker-
peasant short course middle schools to transfer adult cadres of worker-peasant origin to 
intellectuals.' 
In 1950, the only people's university, China Renmin University was established as the first people's 
university in China, and later became one of the most prestigious universities in China. The worker-
peasant short course middle schools, in comparison, were rather short-lived. It stopped recruiting new 
students in 1955. In 1958, there came another round of quantitative expansion. Number of HEIs 
shapely increased from 227 in 1957 to 1,065 in 1958. Moreover, a new forms of HEIs was introduced 
to the system — 23,500 spare-time 'Red and expert' (political loyalty and skills) colleges and part-work 
part-study universities had been set up by autumn 1958. These new institutions were run by local 
factories and communes for adult workers and peasants, without government support in funding and 
teaching faculty. It was not surprising to see that the majority of them did not survive the period of 
consolidation and the upcoming economic hardship. In other words, the educational strategy put 
forward by the radical faction of the CCP was largely unsuccessful. 
In comparison, another strategy of educational development was able to establish itself as a stable 
institutional stream and also a discourse of educational righteousness - the model of key institutions. 
The concept of key institutions was not a new invention. It can be traced back to the 'central school', 
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which was promoted in 1942 in Yen based on the Communist Party's economic development strategy 
during the wartime — concentrating manpower and material for the purpose of economic construction 
in the impoverished rural base areas. Key schools in the 1950 simply referred to the most prestigious 
schools from the Republican era. But it was no until the 1960-1966 period that the system was 
developed in a concerted fashion throughout the country. Premier Zhou Enlai (Zhou, 1959, p. 517) 
explains the rationality of keypoint public schools in the First Report on the Work of Government, 
`full-time regular schools at all levels should make it their constant and fundamental task to raise the 
quality of teaching and studying; in the first place, we must devote relatively more energy to perfecting a 
number of "key" schools so as to train specialised personnel of higher quality of the state and bring about 
a rapid rise in our country's scientific and cultural level'. 
The new Education Minister Yang Xiufeng made the point more explicitly — the mass-level work-study 
schools must be treated separately from the quality-oriented full-day schools, as this division could 
help to utilize reasonably the limited resources and thus make it possible to popularize education while 
simultaneously raise standards. The elite keypoint schools were therefore institutionalised at the apex 
of the education hierarchy at every level of the full-time school system from kindergarten though 
university. The selection of keypoint schools was entirely based on a narrow form of examination-
based meritocracy — 
`Schools with the highest pass rates from junior to senior middle and on to college were designated as 
keypoints ensuring that they would receive the best teachers, the most generous fmancial appropriations, 
the best equipment, and a continuing supply of the best primary and junior middle graduates. Students 
who scored highest on their secondary school entrance exams were channelled into the first category 
schools, and so on down the scale of academic achievement' (Yang qouted in Pepper, 1987b, p. 422). 
The function of work-study schools was therefore defined as the production of talent for the 
countryside, and the urban-based keypoint system was primarily responsible for the production of 
talent for higher learning. Therefore, the keypoint system emerged as an exclusive institutional stream 
of college preparation leading to an elite route of learning, and in discourse a superior form of learning 
leading to higher reward and better life chances. If the division between full-day school and work-
study school was not clearly a sign of elite-mass dichotomy, it proved that the division between the 
keypoint system and the regular system was undeniably so. The influences of this division on students 
will be further discussed in the following chapter. 
The rationality of keypoint schools also applies to HE institutions. As mentioned previously, the HE 
inherited from the Republican era does not have a distinction between keypoint and regular 
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institutions, only diversifies according to their respective governing bodies, therefore, national, 
provincial and private institutions. The idea of `keypoint university' as such was first introduced in The 
Resolution on keypoint HE institutions and the scope of expert work, and named 6 universities as the 
first group of keypoint universities — China Remin (People's) University, Peking Univerity, Qinghua 
University, Beijing Agriculture University, Beijing Medical University, and Harbin Institute of 
Technology. This list includes two traditional universities known for their academic reputation, Peking 
and Qinghua, a university that is designed to serve the interest of the working class, Renmin University 
(which was intended to recruit those from working class background), and three other universities in 
each of the disciplines that are regarded as most essential to the development of the new nation. The 
rationality behind this selection coheres with the establishment of keypoint public schools for the 
secondary education sector — that the new nation only has a limited resources at its disposal after a 
long period of warfare, and needs to focus what is available on a few institutions to produce personnel 
of the highest achievement for the national reconstruction. 
In The Decision to Designate A Group of Keypoint HE Institutions issued at 22th March 1959, the 
number on the list rose to 16, and on 28th August the same year, 4 other institutions in medicine and 
military affairs were added, at the time when China was in diplomatic conflict with the Soviet Union. 
By 1960, a number of specialised colleges such as Beijing Petroleum University, Beijing Geological 
Institute, the Central Conservatory of Music, Beijing Institute of Physical Education were added to the 
list. By 1963, the number of keypoint HE institutions amounted at 68. 
During the Cultural Revolution that follows, the keypoint system was completely dismantled, and 
almost the entire HE sector was not functioning, except a small number of institutions which accepted 
students from the Recommendation route. Once the Cultural Revolution ended and the moderate 
faction of the CCP came into power, this keypoint system was reinstalled immediately. Using the same 
discursive markers as in 1958's policy of 'Walking on two leg', Deng Xiaoping (1977b, p. 1) stated in 
his speech at the Science and Education Work Forum in 1977, 
`Education should still walk on two legs. In terms of higher education, regular universities and colleges 
are one leg, and work-study universities and spare-time university are the other leg; walking on two legs. 
Among regular universities and colleges our strength should be concentrated on a number of key 
universities. Key institutions should not be limited to the jurisdiction of Ministry of Education, but 
should also be operated by various provinces, cities, self-regulated regions and various industrial 
Ministries.' 
And also his widely circulated speech "Respect Education, Respect Personnel', 
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`Education should be walking on two legs, one on popularising, the other on quality improvement. We 
are to have keypoint primary schools, keypoint secondary schools and keypoint universities. We are to 
concentrate the most competent in keypoint secondary schools and universities. (Deng, 1977a, pp. 4-5)' 
In 1978, the State Council listed 88 institutions as 'National Keypoint Universities'. By then, these 
national keypoint institutions were only set as models in academia, but soon the notion of keypoint 
began to be used as a rationality to diversify governmental investment within the HE system. In 
1984 the State Council approved in the 7th Five Year Plan to prioritise the construction of 10 
keypoint HE institutions and the investment in 15 others . In the 9th Five Year Plan, the '211 
Project' was introduced in 1993 and implemented in 1995, and the '985 Project', started in 
1999-2001. The 211 Project approved funding from a pool of RMB 30 billion for 100 universities 
to improve teaching quality and build a network of institutions aiming at the production of high 
skilled professionals for economic development. Priority was therefore given to the development 
of capacities in engineering and technological sciences, physical sciences and biological sciences. 
The 985 Project offered additional funding of RMB 14 billion to some 36 tertiary education 
institutions, and in the first funding phase nine institutions were given world-class university 
status: Peking, Qinghua, Zhejiang, Fudan, Nanjing, Shanghai Jiao Tong, Science Technology 
China, Xi'an Jiao Tong, and Harbin Institute of technology, constituting the top tier of the system. 
For instance, Qinghua and Peking were each given 1.8 billion by the Ministry of Education in 
1998. Funds are intended to recruit internationally renowned professor and develop international 
collaboration and student and staff exchanges (Gallagher et al, 2009). As the Ministry of Education 
report (2007)lists, there were 1,731 regular HEIs in 2004, out of which 111 national institutions 
were under the supervision of central Ministries (73 were affiliated with the central Ministry of 
Education in Beijing, 38 with other central government ministries), 1,394 administered by local 
governments of provinces, 226 privately-run. The list of centrally supervised institutions overlaps 
with the list of the '211 Project', and hence these enjoy better funding than those under the 
supervision of local government. In other words, it is fair to say that these 111 institutions are in 
practice the elite sector of the system, and the rest the mass sector (perhaps with only a few 
exceptions). 
A related dimension to the internal hierarchy of the HE system is a change in the student 
accommodation capacity among different kinds of institutions — from 1998 to 2001 alone, the share of 
student population of centrally supervised institutions dropped from 33.76% to 17.80%, while that of 
other institutions supported by local governments and private resources rose from 66.24% to 82.20%. 
Among local institutions, colleges of higher vocational technology (offering two-year diplomas) had 
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the most rapid growth in number and capacity, and by 2001 these institutions had 12% of the entrants, 
making the fourth largest share of student population in the system, after universities of science and 
technology, comprehensive universities and Normal universities (Ministry of Education, 2007). In 
other words, the keypoint universities further ensure their privilege not only by securing better public 
funding, but also by restricting the growth of their enrolment, while other institutions contribute to the 
majority growth in student intakes. In 2003, key institutions, accounting for 10% of the total number, 
were granted 71.44% of the government funding, while other institutions had 28.06% of the funding. If 
we are, for the sake of convenience, to label the keypoint HE institutions as the elite sector of the 
system, and the rest as the mass sector, then this division within essentially shelters the former from 
the intrusion of non-traditional students, while leaving the mission of social inclusion to the mass 
sector. As a result, the elite sector in Chinese HE system emerges not as a result of ongoing academic 
competition, but mainly as a consequence of robust state intervention in forms of unbalanced financial 
support and favours in various other policies. 
Apart from the binary between the keypoint institutions and the others, there is also another significant 
binary between the academic and the vocational tracks of student preparation. In 2008 new entrants in 
these two tracks were equal in number — 2,820,971 in the former, and 2,838,223 in the latter (China 
Statistic Bureau, 2008). Students in the academic route are considered intellectually superior as they 
normally outperform their counterparts who choose the vocation route. In the job market, a university 
degree is attached to higher economic values/returns than a vocational diploma. I will return to this 
academic-vocational binary in Chapter 11 on the subjects of HE. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have explored the emergence and development of the HE system in modern China, 
the emergence of a public school system and its connection with the HE sector. More importantly, I 
have explored the underlying rationalities for both processes. I argue that, first, although the first group 
of HE institutions were established in the late Qing, the HE system emerged in the Republican era, 
particularly under the Nationalist government which enforced its intervention in the system. Second, I 
argue that the privilege of the HE sector over the pre-HE sector is established in two ways - the 
emergence and development of the public school system establishes a rationality that the primary 
mission of the pre-HE sector is to produce and prepare candidates for the selection of the HE sector, 
and the conventional emphasis on HE over the primary and secondary education is also evident in the 
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sustained imbalance in the public financial support for the two sectors. I argue thirdly that the shaping 
of a structural hierarchy, an educational pyramid with a descending size in primary, secondary and 
higher education, is the result of political struggles in educational policies. There were policies that 
introduced new forms of institutions and an alternative route of educational transition, policies that 
drastically reduced the size of the senior secondary education to enhance the competition for the 
academic route of social division, policies that 'normalised' educational selection at each stage of 
schooling and establish it as a rationality of social selection. My fourth point is that the internal 
hierarchy within the HE system, among various institutions, emerges out of a various policies under 
the Communist regime, and mainly as a result of the introduction and prevalence of a keypoint 
rationality that favours an emphasis on a selected few institutions. I argue this keypoint rationality 
gives rise to a clear division between the elite sector made of national keypoint institutions that receive 
disproportionally large amount of government investment, and the mass sector that contributes to the 
majority of the student enrolment growth in the current wave of HE expansion with considerably 
smaller amount of public financial support. Also, there is now a noticeable divide between the 
academic route and vocation route of HE in China, which, as I will display in Part IV, gives rise to a 
discourse of their respective economic values among the public. 
In the next chapter, I will discuss other three components of HE apparatus — curriculum, pedagogy and 
campus space. 
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Chapter 6 Curriculum, Pedagogy and Campus 
Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, I examine two apparatus components of HE, principles and systems, and 
in this chapter, I continue to explore other three components — curriculum, pedagogy and campus. As 
in the previous two chapters, my analysis to follow also make a reference to its social and political 
dimension, but I nonetheless refuse to understand any of the three components as a mere reflection of 
dominant ideologies, as resources used in the service of political powers, as being 'driven and shaped 
by political and professional interests, serving to legitimate and mask the manipulation of human 
beings for the ends of social order and private profit' (Rose, 1999, p. xiii). 
It is true that HE curriculum, pedagogy and campus in modern China has been subject to the influence 
of socio-political forces, and have been adjusted to perhaps a radical extent to pattern foreign models 
that are favoured by various educational thoughts or political ideologies at different historical points, 
but it was not my primary intention to establish such connections. What I have attempted to display is 
the actual formation of various HE practices, practices that render curriculum, pedagogy and campus 
intelligible and governable, practices that were intended to direct the formation and development of 
HE towards certain objectives that were deemed appropriate in various socio-political settings. 
To this end, I will focus on two dimensions of HE practices connected to the three components — the 
first dimension is 'genealogical', focusing on the ways in which these components began to take 
shape, such as the various streams of knowledges that are included in HE curriculum, the adaption of 
certain forms of pedagogy to organise teaching and learning at an advanced level, and the emergence 
of campus space to perform certain functions for teachers and students; the second dimension is 
`political', focusing on the ways in which these components were established as targets of various 
forms of government and technologies, such as how to govern the formulation of HE curriculum, how 
to govern the use of pedagogy and how to govern the arrangement of campus, and also what aspects to 
govern, and who should govern and to what ends. 
I will first explore the formulation of HE curriculum in modern China, with a focus on the ways in 
which various knowledges are rendered 'higher-educational', educationally appropriate for universities 
and colleges, dependent on the historical circumstances in which various rationalities and technologies 
of knowledge production, organisation and transmission are invented and utilised. 
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HE pedagogy has for long been a contested field of educational research. However, in this section I 
will not engage with questions such as 'what are the best teaching approaches for HE?' Or 'what are 
the changes brought to HE pedagogy by globalisation?' My concern is rather how pedagogy as a 
particular field of activities has been deployed in the government of HE and HE subjects, what 
technologies and techniques have been invented, developed and transformed in the process, and what 
the effects of such deployment of pedagogy on HE and its subjects actually are. 
In term of space, I will explore how campus is utilised as a means of governing in HE. I will first 
engage with the logic of campus building in the early Republican era and also how regulations over 
HE space were invented and enforced. Second, I want to explore the exemplarity of HE campus in HE 
discourses in contemporary China. Third, I discuss the ways in which space is made into a form of 
governing in contemporary HEIs. 
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The Formulation of Curriculum 
Knowledge, Curriculum and Sociology 
There has been a long tradition of sociological inquiries into the notion of knowledge. This particular 
branch of sociology, the sociology of knowledge, is concerned with the social or existential conditions 
of knowledge (Pickles, 1985; Schutz, Walsh and Lehnert, 1972). To this end, scholars in this field have 
engaged with a wide range of intellectual products such as philosophies, ideologies, political doctrines, 
and theological thought. For instance, Karl Marx(1991) in German Ideology attempts to establish the 
relations between philosophical ideas and the social structures in which they emerged, with a focus on 
the ways in which systems of ideas depend on the social positions, in particular class positions. 
Underpinned by a central assumption that the social organisation of a particular society affects the 
dominant form of knowledge within it, the sociology of knowledge examines the construction, 
interpretation and understanding of 'reality' among human beings and their home society. It concerns 
the social determinants of knowledge, and also the non-intentional structuring of knowledge that can 
be used to achieve and promote standards and assumptions of 'truth'. The New Sociology of Education 
in the early 1970s questions the epistemological claims about the objectivity of knowledge (see the 
edited collection Young, 1971 for instance). For instance, Michael Young (1971)challenges the 
knowledge base of the prevailing liberal academic curriculum among grammar and public schools and 
the universities, and argued that such academic curriculum is historically constructed to preserve the 
status quo of a class society by ensuring the failures of the majority of the working-class pupils. 
Michael Apple's (Apple, 2000) Official Knowledge analyses the effects of conservative beliefs and 
strategies on educational policy and practice, particularly how the Right is attempting to impose its 
values and re-impose its control on the school system through the curriculum, textbook adoption 
policies and the efforts of the private and business sectors. 
This section is intended as a genealogical inquiry with a focus on how various knowledge practices are 
integrated with governmental agenda and socio-political changes, and are further developed into 
techniques of knowledge organisation and management. This genealogical exploration is a certain kind 
of 'historical epistemology' that is intended to reconstruct the 'epistemological field' (Rose, 1999) that 
allow certain knowledges to be considered as appropriate, sufficient and readily prioritised, and the 
kinds of rationalities and technologies that are invented and utilised if the curriculum formulated is to 
count so. 
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Techniques of Curriculum 
I explore how the deployment of knowledge practices, or what I term the techniques of curriculum, 
creates a space for power relations to be established, developed and exercised. 
The formulation process of HE curriculum, in this regard, can be understood as the generation of 
formal curricular materials of a clear educational nature and pedagogical aims. The formulation of HE 
is beyond the mere printing of textbooks, but instead it is a complicated process that resolves around 
socio-political struggles upon what kind of knowledge is appropriately and sufficiently 'higher-
educational' for a given society. In this chapter, the notion of knowledge refers knowledge presented in 
formal educational setting such as schools and universities, in textbooks and evaluations, in forms of a 
variety of disciplines, and the knowledge practices are what I term the techniques of the curriculum, 
the ways in which different streams and forms of knowledge are included or excluded, legitimised or 
delegitimised, produced, maintained, reproduced or adjusted, improvised or entrenched, and perhaps 
abolished. Inspired by Foucault (1977; Foucault, 1998), Rose (1999), and Bernstein (1971), I put 
forward a list of four techniques that play significant roles in the formulation of HE curriculum, 
including 
1.the integration of existing or borrowed knowledges into curriculum in forms of textbooks, 
syllables and references; 
2.the categorisation of these streams of curricular knowledge in forms of institutional units —
schools, departments, disciplines or subjects; 
3.the production of new curricular knowledges, either as an extension of the existing body, or 
new streams; 
4.the regulation of curricular knowledge to ensure both a maximised utilisation of and a 
minimised deviation from socio-political agenda set by the given society or government. 
I will now discuss these four techniques respectively. 
Integration 
What I mean by integration here is the process by which various bodies of knowledge are transferred 
into the forms of curricular and extracurricular materials — textbooks, references, examination papers, 
and extra-curriculum readings, etc. - and therefore make these bodies of knowledge educational. 
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This first step is vital to the deployment of curricular knowledge as it clarifies the nature of these 
bodies of knowledge. Once these bodies of knowledge are presented in textbooks, references and 
examination papers, they are no longer only informative but officially educational, and therefore would 
and should be exposed to a different sets of regulation and intervention from various sources. 
Secondly, it also signifies, again if not a change, at least a clarification of the ownership of these bodies 
of knowledge. As mentioned in the preceding discussion, educational practices before the late Qing 
were mainly conducted by private schools in forms of Sishu and Shuyuan, and the state tended not to 
participate directly in the organising of formal public schooling and therefore could claim no 
ownership of these bodies of curricular knowledge in circulation despite the repeated exercises of its 
supervisory power over the circulation process. When these bodies of curricular knowledge were 
integrated into public schooling curriculum, the state could also announce a new ownership over them, 
and therefore a new power relationship come into being. 
In this historical development of Chinese HE, there are normally two major resources that have been 
put into use — China's own historical collections and that of its foreign counterparts. Under the late 
Qing regime, new streams of knowledge translated and introduced from mainly European and 
Japanese works were integrated into curriculum. Tongwen Guan (the School of Combined Learning), 
for example, taught some courses in western natural science and social science into its curriculum, 
such as mathematics, physics, international law, and political economy. However, it should be restated 
that the domestic curricular knowledge was still regarded as the absolute core of curriculum. The 
Charter of Imperial University for instance listed Confucian classics as the head of its eight faculties, 
which to include 11 courses of the traditional Confucian canon such as Zhouyi (Book of Change), Liji 
(Book of Rites), Lunyu (Analects), and Lixue (Confucian school of idealist philosophy). It was fairly 
understandable that Confucian canon, the core curricular knowledge prevailing for the past two 
centuries, was firstly integrated into official curriculum — it was regarded as more immediate, relevant 
and mature in operation for the Late Qing regime than knowledge from other sources. 
During the Republican era, the hierarchy of curricular knowledge from the previous regime was 
overthrown — new streams of curricular knowledge introduced from Europe, the U.S and Japan were 
given higher status than their native counterparts. The new governors and educators were mainly under 
the influence of western education, and far more enthusiastic in introducing new forms of curricular 
knowledge. 
In the new Communist era, it was the Soviet Union that became the dominant provider of curricular 
knowledge. According to then the Ministry of Education, the new entrants of 1952 academic years 
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were to use Soviet teaching syllables and guidance, and HEIs were to set up specialities7 and teaching-
research offices after the Soviet model and organise the translation and compilation of Soviet 
curriculum. Between 1952 and the end of 1956, there were 1393 translated versions of Soviet 
curricular materials published (Yang, 2003, p. 121). However, this wave of integration was brought to 
an abrupt end when China and Soviet Union split towards the end of 1960. By that time, curricular 
knowledge from the Soviet provider had been deeply integrated into the curriculum of HEIs, and 
remains deeply influential even today. 
Categorisation 
Categorisation here refers to the process by which curricular knowledge is divided into separate, 
distinctive and connected units of various sizes - schools, faculties, departments, majors and courses, 
etc. which make the bodies of curricular knowledge (more) organisable. This process involves not only 
a managerial arrangement in the style of book catalogues in a library, but also a selection, a 
reorganisation, and an exclusion of certain sectors from the existing bodies of curricular knowledge. 
Moreover, the effects of categorisation can be magnified tremendously once used in combination with 
certain pedagogical practices. 
The categorisation process has two major effects: first, it introduces itself as a new managerial 
rationale in the deployment of curricular knowledge, which can be used in both curriculum 
development and pedagogy organisation; second, it creates a new space for power relationships, as a 
web of educational units — schools, faculties, departments, specialities, and courses- is produced and 
can serve as a principle based on which various forms of HEIs can be assembled, adjusted and 
reorganised. HE policies in different historical periods introduce varied ways of structuring HE 
institutions, and in the light of my discussion in the previous two chapters, these structures created, 
reflect in them different underlying principles and systematic designs of HE. And consistent with the 
emergence and development of HE principles and systems, this categorisation process of HE 
curriculum, in various historical periods, was either modelled after foreign practices or inspired from 
China's own educational tradition, or both. It was constantly subject to changes, initiated by 
governments or university heads or teaching faculties, etc. It is therefore also a field where power 
struggles are most visible. 
7 Referring to university subjects in the English tradition, but this expression was used here to avoid confusion in the 
following chapters on educational subjects 
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To further elaborate my argument, I will use the example of philosophy in HE curriculum, a discipline, 
judged from the Mandan perspective that is most likely to be affected by political ideologies. Its 
development and transformation in HE curriculum in modern China is a case where this assumption 
certainly rings true. 
As mentioned previously in this chapter, to start with, the Confucian canon remained the prevailing 
philosophical stream of knowledge in the late Qing. The Confucian classics remained the principle 
faculty among the eight faculties8 listed in the Charter of Imperial University. But in the Republican 
era Confucian classics no longer occupied the top of all faculties, and instead it was dismantled and 
placed in various disciplines, the majority of which were called Chinese philosophies. According the 
University Regulation in 1913 (reprinted in Yu and Tang, 1991, p. 698), the Department of Philosophy 
was to include the follow two streams: Chinese stream and western stream, and the traditional 
Confucian classics were only a few amongst many courses. 
However, this was soon to be changed under the Communist regime. According to the Provisional 
Regulations of Departmental courses in Universities, vocational colleges, and Colleges of Liberal Arts 
and Law (Higher Education Committee of North China Region, 1949, webpage, my translation), the 
philosophical courses should include: 
`(1), dialectical materialism (including dialectics of nature), (2), historical materialism, (3), history of 
Chinese philosophy (should stress the history of recent thoughts, in particular after May 4th movement, and 
stress the unification of Marxist Philosophy and Chinese revolutionary practices, but also include an 
introduction of a history of accent philosophy), (4), western philosophy (should stress a history of struggle 
between materialism and idealism. On the period after Hegel, the course should have the historical 
development of dialectical materialism and historical materialism as both the lecture and research focus), 
and (5), logic.' 
Philosophy was narrowed to a particular stream out of its enormous schools of thoughts, with only 
Marxism and some of its derivative applications ordained as the legitimate branch. It should also be 
pointed out that the regulation not only lists what is to be taught as authorised educational knowledge 
in the domain of philosophy, but also how these authorised courses should be taught, with what 
purpose and focus, and to what ends. 
8 Other seven faculties included Politics, Literature, Medicine, Natural Sciences, Agriculture, Technology and Economics 
(Yang, 2003, p. 14) 
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Production 
The production process refers to the way in which new bodies of knowledge are generated as either 
extensions to their existing counterparts or completely new streams. The production process sustains 
the assemblage of curriculum as it expands both the width and depth of curricular knowledge, which 
can in turned be integrated back into curriculum. It enables HE to generate new forms and streams of 
knowledges and absorb them into the existing curriculum. 
For the sake of convenience alone, I argue that there are mainly two forms of knowledges that are 
generated in this process — the first is 'epistemological', largely based on the development and 
exploration of existing curricular knowledge, and the second is 'political', or in Foucault's term 
`disciplinary', with HE itself as the focus of the studies, as the resources and also the ends of various 
knowledge practices, and with regard to how to govern HE institutions and the subjects within. 
As for the former, the production was largely done by the research units of HEIs. The first modern 
university, the Imperial University, was to include a Tongru Yuan (graduate school) with the 'aim to 
advance academia in China on a daily basis, to produce new knowledge for publication, to invent new 
pieces of technology for the use of the public (Charter of Imperial University for Royal Permission , 
reprinted inYu and Tang, 1991, p. 339, my translation)'. But it is not until the Republican era when HE 
enjoyed a rapid development that research activities emerged. In June 1928, Academia Sinica, as the 
first national scholar community, was founded in Shanghai and following its lead HEIs soon 
established their own research units. Peking Union Medical College was founded by the Rockefeller 
Foundation from 1915 to 1947 to be a research and training hospital, and contributed especially in 
parasitology and in dealing with communicable diseases. The Institute of Chinese Studies was founded 
by Peking University in 1921 under the directorship of Shen Yinmo, where research students worked 
independently with individual professors in pursuit of particular topics. Nankai University established 
the Nankai Institute of Economics (Sun, 1986). 
During the Maoist era, however, the research function of HE very much diminished. Patterned on the 
Soviet model, the research units in HE institutions were largely suspended, and the Chinese Academy 
of Science was set up to conduct advanced research separately. The underlying rationale for this 
adjustment is that HE should be devoted to teaching alone, and should be focusing on the preparation 
of technocrats. This situation lasted until the 1980s when research units began to emerge again among 
HEIs. 
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With regard to the second form of knowleges, the political or the disciplinary, it is worth noticing that 
in the recent two decades there has emerged a substantial amount of studies of HE system as an 
institutional objects and also university teachers and students as subjects. There has been a fairly large 
body of research done in this fashion, in academic journals (for instance, China Higher Education 
published by Ministry of Education, China) published as books (Pan and Liu, 1993; Pan, Wu and 
Zhang, 2003; Wu, 2004), which has also been integrated back into the HE system in China as 
guidance, references, textbooks, and specialties in universities9. Also, there are increasing numbers of 
studies in recent years that have university students and teachers as the research focus. To use The 
Notification of applications for specific research projects in humanity and social science (ideological 
and political work in HEIs) by Ministry of Education 2010 as an example. This document lists 10 
tier-1 projects, each entitled RMB 80,000 research funding (approximately £8,000 in 2010), and 60 
tier-2 projects, each entitled RMB 20,000 research funding (approximately £2,000 in 2010). 
These proposed studies are to be targeted on 'specific issues in the ideological and political work on 
university students on a daily basis' and expected to produce 'new means, solutions and techniques in 
enhancing and advancing ideological instead of abstract and void discussion'. The focus of most of 
these projects are very articulate in their titles alone, in particular among the tier-2 projects — a research 
of model university students from the Sixteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Part, a research 
on economic globalisation and patriotic education among university students, and a research on the 
significance of the use of university BBS (Bulletin Board System) in promoting the construction of 
harmonious campus, to name a few. This serves as an example of political guidance and intervention in 
the production process — what is to be researched, with what focus, in what manners, and for what 
ends. I will return to this discussion in the chapters in Part III. 
Regulation 
The regulation process does not work entirely separately from the three processes discussed above. 
Instead, it is embedded in the production chain of integration, categorisation and production. We have 
already noticed the traces of regulating techniques in the preceding discussion — the setup of priority in 
the integration process, the selection and exclusion in the categorisation process, and the political 
9 For example, there is a specialty named 'Higher Education Studies' in Xiamen University, Beijing Normal University, and 
East China Normal University. 
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guidance and intervention in the production process. There are a number of techniques that are worth 
mentioning here. 
One of the most effective means of regulation is the exercise of censorship. This is by no means a new 
invention, but we will focus on its uses in curriculum in the past hundred years. For instance, the late 
Qing regime was on the one hand eager to integrate orthodox Confucianism into new curricular 
materials, and on the other hand worried of the influence of new ideas and theories introduced into the 
same materials outside the official channel. In 1898, Sun Jiading, the Minister of Educational 
Management, suggested to the emperor that all translated works should be reviewed by the official 
organisation to ensure all rebellious works are ruled out, and 'one stream of thought' should be 
employed to 'expand public intellects' and 'consolidate public minds'. In 1903, then the Ministry of 
Education established educational principles as 'loyalty to the emperor', 'veneration for 
Confucianism', 'advocacy of collectivism', 'advocacy of practicality' and 'advocacy of disciplines and 
strength'. In 1905, then Ministry of Education requested that 
`curricular materials for primary and secondary schools should be composed quickly ... and to be assessed on 
(educational) principles and evaluated by the Ministry before passing on to schools. In doing so, public thoughts can 
be unified and the national foundation can be kept from destruction. (Zhang, 2009).' 
The Ministry performed strict censorship over the publishing houses that promoted new ideas and 
schools of thoughts. For instance, Intensive reading of the Four Classics by Mengbiao Publishing 
House was printed for 20 editions and highly influential, but was also banned for the suspicion of 
circulating new ideas, and the publishing house was shut down soon afterwards (Zhang, 2009). Under 
the Communist regime, this censorship was carried out to yet another extreme. All curricular materials 
were censored and edited to fit the ideology of the new regime. This has been discussed in the previous 
chapter and so will not be repeated here. 
Another example is the shutdown of 'High Culture Fever' in 1989 (Wang, 1996; Zhang, 1994). The 
1980s witnessed a wave of integration of curricular knowledge -large volumes of western works in 
sociology, psychology, and politics, etc. were translated into Chinese and hence a sudden expansion of 
curricular knowledge for the public intellectuals and HE students alike. This gave rise to a social 
movement later known as the 'High Culture Fever' - referring to a nationwide discussion of notions 
such as culture, tradition, modernity, and particularly the meaning and implications of Western theories 
ranging from Nietzsche, Freud and Sartre to neo-authoritarianism, emerged in China in early 1985 - 
1° In this dissertation, I will not explore the reasons behind the popularity of these three authors, as the phenomenon itself 
deserves another dissertation on its own. Please refer to, for instance, Wang's (1977) High Culture Fever politic -aesthetics, 
and ideology in Deng's China for the discussion of this issue. 
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was brought to a sudden end in 1989 when these knowledges were believed to propose political 
challenges to the ruling party. After the Tiananmen crackdown, all new knowledge in circulation was 
announced as harmful and illegitimate, undermining orthodox Marxism. As an article on People's 
Daily in June, 1989 criticised, 
`many course books on political theories were lacking contents that would facilitate students to develop great 
expectations of Communism. In particular the extra-curricular readings, majority of which are unhealthy. In recent 
years, there emerged "Freud fever", "Sartre fever", "martial art novel fever", "Qiongyaol I fever", "physiognomy 
fever", "sex studies fever", etc., all having negative effects on students thoughts to varied extents.' 
Therefore, 
'to enhance thought education is not a mere issue of adding some instruction lectures, but more 
important to treat ideological and political work as the lifeline, to place it at a proper position, and to turn 
it around from a gradual withering (Zhuang, Yong and Zong, 1989, my translation)'. 
In other words, censorship as a regulating technique over curriculum is not just a political action upon 
its physical forms, but also, with the circulation of hegemonic discourses, emerges as a rationale of 
spiritual inspection, or a technology of the mind. I will further discuss this issue in the chapters to 
follow. 
Summary 
This section continues with a genealogy of HE apparatus components, with a focus on the formulation 
of curriculum. The discussion above covers four important techniques at work, integration, 
categorisation, production, and regulation - techniques that make bodies of knowledge appropriately 
educational, organisable, organic, and controllable. I now move on to the discussion to pedagogy. 
11 Qiongyao is a romantic love novel writer based in Taiwan. 
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The Use of Pedagogy 
Like the domain of curriculum, there have been numerous studies regarding pedagogy in general and 
HE pedagogy in particular (Bell, Neary and Stevenson, 2009; McLean, 2006). For instance, both 
Bourdieu (2000) and Bernstein (1996) explore pedagogy from the perspective of sociology, and also 
much work has been done in the field of critical pedagogy (most noticeably by Giroux, 1997; 2001; 
Giroux and Shannon, 1997) that is intended 'to help students develop consciousness of freedom, 
recognize authoritarian tendencies, and connect knowledge to power and the ability to take 
constructive action' (Giroux, 2010). However, it is not my intention in this section to engage fully with 
the domain of pedagogy in theory, neither is it to develop an alternative form of pedagogy for HE in 
modern China. Instead, I intend to explore HE pedagogy to the extent that it bears relevance to certain 
forms of government and technologies. To this end, I engage primarily with the notion of 
`exemplarity' introduced by by Bakken (2000) and developed by Kipnis (2011). 
As Bakken (2000) and Kipnis(2011) argue, education in China has long been dominated by an 
exemplarity logic, featured by lectures as the main teaching approaches, and imitation, memorisation 
and repetition as the main learning approaches. Under this rubric teachers are made the authorities of 
knowledge transmission and students are not encouraged to debate and question what is taught and 
how teaching is conducted. Education has been largely reduced to the following of examples and 
models. This is what I term 'exemplary pedagogy' and as my discussions will show, it is manifested in 
HE in a rather coherent way across the history of modern China, and remains noticeable in the 
contemporary HE system. Under this exemplary logic, students in HEIs have largely been understood 
as passive targets of pedagogy. In the following discussion, I look into the early criticisms, mechanism 
and effects of such a pedagogy. 
Early Criticisms 
Though much has been said about the liberal atmosphere in the Republican academia, and the 
prevalence of laissez faire mentality among HEIs, pedagogy during the period was not primarily 
configured by liberalism and autonomy. The League of Nations' Report (Becker et al, 1932) for 
instance, made harsh criticisms over the ways in which teaching and learning was conducted in the 
Republican HEIs. In terms of teaching, the report raised concerns of the use of lectures as the principal 
and sometimes even the sole teaching approach. To the authors of the report, such a heavy proportion 
of lecturing was regarded as dangerous, as 
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`(i)t tends to produce in all but the ablest students an attitude of unthinking dependence on the teacher's words, 
which does not necessarily imply a corresponding respect for his opinions or personality... Students who are 
habitually over-lectured have little interest or independent study; nor, if encouraged to rely with docile receptiveness 
on notes taken down from a teacher's dictation, are they likely to realise the necessity for it. Too often, as a 
consequence, instead of learning to consult serious works and to compare the views of different authorities, they 
confine their reading to text-books of a type, which, even if suitable in a school, is miserable nutriment for active-
minded young men' (Becker et al, 1932, pp. 160 -161). 
Concerns were raised over the negative effects of this teacher-centred approach on the initiatives of 
students. Over-lectured students, as the authors argue, may become 'docile' bodies of knowledge 
transmission, and are less likely to critically engage with the production process of knowledge, also to 
participate in the process of knowledge production themselves. What also worried the authors, in term 
of learning, was the fact that students were introduced to curricular materials that were irrelevant to 
their own experiences outside the classroom, as a large number of school materials were introduced 
from Europe and the U.S, 
`students (were) dealing with materials which (were) necessarily remote from their own experience and slip 
insensibly into the disastrous habit of memorising books, instead of observing facts and using books, in a critical 
spirit, as one instrument for interpreting them (Becker et al, 1932, p. 166)'. 
The prevailing learning approach identified by the report — the 'disastrous habit of memorising books', 
or root/repetitive learning, was put in comparison with the more European styled learning approach of 
critical engagement, of 'observing' and 'interpreting facts' for students themselves. The report further 
argue that the heart of the problem was not merely a matter of choices over teaching approaches, or to 
what extent learning was promoted as a means of critical engagement with knowledge, but how to 
understand the function of a modern university in terms of its pedagogic aims. The report argues, 
`if a some professors suppose that their duty is completed when they have delivered a lecture, and some students that 
no more is required of them than to hear it delivered — the reason is not, as a rule, that better methods are 
impracticable, but that the importance of adopting them has been obscured by a fundamental misconception of the 
function of a university. That function is not to supply students with information prepared for them in an easily 
digestible form by their teachers, but to cultivate in them an enquiring, critical and reflective spirit, to show them the 
methods by which knowledge is acquired, and to train them, in some small measure, to acquire knowledge for 
themselves. An education which neglects these essentials may be given in a university, but it is certainly not a 
university education (Becker et al, 1932, p. 161).' 
The Chinese Learner Debate 
The report's observations and concerns may be applied to the HE system throughout the history of 
modern China. In recent decades, a number of educational studies have engaged with the 'pedagogical 
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deficits' identified by the authors of the report. In terms of learning, a large number of studies are 
conducted around with the notion of 'the Chinese learner' (Biggs and Watkins, 1996b; Biggs and 
Watkins, 2001; Brennan, Patel and Tang, 2009; Bretion, 2003; Bridger, 2007; Brockling, Krasmann 
and Lemke, 2009; Brownlie, Feniak and Schnellert, 2006; Burke and Jackson, 2007; Nield, 2004). 
Researchers into this domain are concerned with a 'paradox of the Chinese learner'(Biggs and 
Watkins, 1996b; Biggs and Watkins, 2001) that Chinese students outperform their Western 
counterparts in certain subjects (in particular mathematics) although they may appear as rote learners 
who heavily rely on repetitions and memorising. Also, studies suggest that Chinese students did not 
give answers that indicated that they preferred to learn by rote when asked about their learning 
preferences (Watkins, 2000). Therefore, studies of the Chinese learners tend to suggest that it may be 
misleading to assume that Chinese students are merely rote learning simply by observing their learning 
approaches. As Biggs and Watkins argue (1996a; Biggs and Watkins, 2001), in Chinese culture, 
memorising may not be separate from understanding in learning, rather they belong to one connected 
and interlocking procedure. Chinese students may rely on memorisation only as a part of the learning 
process and by doing so they become familiar with the text first and then they can understand it, reflect 
upon it and then question it. Therefore, this Chinese approach of learning through repetition is believed 
to lead to a deeper understanding and high levels of achievement. 
`The Chinese learner' argument revolves primarily around how memorizing and repetition can also 
lead to deep learning, and how it is misleading to regard the Chinese learners as rote learners. As I 
understand it, this argument seems to explain the ways in which the Chinese learner survives a 
pedagogy that is regarded undesirable in the western educational discourses. It seems to justify such a 
pedagogy without a critical engagement with its effects on educational subjects. Also, this argument 
does not properly address the questions of the emergence and prevalence of such a pedagogy 12. 
Exemplary Pedagogy 
Drawing on LeVine and White (1993) and Bakken (Bakken, 2000), Kipnis (Kipnis, 2011) identifies 
pedagogy in China with its agricultural tradition, Confucian texts and the Imperial Examination. He 
first argues that the emergence of such a pedagogy of imitation was a result of agricultural practices -
copying farming techniques of other successful farmers can reduce one's risk of poor harvests, and 
12 I conducted a more comprehensive investigation of this issue in my unpublished MSc dissertation (Guo, 2006) Teaching 
the Chinese learner - a study of trans-national higher education in China at Department of Education, University of 
Oxford 
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also the natural social hierarchy of age in agricultural empires makes young people depend on the 
elders for the knowledge of how to farm; therefore 'the disciplined, rote memorisation and the 
imitation of ideal models are considered the most virtuous of pedagogical techniques'. However, one 
may argue that such a pedagogy should be universally applied to other societies with agricultural 
traditions, not only limited to China. With regard to the prevalence of such a pedagogy in China, 
Kipnis further argues that memorisation as a learning approach was essential to the educational success 
and social advancement in imperial China - via the Imperial Examination, the Confucian texts that 
underpinned all educational activities in imperial China, 'were held to be morally lifting, and their 
memorisation was thought to improve the morality of students', and the relation of Confucian texts to 
the worldly power of the imperial bureaucracy made such a pedagogy beneficial and persuasive. 
With regard to the effects of such a pedagogy, in his excellent book The Exemplary Society, Bakken 
(Bakken, 2000) engages with the issue from a sociological perspective. He argues that imitation is an 
important governing technique as exemplary governing involves models of various types such as 
essays, speeches, people and conducts. Such models are used in early schoolings of children when they 
first learn to write the Chinese language, but also in various domains of governing. The word 
`study' (xue) in the Chinese context often means to imitate a model in the process of mental and bodily 
memorisation. He further argues that such a pedagogical preference is closely connected to the 
maintenance of social order. He writes, 
`(n)ot only are educators preoccupied with imitation; the bureaucrats of social orders are equally intensely involved 
in this discourse. In the case of repetition, ...(it) is seen as a guarantor for stability, and as a reminder of the way of 
conduct so early promoted in moral education. ...In fact, imitation and repetition have been important instruments in 
this process of instrumentalisation of education, and there has been an educational administrative institutionalisation 
of imitative and repetitive practices. (127)' 
Therefore, Bakken concludes education based on such pedagogy has become synonymous with social 
control in China. He writes, 
`much of what has been called pedagogy in China has been less preoccupied with methods of creative learning than 
it has been directed towards finding methods of effective control. Education has been more about the ways to rule 
than the ways to teach. Discipline, loyalty, submission, control — these are some of the most important "synonyms" 
of the Chinese word for education' (96). 
Despite its critical tone, this argument seems to have certain elements of truth. And it is also echoed by 
many contemporary critics of such pedagogy. The contemporary criticisms suggest that teaching 
through exemplarity serves to support authoritarian ruling and eliminate the justification of critical 
questioning. If one learns by imitating, then 'debate and questioning becomes irrelevant' (Kipnis, 
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2011, p. 91). Educational reformers in contemporary China object to this 'latent authoritarianism' in 
Chinese pedagogy. Mo Gong (2005) argues in an editorial in Southern Weekend that 
`Our schools put forth all sorts of authoritative models: thought models, political models, model schools, model 
academics, model teachers, and so on. These authorities cannot be doubted, cannot be criticised, and cannot be 
analysed; they can only be followed. This sort of education is far removed from the type of citizenship education that 
a modem society should promote' (quoted in Bowie, 1970, p. 92, author's translation). 
Socialist Exemplarity 
These criticisms target the authoritarian aspect of the socialist form of government. The logic of 
exemplarity interweaves with HE pedagogy under the Communist regime, and has in fact been pushed 
even further. In the same way that HE curriculum was reorganised under state socialism, HE pedagogy 
became an important part of educational reorganisation. The controls over pedagogical exemplarity 
were conducted in a more robust manner, as the Communist regime became the sole producer of 
authoritative exemplarity, and the enforcement of such pedagogical exemplarity was made possible by 
even fiercer governmental administration and intervention. The Soviet model of pedagogy was 
introduced and implemented to combine the indigenous exemplary logic with the socialist arts of 
government. 
Up to 1953, a mix of teaching plans and materials had been used in various institutions, some directly 
translated from the Russian and some originally formulated. But after 1953, curriculum development 
was made more centralised and standardised. A single set of teaching plans, syllabi and materials was 
developed for each subject or speciality and even each course within, and was soon used nationwide. 
Consequently, 
`teaching plans specified the aims, requirements, and the contents of each major (specialty), including the courses to 
be taught within it. The syllabus for each course was so detailed that it included the items to be taught, their 
sequence, the time to be spent on each item, and the exact material to be covered during each hour of instruction. 
Textbooks and teaching materials were also similar complied...once they were authorised to use, were treated as 
sacrosanct and enforced like the law' (Pepper, 1996, pp. 186-187). 
This form of 'standardisation and uniformity' was extremely difficult to imagine under the Nationalist 
regime in the pre-1949 period. Not surprisingly, such rigid control over HE pedagogy inevitably 
received criticisms from teachers, a majority of whom found the Soviet model difficult to adjust at best 
and inappropriate at worst. In the name of adapting the Soviet model to the Chinese realities, Chinese 
educators from the previous era objected to the radical increase in enrolment and the overemphasis on 
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standardisation and conformity, which led to heavy loads in teaching and learning and too many 
students, a neglect of studies in theoretical and foundation courses because of the rush to specialised 
courses, and the Soviet model of 'all-round development' which overlooked the individual aptitude of 
students, etc. These criticisms were acknowledged by the government and in provisional regulations 
authorised by Ministry of Education in 1956 allowed teachers to modify the teaching plans and present 
their personal opinions, but it should still remain as the guiding document for instruction. Moreover, 
students were given more time for independent studies and some new courses (such as European 
philosophy and economic theories of Keynes) were introduced in some universities for the purpose of 
criticism and contrast with the mainstream dialectical materialism (Hayhoe, 1996; Liu, 2005; Pepper, 
1996). However, this period of relative openness was brief. The open criticism of the Party monopoly 
over HE was soon silenced by the 'Anti-rightists' campaign in 1957, during which the intellectuals 
were targeted by a number of policies and social movements — some were assigned to low-status jobs, 
some imprisoned, and some exiled. 
After the anti-rightist campaign, the Party decided to strengthen their control over HE with a number 
of measures. The exemplarity logic was further enforced with socialist forms of government — 'the red 
and expert working class intellectuals' became the new model for one to imitate and hence students (at 
all levels) were assigned manual or menial work as compulsory in order to appreciate the contribution 
of the worker-peasant class; an additional thousand middle-ranking cadres (added to the almost one 
thousand existing cadres) were sent to universities to shore up leadership work; teachers and students 
were required to prepare teaching plans and course outlines together in a form of close contacts, and 
students were also to assess the performance of other classmate; non-Marxist social sciences were not 
allowed and political course would not be made optional; etc. These measures not only put faculty and 
students under closer surveillance of the personnel officials but also imposed the practice of mutual 
surveillance. Teachers and students alike were turned into docile bodies of HE pedagogy. 
These pedagogical practices were further practiced in the following era of the Cultural Revolution. But 
as the Cultural Revolution reached its end and the Reformist faction of the CCP led by Deng Xiaoping 
came back into power, practices introduced in the Maoist era were largely dropped together with all 
other regulations that were regarded as 'destructive towards the order of HE' (Zhongguo Jiaoyu 
Nianjian Bianjibu, 1984). Between 1979 and 1989, universities enjoyed a period of academic freedom 
and openness. The first half of the 1980s saw the revival of educational exchange programmes with 
support mainly from OECD countries. These programmes opened up opportunities of overseas studies, 
and also launched a series of World Bank projects providing overseas training for university faculties 
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in 180 institutions. Those faculties who received 2 years overseas training normally returned in 
mid-1980s and took up leadership positions in their own universities, from dean of departments to vice 
presidents and even presidents (Hayhoe, 1996). A large number of these returnees from overseas 
training struggled for greater academic autonomy. 
In the realm of pedagogy, the Maoist radicalism was replaced by the conventional exemplarity logic. 
Lewin et al (1994) confirms that the exemplary pedagogy prevailed - university education at diploma 
and undergraduate level was still dominated by classroom teaching, characterised by uninterrupted 
lectures with no student participation in discussion. Debates, discussions and interaction between 
teachers and students were still as rare as before, from the early Republican universities to the ones of 
Soviet Model (classroom activities were basically non-existent during the Cultural Revolution, as 
mentioned previously). Moreover, study loads continued to be heavy, in particular for first year 
students in humanities and social science who needed to attend 17 -20 hours compulsory classes a 
week. As result, students still lacked of time for independent learning. It is again in this regard that 
social memory of conventional teaching and learning approaches proved most consistent and robust. 
Summary 
In this section, I have explored the use of pedagogy in HE as a particular form of technology, with 
reference to the notion of 'exemplarity'. I argue that an exemplary pedagogy has for long prevailed in 
HE throughout the history of modern China, reaching its extreme during under high socialism. This 
exemplary pedagogy is intended to shape students as passive targets of HE, and encourages certain 
forms of teaching and learning such as lectures and memorizing. In this next section, I go on to discuss 
the final dimension of HE apparatus in my framework — space, and one can also find this exemplary 
logic in the arrangement of HE campus. 
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The Arrangement of Campus 
Space 
There has been substantial amount of studies on the notion of space in philosophy (Heelan, 1989; 
Reichenbach, 1958) and sociology (Gieryn, 2000; Urry, 1996). Foucault, for instance, explores 
particular spaces in his examination of power and technology, for instance the architectural plans for 
asylums, hospitals and prisons (Foucault, 1967; 1973; 1977). As Elden and Cramptons(2007) suggest, 
spatiality for Foucault is 'an integral part of a larger concern', and 'a tool of analysis'. In the interview, 
Space, power and knowledge, Foucault (1984) further elaborates the political dimension of space with 
reference to his notion of power, government and technology. For Foucault, space, knowledge and 
power are closely related. He states, 
`it is somewhat arbitrary to try to dissociate the effective practice of freedom by people, the practice of social 
relations, and the spatial distributions in which they find themselves. If they are separated, they become impossible to 
understand' (Foucault, 1984, p. 246). 
Following Foucault's lead, other geographers, philosophers and social scientists have further explored 
the notion of space and spatiality in a range of other areas. With regard to educational settings, Jones 
and Williamson (1979) in their excellent work The Birth of Schoolroom discuss the spatiality of 
English popular education in the first half of 19th century. Pike (2008), also drawing on Foucault, 
explores the spatiality of primary school dining room in the frame of power relations and 
governmentality. Authors in the collection Spatial Theories and Education (Gulson, Symes and 
Armstrong, 2007) draw on a wider range of theories of spatiality and look into a broader scope of 
issues in relation to space, such as disability, inequality, exclusion and social mobility. 
My discussion is inspired by Foucault's discussion of spatiality, power and technology, and I first 
explore the emergence and presentation of campus in HE discourses and institutions, and second I look 
into the government of HE campus spaces and also the deployment of campus in the government of 
HE subjects. 
Exemplary Campus 
Similar to the case of HE pedagogy, the exemplary logic of education in China also applies to HE 
campuses. Two of the most famous universities in contemporary China, Qinghua and Peking (Beida), 
both have spacious campuses in the northwest of Beijing. But Peking University did not own its 
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campus from the beginning. It belonged to Yanjing (Yenching in early texts) University, which was 
merged with Peking University in 1949. In the Republican era, both universities were much admired 
for their campus facilities. And their advantages in both facilities and academic reputation have been 
well maintained in their later development. Nowadays, the two campuses remain the most popular and 
cited images of HEIs in China. One of the most popular cramming materials in China, 'Three key 
points and One Test' (Sandian Yice) series (which I will further discuss in the next chapter), use the 
images of the gates of Qinghua and Yanjing (now Peking) in their cover designs. The images of gates 
of two universities (see next page) here imply successes in admission into the most renowned 
universities in China, and also promising life chances afterwards. 
Figure 4, Cover pages of Sandian Yice, left the Gate of Qinghua Yuan, and right, the entrance building of now 
Peking University. 
In the Republican era, Qinghua and Yanjing enjoyed secure finance and their campus facilities were in 
much better condition than those of the Chinese universities, which had their offices and classrooms 
converted from former temples (Beida), public shrines and government offices (Fudan), imperial 
examination halls and Qing academies. Yeh (1990, p. 207) describes the campus facilities of Yanjing 
University. She writes, 
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Image redacted due to third party rights or other legal issues Image redacted due to third party rights or other legal issues
`Yenching students were housed 2 to a room; their dormitory buildings received high praise as models of structural 
elegance, modern comfort and practical utility. In addition to baths, showers, hot and cold running water, drinking 
fountains, telephones, newspaper reading rooms, laundry facilities, and small kitchens on every floor, there were 
servants hired by the university as the students' beck and call. These buildings, ablaze at night, with reflections 
shimmering in the Weiming Lake (Lake Without a Name), the centrepiece of Yenching's 200-acre landscaped 
campus, were elegant symbols of the life of ease and tranquillity enjoyed by the privileged and Westernised 
cosmopolitan elite of the Nanjing decade'. 
Yanjing's landscaped campus, with Weiming Lake and Boya Tower as the centre, remains the most 
famous image of HE in contemporary China. The image now means more than tranquillity and ease, 
namely, a combination of academic elitism (the most renowned university) and cosmopolitan elitism 
(campus located in Haidian, the high-tech and HE district of Beijing). Also, the advantage of Yanjing 
University in the early years of HE in modern China was further manifested in other 'hardware' 
facilities such as 'libraries, laboratories, social halls, auditoriums, athletic fields, swimming pools, 
gymnasiums, and dormitories, in addition to administration and classroom buildings' (Yeh, 1990, p. 
207). Qinghua University, the neighbour of Yanjing University, with its secured finance, was also 
admired for its facilities such as 'the granite exterior and wood floor of its half-million-dollar library, 
the pianos and violins in its neo-classical-style auditorium, the imported equipment in its gymnasium, 
laboratory, and observatory' (207). 
The overall high standard of the facilities of the two campuses are well maintained today, with 
enormous government investment (each university receives annual investment of 1.8 billion RMB 
from the Ministry of Education, to build 'the world class universities'). Their campus images have now 
sent a particular message. Campus as a symbol of academic success, of spiritual pursuit of knowledge, 
of industriousness and autonomy. I now look into the images of both campuses. 
Both universities have set up particular sections of 'campus landscape' online. Peking University posts 
360 degree panorama photographs and Qinghua posts pictures and introductory texts 13. In the two 
pictures of Weiming Lake', there are students reading by the lake. The two pictures both present 
images of natural tranquillity and ease, but they are also presented as educational sites where students 
are with their reading. The counterpart of Weiming Lake in Qinghua campus is the landscape of 
`Shuimu Qinghua', featured by a Chinese classical garden space with a pool, a mansion, garden 
rockery and small woods. In the introductory text, this space is also interpreted as an educational site. 
13 http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/th/6259/index.html for Qinghua University, and http://www.pku.edu.cn/about/ 
xyfgjsp for Peking University. 
14 http://www.pku.edu.cn/images/ylbci/virtual%20tour/wming-1.swf and http://www.pku.edu.cniimages/ylbdivirtual 
%20tour/wming-2.swf 
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It says, 'because of its scenic views, Shuimu Qinghua is often a place for Qinghua students to read, 
study and rest'. These two of the most famous HE campus landscapes are not only presented as 
exemplary scene of academia, but also educational sites for those who are industrious enough as to 
make it into the campuses. In other words, these two landscapes are both presented as scenic and 
spiritual rewards for those who make it to the most elite universities in China. 
Also, in the landscape section of both university websites, images of libraries stand out as most 
noticeable. Libraries are presented as another symbol of HE, as it is in libraries that one can search and 
pursue knowledge for oneself; it is an educational site marked by industriousness and autonomy. The 
introductory text first reviews the history of the building, then it goes on presenting the library in a 
symbolic tone. 
`It is said that architecture is frozen music. If Qinghua campus is understood as a beautifully toned symphony, then 
the library is without doubt one of the most melodic notes. Regardless of the changes of seasons, of mornings and 
dawns, when you walk into the Qinghua library, you are greeted with a delicate scent of books, and you see figures 
of students who are industrious in their studies. This is the ocean of knowledge, the heaven of knowledge pursuit, the 
spiritual paradise leading to a different world, the path to success and glory'. 
In this text, the library of Qinghua is associated with a number of 'characteristics' of HE, such as 
persistence (anytime in the year, in the day) and industriousness, and it is also given a romantic tone, 
such as melody, scent of books, and it also bears some meanings beyond its worldly function, such as 
spiritual paradise and the path to success and glory. In a way, libraries are the most exemplary image of 
HE in general. It bears all the positive imaginations of HE, such as laissez faire styled autonomy, 
industriousness, provision of a wide scope of knowledge, and above all, promises of a successful and 
glorious future. 
Enclosed Space, Governable Space 
Apart from the exemplarity of campus, some governing logics of HE space also emerged in the 
Republican era. Campus space was turned into the target of HE government. On the one hand, 
university campuses were isolated by the mundane world, either from geographic distance or specific 
regulations; on the other hand, different locations within campuses became associated with a variety of 
conducts, and the governing of space became integrated into the governing of conducts. 
Yanjing and Qinghua were both located in the relative isolation of the northwest suburbs of Beijing at 
the time. The location of the campuses was intended to create 'an enclosed community with the weight 
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of (their) social life within (themselves)' (Yeh, 1990, p. 208). Dormitory residence was required and 
hence there was virtually an entire body of students in residence. Therefore, students were governed by 
an enclosed lifestyle, but this did not mean that this lifestyle was suffocating. Students were exposed to 
a variety of activities on campus, such as interacting 'at dances, picnics, and lectures, or,while 
attending chapel, studying in the library, and dinning in the refectory'. Similarly, students at Qinghua 
were also subject to the lifestyle of an enclosed campus, and 'among the favourite campus recreations 
were fishing, ice-skating, picnics, and movies (Yeh, 1990, p.209)'. 
At the first glance, student activities on campus were very much in a fashion of lassiez faire, with a 
hint of academic romance. But these activities were also under order and control, all organised within 
an enclosed and isolated campus. This logic of enclosure and isolation is also at work in contemporary 
China. University campuses are usually separated from its immediate area by walls. Fang Zhouzi, a 
well-known contemporary critic in China, writes in his much-cited article on Southern Weekend, 
University without Walls, 
`I went to Heqi Technique College (now China University of Technology) in the 1980s. The entire campus was 
enclosed by red-brick walls, with broken glass shards of Chinese characteristics plugged on the top. Only two gates 
for access, both closed by 11PM... 
I have visited some renowned universities in recent years. The stares of the guards at the campus gate on every 
passerby made me feel guilty inside, as I do not usually carry a valid ID... I read in a news report that the east and 
west gates of Qinghua University are now fixed with card readers, so everyone needs to swipe their card to get in or 
to register at the door.' 
Qinghua University is now in the heart of Haidian district of Beijing, known for the density of high-
tech corporations and HEIs, and therefore is no longer isolated by geographic distance from the urban 
area. Therefore, the enclosure of contemporary campus, Qinghua, China University of Technology and 
many others alike, is now maintained by the campus walls, gates and security checks. Fang in his 
article goes on criticising the use of university wall as a form of spatial government as hypocritical and 
pointless. He argues that no such walls exist in American universities, and no walls can stop the lure of 
the mundane world. There might be some elements of truth in Fang's criticism, but it is not my 
intension to make further criticism of this form of spatial government at the moment. It is sufficient to 
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point out that the logic of enclosure and isolation remains noticeable in contemporary HEIs in China, 
particularly with the walls as the symbolic gesture". 
Another technique of spatial government was also invented during the Republican era. In comparison 
to Qinghua and Yenching, the private colleges in Shanghai were often in the urban areas, and therefore 
needed to enforce certain regulations to keep its distance from the outside world, and 'to shelter their 
students from the lure of the larger urban environment' (Yeh, 1990, p. 210). In particular, the space of 
dormitory was used as a site of governing. Fudan University, for instance, insisted upon university 
supervision of the housing arrangements of all students. 
`Students were assigned rooms in residential halls in accordance with their classes: junior and seniors in the two 
buildings a few blocks of the main campus, and freshmen, sophomores, and women students in the buildings on 
campus. To house oneself differently a students had to go through a slow and complicated process of petitioning. 
Permission for off-campus residence was granted only if a student was to stay with a parent or a legal guardian'. 
Under such housing arrangements, students' whereabouts during after-class hours were rendered 
visible to the university administrators, and students were put under mutual supervision among 
occupants of the same dormitory unit. Yeh traces the origin of the dormitory system to the baojia, or 
the neighbourhood responsibility system. She writes, 
`each unit elected its representative who was responsible to the university for keeping tidiness within the immediate 
area of the room, for maintaining proper peace and order, for reporting cases of illness and leaves without absence, 
and, above all, for guaranteeing the condition of school furniture and property used in the room'. 
Therefore, a dormitory unit became the local centre of spatial government on campus. Students were 
turned into self(group)-responsible subjects (for hygiene, order and property of the room), and also 
supervising and supervised subjects (for each other's whereabouts and health conditions) within their 
residential unit. This system is still in wide use in contemporary HEIs. In the Dormitory Regulations of 
East China Normal University (1995), the clauses of hygiene, tidiness, order, property use are written 
in a similar fashion. For instance, 
`The occupant should keep the room tidy and clean, and should not put clusters on desks and beds, and beds and 
duvets should be attended to on a daily basis. The unit should set up a daily cleaning schedule among the occupants, 
with one copy of the schedule on display in the room and another submitted to the dormitory administrators. The 
occupant on duty should clean the room before 8AM, and urge others to maintain a good condition of the room — all 
15 The logic of enclosure and isolation is also noticeable in the form of 'university town' (daxue cheng). The 'university 
city' is usually a suburb area that hosts a number of universities, in particular their first year and second year students. The 
location of the 'town', on the one hand, is also intended to keep students away from the lure of the urban areas, and on the 
other hand, is to absorb private investment in campus construction and to promote economic development of the town area. 
I will not engage with this issue for the concern of word limits. 
126 
furniture in order, the floor, the windows and the corridor clean and tidy, with no spider web and dust' (my 
translation). 
In this contemporary version of dormitory governing, students are put under even tighter supervision, 
with their personal duty visible to administrators via the cleaning schedule, and also detailed 
requirements of room maintenance at work. In addition, the dormitory halls in general are also sites of 
governing. The Regulations of East China Normal University also state that 'in order to maintain the 
peace and order of the dormitory', all halls are put under a time management system — visitors are only 
allowed from 10.30AM to 12.00PM, and from 3.00PM to 10PM; all halls are closed between 
12.00AM and 5.00AM, and occupants need to display their ID to get access after 12.00AM, and those 
who return late will be subject to 'behaviour guidance'(East China Normal University, 2009, my 
translation). Here, time is also integrated into the space governing — occupants are not allowed to have 
visitors after the visiting time and are advised to return to their residence on time. In a way, the 
dormitory system is also a technology of the body, which renders the bodies of HE subjects highly 
visible and governable. 
Configuring Campuses 
Furthermore, the arrangement of campuses in contemporary HEIs is subject to the 'Area Index of 
Architectural Design for HEIs' by Ministry of Education (Ministry of Education, 1992), which requires 
that 
`every HEI must be equipped with 13 forms of architectures, including classroom, library, laboratory and experiment 
site, indoor gymnasium, University administrative site, departmental administrative site, auditorium, student 
dormitory, student cafeteria, faculty residential hall, faculty dormitory, faculty cafeteria, and sites for social welfare 
and other uses'. 
This regulation also details the scale of each of the architectural forms, from the size of entire 
campuses for different type of HEIs (comprehensive universities or specialised colleges, etc.) to the 
average dormitory space for each student (different standards for undergraduate, postgraduate, and 
overseas students). In other words, campus space itself has been made the targets of HE government as 
well. The arrangement of 13 forms of different architectures also indicates the forms of conducts and 
subjects that this contemporary HE government intends to produce. The indoor gymnasium is to make 
sure that physical education classes can go on uninterrupted during the rain seasons or bad weathers, 
which indicates the importance of the exercise of the HE bodies (this will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 8); student dormitory as a spatial management of student bodies is still in use on every HE 
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campus; faculty is housed on campus as well in a fashion of the socialist work unit, which also makes 
it convenient to supervise the faculty members, etc. Also, the so called welfare sites are noticeably 
legacies of the socialist work unit system, including kindergarten for children of the university staff, 
nurseries, clinics (or hospitals), student activity centre, student bathroom, faculty bathroom, boiler 
room, laundry, etc. (Butler, 1997, p. 10; Ministry of Education, 1992, p. 10). The HE campus is still 
designed to offer an enclosed lifestyle, with most of needs of mundane life accommodated on site. 
Space, Time and Pedagogy 
I also want to explore the ways in which space, time and pedagogy are infused together in a particular 
technique that prevails in HE in contemporary. This particular practice — 'evening-time self-
study' (wan zixi) is very common in contemporary Chinese universities, and most of the HEIs have 
similar regulations of 'self-study'16. This practice manifests in itself a strong sense of socialist 
governmentality, as it once again understand HE subjects as passive target of administrative 
intervention. For instance, Anhui Polytechnic University posts its regulations online, which states 
'1, Evening time self-study is an important part of pedagogy, and students are advised to conduct self-study. The 
evening time for self-study is from 19:00 to 21:00, Sunday to Thursday. 
2, During the listed evening time, students should in principle leave their dormitories and conduct self-study, attend 
lectures, or participate in other learning activities in educational sites such as classrooms, libraries, labs, or lecture 
rooms... 
3, During the listed evening times, all units, organisations, and student groups dn principle should not organize any 
activities that are not relevant to studies, in particular entertainment activities, in order to maintain a good order and 
environment for self-study. 
4, ... Special attention should be paid to the attendance supervision and management of the first year students, and to 
the cultivation of good habits of self-study among them. 
5, Student cadres are responsible for the attendance supervision of evening time self study of each class. Those who 
cannot make it to the self-study as a result of personal matter or illness should report to the cadre on duty... 
As one can see, regulations as such are not to recommend a certain way of learning, but to enforce it 
with administrative method. Students once again are turned into passive targets of HE pedagogy, as 
they are requested to restrict themselves to one particular conduct (academic studies) within a listed 
16 
 http://www.ahpu.edu.cn/s/17/t/167/16/73/info5747.htm last accessed 4th August, 2011, my translation. By using the 
keyword 	 (university regulations of evening time self-study) one can easily find numerous 
regulations of HEIs in contemporary China, such as Jiaozuo University http://www.jzu.edu.cn/wyxy/show.php? 
 
itemid=786 , Northern Normal University http://denmark.chsnenu.edu.cn/news.asp?id--381&code=AB 
 , and Shenyang 
University http://college.syu.edu.cnijingji/showartasp?id=98. 
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time (7PM to 9PM) at certain sites (libraries, classrooms, etc,). In other words, the 'evening time self-
study' is a form of government over conduct, time and space. It is noticeably disciplinary in nature, 
and students as HE subjects are once again turned into docile bodies of pedagogical 'management' and 
`supervision', in particular those who are considered lacking self-discipline (first-year students). 
This practice of evening time self-study did raise some controversy recently. Renming web 
(www.people.com.cn), one of the governmental portal sites, posts a news report entitled 'The 
promotion of evening time self-study in Chongqing University of Technology and Business raises 
controversy' 17. Some of the students objected to such a practice, and argued that they were now adults 
and should be given more space for 'self-development', while the university administrators argued that 
four to six hours of classroom studies were far from enough if one is to become a 'talent' after 4 years 
of university education, and therefore extra hours of self-study should be imposed to make sure that 
students from this university will graduate as 'qualified talents' (hege rencai) for the nation and 
society. The news report concludes with the opinion of Professor Meng Dongfang, who was described 
as an educational authority (one with special allowance from the State Council). Meng argues that 
students in contemporary universities are likely to be the single child of the families, 'clever but 
lacking self-discipline', and implies that such a practice can be beneficial to them. 
From this news report, one can pick out the socialist rationality of HE pedagogy, which still 
understands students, subjects of HE, as targets of administrative interventions. But such an 
intervention is for their own good, to make sure that they come out as 'qualified' products of HE 
pedagogy. Students are also problematised to justify such an pedagogical intervention - they are mostly 
single child of their families, and are likely to be spoiled and lacking self-discipline, and HE pedagogy 
should accordingly address this 'problem'. 
Summary 
In this section, I have explored the issue of HE campus space, including its emergence, presentation, 
government and deployment. I make reference to the notion of exemplarity, and look into the ways in 
which certain exemplary HE campuses took shape and how they are presented in discourses in certain 
forms. I also look into the ways in which certain spaces such as dormitory and study room are 
deployed as ways of governing HE subjects, and I will discuss this in more depth in the following 
chapter in Part III. 
17 http://edu.people.com,cn/GB/4156977.html edited by Yin Guan, last accessed 4th August, 2011, my translation. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I explore three components of HE apparatus — curriculum, pedagogy and campus. From 
the genealogical dimension, I argue that throughout the history of HE in modern China, there are only 
limited resources at disposal at any given historical moment for HE practices such as curriculum 
formulation, pedagogy adaption and campus design. For instance, it is not surprising that the first 
major group of curricular knowledges included to modern HE institutions in the late Qing is the 
Confucian canon, and under the Communist regime the Soviet Union becomes the major provider of 
HE curricular knowledges. Also, the exemplary pedagogy, which understands students as passive 
targets of education, became the principle pedagogical choice in HE settings and has remained so 
during most of its modern history and till today, with perhaps only a brief interruption during the 
Cultural Revolution. The enclosed campuses of Qinghua and Yanjing (Yanching in early texts) are still 
models of contemporary campus design and some of the early techniques of spatial government are 
still in use today, such as the dormitory regulations. 
For the political dimension, ongoing attempts have been made by various governing regimes to 
influence all three components, such the inclusion and exclusion of knowledges for HE curriculum, the 
introduction of new forms pedagogy under state socialism, and the regulation upon the size and 
function of university campus in contemporary China. I am not suggesting that these attempts 
necessarily determine the construction of HE curriculum, pedagogy and campus, but considering the 
fact that China has been for the most part of its history subject to the governance of authoritarian 
regimes, these attempts may have been more successful in establishing hegemonic accounts and forms 
of these components, and this is perhaps the case as my discussion above has shown. And such 
hegemonic accounts and forms have within them a polemical purpose, knowleges, pedagogy and 
spatial practices are suffused with socio-political agenda and cultural assumptions. These agenda and 
assumption resolve around norms, discourses and strategies of what streams and factions of 
knowledges should be prioritised in the knowledge production and transmission, what pedagogical 
practices can best serve the aims of HE, what shapes and functions of HE campus can best reflect and 
serve the 'spirit' of modern universities. 
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Summary of Part II - The Will to HE 
In Part II, I have analysed HE as a complex apparatus made of a variety of components; each of these 
components — principle, system, curriculum, pedagogy, and campus, involves multiple power relations 
and cannot be reduced to a single powerful will. Therefore HE as an apparatus should not be regarded 
as 'ideological state apparatus', as a mere reflection of dominant ideologies. Instead, during the 
emergence and deployment of HE, some alternative forms of HE discourses and practices competed 
with their dominating counterparts, which were mostly promoted and directed by the successive 
authoritarian political regimes. 
Such enduring competitions between the dominating and the alternative forms of HE give rise to a 
certain hegemonic account of HE. This hegemonic account of HE revolves around a number of issues, 
such as what ends HE should be intended to achieve, what needs HE should primarily serve, what 
forms of subjects HE should attempt to produce, through what means, and regulated by whom; it also 
involves some more detailed issues, such as what curricular contents HE should choose, what 
pedagogical practices HE should be organised through, in what campus space HE should be carried 
out, etc. This hegemonic account of HE is what I called 'the will to HE'. 
Though certain political forces have been more influential than others in directing this will towards 
certain objectives, there has been some room for agency and resistance. As my previous discussion has 
shown, the will to HE is a complex assemblage, through which struggles over the discourses and 
practices of HE in modern China constantly take place. However there has been a noticeable 
imbalance of power relations in the struggles over the will to HE, and that HE in the history of modern 
China has been deployed to serve certain ends more often than others; for instance, the needs of the 
nation/state has been often prioritised over those of individual subjects, and the emphasises on 
sciences and technologies over social sciences and humanities have been noticeable in most periods, in 
particular under state socialism. This power imbalance, however, does not determine the will to HE 
entirely, but only serves to shape it, and such an imbalance among multiple power relations, among 
different voices and authorities, among various discourses and practices, is not stable, and but rather is 
constantly shifting among different social-political forces. And during this constant shifting that 
alternative forms of HE may begin to emerge. I shall return to this in the final chapter. 
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Part III 
Governing Through HE 
Framework for Part III 
Governing Through HE 
In this section, I put together some of the theoretical tools that are particularly useful (but not 
exclusive) to my discussion in Part III, including subject and subjectivity, government and 
governmentality, etc. 
To analyse government 'is to analyse those practices that try and shape, sculpt, mobilise and work 
through the choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants and lifestyles of individuals and groups'(Dean, 
1999, p. 12). To do so, Dean puts forwards a method of what he terms an 'analytic of government'. For 
Dean (1999, p. 21), an analytic of government should focus on what can be termed as 'regimes of 
practices', or organised practices through which one is governed and through which one governs 
oneself. Rather than focusing on particular practices of government, Dean argues that 'an analytics of 
government examines the conditions under which regimes of practices come into being, are maintained 
and are transformed'. Here, Dean suggests that one should shift one's attention from the empirical 
activities of government to the emergence and development of particular regimes of practices that aim 
at shaping human conducts towards certain desirable objectives. He also calls for attention to the 
maintenance and transformation of regimes of practices apart from their emergences. 
In this regard, if one is to understand of HE as such a regime of practices in modern China, one should 
Governing HE subjects 1, Rationality 
2, Authorities 
3, Technologies and Techniques 
4, Desires and choices 
Table 7, Dimensions of Government through HE 
look into the ways in which HE is invented and deployed as a form of government, as an assemblages 
of various technologies and techniques, as a ways in which attitudes, understandings, desires and 
choices of a particular form of advanced learning come into being, how these desires and choices in 
turn shape and adjust the conducts of populations and individuals, how these populations and 
individuals as subjects of HE are encouraged to participate in a variety of activities that resolve around 
HE, may they be believing in the effects of HE in national salvation, preparing intensively for the 
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College Entrance Examination, reading university life guides, joining various university clubs and 
societies, and seeking career opportunities on one's own, etc. 
The Foucauldian notion of government and governmantality, and Dean's approach of an analytic of 
government can be very useful for this research, as they enable one to cut across a succession of 
political regimes in modern China, to look beyond chaos of regime changes and societal upsets for 
perhaps a certain coherence in the rationalities, strategies or logics of HE. Despite the contradictions 
among rival political philosophies and ideologies in the history of government in modem China, these 
rationalities strategies and logics may continuously serve to shape human conduct in similar fashions. 
For instance, concerns with education and productivity of population are shared by various political 
regimes in modem China — late Qing Empire, the Nationalist government, and the Communist 
government in both socialist and post-socialist eras, and also the ways in which HE has been promoted 
to serve the greater good of national prosperity are very much consistent across the history of modem 
China. 
Moreover, if we are to understand HE as a form of government, and as a part of governmentality, this 
notion of government provides us with a framework that makes visible the ways in which HE is used 
to shape the conducts of populations and individuals in modem China, how governmental objectives 
are translated into the norms of individual conducts, desires, aspirations, and beliefs. To do so, one can 
explore government via HE by looking at the dimensions of government — first, what is the rationality 
of HE in modem China with regard to its aims, development and deployment?; second, what are the 
authorities and agencies involved in the undertaking of government via HE?; third, what are the 
technologies and techniques invented and deployed in the undertaking of government via HE?; fourth, 
what are the desires, beliefs, choices and other normative activities are introduced and fostered to 
facilitate the government via HE? 
My discussion in Part III is based on the framework in the table below, and resolves around these 
questions above. In Table 8, I summary the framework for my discussion in this Part. 
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Chapter 7 Rationalities and Authorities 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will discuss the notions of government and governmentality, and how these notions 
can be useful in a critical history of the government of HE and its subjects in modern China. Also, I 
will engage with two dimensions of the governing process – rationalities and authorities. 
Rationalities 
The Foucauldian perspective of government and Dean's analytic approach enable one to move beyond 
the gaps, inconsistencies and contradictions among policies and political regimes, etc., and to seek 
rationalities, or logics, and strategies of a particular regime of practices across time, space and cultures, 
to trace 'any systematic way of representing, thinking and acting upon a particular field of intervention 
such as a school, community, or workplace' (Ball, 2003, p. 2, footnote). For instance, if we are 
understand participation of HE in contemporary societies around the world as a regime of practices, we 
can then go beyond the differences among HE policies such as funding and enrolment procedures 
among countries, and instead focus on the ways in which HE as an assemblage of human technologies 
is integrated into contemporary socio-political mechanism of 'talent cultivation' (rencai peiyang), 
meritocratic selection and social development. As Dean (1999, p. 21) further argues that, 
`an analytics of government will seek to constitute the intrinsic logic or strategy of a regime of practices 
that cannot be simply read off from particular programmes, theories and polices of reform. The strategic 
logic of a regime of practices can only be constructed through understanding its operation as an 
intentional but non-subjective assemblage of all its elements. That is to say that regimes of practices 
possess a logic that is irreducible to the explicit intentions of any one actor but yet evinces an orientation 
toward a particular matrix of ends and purposes. It is necessary to be extremely careful to distinguish 
between the strategy of regimes of practices and the programmes that attempt to invest them with 
particular purposes.' 
To make reference to HE in modern China, one can argue that, in the light of my discussion in Part II, 
HE can be understood as an intentional assemblage of principles, systems, curriculum, pedagogy and 
campus space, and its underlying strategic rationalities seems to orient it towards this matrix of ends 
and purposes resolving around the fostering, mobilising and deployment of educated personnel or 
`talents', primarily for the good of the nation rather than individuals. Although various political 
regimes at different stages devise different policies and practices to serve their interests and agendas- 
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for instance, the Communist regime introduced positive discrimination against the working class in the 
college enrolment procedures—they may to great extent agree upon the strategic logic that the 
cultivation of skilled personnel is essential to the national development. 
In this section, the focus of my discussion is the rationalities of HE as a means of government and a 
part of governmentality in modern China. I will make reference to my discussion in previous chapters, 
in particular Chapter 4 on the articulation of HE principles. I will also engage with other historical 
materials and discursive elements. But first, I want to discuss the applications of government and 
governmentality in the Chinese context. 
Governmentality and China 
Until recently, governmentality studies has been predominantly associated with advanced liberal 
democracies and overlooked non-liberal forms of governmentality in both western and non-western 
contexts. As it has been subject to authoritarian rule for most of its history, China has been mostly left 
out of the discussion of governmentality. 
The discussion of China's governmentality is made possible first by Dean, who reveals both 
facilitative and authoritarian dimensions of liberal government. He notes that the distinction between 
liberal and authoritarian forms of rule rests on the grounds that the former governs through freedom, 
whereas the latter rejects a conception of limited government and the rights of individual citizens. But 
he questions this distinction by arguing that 'liberalism is itself interlaced with forms of despotism for 
those who are deemed not (or not yet) to possess the attributes required of the autonomous and 
responsible subject'. Such groups include indigenous peoples, women, homosexuals, etc. 
A number of scholarly works have addressed the notion of China's governmentality, for instance in the 
special issue of Economy and Society (Jeffreys and Sigley, 2006) and the most recent completion of 
China's Governmentalities (Ball, 2006). Sigley, for instance, has produced a series of works in this 
regard (2003; 1996; 2004a; Sigley, Jolly and Ram, 2001). He borrows Dean's idea of 'art of 
government', which refers to 
`various forms of thought about the nature of rule and knowledge of who and what are to be governed, 
and ... particular techniques and tactics in achieving its goals ... and definite identities for the governed 
and the governors, and ... about all, it involves a more or less subtle direction of the conduct of the 
governed' (Dean, 1999, p. 18). 
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In contrast to 'liberal art of government', Sigley introduces the notion of 'socialist arts of government 
or Chinese governmentality, which governs not through familiar tactics of 'freedom and liberty', but 
rather through a distinct planning and administrative rationality (Jeffreys and Sigley, 2009, p. 5)'. In 
his studies of population policies in socialist and post-socialist China, Sigley further articulates the 
features of China's socialist governmentality that 
`Chinese governmentality differs from liberal western variants in its perception of the limits regarding 
what can be known about the object to be governed. Liberal reasoning is "sceptical" about the possibility 
of knowing the object to be governed in detail and thereby employs an array of indirect methods of 
shaping human conduct. In contrast, China's socialist governmentality, especially as its developed under 
the Maoist period, claimed that through the science of Marxism-Leninism it was possible not to "know" 
the object to be governed, but also to predict the precise outcome of any possible intervention (Jeffreys 
and Sigley, 2009, p. 7).' 
Among the authoritarian arts of government, what stands out as most significant is the technoscientific 
reasoning under state socialism, in particular during Maoist period. This technoscientific reasoning is 
most distinguishable by its reliance on administrative commands to reach state objectives; the human 
body in this reasoning is acted upon in a very instrumental way, as passive target of administrative and 
planning intervention. Sigley (2009, p. 549) points out that this technoscientific reasoning equates 
human (re)production with material production, and therefore brings human reproduction under the 
dictates of the administrative planning state. This observation also applies to the government of HE. 
The socialist state would predict the need for personnel for each post in every industry in the country, 
and accordingly set up plans for HE recruitment and graduate assignment. The application of 
technoscientific reasoning has not gone uncontested. Also, it overlooked the possible mismatch 
between the production of the graduates and the needs of the state sectors that might arise as a result 
of, for instance, the time gap between the prediction of the needs and the completion of personnel 
production (university education normally takes 4 years), or simply the changes of personnel demands 
in the enormous machine of socialist production. But nonetheless, this technoscientific reasoning 
pervasive in the government of HE did not change fundamentally until the reform era when the market 
mechanism was introduced to supplement the planning mechanisms. Although this reasoning 
disregarded the wishes and needs of individual students, which is consistent with the authoritarian arts 
of government in modern China, it gave rise to a discourse of socialist security — students who are 
enrolled in HE will not have to worry about their future employment as the state has already made 
plans for them. This discourse of socialist security is still cited with admiration with perhaps 
misguided confidence in state socialism by the contemporary students who are now invariably faced 
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with the risks of a market economy — meaning one is responsible for one's own career after graduation. 
I will map out these socialist forms of government and technologies later in this Part. 
But in the post-socialist China, the socialist governmentality is infused with other forms of 
government, most noticeably some element of neoliberalism. In Sigley (2006), he discusses the change 
from `Jihua' to `Guihua' in the official discourses, most noticeably in the Eleventh Five-year Plan 
(Zhonggong zhongyang, 2005). lihua' was the official phrase for the socialist plan in China, which 
implies detailed planning and orthodox socialist interventions, while `Guihua' implies a more 
managerial and supervisory role for the CCP and Government 's. This new approach in China, as 
Sigley (2006) points out, is characterised by the rise of a discourse of 'governance' (zhili), which 
suggests a shift in the forms of exercising authority. The notion of 'governance' draws upon 'a 
neoliberal vocabulary of empowerment, responsibility and accountability' (p.6), but in the Chinese 
contexts, it does not suggest an immediate connection with neoliberalism as an ideology in a simplistic 
fashion; it rather understands neoliberalism as a form of practice for government, 'insofar as it extends 
the scope of government to include not only the state but also other actors and process that appears to 
be of greater conceptual utility' (p.9). 
In the recent Chinese discussions of government, this shift is integrated in the context of 'changing 
functions of the Government' (zhengfu zhineng zhuan bian), which means a shift in the task of 
government from 'planning' (jihua) and 'administration' (xingzheng) to one that is featured by 
`management' and 'governance'. And with regard to the governing of subjects, Sigley points out, 
`in the context of present-day China ... one-party rule increasingly is achieved through recourse to a rule 
of law and associated conceptions of citizenship, as well as through governmental interventions that seek 
to govern certain subjects from a distance, by relying on their individual choices, aspirations or 
capacities.' (6) 
But this is not to suggest the neo-liberal arts of government have supplanted the socialist 
governmentality. Sigley argues, governance in China 
`is best understood as an amalgamation of "socialist" and "neoliberal" statecraft. "Governance" as it 
relates to the "socialist market economy" in many ways continues the scientific and technocratic 
tendencies of socialist government (p.13)'. 
As Sigley explains, the neoliberal arts of government have become integrated into 
18 I will use Government with a capital 'G' to refer to the political regime, the party-state apparatus. 
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`the new technoscientific-administrative Party-state — a mixture of conventional Chinese socialist 
technologies of government such as "the mass line" and seemingly neoliberal strategies designed to 
govern through the desires of individuals conceived of as consumers, property-owners, job seekers, and 
citizens (not as workers for the revolution). It is this combination of market autonomy and 
technoscientific-administrative regulation that characterizes the "socialist market economy" and Deng 
Xiaoping's notion of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" (p.9).' 
The shift in the forms of government and the mixture of technologies manifest themselves in the 
governing of HE subjects, most noticeably in the post-socialist technologies of the social and of the 
self that promote autonomy, choices and accountability in the management of one's own HE 
experience and job hunting. I will engage with these issues later in the following chapters. Now I turn 
back to the discussion of rationalities of HE. 
Based on the discussions of governmentality literatures and studies (Bakken, 2000b; Brockling, 
Krasmann and Lemke, 2009; Burchell, Gordon and Miller, 1991; Foucault, 1979; Jeffreys, 2009; 
Jeffreys and Sigley, 2006; 2009; Sigley, 1996; 2004b; 2006; 2009; Sigley, Jolly and Ram, 2001; Yang, 
2011), I intend to discuss the idea of rationalities of HE with regard to three perspectives of 
govemmentality — the mentality of government, concerns disclosed for population and economy, and 
the alignment between government and individuals (Dean, 1999). I will not engage with the 
perspective of governmentalisation here as it belongs to a different political register, and bears little 
relevance to this discussion of governing HE subjects. 
HE as a Solution 
I now discuss the rationalities of HE with regard to these three dimensions in turn. By focusing on the 
mentality aspect, governmentality emphasises 
`the way in which the thought involved in practices of government is collective and relatively taken for 
granted, i.e. not usually open to questioning by its practitioners. To say that these mentalities are 
collective is ... to say that the way we think about exercising authority draw upon the theories, ideas, 
philosophies and forms of knowledge that are a part of our social and cultural products' (Dean, 1999, p. 
20). 
In this regard, I want to address the issue of the role of HE in modern Chinese society, essentially, to 
what HE is understood as a solution? My question is not to what extent HE actually helps to solve 
various social, political and managerial issues such as equality of access, scientific advancement and 
integration between research and the world of work, but rather to what problems, dilemmas, issues has 
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HE been introduced, developed and positioned as a solution, as a cure? This very question is perhaps 
the most unexplained dimension of the rationalities of HE in modem China. 
The Leagues of Nations Report (Becker et al, 1932b) on Chinese education provides us with a clue. 
This report was commissioned by then the Nationalist Party, and was intended to help prepare a plan 
for a comprehensive education reform. This report, which is highly critical, tackles the early thinking 
of educational development in republican China, but also provides a benchmark for the evaluation of 
pre-communist education system (Pepper, 1996, p. 37). In the section on HE, the reports concludes that 
the Chinese had not yet understood the function of a modem university, with a particular reference to 
the pedagogical practices in HEIs — a modem university should not aim to supply knowledge to 
passive students but to train them to acquire it for themselves. Also, with regard to the rationalities of 
HE, the report points out a prevailing misunderstanding of HE among Chinese educators of the time, 
who 
`continually put forward the argument that the Europe and America of to-day are the products of the 
scientific development of modern times, and that in consequence, China has only to adopt the scientific 
and technical equipment of those countries in order, thanks to the intellectual energy of the people, to 
attain a standard of culture as high as that of America or Europe. Our invariable answer to this argument 
was that the contention is a false one; that modem science and technique did not give birth to the 
present-day America and Europe; that, on the contrary, it is European and American mind which has 
engendered modem science and technique and brought them to their present high level... The 
fundamental problem which arises in regard to education in China is not a question of imitation but of 
creation and adaption' (Becker et al, 1932b, pp. 27 -28, emphasis in original). 
The report argues here that modem Europe and America were not the products of science and 
technology, but it was the other way round. Therefore, China could not become similarly advanced 
simply by acquiring Western science and technology. Also, it would be misleading for Chinese 
educators to equate modernisation with the mere imitation of foreign models of schooling and HE. 
With regard to the rationalities of HE, what the report implies is that, first, the Chinese had 
overestimated the contribution of HE and its institutions to the scientific and technological and social 
development of modem Europe and America, and hence its potential contribution to China as a nation 
in crisis; second, by simply adapting to the foreign models of HE, the Chinese HE system would not 
necessarily succeed in adapting to the conditions of its home culture. 
As my discussions in Chapter 4 have shown, HE in modem China has occurred under the very 
conception the report criticised as 'false'. The early development of HE was influenced by a variety of 
foreign models, Japanese, European, American and Soviet. Additionally, the discourses still prevail 
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that HE is indispensable to the development of the nation as it produces highly educated personnel the 
provision of which makes the scientific, technological and social advancement of the nation possible. 
Therefore, I argue that HE in modem China was proposed as a solution to two problems — first, the 
scientific, technological and societal disadvantages of China in comparison to its foreign counterparts, 
America, Europe and Japan; second, its shortage of highly educated personnel that were essential to 
the process of catching up with these foreign countries. In contemporary discourses, these two 
problems still prevail — first, the disadvantage in science and technology between China and developed 
countries still exists, and accordingly Chinese universities should catch up with their foreign 
counterparts and strive to be 'world class' (as the '985' project suggests) so that in turn Chinese 
universities can accelerate scientific and technological advancement in China; second, China is still in 
great needs of 'talents' to compete with other countries in an age of global economy. 
The idea of 'talent cultivation' (rencai peiyang) has underpinned the development of HE in modem 
China. The idea of 'talents' has been most closely integrated into the rationalities of HE — it is the 
primary aim to produce 'talents' to serve the social, economic, political, scientific and technological 
development of the nation. Therefore, 'talents' in the Chinese contexts refer to highly educated 
personnel that are equipped with knowledge, professional skills, expertise in particular areas, and 
devotion to their nation. Their bodily and intellectual capacities are to be fostered, cultivated and 
optimised primarily for the use of a collective, may it be the Party, the state, or the nation. If one fails 
to serve the requests of one's nation, regardless of what these specific requests may be under different 
political regimes, even if he or she is equipped with professional expertise, one will not be 
acknowledge as 'talents'. Moreover, the discourses of 'talent cultivation' also imply that the requests 
of the nation, may they be national salvation or reconstruction, or socio-economic development, need 
the production of the `talents'; this directs HE to serving its own agenda as institutions of laissez faire 
spirits, but to serve the agenda of the nation by producing 'talents' with desirable characteristics for 
other broader objectives than their own individual goods. 
A quick historical review of 'talents' production in modern China would help to illustrate my 
arguments here. In late Qing, modem HE institutions and curriculum were introduced to produce 
highly educated personnel to cope with the immediate national crisis in diplomacy and warfare. In the 
Republican era, HE was still strongly associated with the discourse of national salvation and 
modernisation, although in the first half of the era, HEIs institutions enjoyed a relatively high degree of 
autonomy, an age of laissez faire, in the second half of the Republican era, the Nationalist government 
soon sought to seize control of the HE system by launching its 'Party-doctrine education' campaign 
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and HE was directed to make immediate contribution to the national salvation and strengthening by 
producing 'talents' in science and technology and with loyalty to the party doctrine. Under the 
Communist rule, the entire HE system underwent a radical transformation after the Soviet Model in the 
1950s, with all institutions nationalised and reorganised into three forms — comprehensive universities,. 
polytechnics and specialised colleges, no such a HE system as such could best serve the national 
restoration and development by producing technocratic 'talents' who would serve the socialist 
development of the nation with narrow yet specific experts in their assigned posts. In the post-socialist 
China, the new form of 'talents' includes a certain degree of autonomy and accountability (in 
managing one's HE experience and job choice) and contribution to the development of a socialist 
market economy and to the over-all national strength (zhonghe guoli). 
Apparently, the repeated warfare in the first of the 20th century provides a persuasive justification for 
the argument that talents production should serve the needs of the nation. In the second half of the 
century, this argument was sustained by fighting against 'foreign imperialism' (e.g. the U.S), and 
enhancing 'overall national strength' in a global age. To some extent, one might say social Darwinism, 
which was introduced into China in late Qing, and later via manpower planning strategy in high 
socialist China and human capital theory in the post-socialist China have been integrated into of the 
rationalities of HE — the cultivation and production of 'talents', of highly educated personnel, is most 
essential to the survival and revival of the nation; with the development of HE and the personnel it 
fosters, the development of the nation is made possible by advancement in science, industry, 
technology and economics, etc. Without HE and the talents it produces, China is vulnerable to the 
hostility of foreign powers, may they be military invasion or market competition or financial wars. 
HE as Social Selection 
A second perspective of governmentality refers to a form of conceptualizing and exercising of power 
in certain societies' that resolves around the connection between economy and population. As Dean 
explains, 
`the emergence of this modern governmentality can be identified by a particular regime of government that takes as 
its object 'the population' and is coincident with the emergence of political economy (and its successor, economics). 
Government, henceforth, will be required to be a government of 'each and all', evincing a concern for every 
individual and the population as a whole. Thus government involves the health, welfare, prosperity and happiness of 
the population... The new object of government, by contrast, regards these subjects, and the forces and capacities of 
living individuals, as members of a population, as resources to be fostered, to be used and to be optimised. 
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(Moreover), governmentality seeks to enframe the population within what might be called apparatuses of security... 
(which) includes health, education and social welfare systems and the mechanisms of the management of the 
national economy. It thus encompasses those institutions and practices concerned to defend, maintain and secure a 
national population and those that secure the economic, demographic and social processes that are found to exist 
within that population (Dean, 1999, pp. 19-20)'. 
This perspective of government sheds some interesting light on the role of education in modem China. 
For now, I will only focus on the issue of population. Education as a form of government in modern 
China can be understood as a government of 'each and all'. From late Qing to contemporary China, 
continuous efforts can be identified to promote education within the entire nation, to reach into the 
most remote regions, to include every child whether in wealth and poverty. The late Qing regards a 
lack education of its population as the reason for its defeats against foreign invasions; compulsory 
education was introduced in early Republican era by a number of warlords and was integrated in the 
discourses of social modernity; the contemporary regime links a low participation rate in compulsory 
education in certain regions with their socio-economic backwardness, which become an obstacle to the 
national development and the improvement of the entire population. Education in modern China, and 
as I have shown in previous chapters, HE in particular, is clearly a component of an 'apparatus of 
security', insofar that education improves the physical, moral, and intellectual wellbeing of the 
population and hence contributes to the defence of the nation in repeated warfare and other 
turbulences. Education can be understood as a optimizing technology in terms of its contribution to the 
improvement of wealth, health, happiness, prosperity, efficiency of its targeting population (Zhang and 
Ong, 2008). 
However, education does not only serve to optimize, but it also selects. Its selection function is most 
evident in the HE sector. A variety of discourses and technology of HE aims to mobilize as many 
candidates as possible for HE so the society can make a selection of the best, the most suitable and the 
most promising, and also by promoting this form of social selection, the general quality of the 
population is also to be improved. These two objectives, social selection and improvement of 
`population quality', are much imbedded in the discourse of human quality in modem China. A 
number of scholars have addressed this issue of human quality (see Sigley, 1996; 2009 for a good 
review of the discourse of the body in modem China), and in particular its contemporary version of 
`suzhi' (Anagnost, 2004; Jacka, 2009; Kipnis, 2006; Kipnis, 2007; Murphy, 2004) and `suzhi 
education' (1932a; Kipnis, 2007; Woronov, 2009). 
143 
The discourse of population quality in early modern China, as Sigley (2009) explains, was closely 
associated with the dissemination of theories of race and citizenship (Yan Fu's translated works, for 
instance, which I mentioned in Chapter 5), and knowledge of modern medicine and science. The 
notion of population quality enables 'the calculation of the value of a particular subject in relation to 
the overall national stock', and also requires regulation and protection of life itself. A key concern was 
to shrug off the image of China as the 'sick man of Asia' (dongya bingfu) rising from the military 
defeats from late Qing onwards, and to ensure that China would never be humiliated by foreign 
powers. In the Republican era, it was widely understood that the physical, mental and moral attributes 
of the citizen were significant to the survival and revival of the nation, and also to the modernisation of 
a 'backward' society'. In the socialist era, the population quality was understood as both the physical 
and quantifiable features of the body and also forms of human conduct that can be measured in terms 
of technical moral and cultural value, both of which are open to governmental intervention and 
administration and can be improved either by the subjects themselves through 'self-improvement' or 
by other administrative measures. 
In the post-socialist China, the notion `suzhi' began to prevail. Jacka (2009, p. 524) for instance, 
provides an excellent review of the suzhi discourses in modern China and related studies. She (p. 524) 
points out that suzhi 
`refers to the innate and nurtured physical, psychological, intellectual, moral and ideological qualities of 
human bodies and their conducts ... (It) is of critical importance to contemporary China's booming, 
globally oriented market economy and to new, "postsocialist" forms of state governance and social 
control. It plays a central role in contemporary processes of citizenship, simultaneously contributing to 
understandings of the responsibilities, obligations, claims, and rights that connect members of society to 
the state; to determinations of which individuals and social groups are included in this set of rights and 
responsibilities and which are excluded; to discourses on how to produce the "ideal" citizen as well as 
what to do about the less-than-ideal citizen; and to processes and institutions that produce and reproduce 
boundaries and gradations between different types of citizenship and citizen ... suzhi is very much a part 
of contemporary public culture, being reproduced by numerous different social actors and in a variety of 
popular, as well as official, discourses.' 
The all-embracing concept of `suzhi' itself is hard to define. It is closely connected to other keywords 
of socio-political development in the history of modern China such as modernity and civilisation. 
From the perspective of social inequality, a number of scholars (Anagnost, 2004; Kipnis, 2006; 
Murphy, 2004) argue that suzhi is not merely a normative goal or substance that is supposedly 
attainable by all; more importantly, the discourses of suzhi implies a form of lacking, an absence of 
particular qualities among some social groups, and therefore justifies the systematic social inequalities 
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that put these groups in social and educational disadvantages. Murphy (2004, p. 3) suggests, 
`Suzhi derives part of its ideological potency through its reinforcement of related systems of valuation 
already embedded within Chinese development discourse, such as town versus country, developed versus 
backward, prosperous versus poor, civilised versus barbarian, and to have culture (you wenhua) versus to 
be without culture (mei wenhua)'. 
Ann Anagnost (2004, p. 190), one of the first to write about suzhi, argues that 
`the discourse of suzhi appears most elaborated in relation to two figures: the body of the rural migrant, 
which exemplifies suzhi in its apparent absence, and the body of the urban, middle-class only child, 
which is fetishised as a site for the accumulation of the very dimensions of suzhi wanting in its "other".' 
Anagnost further draws on research on rural-to-urban migrant women and argues that suzhi plays an 
important role in China's neoliberal governmentality and its incorporation with global capitalism. She 
points out that suzhi serves as a 'value coding' to differentiate and highlight gaps between various 
social groups and in this case between migrant workers from rural areas and the urban middle class. In 
this way, suzhi is used to justify worker exploitation and to legitimate and reinforce the systemic 
causes of levels of social inequality in contemporary China. 
Another important perspective connected to suzhi is the concept of suzhi jiaoyu (education for 
quality), which has since the late 1990s come to dominate discussions of suzhi in China and has, 
indeed, become a national obsession (Kipnis, 2006). Suzhi jiaoyu is proposed as an pedagogical 
alternative to yingshi jiaoyu (education for passing exams), and is intended to foster creativity, civic 
responsibility and overall personal development. Reforms to promote suzhi jiaoyu include 
`encouraging self-expression, manual dexterity, life skills appropriate to the local environment, and 
extra-curricula activities such as music, sport and art' (Murphy, 2004, p. 4). But the concept of suzhi 
jiaoyu has been widely criticised as being empty, all-inclusive and therefore difficult to practice in 
real-life educational settings, and as it requires better-trained teachers and educational resources for 
students, suzhi jiaoyu is usually exclusive to urban schools (Kipnis, 2006). 
Murphy (2004) engages with the discouses and practice of suzhi jiaoyu (education for human quality), 
identifies a similar situation to that of migrant workers in rural educational setting. She argues that the 
education system in China puts students in rural areas in further disadvantages to their urban 
counterparts by labeling them as low suzhi and by filtering them out in social selections and 
accordingly preparing them for rural lives. She states, 
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`the education system disseminates a meritocratic ideology that labels and filters out low suzhi rural 
people, legitimizing structural biases... Filtering may be seen in the view common among university 
recruiters that "a child with high ability and low grades is preferable to a child with high grades and low 
ability." In practice this means that local urban children are favoured because they possess artistic, 
sporting or English language abilities which bring honour to the university in regional competitions. 
Students from predominately rural provinces with fewer universities are further disadvantaged because 
most major city universities stipulate a higher entry requirement for applicants from outside their area'. 
The role of HE in the discourses of human quality and suzhi lies in first its 'exemplary' effects, 
(Bakken, 2000a), that the subjects of HE, may they be applicants, students or graduates, are supposed 
to be at the highest of the human quality hierarchy. Despite the fact that the measurement of 'quality' 
may vary greatly from one another across the history, those who are eventually chosen by HE are 
nonetheless the ones who best match the standard of ideal 'quality'. This is confirmed by the old 
discourses of those who succeed in the Imperial Examination as 'the student of the Emperor' (tianzi 
mensheng) and the contemporary discourses of university students as 'the treasured children of the 
heaven' (tianzhi jiaozi). In other words, presumably, those who succeed in the social selection via HE 
are believed to possess the best of 'human quality' in various perspectives. In reality, this assumption is 
repeated challenged by news reports on wrong doings of university students. I will further engage with 
this issue of human quality in the discussion of the technology of the social in the next chapter, and 
further the role of the suzhi discourses in promoting certain forms of subjects and subjectivities in 
Chapter 10. 
HE as Self-governance 
A third perspective of government 'refers to the structures of power by which conduct is organised and 
by which governance is aligned with the self-organizing capacities of individual subjects'. (35) The 
usefulness of this approach toward the notion of government is the way in which it provides a 
language and a framework to conceptualise the linkages between questions of government and politics 
with questions of subjects, self, identity and personhood. It offers us a new perspective to understand 
the relations between politics and subjectivities. Such linkages, or relations, between the micro-
practices of mundane everyday lives of the many and what one normally calls government in capitals 
and concrete buildings, in other words, between the micro-physics of power and the objectives of 
government, are made possible through what Rose terms the 'translation' process. He writes (1999, 48 
50), 
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`In dynamics of translation, alignments are forged between the objectives of authorities wishing to govern and the 
personal projects of those organisations, groups and processes of various sorts that linkages are assembled between 
political agencies, public bodies, economic, legal, medical, social and technical authorities, and the aspirations, 
judgements and ambitions of formally autonomous entities, be these firms, factories, pressure groups, families and 
individuals'. 
In terms of the translation from governmental objectives to individual drives, such a process under the 
authoritarian governmentality may appear greatly different from that under the neoliberal 
governmentality, as it underplays the importance individual desires and rights. Instead, the 
authoritarian discourses state that the wishes, desires, choices, and freedom of individuals should all 
give way to the needs and demands of the collective, simply because if the collective is destroyed, 
there will be no protection of individuals. 
This perspective is most useful if one is to understand the operation of HE as a contemporary form of 
government in the post-socialist China. HE is increasingly promoted as an individual investment in 
one's capital, may it be human, social or intellectual, and participation in HE is associated with a neo-
liberal vocabulary of 'choice', 'freedom', and 'value', and participants are equipped with a variety of 
desires of 'social mobility', 'economic return' and 'personal development' and hence turned into 
`desiring subjects' (Rofel, 2007, p. 35). Moreover, the state is withdrawing from its involvement in 
HE, for instance, the abolishment of the job assignment system in the mid-1990s to allow university 
graduates to seek employment opportunities on their own, to make them 'autonomous choosers' and 
at the same time,`self-responsible individuals' (Hoffman, 2003; 2006; 2010). 
In post-socialist China, technoscientific reasoning is now infused with a Neoliberal reasoning. On the 
one hand, the production of highly educated personnel is held as a national strategy of global 
competition; on the other hand, the optimisation and cultivation of such personnel can be better 
facilitated if each individual is given a certain degree of autonomy to allow themselves to explore and 
foster their own interests, needs, desires and aspirations and ask them to take responsibility and govern 
themselves. In this regard, some scholars focus on how the discourses and practices of suzhi serve to 
produce certain forms of self-governing subjects (Jacka, 2007; Kipnis, 2007; 2009a; Tomba, 2009b). 
Woronov (2009), for instance, understands suzhi jiaoyu as a set of biopolitical techniques intended to 
cultivate a generation of children that embody and enact China's modernity and power on the world 
stage. He suggests, that these techniques and disciplines, such as self-assessment grid, are to produce a 
unified cohort of high-quality young citizens who are capable of self-governing for the good of the 
nation. 
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Within the discourses and practices of HE, this self-governance may include making choices of their 
specialties, selecting some optional courses, arrangement with join various clubs and societies on 
campus, and most importantly, choosing their career path. I will discuss this issue in more detail in 
both Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 under 'the technologies of the self' and 'desires and choices'. 
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Authorities 
Hegemonic Authorities 
Although I refuse to understand HE as a mere reflection of dominant ideologies and political powers, it 
is perhaps rather noticeable that the central Governments have played a significant role in the shaping 
and directing of HE in the history of modern China. I am not suggesting that the central Governments, 
either the late Qing or the Nationalist or the Communist, have determined the functions and outlooks 
of HE, but my previous discussion has already shown that they did have significant influence in this 
regard. Most noticeably, I have indicated that it was the successive central Governments that 
established certain hegemonic principles of HE, and despite the changes of political regimes, these 
hegemonic principles of HE appeared largely coherent in that, for example, HE should provide direct 
and immediate serve to the needs of the nation/state, rather than those of individual subjects. My 
discussion of other dimensions have also revealed that hegemonic accounts of HE established by the 
central Governments have also deeply affected the shape of the system, the formulation of curriculum, 
the choice of pedagogy and the arrangement of campus. 
Sufficient to say, the successive central Governments are the hegemonic authorities in the government 
of HE in modern China, and the assemblage of HE apparatus has been largely shaped, if not 
determined, by such hegemonic authorities. But the central Governments as the hegemonic authorities 
have not been without challenges from other alternative authorities, most noticeable those from 
academia and the public intellectuals. 
Alternative Authorities 
From late Qing onwards, the public intellectuals became increasing active and reflective upon the 
future of a nation in deep crisis, and in the early Republican era, a large number of them devoted 
themselves to HE and schooling; some of the most influential figures that I quoted in early chapters, 
such as Cai Yuanpei, Jiang Menglin, and Hu Shi are examples of the early founders of modern HE in 
China. These early founders had either been exposed to foreign HE, in Europe, America, or Japan, or 
deeply imbedded in the traditional Confucian education mentality, or both. They were among the small 
circle of social and intellectual elites in early modern China, and their understanding of HE and 
schooling gave rise to different forms of modern educational institutions, underpinned by a variety of 
educational philosophy and logics, which in turned shaped the early structure of HE. 
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Their articulations and criticisms of HE in modern China also became the authoritative voices, which 
are still echoed in contemporary China. Most noticeably, they are now generally regarded as the 'great 
masters' (dashi), as a particular group of outstanding achievers in their professions, who made massive 
contributions to the nation. China Central Television produced a documentary series of 100 great 
masters, most of whom are influential figures from the Republican era. And the prevailing discourses 
of HE teaching tend to present these great masters as the ideal form of university staff, as a benchmark 
against which teachers in contemporary universities should be evaluated. 
In fact, the influence of academia and the public intellectuals of the Republican era on the government 
of HE was rather brief. It was only because of the absence of a strong central Government in the first 
half of the period that they managed to direct HE away from the hegemonic accounts mentioned 
above. In the second half of the Republican era, officials at the central Nationalist government also 
attempted to established themselves as the authorities of HE, as they represented the ruling party of the 
state, and hence the interests of the state. The Nationalist officials demanded that HE should provide 
immediate service to the Party-state, and that academia should accordingly follow the guide of the 
Party rather than the laissez faire mentality of the early years. The resistance of academia was fierce, 
but the struggle was unresolved as war followed. 
It was under the Communist regime, in particular under the Maoist period, that the academia and the 
realm of public intellectuals were put under the close supervision and scrutiny of the ruling Party, and 
their authorities over educational affairs, HE and schooling alike, were almost entirely destroyed 
(Yang, 2003). This triumph of the central Government over the intellectuals was achieved by a series 
of political campaigns, personal attacks and prosecutions (Goldman et al, 1987; Goldman and 
MacFarquhar, 1999). There is a huge volume of scholarly work on this issue and it would be redundant 
to repeat even a small portion of it here. Suffice to say that the central government or the CCP 
leadership established itself as the sole authority of HE in socialist China by ruling out other 
alternatives, and laissez faire in HE has been largely absent in the Chinese context. 
Derivative Authorities 
In the post-socialist China, some new forms of authorities emerged. They do not intend to articulate 
alternative forms of HE, but mainly to interpret the existing system, to make it sensible and reasonable 
by revealing (partially) its mechanism, and also explore ways to make the best of the system by 
following its mechanism rather than working against it. In that sense, they can be called 'derivative 
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authorities', and their authorities are built upon and through a new knowledge of HE in contemporary 
China, a knowledge that serves to articulate the existing system but not to challenge it, to make a better 
use of it but not to criticise it. These authorities manifest themselves in mainly two forms of 
publications — the first is the cramming materials for the CEE, and the second is the university life 
guide. For the former, one example, which I have mentioned in my discussion of the exemplary 
campus, is the `Sandian Yice' (Three Points and One Test) series published by Longmen Books, one of 
the most successful publications in this regard. The series is a bundle of extra-curricular materials, and 
specialises in linking the curricular materials with what may be tested in the CEE — in other words, it 
provides 'short-cuts' to the success of college enrolment selections. It treats high school education in a 
very instrumental way. Its 2010 edition says in the introduction that 
`by presenting a selection of the real questions in the CEE over the past three years, this series explores 
the common question patterns and the methods and techniques in solving them... everyone is able to 
closely experience and understand the CEE. From compulsory to selective subjects, each book in the 
series details all kinds of questions that repeatedly show up in the CEE and techniques required to 
answer them. With the possession of the book, you have an encyclopaedia of analysis and techniques of 
the latest CEE' 19. 
The authority of this series, and this form of cramming materials, lies in its contribution to the success 
of HE candidates who later become the valuable assets of the nation after they have achieved a high 
degree of academic success. As the series introduction states, 
`since its first appearance, the Sandian Yice series have frequently ranked No.1 in the National Book 
Sales Board in the past 13 years, with its total publication of over 3 million. A large number of those who 
have used this series now have post-graduate degrees or doctoral degrees, and are the backbones of this 
nation'20. 
The underlying logic is that if the value of a student lies in his or her academic success, and the 
measurement of academic success is the acquisition of HE degrees, and the most vital step is the 
success in the CEE, and therefore, this form of publication does not only provide tips for a set of 
examinations and tests, but makes a direct contribution to one's value in the society, one's chances of 
success in the future; and the popularity of these materials prove the righteousness of this logic and 
this mentality of examination preparation, and should therefore be trusted by those who are currently 
preparing for the CEE and fighting for a better future for themselves. 
19 http://baike.baidu.com/view/303756.htm , last accessed 28th July, 2011, my translation 
20 http://baike.baidu.com/view/2093561.htm , last accessed 28th July, 2011, my translation 
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I now turn to the second form of authoritative publications — universality life guide. These guidebooks 
are fulfilled with personal experiences of HE, or personal reflections upon HE, yet these personal 
accounts turn HE experience into a public issue. In articulating their understandings of HE experience, 
such as how to manage your time, how to build up your social connection, how to deal with the reality 
of university campus, not only do these accounts make HE experience more visible and intelligible, 
they also establish themselves as the authorities on conduct. These personal accounts serve as a 
reference of the 'truth' of HE, also as an exemplary model of how to make the best of HE for the 
public. However, these accounts are essentially elitists. These guides are either authored by some self-
claimed successful educationalists (Zhou, 2008), or some regional champions (gaokao zhuangyuan, 
who achieve the highest marks in the examination) of the CEE (Ren and Zhang, 2007), or 
exceptionally successful individuals in business (Tan, 2009) — in other words, some exemplary figures 
who have achieved great success via HE. Zhang (2009, p. 4) the author of one of this series, University 
students — competence decides life chances, states in the preface of this collection of dialogues 
between Zhang himself as 'an expert in elitist education' and 50 'outstanding' university students, 
`My purpose of writing this book is rather simple — to tell the people that, whether you go to a renowned 
university or a regular university, you should spontaneously cultivate your own core competence, and on 
your day of graduation, if you can prove you are competent enough, you will have good life chances'. 
The figures in this book are from renowned universities such as Qinghua, Beida and Fudan. This is not 
to say that only students from these renowned universities can turn themselves into elites or 
outstanding figures; the point is rather to initiate people to think: how should I mange my own 
university experience? What are my disadvantages in comparison? The influences of the exemplar 
figures are enormous.' 
Zhang's statement is rather interesting. On the one hand, he argues that students from universities of 
different academic reputations can have equal chances of success, if they enhance their own core 
competence. On the other hand, In Zhang's book, there is no account of those who achieve reasonable 
success after graduation from regular (non-elitist) universities; instead, his interviewees are invariably 
from the top elite universities, as only these students represent 'true' academic success and hence are 
recognised as exemplary figures of HE, as references against whom others should compare 
themselves, as authorities of HE. The word 'people' in Zhang's statement seem to refer to regular 
students outside the elitist group, a people who is less likely to conduct successful management of their 
own personal experiences of HE, and should be taught the codes of university performatives (such as 
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time management and social networking) and potential to be fully realised (or core competence in 
Zhang's terms). 
Apart from the 'successful' entrepreneurs, some other 'successors' in HE selection also join the camp 
of 'derivative authorities'. Students who enrolled into renowned universities such as Qinghua and 
Peking have been invited to author university life guides or to provide 'authentic' information in forms 
of small essays or proses or interviews about either preparing for HE or experiencing HE. Another 
book published by People's Press, Perfect University, is authored by two former students of Peking 
University, both of whom were Gaokao Zhuangyuan (highest achievers of the CEE) of their respective 
provinces, and not surprisingly their accounts of HE were based on their Peking University experience. 
Though the book is written in Chinese, the authors repeatedly use contemporary English phrases and 
expressions throughout the book, such as Globalisation and integration, leadership experience, 
educational plan and resume-oriented, self-education awareness, human capital, high profile, etc., 
often without translation or explanation. It seems that the authors are readily to show their authorities 
of HE experiences regardless of their readership, which according to the afterword of the book, should 
be students outside Peking University (Ren and Zhang, 2007). On the contrary, Ren Yunzhong, one of 
the authors, in the summary section of the book articulates his idea of university studentship mainly 
based on intellectual elitism. He writes, 
`the massification of HE in China is already a fact. However, no matter how much we expand our HE 
system, only a minority of the enrolment age group can make it to university, and university students 
remain the elites of the society, or at least should strive to be as such. A true university, in comparison 
with other technique schools, is most distinguishable in its aim to produce "liberal gentlemen" beyond 
mere experts. His mastery of knowledge, basic manners, and dispositions should be different. (p. 169, 
my translation)' 
It is clear that Ren does not intend to tackle what is behind the 'fact' of HE in China, but instead he 
tries to persuade his readers to first of all accept such a fact regardless, and to hold on to the 
conventional values of HE such as the privilege of regular HEIs to technique schools, in other word a 
university degree to a technical diploma. One should strive to become 'different', or privileged to those 
who do not have access to 'true' universities, to model oneself after 'liberal gentlemen'. Though he 
does not articulate this model further, Ren's idea of liberal gentlemen is not modelled upon Newman's 
idea, but rather perhaps an infusion of a number of exemplary figures, both native and international, 
including Confucian intellectuals, such as Zhou Dunyi and Cai Yuanpei, and some global figures such 
as Bill Gates. By using these exemplary figures, Ren and others who produce and/or act as 'derivative 
authorities' try to maximize the contribution of personal efforts in individual 'success', whether in 
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academic pursuits or contemporary business or other domains, so if one fails to achieve as big as these 
exemplary figures, one only has him/herself to blame, not the wider 'fact' of HE or the contemporary 
society. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I first explore the usefulness of government and governmentality to my inquiries in this 
Part. In particular, I make a comparison between socialist arts of government and neoliberal arts of 
government, and explore how these two forms of government are infused in post-socialist China, and 
how they are manifested in the government of HE subjects. 
I also engage with the first two dimension of government via HE. With regard to the rationalities of 
HE, I make reference to the three perspective of governmentality and argue that the rationalities of HE 
in modern China are characterised, first, as a solution to the problems of national disadvantage in 
science and technology and a lack of `talents'; second, as a means of social selection and improving 
population quality; and third, as a form of self governance. 
With regard to the authorities of HE, I trace out a variety of authorities in the history of modern China, 
including the hegemonic authorities - the central Governments, the alternative authorities, most 
noticeably the academia and the public intellectuals in the Republic era, to the 'derivative authorities' 
in the post-socialist China such as cramming materials of the CEE and university life guides. These 
authorities all serve to enforce certain subjects and subjectivities, and I will further engage with them 
in later chapters. 
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Chapter 8 Technologies 
Introduction 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1977) identifies a series of technologies of disciplinary power, and 
such technologies may manifest themselves in the organisation of space, the development and 
deployment of hierarchical observation, and the documentation of individuals in cases. In The Care of 
the Self (1990), he begins to concern himself with the technology of the self — the knowledges, 
practices and methods and techniques through which human subjects constitute themselves. But 
Foucault does not articulate his notion of technologies. A further elaboration is provided by Rose 
(1996, p. 26). He says, 
`The notion of technology may seem antithetical to the domain of human being, such that claims about the 
inappropriate technologisation of humanity form the basis of many a critique. However, our very experience of 
ourselves as certain sorts of persons —creatures of freedom, of liberty, of personal powers, of self-realisation — is the 
outcome of a range of human technologies, technologies that take modes of being human as their object. Technology, 
here, refers to any assembly structured by a practical rationality governed by a more or less conscious goal. Human 
technologies are hybrid assemblages of knowledges, instruments, persons, systems of judgment, buildings and 
spaces, underpinned at the programmatic level by certain presuppositions and objectives about human being.' 
By applying the notion of technologies to contemporary institutions, Rose (1996, p. 26) also usefully 
points out that, 
`One can regard the school, the prison, the asylum as examples of such technologies, those which Foucault termed 
disciplinary and which operate in terms of a detailed structuring of space, time, and relations among individuals, 
through procedures of hierarchical observation and normalizing judgment, through attempts of enfold these 
judgments into the procedures and judgments that the individual utilizes in order to conduct his or her own conduct'. 
The objectives of technologies are to 'produce and enframe humans as certain kinds of being whose 
existence is simultaneously capacitated and governed by their organisation within a technological 
field'(Rose, 1996, p. 27). With reference to my discussion in previous chapters, HE can be understood 
as an assembly of such human technologies (Rose, 1999, p. X), technologies that may present 
themselves as, first, 'means of judgment', such as unified examinations and tests that are used to 
define and measure one's intellectual capacity, and physical examinations in China that rule over one's 
bodily qualification for academic studies at HE level; second, 'the techniques of reformation and cure', 
such as pedagogic supervision that is aimed to direct students towards certain desirable academic 
outcomes, and psychological counselling provided to students who have difficulties in coping with 
stress and anxieties from their HE experience, etc.; third, 'the apparatuses within which intervention is 
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to take place', such as the design of university campus that aims to produce certain docile bodies in 
dormitories, study rooms and libraries. 
Rose further places the notion of technologies in the frame of government, and explains that 
`Technologies of government are those technologies imbued with aspirations for the shaping of conduct in the hope 
of producing certain desired effects and averting certain undesired events. I term these "human technologies" in that, 
within these assemblages, it is human capacities that are to be understood and acted upon by technical means. A 
technology of government, then, is an assemblage of forms of practices knowledge, ... traversed and transected by 
aspirations to achieve certain outcomes in terms of the conduct of the governed (which also requires certain forms of 
conduct on the part of those who would govern).' (Rose, 1999. 52) 
HE in modem China has revolved around the cultivation of human capacities, as my previous 
discussions have shown. It not only cultivates a small group of youngsters, but also intends to channel 
and develop the physical, moral and intellectual capacities of the entire population so as to turn a 
population into candidates of HE. But I am not suggesting that HE as an assemblage of human 
technologies is suppressive in nature. At this point, I would agree with Rose, who writes, 
`To say that they are human technologies is not to subject them to a critique. It is not to imply that technology is 
somehow antithetical to humanity, and thus a human technology is actually an inhumane technology, a technological 
rationalisation of the human soul or technological reduction of human subjectivity and creativity to that which can be 
acted upon the interests of government... It is to suggest that all the essential, natural and defining conditions that 
tend to be ascribed to the human world — modern forms of subjectivity, contemporary conceptions of agency and 
will, the present-day ethics of freedom itself — are not antithetical to power and technique but actually the resultants 
of specific configurations of power, certain technological inventions, certain more or less rationalised techniques of 
relating to ourselves. One cannot counterpose subjectivity to power, because subjectification occurs in the element of 
power; one cannot counterpose freedom to technology, because what we have come to understand as our freedom is 
the mobile outcome of a multitude of human technologies'(Apple, 1993, pp. 54-55). 
Based on Agamben (1998) who suggests that the main difference within the realm of political is 
between 'bare life' (zoe) and political existence (bios), referring respectively to natural being and a 
human being's legal existence, Lemke (2009) puts forwards a categorisation of technologies, as shown 
in the following table. This categorisation not only distinguishes two subject forms of politics, 
individual and population, but also two forms of life, zoe and bios. 
Subject Form Individual 	 Collective 
 
Life Form 
 
 
zoe (physical being) Technologies of the Body 
	 Technologies of the Population 
 
bios (moral and political being) Technologies of the Self 
	 Technologies of the Social 
   
Table 8. Different Biopolitical Technologies, from Lemke (2009, p. 175) 
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We can now understand technologies in the following four forms: 
1.technologies of the body, aiming at the speculation, assessment, direction and deployment of 
individual bodies in terms of their physical and mental fitness, in order to maximize, not only 
their docility, but economic utilities, such as hygiene education and personnel documentations 
of one's physical conditions for each and every student in China; 
2.technologies of the population, aiming at governing collectives by analyzing and directing 
life processes at the level of population with the help of disciplines such as statistics, 
demography, epidemiology and biology, such as the discourse of 'quality birth and quality 
breeding' in China that ties up single-child policy with the distribution of educational 
opportunities within families (families in rural areas are advised not to produce more than two 
children as this will diminish their chances of receiving good education); 
3.technologies of the self, aiming at establishing a relation with the self, certain self-steering 
mechanisms, or as Rose explains, 'the ways in which individuals experience, understand, 
judge, and conduct themselves ...for example, requiring one to relate to oneself 
epistemologically (know yourself), despotically (master yourself), or in other ways (care for 
yourself)', as can be seen from practices such as confession, diary writing, and filling self-
evaluation forms; 
4.technologies of the social, aiming at a promotion of a recognition of oneself as part of a 
society, a social utility, a nation or a state, such as citizenship education or patriotic education 
that aim to formulate some 'essential' or 'generally applicable' values among persons and 
institutions. 
For these four forms of technologies, I will begin with technologies of the population, and my focus in 
on the promotion of sportsmanship and physical fitness among university students in modern China. 
With regard to technologies of the body, I will look into the ways in which bodily inspection and 
selection is enforced upon individual students and documented in the personal dossier system 
(dang 'an) and serves as a gaze of the state into the bodies of HE subjects. In terms of technologies of 
the social, I will discuss the role of HE expansion in modern China in the expansion of HE 
candidateship, the ways in which the desirability and feasibility of HE participation becomes 
intelligible among a wider population. My discussion of technologies of the self will cover both the 
use of socialist forms of self-governance in student self-reviews and other documents in the personal 
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dossier system, and neoliberal forms of self-governance promoted by university life guides, which 
intend to formulate new subjects of self-understanding, self-planning, self-cultivation and self-
presentation, etc. I now begin my discussion with technologies of the HE population. 
Technologies of the Population 
Technologies of the population aim at governing collectives by analysing and directing life processes 
at the level of population with the help of disciplines such as statistics, demography, epidemiology and 
biology. In this case, the technologies target the physical conditions of HE subjects, applicants, 
students and graduates alike. The aims of such technologies are to monitor, measure, improve and 
optimise the bodily capacities of the subjects, which can be achieved by, for instance, standard of 
physical qualification, medical examinations and campaign of physical fitness, etc. 
Physical Examinations 
One example here is the CEE which requests a profile of student physical conditions. This practice 
started in the early 1950s after a significant proportion of new entrants in the first few academic years 
dropped out for health issues, which was considered a waste of valuable resources. Large scale health 
evaluations were introduced in 1954, such as the establishment of Student Health Record System for 
the final year students in senior high schools who were also likely to be applicants for HE (Zhongguo 
Jiaoyu Nianjian Bianjibu, 1984, p. 456). Detailed standards were finalised in the 1958 Regulation on 
disqualification in health examinations for university and college enrolment. This regulation lists 13 
diseases or physical disabilities as disqualifications, including, for instance, infiltration of advanced 
pulmonary tuberculosis, active pulmonary tuberculosis, non-full-recovery from leprosy, corrected 
visual acuity of each eye lower than 0.4, and mental illness or epilepsy with an episode within the past 
two years, etc. (Xie and Tang, 1985, p. 824). The contents of this regulation remained largely 
unchanged till the 1980s. The 1985 Standards on health examinations for university and college 
enrolment lists 16 diseases or physical disabilities, with even more nuanced criteria, such as 
`blood pressure higher than 140/90 mm hg, and/or lower than 86/46 mm hg; individual systolic blood 
pressure higher than 160 mm hg, and/or lower than 80 mm hg; single diastolic blood pressure higher 
than 80 mm hg, and/or lower than 50 mm hg (qouted in Xie and Tang, 1985, p. 825 my translation)' 
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The physical examinations are mandatory for all HE candidates, the number of which in 2011 was 9.33 
million (Ministry of Education, 2011). Those who fail to meet the requirement of the tests will not be 
qualified to take the CEE and hence will be excluded from any forms of HE. Their bodily 
disqualification also means their disqualification from HE candidateship. And candidates who are 
diagnosed with certain illnesses or physical disabilities in the tests are denied access to certain 
specialties, or regarded as unsuitable. For instance, HE applicants with 
`slow olfactory, stuttering, abnormal gait, hypnosis, facial scar, hemangioma, black nevi, or vitiligo, 
are not suitable to be admitted to the following majors or specialties: education, public security, law, 
journalism, music, performance. (qouted in Xie and Tang, 1985, p. 825 my translation)' 
This practice of physical examination has been firmly established as a technology of the population of 
HE candidates and introduced a logic of bodily selection for HE - if one fails to prove to be bodily 
qualified, one will most likely to fail in the process of HE, which is regarded as highly demanding of 
one's intellectual and physical capacities. If a student who is not physically qualified is given the 
opportunity to enter HE, and ends up failing to complete, this is regarded as a waste of the educational 
resource, and a wasted opportunity which could have been better utilised by one that is physically fit 
for HE. Additionally, if a student with an infectious disease is allowed on the university campus, he or 
she will pose a threat to the health of other students; if a student with certain physical disabilities is 
allow to choose certain specialties, he or she will still be denied the opportunities to the jobs in the 
disciplinary domain, and hence a gain a waste of educational resource and students' own investments 
in HE. Till now, this rationality of bodily selection remains largely unchallenged. 
On the open forum `Baidu knows' (Baidu Zhidao) of www.baidu.com, the Chinese equivalent to 
Google, the question 'what is the main purpose of physical tests for the CEE?' is posted by a user, and 
the 'best answer' ranked by the website say21, 
`(it is) to examine whether students' physical conditions are qualified, whether he or she is with disabilities, and (to 
make sure) one will not drop out during the studies of his or her subjects because of health, and also to keep away 
those with malignant diseases from universities, such as hepatitis B, to prevent their transmission to other students. 
How should I say? A bit cruel, perhaps? But this is quite the necessary evil. Better than being found out when one 
has infected others with his or her diseases. What do you think?' 
21 http://zhidao.baidu.com/question/22341014.html , last accessed on 13th July, 2011. This open forum `Baidu knows' 
allows users to post questions, and others can post answers directly. One of these answers is listed as 'the best answer' by 
the webmasters. This function of the website is very popular, and a wide range of questions can be found on this open 
forum. 
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In this 'best answer', one can sense a prevailing rationality of bodily selection. It intends to present a 
reasonable and hence persuasive account — those who have certain disabilities will fail the studies of 
certain specialties for sure, and those who have infectious diseases are potential threats to others. But 
so far this logic has not been subject to the scrutiny on the basis of basic human rights in China, at least 
not fully. The 'nude examination' practiced in Guangdong in 2011, in which students for the physical 
examinations were requested to remove all clothing, gave rise to a wide dispute in Chinese media (Xu, 
2011). Examinees argued this was a violation of privacy and expressed concerns that pictures of their 
nudity might be taken by others. However, this dispute revolves only around one exceptional 
procedure of the physical examinations, while the underlying logic of bodily selection has not been 
challenged in the slightest. 
Campaigns and Standards of Physical Fitness 
`Project Sunshine for Physical Exercise' was initiated by the Ministry of Education and the General 
Administration of Sports in 2006 to promote physical exercises in all sectors of education, from 
primary schools to universities. The project was to address the problems that 
`a large number of students suffer from a decrease in their physical fitness and athletic ability, many students have 
poor vision, and the proportion of overweight and obesity among students have increased (Wang, 2006, webpage, my 
translation).' 
This problematisation of the student bodies justifies the implementation of compulsory physical 
exercises. The physical 'deficits' such as poor vision and obesity of a small group of students is here 
generalised to enframe each and every individual student in the country, as everyone should be kept 
away from such failings and should strive to maximize one's physical fitness and capacity. The 
endeavours towards this end will not only benefit students themselves in their work and lives, and 
eventually also the nation which deploys their bodies and minds. The logic of bodily qualification 
arose in the late Qing and prevailed at the early Republican era has echoes in such contemporary 
techniques practiced on student population — to some extent, every student is still reminded not to be 
the 'Sick Man of East Asia'. But in comparison, the contemporary discourses of physical fitness 
among students comprise articulated policies, detailed practices, and exquisite requirements. For 
instance, 'Project Sunshine' 
`raises the goal to meet the requirements of and excel in physical fitness as the goal, to strengthen one's body. (It 
plans) to implement the physical health standard for students among 85% of educational institutions, and to enable 
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85% of the student population to spend one hour on physical exercises daily. At the same time (the project) requires 
every student to at least pass the physical health standards, and to master at least two forms of daily physical 
exercise. The project introduces this slogan of "one hour of exercise a day, fifty years of healthy work and a lifetime 
of happiness"(Wang, 2006, webpage, my translation).' 
This project still uses the language pattern of socialist campaigns, setting goals, percentages and 
standards. It also employs 'happiness' to translate the governmental objectives into personal drives —
the exercises of the bodies of students, though promoted by a central government, are aimed to benefit 
students themselves. If one is to follow the campaigned plan to do daily exercises, one can achieve 
better physical fitness and can in turn better enjoy one's work and one's life. Therefore, by articulating 
the personal benefits from daily exercises, this 'project' manages to translate the government 
objectives of population health control into practices of self-governing that is said to contribute to 
personal happiness. 
If one is to accept this logic, then a standard of physical fitness is needed to differentiate among 
students of various physical conditions, and to encourage one to achieve better results, such as the 
National Standard for Students' Physical Health which was introduced in 2008 by the General 
Administration of Sport of China22. With such a standard of physical fitness is in place, the population 
will be divided into at least two forms of subjects — the physically 'qualified' and the physically 
`unqualified'; for instance, according to the National Standard, a male university student needs to 
complete 11 pull-ups in one session to pass the test and prove his physical fitness (one is waived from 
this evaluation process if medical documents can be provided for one's disability or equivalent)23. 
Also, the costs of failing the Standard are rather high — as the Implementation Measures of for National 
Standard for Students' Physical Health states 
`Students who achieve 'Excellent' and above by the standard are eligible for the applications of "Three Good 
students" and scholarships... If graduates of ...HE institutions have scores less than 50 points in physical tests by the 
Standard, they will be rewarded Certificates of Attendance only' (Guojia Tiyu Zongju, 2008, my translation). 
According to this 'measures', those who prove physically unqualified will be faced with punishments 
in other domains of their academic lives, such as losing one's candidacy for certain scholarships and 
honorary titles such as 'Student of Three Goods' (sanhao xuesheng, students of excellence in three 
22 
 http://www.sport.gov.cn/n16/n1092/n16879/n17321/358582.htm1, the Standard is available at www.csh.edu.cn which 
lists both the standard height and weight and detailed requirements for each of the compulsory form of exercises for 
students of a number of age groups in schools and for students of HE in general. 
23 The standard for male HE students is available at http://www.csh.edu.cn/csphw/press/dx3.html 
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perspectives — ideological, intellectual and physical fitness), or even denials of HE degrees (certificates 
of attendance are not valid degree credentials). 
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Technologies of the Body 
Technologies of the body aim at the speculation, assessment, direction and deployment of individual 
bodies in terms of their physical and mental fitness, in order to maximize, not only their docility, but 
economic utility. The discussion above suggests that the bodily quality of HE subjects have for long 
been a concern of the state, and I have also briefly discussed the discourses of population quality in the 
previous chapter. In this section, I will engage in more detail concerning the deployment of the HE 
body from the perspectives of compulsory physical exercises on university campus and the inscriptions 
of bodily health information on every single subject via the personal dossier system. 
Yan Yangchu in the 1920s proposed to use hygiene and medication education to cure the bodily 
weakness of the rural population in China (Yan in Yang, 2003, p. 90), and the New Education 
magazine argued in 1919 that citizens of the new Republic should have 'physical constitution that is 
strong and vigorous' (reprinted in Su, 1985, pp. 367-369, my translation). With regard to HE, the 
missionary colleges and universities in the Republican era placed an emphasis on sport training of their 
students. For instance, Qinghua University was a preparatory school in the 1910s and 1920s, and sent 
100 students to the U.S for HE annually. In order to change the stereotype of the Chinese being the 
weakly 'Sick Man of East Asia' (Dongya Bingfu) when these students arrived in the U.S., sports and 
physical exercises were made compulsory for the students of Qinghua. Yeh (1990, p. 213)records, 
`Students were required to set aside their books every afternoon at 4:00 p.m. to spend an hour in the gymnasium. 
School officials locked up dormitories, libraries, laboratories, and classrooms during this period so that students had 
nowhere else to go but the gym and the athletic fields. To ensure that students strived to build up their physiques, 
qualifying tests in swimming, in the 100-meter and 400-meter runs, in the shot-put, and in high jump were 
introduced as part of the hurdle to pass on the eve of graduation. Knowledge of soccer and basketball and some 
competence in archery were also required'. 
From the description above, one might say that these techniques of the student population were 
disciplinary in nature. Students were kept away from all other forms of activities than sports and 
physical exercises at the specific time of the day, and each one of them needed to prove their bodily 
qualification in standardised tests. In this regard, this technique of mandatory physical exercise was 
simultaneously collectivising and individualizing, as all students were forcefully included in the 
exercise programme, and the individual students who failed the qualifying tests might be faced with 
certain forms of punishments. Wu Mi, who later became one of the most renowned classical scholars 
in the Republican era, 
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... had to postpone his study trip to Harvard for six months and exercise hard to improve the distance of his long 
jump because of these requirements (of the qualifying tests): On the eve of his Qinghua graduation, Wu Mi's long 
jump was a mere 11 feet, a whole foot short of the minimum requirement' (Yeh, 1990, pp. 213-214). 
Ma Yuehan, the head of the Qinghua's physical education department for four decades, strived to 
introduce the dimensions of sportsmanship and physical fitness into university student culture. For 
instance, he persuaded the academically competent to join the sports teams and Qinghua's sports teams 
proved to be outstanding in various intercollegiate championships. This sportsmanship seemed to have 
integrated into the subjectivities of Qinghua students, as Feng Youlan, who later became one of the 
most famous philosophers in modem China, recalled that 
`Qinghua graduates tended to be aware of their physical selves and attentive to their personal appearance... They 
walked briskly. The seemed at ease in Western-style clothing. They were younger looking and cheerful. Beida's 
graduates, by contrast, were laggardly, solemn, and gray' (Feng in Yeh, 1990, p. 215). 
These techniques were echoed in the policies and practices of the Communist regime. Standardised 
tests, for instance, were used to decide upon the bodily qualification of HE candidates and university 
students; university students in contemporary universities are requested to participate in some 
mandatory physical exercises such as broadcast callisthenics (Guangbo Ticao) in groups; and the 
enthusiasm for sportsmanship can be easily spotted in a variety of campaigns for physical fitness 
among university students. 
In schools and universities in contemporary China, sports and physical exercises are still made 
compulsory for each and every student, and regulations are introduced to enforce the acceptance of 
these bodily practices. The conduct of such practices for all educational institutions from the early 
1950s onwards was summarised in the Generic of Education 1949-1981 (Ministry of Education, 1984, 
p. 454, my translation), which writes, 
`for HE institutions, most students live on campus and are subject to unified work/rest regimes, and morning 
exercises should be included in such regimes. (Students) should do morning exercises for 10 to 20 minutes after 
getting up in the morning, which normally includes doing broadcast callisthenics in groups for two rounds and then 
other physical exercises on one's own.' 
Fudan University, one of the elite universities that dates back to the Republican era, posts its 
Regulation of Attendance to Morning Exercises an Extra-curricular Activities online (Department of 
Physical Education of Fudan University, 2006, my translation), which states that, 
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`Attendance checking operates via one's University ID card, and between Week 3 and Week 15 ... One should have 
at least 35 times of attendance; otherwise, one will faced with a deduction in one's score of Physical Education class, 
1 point for each missing session.' 
This attendance checking system works on the collective of current students by enframing itself in the 
university curriculum (physical education class, which is compulsory for all), and by using the ID card, 
the system reaches into the everyday physical practices of each individual student. Moreover, this 
regulation lists the officially recognised times, locations, forms and requirement of physical exercises. 
`The exercises for this academic term include middle and long distance race, standing long jump, sit-ups (female: 20 
times each for abdominal and back muscles), pull-ups (or push-ups) (Male: 20 pull-ups or 40 push-ups). These 
exercises are compulsory, with at less 2 sessions each time: For Long Distance race: male students should complete 
within 6'30 "or less for1200 meters, the girls within 4'30" or less for 800 meters.' 
`Morning Exercise is conducted between 6.30 a.m. to 7.00 a.m. Monday to Friday. For students at the South 
Campus, one should jog for 800 meters at the gymnasium at the Sport Centre, and then swipe one's ID card at the 
checking point...' 
`For other sport activities, (one should go to) 
1, the track field of the Southern District Sports Centre, for long distance race, standing long jump, push-ups (Male), 
sit-ups (female). 
Time: Monday, Wednesday and Friday between 15:20 and 16:45 ...' 
This regulation displays a rather exquisite technique on the student population with regard to the 
training of their bodies, with detailed arrangements for each and every group, with clear punishments 
known to all. And Fudan is far from an exception in this regard — almost all HEIs have their 
regulations of physical exercises ready to access online24. 
Here I want to further discuss how the technologies of the HE body come to mark each and every 
subject of HE, as candidates, students or graduates. This is mostly achieved by the compiling of 
student dossiers (xuesheng dang'an), which is part of one's personal dossier. Yang (2011) makes a 
useful review of the personal dossier system, and how this system changes in recent ye.ar to adapt itself 
to China's neoliberal governance. Yang explains, 
24 By using the keyword ‘7t4-V-MV-±-  (daxue zicao guiding, universtity regulations for morning exercises), one can 
easily search regulations as such in Chinese HEIs, all in similar tones and formats. For instance, Regulations of morning 
exercise for Jinlin University of Finance and Economics is available at http://xsc.j1ufe.edu.cn/news_view.asp?newsid=227 , 
Shenyang Ligong University http://xsc.sylu.edu.cn/news/n1005c7.aspx and Xuzhou Normal University http:// 
tyxy.xznu.e du. cn/s/27/t/566/c1/9e/info49566. h tm  
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`Dang'an (personal dossiers), the compiling of the minutia of one's work and personal information in an envelope 
that follows one around, was introduced in Mao's era. As a defining feature of Maoist socialism, the dang'an reveals 
the inner, hidden bureaucratic workings of the state on the individual. It documents information about each 
employee's education (including reports from teachers), job history (including reports from employers), family 
background, political activities, achievements, mistakes, self-criticism, and so on'. 
The rule of personal dossiers represents an intimate involvement of the state in individual lives. It is a 
form of technoscientific administration, which regards the human subjects as objects of administrative 
intervention in the Maoist fashion. The system of personal dossiers is an individualizing mode of 
control, which renders the ideological, educational, emotional and physical conditions visible, 
intelligible and measurable; it registers each subject into the operation of the state system, and 
subscribes them to the dominant ideologies via self-evaluations and their own pleas to join the Party (I 
will discuss this later in the section of technologies of the self). The system is the gaze of the state into 
the inner characteristics of the subjects of state socialism, as the dossiers collect a variety of records, 
evaluation, diagnosis, and measurement against certain qualitative and quantitative standards. These 
features are not pre-existing in the subjects, but are part of the subjectivities invented in the gazing 
process — one can be an outstanding student on record, a hardworking employee, a dedicated civil 
servant, or a patient with mental disability25, all based on the subjective evaluations of certain 
administrative figures of one's affiliated organisations (schools, universities and working units for 
instance). 
The student dossiers are part of the personal dossiers, covering the information of each individual 
student before one leaves formal education and starts working. For example, within collections of 
certain documents and forms in the dossiers, students are categorised as 'outstanding', 'qualified', or 
`partially qualified', or 'failed', as a result of a series of evaluations of their superiors (teachers, class 
tutors, school administrators) upon their ideological attitude and academic aptitude, or test results of 
physical and medical examinations (height, weight, liver function, etc.). The corresponding section to 
HE candidateship is the section marked as 'Examinee's dossiers', which normally includes the 
following materials. 
For the time being, I will only discuss the information regarding the individual student bodies, and 
attend to other techniques in later sections. As shown in Table above, the bodily information of each 
HE candidate is mainly recorded by three documents, one at the top of the main files, Form of Physical 
25 Yang (2011, p. 511) gives an example of a well-known Chinese writer, Tang Guoji, who unexpectedly found out in 2003 
about that he had been officially identified as 'mentally ill' in his personal dossiers 20 years before by the some-called 
`organisational opinion'. It turned out that one of his college teachers filed in his student dossiers of his 'mental disability', 
which resulted in his unemployment after graduation and a severe challenge to his career and life. 
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Examinations, and others revealing the physical record of all three years of high school education, 
Health Record of High School and Registration card for physical education examinations. In the 
former, test results are either reported in statistical figures or marked as `normal'/` abnormal not 
detected' or 'abnormal'. The tests include the following 
1.eye, including visual acuity, colour vision, eye illness; 
2.medicine, including blood pressure, growth conditions, heart and blood vessels, respiratory system, 
the spirit of the nervous system, abdominal organs, etc.; 
3.surgery, including height, weight, skin, face, neck , spine, limbs, joints, etc.; 
4.E.N.T, including hearing, smell, ear, nose, throat, etc.; 
5.dentistry, including chune, stuttering, teeth, etc.; 
6.chest perspective; 
7.liver function tests, including transaminases, hepatitis b surface antigen. 
For each category, the doctors in charge of the examination are requested to give their professional 
`opinions' upon the candidateship of the individual examinee, which means filling the appropriate 
number (1-3) in the blank (also with their signature right below) — 1, qualified; 2, not eligible for 
certain specialities; 3, unqualified. If any category is marked as 2, for instance as a result of poor 
vision, the 'conclusion' of the examinations at the bottom of the form will also report the examinee as 
  
Main Files 
1, Form of Physical Examinations 
2, Form of examinee status 
3, Supporting documents for Privileges in 
admission 
4, Other materials 
5, Application form (for the CEE) 
 
Supporting Files 
1, Registration form of graduation from high 
school 
2, Enrolment Record Card of High School 
3, Health Record of High School 
4, Form of political situation of the family upon 
graduation from High School 
5, Record of social practices of High School 
6, Registration card for physical education 
examinations 
7, Registration form of High School graduation 
examinations 
Table 9, Documents in Examinees' dossiers 
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`not eligible for certain specialities'. Likewise, if any category is marked as 3, the examinee will be 
reported as 'unqualified' and hence lose his or her candidateship for HE. 
In comparison, the latter two documents are less important in deciding the bodily qualifications of the 
HE candidate, but they do provide a full history of the physical condition of each student. The Health 
Record of High School records tests results of one's vision, hearing, and functions of other important 
organs, etc. Also, Registration card for physical education examinations presents the annual summary 
of evaluations of one's physical education, once again either as 'qualified' or 'unqualified'. But it 
seems that these summaries are not likely to affect students' HE candidateship. Nonetheless, these two 
forms represent the continuous gaze of the state into the bodies of each and every student. 
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Technologies of the Social 
Technologies of the social aim at a promotion of a recognition of oneself as part of a society, a social 
utility, a nation or a state, such as citizenship education or patriotic education that aims to formulate 
some 'essential' or 'generally applicable' values among persons and institutions. In this case, such 
technologies are featured in the expansion of HE candidateship in modern China, a promotion of 
oneself as an eligible candidate of HE. I argue that a successive expansion of HE means more than a 
mere wider spread of university campus or an increasing number of building, faculty and students — it 
is an expansion of candidateship among a population, or a growing awareness of the accessibility, 
desirability and feasibility of HE among social groups that are yet to be included in HE. And to briefly 
refer to what I will discuss in the next section, such awareness can be promoted and cultivated, turned 
into a desire for access to HE, an aspiration for the benefits of HE, a longing for the choices and the 
opportunities that can bring significant changes to one's life chances. Also, I argue that during the 
process of this expansion across the history of modern China, different subjects begin to emerge, such 
as the 'wasted' subjects in late Qing, the 'alienated' subjects in the Republican era, the 'mistreated' 
subjects in socialist era, and the 'willing' and 'expecting' subjects in the post-socialist era. 
As mentioned in previous discussions, the first modern university in China, the Imperial University, 
was mostly open to governmental officials, royal elites and their offspring, and therefore highly 
exclusive. Despite its royal status and the attention it enjoyed from the Emperor, this early institute was 
not known for the quality of teaching and learning. On the contrary, a number of sources suggest that 
the university was filled with largely arrogant and bureaucratic officials and aristocrats (see Yang, 2003 
for instance); they did not concern themselves with serious academic studies but only aimed to claim 
the exclusivity and the titles given to the graduates from the University which were equivalent to those 
offered by the to-be-abolished Imperial Examinations. They are regarded in historical reviews of the 
early modern HE as the 'wasted' subjects (see Chapter 1 in Sang, 1995 for an excellent overview of 
studenthood in late Qing). This is also what Zeng Pu implies in his description of his experience in 
Tongwen Guan, which is quoted at the beginning of this thesis. 
In the Republican era, although there was a significant rise of both HE institutions and enrolments, HE 
remained highly exclusive as the tuition and fees were much higher than what an ordinary family could 
afford. According to Yen (1990, pp. 195-199), the household income of wage-earning families (4-5 
people in one of the average size) in large cities such as Beijing was lower than 300 yuan a year, which 
was insufficient to sponsor a student in a public university and even less capable of sponsoring a 
student in a private institution. In the 1920s, the tuition ranged from 40 to 60 silver dollars (yuan) for 
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one academic year at state-funded public institutions, and that of private colleges and universities was 
much higher — Nankai University charged 70 yuan, and Tongji University charged 210 yuan. In 
addition to tuition fee, the average annual expenditure of HE students in the 1920s ranged between 220 
and 400 yuan, reaching 600 yuan in the 1930s. It was only in a small number of normal colleges that 
tuition was waived, and in a few new public universities created by the Nationalists n provincial 
capitals in the latter half of the Republican era ,significantly lower tuition fees were charged (20 yuan). 
It is not surprising that university students at the time were from relatively wealthy families, and also 
the lifestyle of university students (in particular in metropolitan cities like Shanghai) such as going to 
the movies and dining out, further enforced their alienation from the real world outside the campus, a 
world of warfare, supply shortage, and financial crisis. They are described by Yeh(1990) as the 
`alienated' subjects. 
The expansion of HE candidateship was mostly achieved under the Communist regime, the discourses 
of educational development revolved on 'a people' that had been traditionally excluded from formal 
education in public schools and advanced learning at HEIs, meaning the proletariat class such as 
workers and peasants. In huge volumes of policy documents, campaign slogans, news reports and 
curricular materials, the discourses of the expansion of candidateship invariably stated that education 
should be targeted on this people of the proletariat class who had traditionally been treated unfairly in 
educational provision, the people that made up the majority of the population and therefore the true 
owners of the country, and the people who had made the survival of the country possible and would be 
equally important to the prosperity of a new nation. The working class was then made into the 
`mistreated' subjects (see Zeng, 1953; 1965 for instance), a group that had been deprived of access to 
HE and hence should be compensated in this regard. 
This determination to expand HE candidateship among the proletariat class was most evidently 
reflected in positive discrimination in student enrollment policies. The 1953 Regulation of College 
Entrance Enrollment mandated that priorities should be given to worker and revolution cadres once 
they fulfilled the basic academic requirements. However, as mentioned in Chapter 4 and 5, the 
inclusion of students from working class background in HE was not as successful. HE institutions were 
reported to be dominated by students from the old elite families or from revolutionary cadre families 
(the new elites). The failing of the system to include working class students on a larger scale was 
believed to be the trigger of Educational Revolution of 1958. During the Cultural Revolution, the CEE 
was abolished and replaced by a recommendation scheme. This scheme was implemented for 7 years 
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between 1970 and 1976, the new standard emphasised practical experience (labour and working 
experience), and the criteria specifically targeted on the 'mistreated' subjects. 
`Workers, lower-and-middle-class peasants, soldiers of the Liberation Army and young cadres, with 
correct political ideology, healthy physical constitutions, and at least three-years practical experiences, 
and educational levels equivalent to junior high school graduates; and the age limit should not be 
applied to workers and lower-and-middle-class peasants with substantial practical experiences and 
special considerations should be given to young intellectuals who were in the down-to-the-countryside 
movement and returning to the countryside' (Yang, 2003, p. 194, my translation) . 
The new enrollment policies requested no unified written examinations, but instead recommendation 
by the masses, the approval of the leadership, and administrative reviews of HEIs. According to a 
survey of 8966 entrants in 7 universities in 1971, students from worker, peasant, revolutionary cadre 
and other working-class people origins accounted for 99.80% of the total (Yang, 2003, p. 195). But 
according to Unger (1982), among those who had access to HE during the Cultural Revolution, the 
majority were still from the cadre families, the new elites under state socialism, who changed their 
status to workers or peasants in the previous 'Down to the countryside' 26 movement. 
In the post-Mao era, the CEE was immediately reinstalled, so was the key school system, both leading 
to a resumed emphasis on formal education in public schools in urban areas over the diversified 
provision in rural areas. From the early 1980s onwards, there has been a gradual expansion of the HE 
system, which began accelerating rapidly in 1998. The decisions to initiate such a rapid expansion 
were not entirely clear, but the prevailing discourses revolving around the expansion include some 
immediate concerns of the impact of the 1997 Asian Economic crisis on domestic employment. One of 
the most well-known documents in supporting the decision to expand HE system was a report by 
economists Tang Min and Zuo Xiaolei in 1998 recommending the doubling of entrants to HE. This 
report (Tang and Zuo, 1998, my translation) entitled Recommendations to double the enrolment of 
Higher Education Institutions based its argument on the following reasons, 
`first, the expansion of HE enrolment will increase the consumption demand by RMB 100 billion annually... second, 
the expansion of HE enrolment can to some extent reduce the current pressure of employment... third, existing HEIs 
are capable of expanding enrolment by one fold via proper utilisation of (existing) resources and (further) 
investment...fourth, the general republic is willing to pay for full tuition fee with the aid of student loan system.' 
26 The 'Down to the Countryside Movement' was a policy instituted between the late 1960s and early 1970s. Mao declared 
that in order to learn from the workers and farmers, certain privileged urban youth needed be sent to mountainous areas or 
farming villages and participate in manual labour. 
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Tan and Zuo base their recommendation almost entirely on a market rationality and economic 
calculations — how much profit the expansion can produce, how it can help to reduce the pressure of 
employment at the time of Asian Financial Crisis, how it is feasible by well-planned investment, and 
how it can be easily funded by the willing families of China. To some extent, Tan and Zuo's plan echos 
the conventional socialist governmentality — the state sets targets of personnel production for HEIs to 
accomplish, and in this case the target was to double enrolment. This plan of Tan and Zuo enframes the 
production of HE subjects in an economic reasoning, resolving upon the feasibility, practicality, and 
profits of the expansion. What Tan and Zuo describes is a product chain of HE subjects that is 
profitable and low in state investment and risk; what the central government reads is a technoscientific 
formula of the acceleration of the production of advanced personnel with a very small state investment, 
which in turn, according to the human capital theory, will promote further economic growth. 
With regard to the fourth reason listed by Tan and Zuo, one should be reminded that HE tuition fee in 
China began to be charged in the 1990s, and the notion that HE was not free to all was not entirely 
alien to the public. Tang and Zuo further argue that 
`the Chinese nation has a long and treasured tradition of valuing education. One can say that it is the biggest wish of 
all parents to offer their offspring the chances of receiving higher education. A quite few social surveys indicate that 
the primary motive of saving among the public is to prepare for offspring's possible higher education cost. To invest 
in offspring's education would be one of the projects that the public will genuinely wish to get involved in'. 
Here, Tan and Zuo locate the individual calculation of the HE investment, or economic rationality of 
HE investment, in what they describe as 'the cultural norm' of Chinese families that suggests a high 
degree of willingness to share the cost of HE. By doing so, Tan and Zuo further justify their plan to 
sponsor the expansion by raising tuition fee. Their logic is simply that if the families are willing to pay 
for HE for their children, the state should make a good use of this enthusiasm of HE and cut state 
investment. This logic is quite different from that of the funding cut of HE in the U.K. in recent year, 
which associates individual benefits from HE with 'necessary' individual investment (Barr, 2004; 
Greenaway and Haynes, 2003). Tan and Zuo do not discuss much about the relation between the 
possible personal benefits from HE, but instead they translate the government objectives into the 
willingness of family units rather than individuals. Therefore, according to Tan and Zuo, HE 
candidates in the post-socialist era are the economically 'willing' subjects, but to what extent their 
economic willingness is economically rational is apparently not Tan and Zuo's concern. 
Another text that represents the official account of HE expansion is provided by Li Lanqing, then 
Deputy Premier in charge of educational affairs, who recalled this decision to expand HE in his book 
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Education for 1.3 Billion. In the section entitled HE expansion was to follow the popular demand and 
to be imperative under certain circumstances, he explained that there were four reasons for this 
decision (Li, 2004, p. 119, my translation), 
`first, the Chinese economy is developing at a tremendous speed and we need more high-quality personnel ... 
Second, the mass all expect HE for their offspring, and the government is responsible to fulfill their expectation in its 
full capacity. Third, this expansion can also postpone graduate employment, increase educational consumption and is 
an important practice to enhance domestic consumption and the development of related industries. Fourth, the low 
enrolment rate and the small number of entrants make it difficult to get into university, and basic education was 
therefore forced to be devote itself to the preparation of highly exclusive examinations, and subsequently hindered 
the promotion of education for quality (suzhi jiaoyu).' 
Here, Li incorporates multiple reasonings — the first is a conventional technoscientific reasoning of 
personnel production, the second may appear as a democratic reasoning of responding to the wishes of 
the mass, but in fact, like Tan and Zuo's argument above, it turns 'the mass', which refer to the entire 
population of China, into the 'expecting' subjects, the third an economic reasoning of the profits and 
benefits of HE expansion, and the fourth a managerial reasoning of education system infused with a 
technoscientific reasoning of human quality (suzhi discourses). Therefore, Li's argument intends to 
address various 'stakeholders' of HE — the state, the family, and the individual student. With regard to 
the 'expecting' subjects, Li says, 
`since there are so many high school graduates expecting to go to university, we should figure out a way to make that 
happen. It is merely to set up a few more HEIs, and (we could) do it in forms of public education and private 
education alike. Why should so many high school graduates be rejected (by HE)? Now there are a lot of single-child 
families (in China), and it is a huge psychological pressure for these families if their children cannot go to university. 
(Li, 2004, p. 120, my translation)' 
Li cites the 'expectations' of the HE candidates (the hoping subjects) in a fashion of a social reality, 
and he then concerns the state with answering to such expectations. On the one hand, Li's argument 
tries to bring out a political consistency in this plan of HE expansion with the slogan of 'Serve the 
People' (wei renmin fuwu) of the Communist Party, and implies that all is planned to better serve the 
mass; on the other hand, Li also entangles this concern of the mass with the state's concern fOr the 
economic development. 
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Technologies of the Self 
Technologies of the self aim at establishing a relation with the self, certain self-steering mechanisms, 
or as Rose explains, 'the ways in which individuals experience, understand, judge, and conduct 
themselves ...for example, requiring one to relate to oneself epistemologically (know yourself), 
despotically (master yourself), or in other ways (care for yourself)' (Rose, 1996, p. 72), as can be seen 
from practices such as confession, diary writing, and filling self-evaluation forms. The discussion of 
such technologies have been primarily associated with neoliberal governmentality (Gibb, 1993; 
Mitchell, 2006; Neave, 1988; Peters, 2001; Simons and Masschelein, 2006). The Special issue of 
Educational Philosophy and Theory — The Learning Society from the Perspective of Governmentality 
(Peters, 2006) discusses the notion of 'learning society' as a technology of the self. Besley and Peters 
(2007) discuss the use of confession in educational setting as a technology of the self. 
I argue that such technologies of the self are not exclusive to neoliberal governmentality, but rather, 
they are common in socialist forms of government. The Confucian ethics places an emphasis on the 
role of the self in one's education and personal development in general (Ivanhoe, 2000; Nivison and 
Van Norden, 1996). As my analysis in this section will show, the socialist governmentality does not 
intend to blindly suppress the subjectivity of the self in order to serve the collective good; but rather, 
via socialist technologies of the self, it intends to produce a particular form of 'socialist self', a self 
that is capable of turning itself into the subject of socialist technologies of the government, an active 
self that is capable of adapting itself to dominant socialist ideologies, a conscious self that is capable of 
judging itself on socialist values and norms, an independent and responsible self who is capable of 
managing one's own life under the supervision of the socialist norms, regulations and laws. To explore 
the use of such socialist technologies of the self, I will return to the student dossiers and discuss 
several documents that best manifest the technologies. Also, in the post-socialist era, neoliberal 
technologies of the self also began to prevail, and such technologies are most noticeable in the 
university life guides, what I term 'derivative authorities' of HE in the previous chapter. In the life 
guides, certain forms of subjectivities such as 'self-understanding', 'self-planning' and 'self-
presentation' are promoted. 
Socialist Self 
In the student dossiers, documents such as the Annual Review form (xuenian jianding biao, please 
refer to Appendix 1) may represent the exercises of such technologies. As the following Table 9 shows, 
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apart from the basic information of individual students, this form is designed as a hierarchical pattern 
of evaluation, or a hierarchical gaze into the moral and political dimension of subjects of HE. It begins 
with a self-review, then a 'review of the class', usually done by the head student, followed by a 'review 
of class tutor', usually by a junior administrator in charge of the class, and ends with the 'opinion of 
department' by a senior administrator of the department of school or faculty. Therefore, by procedure, 
the head student reads the self review sections of his or her fellow students, and also adds up his or her 
review of this individual; then the class tutor also adds his or her review based on the previous two 
sections and his or her personal observation; in the end, the senior administrator will simply writes 
`agree' or 'disagree' as the final judgment of the review procedure. 
The hierarchical review procedure displays the mechanism of a socialist technology of the self. Such a 
technology is individualising and collectivising at the same time — on the one hand, it collects 
information, reviews, and judgments of each and every individual and places these individuals, or the 
selves, within units of different sizes and positions within the political structure of government, and 
makes their moral and political features visible, measurable and open to the evaluations of others who 
are higher in the governmental hierarchy; on the other hand, it subjects each and every self to the 
values, norms, languages patterns, phrases, ways of judgment of a collective form of government. 
Here is an example of the first year self-review section by Mr. Y, one of the students who, together 
with his university administrators, granted me the access to his personal dossier. 
`I have made big progress and improvement within the first year of my university life. In ideological terms, as an 
"active applicant (for the Communist Party membership)"27, I further embed myself in the studies of Marx-Leninism, 
Mao Zedong's Thought and Deng Xiaoping's Theory, and I vigorously participate in various activities organised by 
the Party branch ... In academic terms, I have been hardworking and industrious, and I have studied a lot beyond the 
knowledge of my own speciality, and my rank has gone up by over 20 in the second term... In terms of daily life, I 
am able to manage (various aspects of) my personal life such as dining, clothing and grocery-shopping; I have now a 
steady work schedule and a regular lifestyle. I neither drink nor smoke, (as I) intend to be civilised and healthy 
university student... Although I am not a student cadre, I nonetheless actively participate in various activities that are 
good to my academic studies and my health, and support the work of student cadres and teachers, and complete the 
assigned tasks from them; (I have) embraced a full development28. In summary, within the past one year, I have made 
27 The 'active applicant for the Party member' is an honorary title given to students who behave actively and 
enthusiastically to join the CCP. One needs to be recognised as an 'active applicant' first, then as a probationary member, 
and eventually accepted as a member of the CCP. This procedure may take a few years to complete, during which the 
applicant is subject to a series of evaluation. Therefore, students are encouraged to apply for the Party membership in the 
first year of their university education. 
28 'A full development' is a slogan introduced in Mao's period, which suggests that students should develop in a variety of 
dimensions including ideology, physical health, and academic studies. 
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big improvement in terms of study, personal life, and ideology, and I have pushed myself for bigger achievement, to 
be ever-progressing, and to be an outstanding university student'. 
This section of self-review is made up of arguments from four perspectives — ideology, study, body, 
and peer relations. And his 'progress and improvement' in those four perspectives, such as further 
studies of the dominant ideologies, an improvement in the rank of examination scores, a healthy and 
civilised (non-smoker and non-drinker, for instance) lifestyle and a responsible and attitude towards his 
daily life (a regular work schedule, and capability of self-management), and a willingness to 
participate in collective activities and to cooperate with others, all serve as evidence of his efforts in 
becoming a qualified university student, an 'outstanding-to-be' subject, or a righteous socialist self. 
The four categories of this self-review may appear as well-argued and persuasive, as they fit with the 
language pattern of this evaluation procedure — corresponding keywords can be found in other sections 
of review form such as 'industrious', 'self-discipline', 'ideologically progressive'29, and 
`collaborative', and together these keywords present a positive review of the student. For instance, the 
`review of the class' writes, 
`This student is industrious in academic studies and has a strong sense of self-discipline. He is ideologically 
progressive, and is very self-motivated and capable of living and working with his peers in harmony. He has a good 
sense of humour. He is collaborative with the works of student cadres and is good with his assigned works by the 
teachers. He is honest and frugal.' 
And the same language pattern can be easily identified in the 'review of the tutor', which writes, 
`This student is ideologically progressive, hardworking in studies, and has achieved good results in examinations. He 
has wide interests (beyond academic studies) and actively participates in various activities organised by the 
department and the school, and has made some good performances'. 
It is also worth noticing that this review of the tutor begins with the evaluation of Mr. Y's ideology. As 
an administrator of the university, the reviewing tutor displays more than an adherence to correct order 
of norms. The socialist form of government emphasises political loyalty more than the professional 
expertise of its subjects (Tsang, 2000; Zhou, 2004). Therefore, in this review procedure, the evaluation 
of one's ideology is prioritised over one's academic achievement. 
At the first glance, such a review procedure may appear a mere bureaucratic formality. But with a 
closer look, one notices the mechanism of such a socialist technology is rather delicate but effective. 
This student reviews his first year of HE almost strictly in line with the norms of the evaluation 
29 This is one of the most common phrases in such evaluation forms. Usually it means meaning being enthusiastic in 
adapting oneself to the dominant ideologies, such as application for the CCP membership. 
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procedure, which in turn reflects the targeting domains of the socialist govemmentality — ideology, 
body, study, and collaboration. The reviews of 'the class', 'the tutor', and 'the Department' serve to 
promote, confirm, and evaluate the process of student's subjection of the evaluation standards — in 
other words, the degree of subjectification of the HE self. In order to pass such an evaluation, to 
present oneself as a qualified HE self, students actively choose to review themselves in the language 
pattern, the phrases, the normative values of a socialist technology of evaluation. If one chooses not to 
do so, he or she will perhaps have negative reviews from those higher in the political hierarchy in these 
reforms, and these negative reviews will stay with him or her as a part of the personal dossiers, and 
will be readily accessible to his or her future employers or superiors and hence put his or her life 
chances in risk. 
The same review procedure applies to another document in the dossier — the Registration Form of 
Graduates of Higher Education Institutions. Apart from the basic information similar to the form above 
and a full academic record of the individual, this form also includes similar review sections — the 
review of the class is filled by the class tutor instead, and there is an extra section titled 'the opinion of 
the university'. In this case, the administrative office of the university serves as the top of the political 
government of HE. In the self review section, Mr. Y writes the review of his four years of HE in a 
similar language patterns; 
`In university, I have been industrious in studies, and respective towards my teachers, and united with my peers; I 
have been ideologically progressive and frugal in daily life; I have been very self-motivated since my enrolment into 
the university. Ever since I was accepted by the CCP, I have complied myself to the requirements of the party, and 
strived to be a qualified member of the CCP. In academic terms, I have successful passed all the examinations of my 
speciality. In term of daily lives, I have been frugal, and also very supportive towards my peers, and established good 
relationships with them. In terms of work, I have actively participated in the works of the Party branch, and 
completed all the assignments of my Party group in earnest'. 
Once again, Mr. Y begins his review with the ideological perspective. Now a member of the CCP, he 
emphasises his status and how he complies with the regulations and requirement of this membership, 
in order to prove that he is qualified university student, a qualified HE self who has made good 
performance in various perspectives. This 'qualification' is confirmed by his class tutor, who writes, 
`This student is ideologically progressive, and hardworking in studies. He takes work (as a member of the CCP) in 
earnest, and leads a frugal life. He is a qualified university student.' 
This review is further agreed upon by his department and university, with simple administrative seals 
and the word 'agreed' in the sections. This simple conclusion presents Mr. Y's qualification as a 
university student/graduate at the end of this form, ready for the speculation of his future employers 
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and superiors. It also signifies the end of a subject formation process, through which the making of a 
qualified university student, a qualified HE self is encouraged, constantly reviewed, and eventually 
confirmed. 
Neoliberal Self 
Now I want to attend to some neoliberal technologies of the self. Compared with their socialist 
counterparts, these neoliberal technologies of the self may differ in the underpinning of normative 
values. For instance, within the frame of socialist govemmentality, personal autonomy, as Mr. Y writes 
in his review of the first year in university, is more about one's capability in self management (work 
schedule, dressing, dining, grocery shopping, etc.) in the line with normative values of state socialism, 
a socialist concern with the self so to speak. Neoliberal govemmentality, in comparison, understands 
personal autonomy in a sense that one can make choices for oneself but also needs to be responsible 
for all the choices made (Barry, Osborne and Rose, 1996; Rose, 1996; 1999). In this sense, subjects of 
a neoliberal government are not primarily concerned with following a particular set of dominant 
ideologies and norms, but taking responsibility for one's own desires, choices, and decisions. This is 
the tone taken up in the numerous 'university life guides' in the book markets of contemporary China. 
I have made reference to some of them in previous sections. Now I engage with them from the 
perspective of neoliberal technologies of the self 
These guides mostly endorse a managerial language of a market economy, and this market and 
management language is highly visible in the book titles — one of the guides I mentioned previously is 
entitled University Student — Competence Decides Life Chances (Zhang, 2009), and others include My 
University Education, I am in Charge (Chen, 2008), Successful Management of Your University 
Education (Zhongguo Daxuesheng Jiuye Wenti Yanjiu Zhongxin, 2005), etc. They encourage their 
readers to obtain better self-understanding, to more vigorously adapt oneself to the norms of the 
existing HE system and the wider society; in order words, to `responsibility' oneself (Davies, 2006) 
with the task of self-understanding, self-cultivation, self-adjustment, and self-development. In these 
discourses of self-management, HE is not longer understood as a particular form of education with its 
specific aims and approaches, but a unique stage of education, a particular period of time when one 
should be concerned primarily with oneself from various perspectives. These perspectives may 
include, as Chen suggests in the chapter titles of his book 'My university, I am in charge', one's 
adaption to university lifestyle, management of academic studies, maintenance of one's physical and 
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mental health in daily life, participation in various social activities, acquisition of working experience 
from student cadre posts and part-time jobs, and the expectations of one's own future. One is held 
responsible for his or her own success or failure in HE, as Ren and Zhang (2007, pp. 12-13, my 
translation) write in the introduction to their book Perfect University, 
`University education is an education of self-service. The bigger the name of the university, the bigger the personal 
space for each student to explore; you can make efforts in your academic studies or social activities, or you can waste 
it on computer games such as "Saga" or TV shows such as "Super Girl". As expected, we may all have a piece of 
degree certificate in the end, but the value and meaning of this piece of paper may vary greatly. One does not just 
happen to have a salary of 4,000 RMB, or a full scholarship from Harvard University; opportunities favour those 
who are prepared. 
... Therefore, you must not be muddled or follow others' steps; you must not be narrow-minded or avoid challenges; 
you can only rely on yourself — your mind and courage. 
... The awareness of self-education is essential to any university student. In other words, if we are clever enough, we 
can design for ourselves the plan of a perfect university education. Within this short period of four years, we will 
seek our opportunities with careful plans to build up social connections and mobilize resources, and by self-
motivated training, we can cultivate in ourselves an outstanding sense of judgment, direction, and a grand vision'. 
Ren and Zhang underpin their argument of 'the university education of self-service' with a sense of 
social Darwinism; each student is responsible for how he or she spends the four years of university 
education — spend it on the worthwhile (academic studies and social activities) or waste it on the 
worthless (computer games and TV shows), and how one may end up after the four years — one can be 
a winner (with full scholarship from Harvard University) or a loser (with a salary of 4,000 RMB30). To 
be a winner, a successful manager of one's university education and life chances, one needs to be 
equipped with self-awareness, careful plans, strong initiatives, and self-motivation. In this way, one 
can realize a 'perfect' university education, which is believed by the authors to lead to better life 
chances. 
This idea of social Darwinism endorsed by Ren and Zhang is consistent with the official discourses of 
post-socialist governmentality, which associates one's life chances primarily with one's own efforts 
and competence (Jeffreys, 2009; and also Wu and Lansdowne, 2009 talk about the logic of 'winners 
take it all' mentality in the era of market economy, or in their term, capitalist China). The logic follows 
these lines: if one is having difficulties finding a good job, it is because he or she is not competent 
enough; seeking employment is a fair game in a market economy, as a market economy will only 
3° In fact, 4,000 RMB is much higher than the national average incoming of university graduates in recent years. According 
to Li and Wang (2008)'s report of graduate employment, the average income of a graduate with a bachelor's degree is 
below 3,000 RMB (6 months after graduation, 2949 RMB among graduates of '211' universities and 2282 RMB among 
others). 
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choose those who are competent enough. Not surprisingly, when these guides tackle the issue of an 
increasing competition in graduate employment, which is arguably a result of rapid HE expansion in 
the recent decade, the most common solution provided by these guides is first to accept the fierce 
competition as a social reality (rather than throw 'useless' criticisms on the issue), and then to focus on 
the improvement of one's own competence in the market. For instance, in the preface of the book 
Successful Management of Your University Education, the authors from the Research Centre of 
Graduate Employment Problems in China write, 
`The fast-growing number of those enrolling in HE, and the increasingly worrying competition in graduate 
employment, have forced university students to think about their career paths much earlier. The fierce market 
competition and the gap between dreams and reality have put the new graduate entrants of the job markets in 
bewilderment and confusion about their future career... 
... for university students, the acquisition of knowledge is without doubt important, but improvement of one's job 
seeking abilities and professional quality (zhiye sushi) is equally urgent ... The success of most winners, whether in 
seeking employment or setting up their own business, rests on their personal competence from a long-term 
cultivation, and their positive and appropriate attitudes. (Zhongguo Daxuesheng Jiuye Wenti Yanjiu Zhongxin, 
2005)' 
Here, the authors first present the crisis in graduate employment, and then suggest both improvement 
in market professionalism (job-seeking abilities) and 'positive and appropriate attitudes' towards the 
crisis, which are again a sense of self-responsibility and self-motivation, as the latter chapters of the 
book suggest. 
According to these guides, to enhance one's personal competence equates to maximizing one's market 
value. And this can be achieved by a better self-understanding of one's interest, strength, desires, and 
available choices, etc. and better self-presentation in which one shows acquaintance with the 
requirements of market professionalism, such as the normative social values and practices, and 
mastery of practical skills of interpersonal communication, of team work, etc. Zhang (2009) introduces 
in his book 'eight principles of competence building', such as 'matching your speciality with your 
internal desire', 'understanding yourself and having faith in your future success', 'building up your 
advantage and perfecting it', and 'discovering your self- value, and your value to others', etc. Zhang 
uses such a managerial language throughout the book. For instance, with regard to self-understanding, 
he discusses the notion of self-value. He writes (Zhang, 2009, pp. 137-138, my translation), 
`The realisation of self-value can be done in many ways; some are good at studies and often receive scholarships; 
some are good at socialising, and often hold club events, or become the chairmen of student unions; some are good 
singers and win singing competitions; some do part-time jobs and earn money and social experience. 
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Do what you want to do, and get it done; then you will have a sense of fulfilment, and your self-value is realised. 
After these attempts of self realisation, you need to be courageous to adjust yourself once you discover your own 
strength, and devote yourself to do what you are truly good at. What you are good at is where your self-value lies, 
and is your core competence.' 
In this book, Zhang's notion of self-value is not an ethical concept, not an internal reference for what is 
good, beneficial, important, etc., but one's market value. He argues above that one's self-value can 
only be realised once his or her own strength is discovered and fully developed, may it be academic 
study, social skills, special talents (singing, for instance), or making an early start in obtaining working 
experience. To realise one's self-value, or to increase one's market value, one needs to understand 
oneself better to discover his or her strength and to further develop it. 
With regard to market professionalism, Chen(2008) for example spends the chapter entitled future on 
how to behave professionally in job seeking. He lists some tips and reminders about how to produce a 
professional resume, such as cover design, and how to behave properly in job interviews, such as 
dressing codes, standing postures, eye contacts and necessary courtesy. About rules of eye contacts, he 
writes (284-285), 
`When the interviewer is talking, you should look him or her in the eye with sincerity. If your eyes are wandering 
around, the interviewer may find you impolite or untrustworthy. Of course, to look the interviewer in the eye does 
not mean to stare at him or her, but you should place your gaze in the triangle area between his or her eyes and nose, 
with determination and self-confidence, with a small shift of your gaze in every 5 to 7 seconds. (Chen, 2008, pp. 
284-285)' 
• 
As Chen implies, to behave professionally is about paying attention to details of the rule of the market 
—one should adapt oneself to such rules—and produce the correct conducts for the specific 
circumstances, and in this case, how to look interviewers in the eye, in the right area (the triangle 
between eyes and nose), with the right interval between shifts (every 5 to 7 seconds). He also writes 
about replying to offensive questions in job interviews, 
`The worst scenario in a job interview is that you may feel offended by the questions from the interviewer; you 
should control your emotion when feeling embarrassed. You should not reply in a harsh way, not using a sarcastic 
tone to strike back. Please remember, you should show courtesy at all times, and you should also have manners even 
when your interviewers lack of manners. Courtesy is one of the rules of the game of interviews. Of course you can 
refuse to answer these offensive questions, but you need to do it in a subtle way. As a job seeks, you should not find 
excuses for your lack of courtesy under any circumstances. (Chen, 2008, p. 284, my translation)' 
As Chen suggests here, university graduates as job seekers should be acquainted with such 'rules of 
the game', the game of a market which may be greatly different from that of a university life. 
Professional behaviours such as making eye contacts in the correct way, or showing courtesy when 
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offended should be part of one's code of practice for one to win out in a market, to have a future. To 
show one's mastery of the codes of market professionalism in crucial to one's survival in a fierce 
competition, as a tiny mistake of one's own such as not looking people in the eyes can cost one a job 
offer, and leads to unnecessary obstacle to one's life chances. 
Infusing two forms of Self 
In this regard, HE subjects are also placed in potential conflict between two forms of self, and two arts 
of government. On the one hand, HE subjects are encouraged to make choices for themselves, to make 
plans for themselves and to take care of themselves, but for them these choices are not always 
available in other domains of HE experiences other than job choice. The neoliberal arts of self-
government incommensurate with their actual HE experience. Instead, university students are still 
under rigid interventions and administration. They have far fewer choices when it comes to pedagogy, 
as tight schedules, lecture-dominated teaching, and credit systems dominate and students are 
overwhelmed by compulsory courses, and administrative obstacles if one wishes to change specialties, 
etc. HE subjects find themselves in an awkward conflict — they are encouraged to govern themselves in 
a neoliberal fashion, but in reality, they often find themselves still governed by others in a socialist 
manner. I will further explore this conflict in Part IV. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I focus on four forms of technologies of government in the domain of HE. With regard 
to technologies of the population, I argue that medical examinations enforce certain bodily 
qualifications of HE candidateship upon subjects, and select those who are most physically fit for HE; 
additionally, campaign and standards of physical fitness are introduced to perform intervention into the 
physical beings of HE. 
With regard to technologies of the body, I argue that the gaze of the state into the physical condition of 
each HE subject is made possible by the medical and physical report in the personal dossier system, 
and furthermore, a variety of university regulations, practices and discourses are intended to promote 
sportsmanship and physical fitness among university students, to maximise their bodily capacities, so 
to speak. 
With regard to technologies of the social, I argue the expansion of HE in modern China serves to 
promote the HE candidateship among populations, to include those who have not been targeted by HE; 
in the process, different subjects and subjectivities emerged. 
With regard to technologies of the self, I argue that both socialist and neoliberal technologies of the 
self are at work in contemporary Chinese HE, the former aiming at promoting acceptance of socialist 
norms and values of government, and the latter at promoting self-governance, autonomy and 
accountability. 
In the next chapter, I will further discuss desires, rewards, and choices of HE, and I will conclude with 
a summary of subjects and subjectivities of HE in modern China. 
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Chapter 9 Desires and Choices 
Desires and Rewards 
In the previous chapter, I focus on the ways in which HE as an assemblage of human technologies 
works on its subjects. In this chapter, I will further investigate the ways in which HE works through the 
desires and choices of its subjects. This does not only apply to neoliberal government, but also 
authoritarian forms of government. In this section, I will explore the roles of desires and choices in the 
government of HE subjects. 
In his latest work Governing Educational Desires, Kipnis Kipnis (2011) looks into the educational 
assemblage of classroom activities, family devotions, school regulations and local educational policies 
in a Chinese county, and discusses how educational desires serve a means of governing educational 
subjects. He draws on Deleuze and Guattari (1984; 1987) and suggest that 
social organisation depends on lack. Social production and reproduction by necessity rely upon human desire, 
and human desire ("an abject fear of lacking something") is structured through the social organisation of lack. Such a 
conception of desire recalls the relation between educational desire and ... suzhi discourse. Governing with the goal 
of raising the nation's Quality depends on a conception of the nation as a whole, as well as individuals and 
communities within it, as lacking in Quality. Lack is especially marked in rural, uneducated, and impoverished 
persons, households, and communities, and thus intense passions may be born in such sites. That the standards 
determining what constitutes a "Quality" individual undergo constant inflation (from upper secondary school to 
university education, from undergraduate university education to graduate school levels, from any university 
education to degrees from the top universities only), and can be redefined by powerful institutions and individuals, 
only increases the insecurity that surrounds the lack and intensity of the passion. But also ... the discourses that 
define this lack are not simply the products of unidirectional, top-down, authoritarian governing. Rather these 
discourses emerge from fantasies deeply embedded in the wider society, circulate among various social classes and 
groupings...(Kipnis, 2011, p. 133)' 
Following Deleuze and Guattari (1984), Kipnis associates desires with lack, and in the case of 
education in China, this lack is most noticeable in the discourses of suzhi (Quality, with a capital 'Q' in 
his terms). Educational desires revolve around lacking in Quality, in particular in rural areas and 
among uneducated populations. For this argument, I have two concerns. First, as my previous 
discussions point out, the discourses of human quality, from the late Qing's concern of 'population 
quality' to the contemporary discussion of suzhi, are more closely related to the fear of the state in the 
face of warfare, economic backwardness, and now global competition, than to the fear of the subjects 
of governing. It is perhaps true that the subjects also imbed themselves in the discourses of suzhi, and 
interpret their own educational desires with reference to such a `keyword'(Kipnis, 2006), but while 
Kipnis notes that such discourse is 'deeply embedded in the wider society', he does not sufficiently 
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address the emergence of such discourse from non-state actors. By focusing on the discourses largely 
initiated and promoted by the state, Kipnis overlooks some of the indigenous desires that exist before 
the modern era, desires that are produced by other forms of power. These indigenous desires, I argue, 
resolve primarily around the notion of social mobility, and are well maintained through the history of 
Imperial China and modern China. Second, Deleuze and Guattari(1984)'s notion of desires as lack can 
be very useful in illuminating the emergence of desires, but it does not provide much explanation for 
the maintenance of desires, and also their transformations in different historical periods. Therefore, I 
argue that desires, in this case, desires for HE in China, are maintained by rewards. These rewards may 
take a variety of forms, wealth, power, influence, fame, security, etc., and in different historical 
periods, the exact forms of rewards may vary greatly, which in turn shapes the targeting desires. In 
formulating such rewards, an authoritarian regime may be more powerful in producing a unified set for 
its own objectives, for instance under high socialism, and a neoliberal regime may mobilize more 
forms of rewards with the participation of the market and subjects themselves, rewards of wider life 
choices and higher autonomy for example. In the light of these two concerns, I tend to agree more with 
Rofel (2007, p. 14)'s argument that desire 
`is a historically, socially and culturally produced field of practices. These longings, aspirations, and newly 
experienced needs articulated with the contradictions and inequalities produced out of neoliberalism in China. They 
create attachments and active involvement in these transformations. Novel forms of inclusion and exclusion that 
arose out of economic reform rested on how its policies captured a wide array of desires produced in part out the 
policies themselves'. 
Though Rofel's discussion of desire revolves around the transformations brought about in the name of 
neoliberalism, I want to argue this also applies to other social transformations in the history of modern 
China. These social transformations also brought with them new forms and policies of social inclusion 
and exclusion, which are most noticeable in the contrasts between high socialism and its previous era 
and aftermaths. As I will show below, new forms of social segregations under state socialism, for 
instance, greatly shaped the conventional desires of HE, but the desires did not perish but manifest 
themselves in alternative forms of 'attachments' and 'involvement'. I now begin my review of HE 
desires as such a field of practices. 
Desires 
Before the emergence of modern HE in China, there were discourses speaking to the instrumental 
dimensions of education, with regard to how educational efforts, in particular in preparing for the 
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Imperial Examination can bring out desirable rewards. Successes in the Imperial Examination lead to 
posts in the civil service, which can also mean social status and political influence. The most famous 
saying in imperial China with regard to the rewards of educational endeavours is from Zhao Heng, 
Emperor Zhen of Song Dynasty. He writes 
`to bring wealth to family one needs no good farmland, as there are tons of grains in the book; to settle 
down one needs no high ceilings, as there is a house of gold in the book; ... there is no need to be upset 
by the absence of a good matchmaker, as there is glowing beauty in the book' (quoted in Liu, 2004, p. 
241, my translation). 
Its simplified version is perhaps more well known — 'there are tons of grains in the book; there is a 
house of gold in the book; there is glowing beauty in the book'. What this saying implies is that 
educational efforts can lead to success for men in the Imperial Examinations, which in turn will bring 
out a variety of substantial rewards, such as food, money and good-looking women. It associates 
devotion in the preparation for the Imperial Examination with material rewards in an immediately 
instrumental way. Although it does not suggest one should study industriously simply for these 
material rewards, but it does present these rewards as something desirable and admirable. 
Understandings lie these transfer desires for material returns into motivations of educational efforts. 
Also, there are other popular sayings that revolve around the spiritual rewards in this regards, such as 
`to endure the suffering (from learning) so one can be superior to others' (chi de ku zhong ku, fang wei 
ren shang ren, means 'no cross, no crown'), 'decades of oblivion in school may bring you fame 
overnight' (shi nian huan chuang wu ren wen, yi ju cheng ming tian xia wen), etc. (Yang, 2004, p. 290 
summarises a number of popular sayings of education). These two sayings emphasis the social rewards 
of educational efforts, to be superior and famous. The popularity of these sayings, or their 
persuasiveness, had been maintained by the historical records of social mobility via the Imperial 
Examinations — for those who came from humble backgrounds, it was still quite possible to change 
one's life chances and family situation by the educational path. The spiritual rewards and the material 
rewards are not exclusive towards each other, but rather they have been intertwined with each other in 
the discourses of educational efforts and returns, as the Chinese phrase 'to achieve fame and wealth at 
the same time' (mingli shuangshou) suggests. Using educational rewards as motivations can be 
understood as a human technology, a technology that mobilises the population for the selection of civil 
servants organised by central governments, a technology that translate governmental objectives (of 
open recruitments) into personal desires. Considering the fact that such a human technology had been 
in effect for 1,300 years (605 AD to 1905 AD), with its logic taken over in modern forms of 
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examinations such as the CEE, one may conclude that the correlation between desires and rewards 
have been most sustained and persuasive. 
After the abolition of the Imperial Examination, the discursive connections between education and 
material rewards did not perish. Rather they were also deployed in the new era of advanced learning, 
of modem HE. The edict issued on 5th September 1905 commanded the viceroys and governors to send 
a number of selected students to study in foreign countries, and stated that 
`to those who are willing to cross the wide oceans in order to gain substantial knowledge to be of use to 
their country when they return home we shall certainly show our deepest pleasure and commendations. 
(King, 1911, p. 38, author's translation)' 
The Empress Dowager issued the great edict on September 17th, 1905, regulating the sending of 
students to pursue advanced learning, which specified the aims of such overseas studies, the procedure 
of evaluation upon completion and the rewards for outstanding achievement: 
young men of scholastic promise and ability (are to be sent) abroad to study any branch of western 
science or art best suited to their abilities and tastes, so that they may return in turn to China and place 
the fruits of their knowledge at the services of the Empire. Upon the return of a student from abroad with 
his diploma, providing the completion of his studies, he may present himself before the viceroy or 
governor and literary chancellor of his native Province for examination, and, if approved of, may then be 
recommended to the ministry of foreign affairs for employment, and subsequently memorialised to the 
Throne for promotion by said ministry (translated by King, 1911, p. 31).' 
The rewards for those who went abroad for advanced learning are specified in this edict as 
governmental posts in the ministry of foreign affairs. Once again, efforts in education, in this case 
overseas studies, were associated with rewards typical of the Imperial Examination system. The logic 
of motivating educational efforts remained largely unchanged in this case, as did the primarily targeted 
desires. However, if one was to make such efforts and to claim the promised rewards, one should also 
be subject to certain supervision and regulations in doing so. As King (1911, p. 38) points out, 
`(t)he students were reminded that they should study with profit to themselves and their country, so that 
upon their return they might be of service to their Emperor. They were urged to make careful selections 
of studies, not choosing simple ones, nor shirking difficult ones, but choosing those subjects which they 
were best fitted to pursue and which would give them knowledge and ability so that they might upon 
their return show by examination that they were qualified to take places of responsibility.' 
Students were reminded to invest their efforts with care, not to jeopardise their studies with too 
ambitious a target, and not to waste their chances abroad on 'simple' courses. Their educational efforts 
to be invested are therefore not simply their individual conducts, their human capital, but also a most 
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valuable 'investment' of the central government. Therefore, such investment should be handled with 
care. Under this logic, daily details of advanced learning of individual students, such as the selection of 
courses, were established as a field of government intervention. 
Within the different historical periods that follow, the specific forms of rewards of advanced learning 
or HE may have varied, but the technology of HE rewards remains at work, and the desires for such 
rewards remained largely unchanged. In the Republican era, despite the widespread construction of 
HEIs in western styles, the desires for the HE rewards, and the expected forms of rewards among the 
public were similar to those of the previous era. As Pepper (1996, p. 116) points out, 
`education was being relegated to the less exalted status it occupied in the Western countries, in a process 
largely unanticipated by early Chinese modernizers. Rather, they assumed that just as Confucian learning 
both epitomised the state and controlled access to the most prestigious occupations, so Western learning 
would guarantee both national and personal wealth and power. In reality, Western learning did neither, at 
least not in the manner anticipated. But decisions based on those assumptions continued to influence the 
new education for decades. Its clientele retained traditional attitudes towards educational status — hence 
the emphasis on building a college-preparatory system with a literary liberal arts orientation and career 
aspirations to match.' 
The unchanged attitudes identified by Pepper, or the outdated belief in what rewards (higher) 
education can bring about for those who enthusiastically get involved, are reflections of HE desires, 
desires of material and spiritual returns, of social mobility, of 'personal wealth and power'. Not 
surprisingly, for majority of applicants to HE in that period, it was still social mobility and economic 
incentive that underpinned their HE desires. This went against what early Modernizers intended — to 
establish aspirations for knowledge as the aim of studies in HEIs. Despite the advocacy of the 
government and educators at the time, to reshape the HE desires that build up throughout Imperial 
China would not be easy. Cai Yuanpei, for example, openly warned students of such 'unwanted' HE 
desires in his much quoted inauguration speech of Chancellor of Peking University, 
`fellow students (of Peking University) should establish it as the principle (of university attendance) to 
pursue one's education. Those enrolled in Law should not aim to be government officials; those enrolled 
in Business should not aim to be wealthy. Once the principle is established, one would be naturally .on 
the right track. Students staying here for 3 to 4 years, a considerable amount of time, would make a 
tremendous achievement if one treasure every minute and study diligently. If one aimed to be in 
government or wealth, (I want to remind them) that such rationales (of HE) were misguiding and one 
was taking the wrong routes (reprinted in Cai, 1993, p. 825, my translation).' 
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It is perhaps difficult for contemporary researchers to decide to what extent Cai's advocacy was 
successful in denouncing the conventional HE desires and in promoting his notion of pure academic 
studies instead, as literature in this regard was rather thin. The League of Nations' report argued that 
the early students were still keen to use university education as a channel to government posts. The 
evidence for such a statement was the popularity of subject choices among students at the time31. 'The 
ambition of most Chinese university students (was) a career in public service, central or local, and 
failing that a post as a teacher. Law and political science (were) regarded as the natural preparation for 
the former, an Arts course for the latter (Becker et al, 1932, p. 151)'. In other words, the HE desires 
were likely to have remained largely unchanged. 
Such HE desires were subject to major adjustment under the socialist governmentality. There were two 
major changes to the government of HE subjects — first, the new higher education system was designed 
to produce technocrats rather than bureaucrats, and second, all graduates were put under the centralised 
graduate placement scheme. In terms of the former, the conventional route between HE and 
governmental posts was now cut off. The reconstructing of institutions based on the Soviet model gave 
birth to a highly specialised training mechanism, which led students to positions also of high 
specialisation in their later employment; the model of general education for managerial elites in the 
Republican era was replaced by one of specialised education for technocrats in state socialism, which 
further detached itself from the administrative hierarchy in government posts. As a result, the chances 
of graduate employment in government positions were greatly reduced; they were greatly excluded 
from the mainstream status system based on administrative clearance, and found themselves under 
another upgrading mechanism of technical professions, which was also tied up with the post wage 
system. This mechanism was believed to modelled after the administrative system, which implied the 
inferiority of technocrats to government officials in terms of both political authority and incomes (Liu, 
2005). Therefore, the conventional HE desires for personal power were not to be realised, at least not 
immediately, as graduates from the new higher education system would first be recognised as technical 
elites rather than political elites. 
Also under high state socialism, it was almost impossible to achieve personal wealth via HE. In the 
pre-reform system, Chinese organisations were predominantly publicly owned and controlled by the 
state, with their reward and sanctioning mechanisms set up accordingly. These mechanisms were 
31 The Report shows that in the school year 1930, students in Law accounted for 36.6% of the total population, and in 
Liberal Arts 22.5%; in comparison those in Engineering made up only 11.5%, and in Natural Science 9.7%. The reasons for 
such disparity might be, first the high expenses for advanced scientific and technological equipment and few employment 
positions in those subjects. 
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distinctive for two features — the general absence of economic incentives and a strong tendency 
towards egalitarianism (Cao, 2004). Uniform wage scale, for instance, was carried out nationwide, and 
differences among scales proved to be small — Walder (1995) reported a mere 8% salary gap between 
administrators and ordinary workers, and rewards for superior performance were more often symbolic 
than material. However, this is not to suggest the absence of social inequality. In place of economic 
incentives, other forms of rewards of job performance were exercised, generally in a discretionary 
allocation of career opportunities, housing and some other benefits. Only CCP members had realistic 
chances of being assigned posts with significant powers, and also housing allocation, generally 
considered as a non-monetary compensation, was in heavy favour of cadres and political activists. 
With regard to the second major changes to the government of HE subject, the centralised graduate 
placement scheme took away the autonomy of HE graduates in terms of how they could choose their 
employment tracks (also to great extent their life trajectories). This scheme had actually been practiced 
before 1949, when HE students were all revolution cadres and funded by the government, and 
accordingly assigned employment by the government. The communist regime carried on with the logic 
behind this scheme - university graduates were the most needed human resource and should 
accordingly be deployed by the central government. In 1950 when the scheme was first used, 
graduates were given suggestions of assigned employment but were also allowed to seek their own 
employment. In 1952, a basic principle of 'concentrated utilisation and centralised configuration' was 
established. In 1957 the scheme was given a disciplinary authority to enforce the central placement. 
The Regulations regarding the employment assignment of graduate by the State Council states that 
`the graduates of specialties of greatest urgency to the nation must obey the employment placement 
scheme; apart from them, other graduates can be given graduate certificates if they are to take the need 
of the nation into no account, and relentlessly insist upon their own needs, and refuse to accept their 
assignment employment; university administrators in charge should inform them that the government 
will not be responsible for their employment and they are to seek their own, but they will not be accepted 
by any governmental organisations, schools, enterprises and public institutions. (qouted in Yang, 2003, p. 
133, my translation)' 
Such a policy may be understood as a human technology, as the bodies of HE subjects are to be 
distributed or relocated (from HEIs) by the will of the state rather than by that of themselves. It also 
enforces strong disciplinary power. Considering the fact that all private institutions had already been 
eradicated, students who refused to accept the placement scheme would definitely be unemployed and 
hence unable to survive in a command economy under the state socialism. In other words, the prices 
for those who chose to fight against the will of the central government would be extremely high. 
190 
However, the effects of these two major changes did not mean that HE rewards were entirely devalued, 
or that HE desires perished as a result. Socialist governmentality introduced new technologies of 
government, and in turn produced new forms of HE rewards for such rewards. First and foremost, HE 
remained the most efficient means to achieve social mobility — only now, such social mobility was 
manifest in other perspectives than personal power and wealth. Under this alternative configuration, 
HE rewards still promised to enable subjects of state socialism to overcome new barriers of social 
segregation. 
In the Maoist era, though a number of important policies were intended to eradicate class difference, 
there were two forms of social segregation at play. First, all citizens were assigned to one of the three 
categories in term of official social status — peasants, workers and cadres. All three statuses were meant 
to be equal in prevailing official discourses, but in reality they were attached to different standards of 
social welfares and, less so, economic conditions. These statuses were robustly segregated and the 
arrangement was extremely difficult to change. Another segregation policy was introduced by Mao in 
the 1950s to stop massive migration from rural areas to urban areas — the household scheme which tied 
up individual family's income, social welfare and even food and other daily supplies to its residential 
unit — mainly commune in rural areas or working units in urban areas. This household scheme made it 
almost impossible for one to achieve geographic mobility, as one would be denied access to hospitals, 
schools or food supplies outside one's assigned residential unit (Zhou, 2004; Zhou, Moen and Tuma, 
1998). 
In the face of these two forms of social segregation, the public soon found the participation in HE as 
perhaps the most reasonable route to achieve social mobility. Graduates from HEIs via the placement 
scheme would automatically be assigned employment by the state, most likely to relatively important 
posts in the urban areas and allowed to change one's household, and also graduates could change their 
status from workers or peasants to cadres, as all HE graduates were given 'state cadre' (guojia ganbu) 
titles under state socialism. Moreover, since graduate employment under state socialism was 
guaranteed, it also gave rise to a discourse of 'socialist security' of HE graduates. Although graduates 
lost much of their autonomy in job choice and life trajectories, their employment and other parts of 
daily lives (housing, medical care, and other welfare) were secured under state socialism. Unlike their 
predecessor in the Republican era, HE graduates under high socialism were exempt from the worries 
of unemployment. 
In this way, socialist governmentality established its own HE rewards as persuasive discourses, also 
cultivated corresponding HE desires for the rewards. Such desires, to some extent, did not vary greatly 
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in nature from their counterparts in previous eras, as they still resolve primarily around social mobility 
and economic concerns, only that these two issues now had different implications. Social mobility did 
not mean an (immediate) acquisition of political power, but to enable one to cross boundaries of social 
segregation; economic concerns did not mean an (immediate) acquisition of personal wealth in 
financial terms, but higher standards of living, welfare, and security in socialist scales. 
An example of the persuasiveness of these HE rewards and the persistence of HE desires can be found 
in the Cultural Revolution period. The prevailing discourses during that period argued that formal 
education should be not held superior to manual labour and therefore be discouraged, and the change 
in the graduate placement scheme requested university graduates, who were initially recommended by 
factories or productive units, to return to their previous posts or localities. In other words, the 
discourses and new placement policies both challenged the socialist HE rewards and desires. 
But in practice, even when HE was mostly discouraged, those in the top social class chose to stick with 
their belief in HE rewards, to pass on their HE desires to their offspring by securing the few places in 
HE. As various studies suggested (see Liu, 2005; Unger, 1982 for example), young people from cadre 
families dominated educational opportunities at all levels, including HE. They managed to secure the 
scarce positions in HEIs via the recommendation scheme, which was intended to recruit candidates 
from workers, peasants and soldiers. One explanation for this phenomenon is that a large number of 
students from cadre families might have already settled in rural areas during the previous rustification 
campaigns and were recommended for higher education entry after being reclassified as peasants. 
Also, in terms of graduate employment, Teiwes (1974) examined the first group graduates in post-
Cultural revolution in 1974, and reported that the graduates who had had previous schooling and were 
sent down to the rural areas were most likely to be allocated by central planning agency to various 
departments. Ironically, those who were most capable in providing aid to rural modernisation did not 
presumably return to rural production units but were absorbed by the bureaucracy. But considering the 
fact among them a generous proportion was from cadre families in the first place, their destinations 
would be less surprising. In the circle of being sent down and absorbed back, the ruling class found a 
way to secure their share of HE rewards and maintain their HE desires even in the time of great 
radicalism and scarcity. 
In the post-Mao era, the most immediate change to HE was that unified national entrance examinations 
was reintroduced and enforced for HE in 1977, followed by a remarkable expansion for higher 
education. Attention should also be given to an important new sector of higher education, adult higher 
education. Built upon the informal sector during the Cultural Revolution period, this sector includes 
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television and radio universities, urban adult institutions associated with large enterprises, and colleges 
of adult educations associated with large enterprises. It was intended to provide massive re-education 
programmes for old revolutionary elites to prepare themselves for the new 'modernisation' goals 
(Hayhoe, 1996) and more importantly legitimize their political authority as the 1983 plan required by 
1990, a college education as a prerequisite for all leading cadres down to the county level (Fewsmith, 
2008). In 1986, adult higher education largely completed this mission, and 'by the time of the Thirteen 
Party Congress in 1987, college-educated professional cadres had largely replaced the poorly educated, 
largely peasant cadre forces that had come to power in 1949' (Pepper, 1996, p. 489). The rise of adult 
education and its specified aim implies a new mentality of government in the reform era, which once 
again associated HE with government posts. But this new mentality does not suggest that HE was a 
sufficient condition for government posts, but rather a necessary condition, a pre-requisite, a 
qualification to be further evaluated by other terms. This is later confirmed by the Civil Services 
Examination system (CSE), which requires that all applicants must hold a degree of four-year HE. 
CSE has become increasingly popular in recent years, and is now portrayed as the 'state 
examination' (guo kao). This is not difficult to understand. In the face of the graduate employment 
crisis as a result of a rapid expansion of HE since 1998, university graduates can achieve greater 
security in employment and also access to greater political influence once they succeed in the selection 
of civil servants via CSE. Via this contemporary form of social selection, the conventional desires of 
obtaining governmental posts return, now motivating the contemporary HE subjects. 
In the post-socialist period, HE desires once again take different shapes. On the one hand, the desires 
for socialist security began to fade, as the state sector no longer unconditionally absorbed HE 
graduates, and employment perspectives were not longer guaranteed. With regard to employment 
perspectives of HE graduates, the period between 1978 and 1999 witnessed a fluctuation. Because the 
1983 plan re-established the connection between specialised or professional degrees with particular 
bureaucratic posts (Fewsmith, 2008, p. 5), university graduates normally had little difficulties finding 
employment in national and provincial bureaucracies where there was a gap in professional personnel 
created by the total stoppage of higher education during the Cultural Revolution. However, 
employment prospects became less favourable after 1985. On the one hand, vacancies in professional 
and bureaucratic domain were filled up by succeeding cohorts of expanded group of graduates; on the 
other hand, this situation was worsened by the economic recession in the late 1980s which created 
fewer posts than previous years. 
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Additionally, the market mechanism introduced new forms of desires. First and foremost, choices and 
autonomy in one's job choice (and life trajectories) became increasingly significant as the 1985 
reforms started to move away from the unified graduate placement scheme. `Two-way' selection was 
carried out in 1989, which allowed graduates to choose among a number of posts, and in 1994, the 
government largely withdrew from graduate placement (Hoffman, 2006; 2010). Therefore, graduates 
were faced with the new employment situation marked with more choices, more competition risk, and 
less security. In the following expansion era of HE, this will become an increasingly severe challenge 
to students' discourses of employment security and social privilege. 
Another important change to the desires of HE was the re-introduction of economic incentives. In the 
post-Mao era, principles of egalitarianism were gradually eroded. The economic reforms in the post 
1992 era further introduced the market mechanism to both the public and private sector of Chinese 
organisations. By the mid-1990s, a considerable proportion of the public enterprises had been 
transformed into relatively independent corporate entities, and their obligation to the state was via 
taxation. According to Wu and Xie (Wu and Xie, 2003, p. 245), 
`One of the principal structural changes following the post-socialist transformation has been the 
gradual replacement of the state by the market as the principal agent of social stratification. This 
dramatic change has led some theorists to predict an increasing in the importance of market credentials 
(such as education) and a decrease in the importance of political attributes as determinants of earnings 
in transition economies'. 
With respect to the changing role of education in social stratification, researchers have noticed two 
trends — first, income/earning returns to education have increased over time and second, they tend to be 
higher in the private sector than in the state sector (seeWu and Xie, 2003 for a good review of relevant 
literatures). Hence, HE graduates began to explore opportunities in the market sector and to be more 
concerned with economic returns of their job choices. Xie and Wang (2001), for instance, report a 
noticeable trend that graduates in the 1990s chose foreign enterprises and joint-venture companies over 
the state sector as the former offered higher salaries. 
Also geographic mobility becomes an increasingly important factor in HE desires, in particular those 
who are from economically disadvantaged regions. Therefore, for HE graduates in the reform era, 
secure and well-paid jobs in metropolitan regions, preferably in coastal areas, become perhaps the 
most desirable employment perspective. Li and Wang report (2008, p. 5) that coastal areas in 2007 
absorb 61.3% of new graduates at bachelor level, though the region only accounts for 34.6% of 
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entrants and 34.3% of educational resources. This rapid expansion of HE also means a domestic HE 
migration into urban areas is taking place at a faster speed and a large scale. 
In summary, the post-socialist era witnesses a rapid increases in job choice for HE subjects in terms of 
the type of employers and locations, and how to make the best of the choices available becomes an 
important strategy for each and every HE subject, every HE self. This increase of choices also applies 
to other domain of HE such as universities and specialities. This is the focus of the next section. 
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Choices 
The government of HE subjects in the post-socialist period increasingly works via choices, autonomy 
and self-enterprise, rather than mere robust administrative intervention. As Hoffman(2010, p. 10) 
points out, 
`A critical aspect of the governmental change in China was the adoption of more distanced techniques of 
governing that encouraged self-governance rather than state-directed planning. These techniques... 
differed from those of high-socialist era, when citizens ... had little autonomy to generate their own 
plans, ... to pursue individual interests ...' 
With regard to HE subjects, students are given more choices in various aspects of their HE 
participation and also more autonomy in making these choices. This increasing importance of choice-
making among HE subjects exhibits what Sigley (quoted in Hoffman, 2003, p. 21) terms a 
`reconceptualisation of target subjects from objects of administrative fiat to autonomous agents with 
vested interests and rights'. With the reconstruction and expansion of HE system from the 1980s 
onwards, a large number of specialities in humanity and social science were reintroduced into HE 
curriculum, meaning more choices in what one can study in HE. There was also a significant rise in the 
number of HEIs, meaning more choices in where one can study for HE. The abolishment of the 
graduate placement scheme also allowed HE subjects to choose their career tracks for themselves, 
more choices in what to do after HE. 
At first glance, there seems to be more choices, autonomy and freedom for HE subjects. But this is not 
to say that they are not subject to less government in the post-socialist era. Rather they are now subject 
to different forms of government (Barry, Osborne and Rose, 1996; Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999) which 
require them to make choices for themselves with all the information they can find, all the counsels 
they can have access to, and all relevant factors taken into accounts; they are all to be held responsible 
for all the choices made. In following Rose(1999) and Hoffman (2006; 2010), I argue that, rather than 
measuring the degree to which subjects are truly autonomous and free, we should focus on how choice, 
autonomy and freedom act as a post-socialist art of government, a technology of self-governance, and 
a part of subject formation processes. In this regard, HE subjects are bound to freely make their 
choices (Apple, 1993). They should aim to be professional in the way they choose; they are bound to 
`professionally choose subjects' (Ho ffinan, 2006; 2010). 
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In this section, I focus on the choices of HE specialities, institutions and also professions upon 
graduations, and reveal how choices are introduced, promoted and articulated in these domains, and 
how choices serves as a part of government in the post-socialist era. 
Hot Specialities, Cold Specialities 
One domain of such choices is to choose one's specialty of HE. Sina (xin lang, www.sina.com.en ), 
one of the leading portal sites in China, produces a particular section on how to make choices of 
specialities32. The entire section is organised in the tone of 'insiders', those who are familiar with the 
rules and games of speciality choosing, or as 'authorities' of HE as noted in chapter 7. For instance, 
this 'subject choice' section of Sina gives an analysis of 'hot' specialties, meaning those that are 
popular in the job market and most likely to be well-paid. Such specialities were reported33 to be 
Economics, International economics and trade, Public Finance, Finance, International Finance, 
Insurance, Credit Management, all revolving around economics and finance; but for 2012, the list of 
`predicted' hot specialties looks significantly different34 — it includes Aviation and Astronautics, 
Monetary Management, PMB Logistics, Alternative Energy and Materials, and Creative Industries, all 
connected with industries and domains to be rising in the near future. Although all reports put together 
in this section in forms of 'analysis' or 'prediction' are cast with a tone of 'insiders', they can be 
confusing and contradictory — for those who had to make choices of specialties in the year 2009, for 
instance, should they believe in the analysis of the current hot specialties, or the prediction of those of 
2012, which is closer to the time of their graduation? Apparently, this section of Sina, like all other 
reports and forecasts of this kind, only intends to serve as an information portal, the readers will have 
to make up their own minds. 
This section also gives a number of lists that are intended to warn the choosers of the risks involved, 
such as lists of 'tricky' specialties and the most 'impractical'. The former is entitled 'Don't buy it — top 
10 Superficially Beautiful specialties' 35, and presents 'the truth' of the risks of each one. For instance, 
Environmental Engineering is on the list due to the claim that 'the level of industrial development in 
32 http://edu.sina.com.cn/gaokao/hotmajor/index.html 
33 http://edu.sina.com.cn/gaokao/2008-04-28/1506136749.shtml, author unknown, last accessed on 20th July, 2011 
34 http://edu.sina.com.cn/gaokao/2008-04-27/1902136612.shtml author unknown, last accessed on 20th July, 2011 
35 The article borrows its name from a novel 'Superficially Beautiful' (kan Shang qu hen mei), by Wang Suo (1999), a well-
known contemporary writer. The novel was made into a film in 2006, by the name of 'Little Red Flowers'. 
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China is not advanced enough', Mechanics for the reason that 'one has to deal with practices of boring 
drawing every day', Chemical Engineering and Technology because 'one needs to work in the front 
line', and Public Administration as 'one will know everything but be good at none'. For the latter, the 
article titled 'Summarised by the web users - top 16 Most Impractical Specialties' is actually not 
produced by Media professionals, but is cited from a personal blog. This list of 1636 even includes 
some of most cutting edge specialities in China such as Biotechnology and Environmental Sciences. 
The author37 explains that biotechnology is impractical as 
`In China, one can hardly fmd a good job even with a doctoral degree (in biotechnology) from a 
renowned university; unless with a foreign doctoral degree, one can do a bit teaching. But this speciality 
is of highest enrolment scores. Every year, a lot of high achievers get into this specialty with great 
expectations, but it is a true waste (of their talents). There has not been a proper Biotech enterprise in 
China, so it will be very difficult to find a job. This specialty of this university is now marked with the 
lowest employment record of its graduates for the past three years.' 
Without proper survey data without knowing the specific university the article refers to, it is hard to 
verify the statement of this quotation that Biotechnology has the lowest employment record among all. 
But accuracy is perhaps not the primary concern of articles as such — they are to remind HE subjects 
the risks behind the 'glorious names' of certain specialties, some that might sound interesting and 
promising but in fact lead to undesirable employment perspectives. Biotechnology for instance has 
extremely high entrance requirements, meaning a big investment of one's human capital and 
intellectual capital, but has a poor employment perspective, meaning a low return in the market; 
therefore, it is sufficient to say that choosing Biotechnology as one's specialty of 4-year-HE is highly 
risky and perhaps not wise. The underpinning logic of such conclusions are obviously market 
rationalities — it does not give account of one's personal interests, but revolves primarily on the return 
rate of one's 'investment'. Such a logic is aimed to train its audiences, most likely HE subjects, to 
evaluate their choices with a market rationality, to be professional choosers, to be enterprising selves. 
36 The 16 specialities listed (in fact only 14 are listed) are Biotechnology, Environmental Sciences, Marketing, International 
Politics and Diplomacy, Chinese Language and Literature, Journalism, Economics, E-government, Human Resource 
Management, Mathematics and Applied Mathematics, Physics, Computer Science, Food Science, Information 
Management, etc. 
37 http://edu.sina.com.cnigaokao/2007-12-20/1906114437.shtml author unknown, last accessed on 20th July, 2011, my 
translation. 
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Seeking the Secret Bargains 
After the rapid expansion of HE system in recent years, the number of HEIs rises to 1,908 in 2008. 
This huge system is also a hierarchy of mainly three categories — key HEIs, regular HEIs, and two-year 
colleges. To choose among such a big number of HEIs could be confusing. For high achievers in the 
CEE, the first step is perhaps to make sure one gets into the most renowned and elite universities, as 
credentials from these institutions represent the highest market value. These institutions are most likely 
among the 'national key universities' (quanguo zhongdian yuanxiao). The most convenient way to 
decide whether a HEIs is a key institution or a regular one is to check whether it is in the list of the 
`985' or '211' institutions, the '985' being even more exclusive and elite in terms of reputation (by 
official standards) of the listed institutions and the governmental investment they receive. 
If the key universities represent the highest market values, then for those who are choosing among 
these HEIs, it is most ideal to secure a position in such institutions and hence to maximize the future 
returns of one's investment in HE (time, tuition and other fees). However, the positions available in the 
key universities, in particular the most elite such as Peking and Qinghua, are limited and hence highly 
competitive, so it is perhaps a better strategy for those who are not among the highest achievers to 
secure positions in a key institution that is not among the most exclusive — in this way, one secures the 
market value of his or her degree to be claimed, and reduces the risks of failing in the university game 
- the worst scenario would be not getting into a key university in the end, even if one is academically 
qualified, simply because of writing down the 'wrong' choices in their application forms, for instance a 
highly exclusive university out of one's league. In other words, those who are not among the highest 
achievers are wise to seek the secret bargains, key universities that are not among the most 
competitive, the most well-known, but nonetheless with good values in terms of teaching, research, 
expertises and employment perspectives of their graduates. 
For instance, `Gaofen' (high scores, www.gaofen.com ), a website aiming at providing information for 
educational subjects — supposedly, those who want to achieve high scores at various stages of their 
education, from entrance examinations to primary schools to the CEE and those for study overseas, 
posts an article named 'Analysis — eight '211 universities' that are most likely to be neglected by high 
achievers in the CEE'. It makes recommendations of eight universities that are among the '211' but are 
perhaps among the least competitive — in other words, the secret bargains in university choices. For 
instance, it recommends Fuzhou University38 as it is 
38 http://www.gaofen.com/article/118463.htm last accessed on 20th July, 2011, my translation. 
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`located in the capital city of Fujian province — Fuzhou. For the reason of climate and geographic 
location, it is hard to attract students from North China. But this university is among the "211 project" 
and has its own strength, and desires the attention of those from North China.' 
In this case, Fuzhou University is not among the most popular 211 institutions for applicants in North 
China, and is likely to be far less competitive and of much lower an entrance requirement. For those 
who are not among the highest achievers in the CEE, and willing to trade possible inconveniences in 
climate and geography, Fuzhou University may be a most desirable bargain — it is low in risks of 
gaining admission and high in return in terms of its academic competence and graduate employment 
perspectives). 
It is perhaps, once again, difficult to verify such pieces of information. Information as such is not 
intended to be precise; it is aimed to present itself as 'popular wisdom', and above all, to promote a 
certain market rationality, a market logic that focuses on how to maximize one's investment in HE, 
how to claim the biggest benefits with the lowest risks involved. In this case, for those who are not 
among the most competitive in the CEE, choosing a secret bargain university would be a good 
example of a wise investment under a market rationality, of the professional conduct of an enterprising 
HE self. University choice, according to this market rationality, is a conduct that involves careful 
calculation of risks and returns, a conduct that requires a collection of a variety of information and a 
logic and rational decision making process, a conduct of market professionalism. One needs to choose 
wisely, rationally, and professionally. 
Choosing Professions, Professionally Choosing 
In my previous discussion of technologies and rewards, I explain how the personal dossiers system, 
household registration and employment placement scheme helped produce subjects amenable to a 
socialist art of government, to a planned economy. But major changes were introduced in the post-
socialist era. For instance, new forms of labour distribution such as job fairs, face-to-face interviews 
and career counselling are now in the place of direct job assignment of state plans. The 'Talent Service 
Centre' (rencai fuwu zhognxin) and 'Talent Market' (rencai shichang) are set up and run by 
government's Personnel Bureau in big cities to serve as a platform of job hunting among new 
professionals such as HE graduates (Hoffman, 2006). 
Hoffman (2010, pp. 12-13) in her ethnographic study of college graduates in Dalian China, Patriotic 
Professionalism in Urban China, provides an insightful account of how in the post-socialist era (or the 
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late-socialist era in her term) job choice serves as 'a part of power relations, a mechanism of 
regulation, a device deployed to help encourage college graduates to be self-enterprising individuals', 
and how new practices of choice ... helped to specify new subjects of government'. She gives 
examples of job fairs on university campus and Talent Market as forms of new forms of job 
distribution in metropolitan cities such as Dalian, and explores the ways in which the norms of culture/ 
education (wenhua) and human quality (sushi) are infused into the hiring process. These practices and 
discourses, according to Hoffinan(2010, p. 27), 'reinforced the idea that people could change their 
lives by focusing on self-improvement and self-enterprise, redeploying Confucian ideas of self-
cultivation and Maoist calls for constant self-study with neoliberal notions of entrepreneurialisation of 
the self'. In my discussion of the technologies of the self, I have already discussed how HE subjects 
are encouraged to take control of their own university education, discover their own interests, improve 
their 'self-value', and enhance their skills of self-presentation in the hiring process. In this section, I 
will further engage with the prevailing discourses of job choice of HE graduates in contemporary 
China. 
First, one of most common arguments with regard to the graduate employment problem from the early 
2000s onwards is that HE graduates are unable to adapt themselves to the current situation of the job 
market, and are likely to have related 'psychological issues'. This argument treats radical changes in 
graduate employment perspectives, which are without doubt related to the massive expansion of the 
HE system in the recent decade, as a kind of social fact, an objective truth, and hence label HE 
graduates with possible 'psychological deficits'. Wang (1992; 2007, my translation and emphasis) in 
his An Exploration of Student Psychology in Job Choice argues that there are mainly four problems in 
this regard, 
`first, (university graduates) hold too high an expectation of employment; some people have an unclear 
understanding of the current employment perspectives and of the demands of the employers, and they 
lack realistic evaluations of themselves, so their subjective expectations are not matched with objective 
reality, and hence too high an expectation of profession choice and salary. Second, they tend to be too 
dependent; some rely too much on their parents and universities, and normally give up on fighting for 
job choice and competition, but instead cast their hopes on parents and relatives. Third, they are too 
eager for quick success and instant benefits; some people are single-minded on getting into some work 
units of high salary and welfare, or some joint-venture enterprises or foreign enterprises or the 
economically developed coastal regions, and are willing to sacrifice their own HE specialties and 
personal interests. Fourth, they tend to blindly follow others; some lack rational thinking and neglect the 
demand of the society and fail to understand their targeting employers, and they have no analysis of their 
own strength and instead take others' job choice as their own, etc.' 
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Wang's analysis tends to suggest that the common psychological issues with HE graduates resolve 
primarily around, firstly, a lack of 'self' — self-dependence rather than dependence upon others 
(families, relatives, and universities), self-understanding rather than blindly following others; and 
secondly a lack of 'rationality', in understanding the objective reality of the markets and employers, 
and in planning their own career tracks (sacrifice long term benefits for instant success). 
Second, there are also prevailing discourses that provide solutions to the problems identified by Wang, 
which infuse technologies of the self (promoting self-understanding and governance) with 
technologies of the social (promoting professionalism and market rationalities in the post-socialist 
China). These infused technologies can be found in other reports on graduate employment. For 
instance, Sun (Sun, 2007, pp., my translation) in University students' professional thinking and 
orientation discusses how to be a professional self in job choice. This can be done in three steps — first, 
`evaluate oneself, and understand one's position (in the professional hierarchy)', such as the market 
value of one's credentials; second, 'have a vision and understand one's professional orientation', which 
means detailed research about suitable professions and suitable employers, etc.; 'have a clear mind and 
establish one's life goals', which involves careful and rational choices between many options likely to 
be exclusive to each other, such as between an immediate job or a sustainable career. In Sun's 
argument, a professional self in job choice is to embracemarket rationality (clear about one's own 
market value), of professional choosing ability (capable of detailed research about professions and 
employers), of self-understanding (aware of one's strength and weakness) self-organising and self-
planning (capable of making life plans with various factors taken into accounts). 
Lian (2008, p. 11) bases her discovery of an increasing rationality among HE graduate in job choice 
upon several trends that she picked out of the results of 'A survey of primary job choice of university 
students'. According to Lian, this increasing rationality is manifested in the facts that, first, in terms of 
the type of employers, foreign enterprises are no longer the primary choice, but instead state-owned 
enterprises become the most popular39; second, in terms of geographic locations, although students 
place their primary choice on metropolitan cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and others in the eastern 
coastal regions, they are increasingly willing to go to the 'basic level'(jiceng jiuye), regions that are 
less developed such as small cities and towns; third, in terms of starting salary, more students are 
willing to accept a range between 1,500 to 4,000, which according to the author is more 'realistic'. It is 
obvious that Lian's notion of rationality is a market rationality, a market professionalism that requires a 
39 The reason behind this change may be that in previous years foreign enterprises are more likely to offer higher salaries 
but after the financial crisis in 2008 more students prefer state-owned enterprises for they are more likely to offer higher 
employment security. 
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quick adaption to changes in job market (from foreign enterprises to state-owned enterprises to seek 
better job security), a careful analysis of the distribution of existing job opportunities (from developed 
regions to developing regions to seek wider range of job choice), a realistic evaluation of market 
situation (from too high an expectation of starting salaries to a realistic expectation). 
Also, sending HE graduates to the basic level, meaning towns and villages in less developed regions, 
has become a new strategy of human resource distribution by the post-socialist state. The strategy 
intends to guide HE graduates to take administrative posts in government offices of the basic level 
(these posts are known as 'village 	 chuanguan, in prevailing discourses), which is argued to 
solve the graduate employment problems and introduce 'talents' to where they are most needed. This 
strategy deploys technologies of the population, which guides the distribution of the bodies of HE 
graduates away from the developed regions to reduce the employment competition; second, 
technologies of the social, which presents job choice in the basic level as realistic, beneficial and 
honourable — new graduates can have more opportunities to choose from, to build up their working 
experiences at the basic level, and to serve the local community, the people and the nation; and third, 
technologies of the self, as choosing an administrative post at the basic level not only allows one to 
building professional expertise, but also exhibits a market professionalism that places 'one's own life 
goals and career plans as the priority rather than blindly following others' (Li, 2007, p. 10, my 
translation). The strategy also has its own rewarding system, as Li (2007, p. 10, my translation) 
reports, 
`Beijing has its regulations that village officials with two years working experiences can have bonus points in 
examinations for postgraduate studies, priority in the admission process of the Civil Service Examination, and some 
other privileges in for example applications for Beijing household; these policies reduce the risks of taking up jobs at 
the basic level, and encourage more people to explore their own worlds at the basic level.' 
This strategy of sending HE graduates down to the basic level pervades both socialist arts of 
government and neoliberal arts of government. For the former, reports in this regard tend to describe 
taking up posts as an opportunity to answer to the needs and of the rural area and the demands of the 
nation, to 'make grand achievement and establish enterprise (jiangong liye)' (Yang, 2007, p. 1, my 
translation), to enframe this particular job choice in the socialist mentality of personnel training and 
societal building. Jin (2009, p. 5, my translaton) quotes Youngsters and the Rural area (Qingnian Yu 
Nongchun) by Li Dazhong, one of the founding fathers of the CCP, which says 'in order to introduce 
modern civilisation into the roots of societies, we must blend the intellectuals with the working class' 
and 'our youngsters should go to the rural area and make their contribution to the development of the 
areas' (Li in Jin, 2009, p. 5, my translation). Later in this article, she quotes Zhang Xixian, a professor 
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at the Party School of the central committee of the CCP, who says that personnel training at the front 
level of the working class has been a good tradition of the CCP, and this new strategy represents a 
historical consistency with similar practices in history such as the 'Down to the countryside' 
movement during the Cultural Revolution. 
From the perspective of neoliberal arts of government, this job choice is also a feasible and beneficial 
one for the HE graduates. It is not forced upon the graduates but open to their selection. Li gives an 
example of Zhang Bing, a history graduate, who, to the amazement of his peers and friends, took up a 
job at the basic level in rural Beijing after 'a calm and comprehensive weighing'. Taking up a post at 
the basic level, according to Li, is not just another possible choice, but also a rational and practical 
choice, one which exhibits an 'appropriate attitude of job choice in the time of mass HE' — 'go to 
where your talents are needed, and to build your own golden rice bow140' (Zhang inJin, 2009, p. 5, my 
translation). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I first explore how desires and choices are deployed as means of government of HE in 
modern China. I argue that desires should be understood as a historical, social and cultural product of a 
field of practices, and the maintenance and transformations of desires should be studies with reference 
to material rewards in reality. HE desires in modern China revolve primarily around the idea of social 
mobility and also other factors in life chances, such as wealth and fame. Despite the radical social 
changes in the modern history, such desires have been well maintained by a variety of material rewards 
and the correlation between desires and rewards remains close and appears persuasive. 
With regard to choices, I discuss the ways in which choices are deployed as a way of government in 
the post-socialist era. In particular, I make reference to choices in three domains — specialties, HEIs, 
and professions, and reveal how choices and autonomy in making choices in the post-socialist era are 
used to promote certain market rationality and professionalism. Choices serve as a persuasive form of 
self-governance. 
4° Li makes reference to the socialist phrase 'iron rice bowl', which means a job of lifetime security under high socialism. 
The idea of 'golden rice bowl' can mean a job of good prospective, also of a good income, but Li does not specify here. 
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Part IV 
Governing the Present 
Framework for Part IV 
Governing the Present 
The title of this Part is borrowed from an early special issue of Ideology and Consciousness (1979, vol. 
6), in which Foucault published his famous On Governmentality. It again appears as the title of Miller 
and Rose (2008)'s book on the administration of economic lives in contemporary society. My use of 
this title here indicates both a Foucauldian approach in the fmal Part, and also a focus on HE in the 
contemporary context. 
This Part aims to answer my third research question - 'What is produced as the truth of HE? And what 
are the forms of subject, subjectivity, and ethics produced in such a process?' To this end, I bring 
together three theoretical tools in a Foucauldian frame - truth, subject and ethics. By truth, I follow the 
lead of Foucault and understand truth as a social construct - it is produced by power and relative to 
discourses. For subject, I look into different subject forms of HE that emerge in this history of modern 
China, and I argue these forms of subject are not given but produced and taken up through HE. The 
notion of ethics in a Foucaudian frame refers to one's relation with oneself, and it includes four aspects 
- ethical substance, mode of subjection, self forming activity and telos; I explore their respective 
application to the Chinese context. In the conclusion chapter, I review the contribution and limitation 
of Foucauldian perspectives and also make suggestion for future research. 
I include both interview data and materials from student dossiers. These data shed some interesting 
lights on the ways in which certain truth sets, subject forms and ethical principles are produced, 
modified and taken up through HE in contemporary China. 
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Chapter 10 Truth 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I make use of Foucault's notion of 'truth' and explore the production, 
modification and appropriation of certain discourses of HE. The idea of 'truth' plays an important 
role in Foucault's work. However, Foucault refuses to theorise truth. For him, 
`truth does not support theorizing because it is neither diachronically nor synchronically monolithic, 
Truth has been different things at different times and is different things at the same time. Truth is 
historical and heterogeneous'(Prado, 2000, p. 138). 
Although Foucault is not offering a theory of truth, he provides us with a new perspective of truth, 'a 
novel account of the diverse non-subjective and impersonal mechanics that produce different sorts of 
truths in disparate discourses and epochs' (Prado, 2000, p. 138). However, the difficulties facing the 
readers in understanding Foucault's use of truth, apart from his refusal to theorise it, are increased by 
the fact that Foucault gives many different accounts of truth in different places and these accounts are 
not entirely consistent. At the first glance, his views on truth may have a flavour of postmodern 
relativism with an analytic background. Most noticeably, Foucault argues that truth is historical, 
relative to discourse and produced by power. But this is only part of his perspective on truth. Prado 
(2000) writes an excellent summary of Foucauldian notions of truth, which include the criterial notion, 
the constructivist notion, the perspectivist notion, the experiential notion, and the tactic-realistic 
notion. 
The criterial use of truth focuses on the relativistic side of truth, or 'what counts as truth in a 
discourse'; his constructivist use is concerned with how truth is produced (and sustained) in discourse; 
his perspectivist use tackles the appropriation of truth by individuals, the process in which 
`subjectivities are shaped by power through constraints on individuals to acquire certain beliefs and to 
adopt certain perspectives'; his idea of experiential truth is 'the outcome or resolution of ... 
"epistemological crises",' namely the circumstances in which 'individuals find themselves forced to 
question what they previously accepted unquestioningly'(Prado, 2000, p. 128). Prado introduces the 
last notion, the tactic-realistic to justify Foucault's inconsistency in his uses of truth as either a 
genealogical critic or in other discursive roles, which is not immediately related to my discussion here. 
Therefore, I only make reference the first four notions of truth. 
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Foucauldian 
Notions of Truth 
criterial 
constructivist 
perspectivist 
experiential 
tactic-realistic 
what counts as truth in a discourse 
the production of truth in discourse 
the appropriation of truth by individuals 
subjectivities being shaped by power through constraints 
on individuals to acquire certain beliefs and to adopt 
certain perspectives  
truth acquired by reflecting upon of what one previously 
accepted unquestioningly 
Foucault's shifting roles as either a genealogical critic or 
a discourse participant 
Table 10, Foucauldian Notions of Truth, based on Prado (2000, p. 128) 
The Criterial Notion of Truth 
With regard to the criterial notion, Foucault is most explicit in saying that each society 'has its 
particular regime of truth'. This regime of truth includes different types of discourse which it accepts 
as true, and is shaped by mechanisms 'which enable one to distinguish true and false statements' and 
means 'by which each is sanctioned'. In addition, each society has 'procedures accorded value in the 
acquisition of truth' and 'those who are charged with saying what counts as true' (Foucault, qouted in 
Prado, 2000, p. 118). 
In previous chapters, I have started to reveal the most important components of the truth regime of 
modern HE in China. My discussion of HE principles and rationality of HE government show that, on 
the macro level, HE has been mainly deployed to serve the needs of the state rather than the 
individuals (both in principle and in reality), and has favoured science and technology over other 
disciplines of advanced studies; HE has been endorsed as a solution to a series of linked socio-
economic problems in China, most noticeably the challenge of 'modernisation', whether it is during 
war, recovery, or socio-political transformations; HE functions as the primary means of social selection 
in Chinese society in recruiting 'talents' with the highest 'human quality'; last but not least, HE is also 
introduced as form of self-governance, in particular with regard to its targeted subjects in the post-
socialist era. At this point, I want to make reference to Zhou Ji, who served as the Minister of 
Education between 2003 and 2009. In the preface to his book Higher Education in China, an intended 
introduction contemporary Chinese HE, he writes, 
`If China is to sustain its social development and change its traditional mode of economic growth, it must count on 
science and technology and high-calibre constructive members of society. Humans are the first and foremost 
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resource to reply in our endeavour to achieve modernisation in a resource-poor and financially strapped country 
such as China. The 1.3 billion Chinese can emerge as a dynamic pool of human and intellectual resources if they 
become well-educated men and women of character; otherwise, they can end up being an unwieldy population 
burden... That is why Chinese government places education as a priority in its strategies — to rejuvenate China 
through science and education and to make it prosperous by cultivating talent.(Zhou, 2006, pp. xiii - xiv).' 
And in a summary of the recent reform of HE in China, Zhou (2006, pp. xiv-xv) lists 'three salient 
features' of this period, 
`First, higher education has accomplished a quantum leap in its course of development to keep pace with the 
public's growing need for higher education and the country's socioeconomic development... Second, teaching 
quality is improving steadily. Institutions of higher education across the land are meeting the demand of the 
modernisation drive... enabling them to supply millions of competent professionals for all fields of endeavour... 
Third, higher education is in a better position to serve the country's socioeconomic development. Its research and 
innovation have moved up a notch... Colleges and universities around China have emerged as a vital force in sci-
tech research and development'. 
In the paragraphs quoted above, Zhou includes most of the discursive elements that I identify — HE is 
understood as a significant drive to social development and economic growth through both teaching 
and research; HE is also explicitly interpreted as a bio-power over the entire population, a 'tool' that 
can help transform 'the world's most populous country into an economic dynamo with rich human 
resources' (Zhou, 2006, p. xiv), and prevent the population from becoming a 'burden' to the state; also, 
the priority of science and technology is also emphasised, as both a form of education and a field of 
advanced research. 
In quoting Zhou, I am not suggesting that the truth regime of HE in modern (in particular 
contemporary) China is equated with state ideology; rather, I intend to reveal the most hegemonic 
components of this truth regime. At the same time, I am not suggesting that these components 
constitute an ideologically conditioned truth of HE, and hence there is another underlying truth of HE 
waiting to be discovered - this would go against Foucault's perspective of truth. This has to do with the 
second notion of Foucauldian truth, to which I now turn. 
The Constructive Notion of Truth 
With regard to the issue of ideology and truth, Foucault rejects the distinction between ideologically 
conditioned truth and 'real' underlying truth, or the contrast between 'manipulated sets of ideas and 
beliefs' and 'deeper, suppressed truths', between apparent truth and truth (Prado, 2000, p. 119). 
Although Foucault understands truth as a product of power, he refuses the idea that power produces 
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different categories of truth. But rather, he argues that truth is what comes to be so. As Prado (2000, p. 
121) points out, 
Toucauldian power does not produce truth by generating 'categories' that organize our awareness of 
reality. Power does not produce truth in any systematic way; power produces truth blindly and 
nonsubjectively. It produces truth through actions that enable or inhibit other actions and themselves are 
unknowing with respect to consequences and occur "at the level of tiny local events".' 
Accordingly, I would also reject the idea that in case of modem HE in China, power produces two sets 
of truth, the dominant, manipulated truth set and the suppressed, real truth. But the question remains —
how does what is true in a social or learned discourse come to be so? From a genealogical point of 
view, what emerges as true (HE can assist national salvation and recovery) may be a result of certain 
historical contingency, such as foreign invasion in the case of modem HE in China, and what sustains 
itself as true (HE promises upwards social mobility) may be due to certain technologies and 
techniques, such as the continuous use of HE as a mean of social selection. 
Now I want to turn to 'the level of tiny local events' of contemporary HE, or the micro-level of the 
truth regime. To do so, I make reference to my fieldwork interviews, and reveal the 'local' truth of HE, 
and its production and circulation among HE candidates. I want to focus on one particular truth set, a 
prevailing idea among HE subjects of 'HE as an imagined paradigm shift'. 
This truth set is most noticeably marked by a number of keywords — freedom' (ziyou), 
`autonomy' (zizhu), 'ease' (qingsong), 'relaxation ' (fangsong) and 'richness and colourfulness' (fengfu 
duocai, in one phrase in Mandarin), etc. These keywords emerged when I asked my interviewees to 
reflect upon their primary impression of HE. Almost invariably, my interviewees reported a belief that 
HE was a new lifestyle and constituted a paradigm shift, a burial of their formerly trammeled selves 
and dissatisfying pre-HE experiences. Gaining access to HE has been largely described and understood 
as an ultimate escape from the depressed, heavy, and dire life of high school. 
To gain a further insight into this prevailing truth set and its discursive components, I asked my 
interviewees to elaborate upon these keywords they used. By 'free' or 'freedom', the almost universal 
answer, was referred to 'less constrain in time management', meaning they would take control of their 
own time in university — they would no longer be forced into mere academic study and be allowed to 
explore the world outside the classroom, which is quite the opposite what they experienced in high 
schools. For instance, in group 13, interviewee No.31 said, 
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`(freedom) means the right of autonomous choices, like to choose what you want to do at what time, to 
choose what courses you want to study, to choose your life trajectory afterwards.' 
No.32 then added, 
`I think in comparison to high school, this freedom is more about time management. In university, you 
can have much autonomy in managing your time. As far as I know, we don't have a heavy load of class 
sessions now, so you are much more autonomous. And also, with respect to the future of your life, you 
are the one to choose. You have much more freedom in doing a lot of things'. 
No.33 also joined in and said, 
`I think in terms of autonomy, HE is quite different from before. Now you can go out for a stroll after 
class hours, which is usually more than half of a day. In comparison, high school is all about studies 
apart from eating and sleeping. So university is quite enjoyable in that sense.' 
Within this group, the interviewees were using freedom and autonomy interchangeably, and this 
freedom for them was first featured as one's control over his or her own time after class. In 
comparison, only a few interviewees referred to 'freedom' in a political sense that is more familiar to 
Western readers, meaning a higher degree of tolerance for different thoughts and ideas, wherein 
students are allowed to expressed their own opinions and argue freely, and no 'standard answers' are 
imposed upon them. Interviewee No.44 said, 
`my understanding of freedom is on the one hand similar to theirs (other two interviewees in the group), 
for sure it includes autonomy in time management, and doing what one has dreamed of doing for long in 
university; on the other hand, it is also about freedom in thoughts — because what one had in high school 
was purely education for examinations, so you needed to answer questions, and you needed to produced 
the 'standard answers', even if you disagreed with the questions, or disagreed with the answers, you 
needed to write the 'correct answers'. So I thought, one should have more freedom in thought in 
university'. 
The idea of 'ease' and 'relaxation' also seems to revolve around similar ideas of a paradigm shift -
most interviewees referred to the absence of heavy academic pressure of 'examinations'. These ideas 
have to do with students' completion of 'college entrance examination', which allows one to relax and 
adopt a new lifestyle. Interviewee No.9 said, 
`I had one thought before I came to university: that this was a place of freedom and ease — you don't 
need to learn too much, because in university you are supposed to develop yourself in various ways, and 
that should be easy and free, and then in four years' time, you can find a job without much trouble; that 
was my idea of university' 
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He then went on describing his prior idea of a laissez faire style university life (which was 'proven 
naive' by his 'actual HE experience'), 
`my previous idea was that once I am in university, I can get up late every morning. After I get up and 
have breakfast, I can take a walk around the landscapes around the university, and then come back to 
dinner. I may have only a session a day after lunch, or two. I can go to some seminars, or some events, or 
simply pick up a book and read it on a lawn, or go exploring the mountains or take a stroll, etc.' 
As for 'richness and colourfulness', most interviewees referred to extracurricular activities and student 
clubs or societies in university, which are generally understood as somewhere students are able to 
explore their personal interests and get to know other people through various events. For instance, 
Interviewee No. 31 recalled, 
`when I was in senior high, I imagined university life to be rich and colourful, and you can learn 
whatever you want, outside your academic studies, the extra-curricular — I can learn to play basketball if 
I want, I can do sports if I want to, I can learn whatever instrument I want; I can fulfil myself. This was 
my original thought'. 
I went on with the interviewees to discuss the production and circulation of this prevailing truth set. 
There was an almost unanimous answer to my question of truth production - high school teachers and 
senior graduates were identified as the primary sources of this truth set, this vision of university life. 
For instance, No.9 commented on the information he received from his teachers and seniors, and said, 
`much I heard about university came from my teachers and some of our senior who went to university 
(before me). Especially our teachers, if we were not fully devoted to studies, he would remind us or 
"stimulate" us, saying what university would be like, how it was a contrast from senior high, and if we 
were not fully devoted, what we would end up being — he went on talking about university as some place 
free and ideal. (He did so) to encourage us to study harder I suppose.' 
As No.9 described, his teachers from high school repeatedly 'patronised' them with this image of an 
easy and ideal life, to keep students fully devoted to the preparation for the CEE, to fight with their full 
capacity in the perhaps most 'decisive' battle of life chances. And he himself showed understanding of 
this 'necessary evil'. Interviewee No. 25 also recalled similar situations in her urban school, 
`if we were not paying attention in class, our teachers would say, "are you entitled to have fun now? Not 
until university!" what they meant was, our task then was all study, and once we made it into university, 
we could relax. They wanted to deliver this message — you endure now so you can enjoy yourself in 
university.' 
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Other interviewees also reported they have been surrounded by similar ideas repeatedly employed by 
their teachers and senior peers. For those who were cramming for the CEE, the message from their 
seniors, or recently 'successful' people, also appeared persuasive. The ideas provided by their seniors 
were largely consistent with those from the teachers, but the former may include more detailed 
information on what it is like to attend a university. For instance, interviewee No.29 said, 
`I heard about university from my other relatives and friends. A cousin of mine went to university, and he 
once told about how relaxing university was, with no schoolwork at all. My first impression then was 
that there was no schoolwork in a university.' 
The quotations above shed interesting light on the process of truth production — high school teachers 
and senior peers actively participate (perhaps more than anyone else) in the construction of this 
prevailing truth of 'HE as a paradigm shift'. Recognising as much is not to suggest these two groups 
are the producer of this 'manipulated' truth. Such a view would be misleading in two ways — first, two 
groups identified above should be regarded as nodes which power works through; second, the truth of 
paradigm shift is a prevailing truth set, one set of the entire body of truth that appears as the most 
persuasive, but it should not be understood as an 'apparent' truth as in contrast to a 'real' underlying 
truth waiting to be discovered. One should bear in mind, as Foucault suggests, that it is not necessary, 
nor possible, to display the entirety of truth. 
Discourses present themselves to subjects as cultural environments very much like the physical 
environment, and the sustaining of discourses is made possible by individuals' participation. I have 
provided insight into the prevailing truth set in the HE discourses above, but another question remains 
unsolved — how do individual discourse-participants come to believe the truths of a discourse they are 
presented with? To answer this question, I need to make use of the third notion of Foucauldian truth. 
The Perspectivist Notion of Truth 
Perspectivism is marked by two linked arguments — it denies 'the possibility of descriptive 
completeness, ... the possibility of a global and correct description of the world'; second, it 
acknowledges 'a multiplicity of diverse interpretations (but) denies that we might describe the way the 
world is in itself and thereby integrate and rationalize those diverse interpretations' (Prado, 2000, pp. 
122, 124). Accordingly, the perspectivist notion of Foucauldian truth can be understood in two linked 
aspects — first, individual participants appropriate power-produced truths and come to form beliefs 
about them and attitudes towards them; second, individual participants are subject to various 
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disciplinary techniques, which shape the beliefs they acquire, interpretations they adopt, and 
subjectivities they come to hold. Prado (2000, p. 127) explains, 
`Individuals appropriate the power-produced truths that are relative to and sustained in discourse when 
those individuals take those constructed truths as matters of fact and come to have beliefs about them 
and attitudes toward them. This understanding ... shows that ... subjects form beliefs about things and 
events, they form beliefs about cultural constructs. Subjects are surrounded by both physical objects and 
by cultural "objects' presented to them in myriad ways ranging from expert accounts to texts to 
advertisements to casual remarks, Subjects are inundated with multifarious presentations of "scientific 
facts" and "common knowledge" directly through formal and informal schooling. (127) 
The prevailing truth set can be understood as such 'cultural constructs' surrounding its targeted 
subjects. One should also notice the space between the power-produced truth and what subjects come 
to believe—the process in which subjects acquire beliefs in truths—is the adoption of perspectives. In 
the case of my fieldwork, I asked my interviewees about their beliefs about the prevailing truth set –
whether they questioned the authenticity of all information they heard about university or simply 
accepted it as matters of fact. 
The answers to that question were largely negative. Most replied that they did not question the truth set 
at all, and accepted the information as real, although their reason for a lack of questioning may vary –
such as 'everyone seems to repeat the same thing' (interviewee No.8), or 'we got used to listening to 
what our teachers say, from primary school to senior high' (interviewee No.36), or 'were reluctant to 
question it' (interviewee No.8) as 'university was like a paradise to us' (interviewee No.9). A number 
of interviewees reported 'some brief moments of doubts', but chose to believe it anyway 'in the face of 
great pressure of the CEE' (interviewee No.15). For those who had their doubts, the questionable 
information 'could still serve as an aim of life' (interviewee No.45). As interviewee No.44 recalled, 
`I thought about (the authenticity issue). But I still felt that university would for sure be better than senior 
high. I doubted it; what the seniors said, they told you so with an intention to patronize you, so they 
dismissed all the negative things you might experience in university and only told you about the positive 
side – that was for sure. So occasionally I doubt it, but I still have high expectations of university, and 
these doubts were very brief – I didn't think much about it, so the doubts didn't stay long°. 
No.44 talked about the logic that 'it couldn't be any worse'. Even if the information from the teachers 
and seniors were questionable, university may not be as perfect or as ideal as they had hoped, but it 
would still be an improvement from what one was experiencing in senior high. Even if one saw 
through the tricks of the prevailing discourses of 'the paradigm shift', one would still be willing to 
`hope for the best', to 'hold high expectations', simply in order to 'survive' hardest times of preparing 
214 
for the CEE. The interviewees seemed to indicate that they were willing to be turned, or turn 
themselves into such 'hoping' or 'wishful' subjects, either because they have gotten accustomed to the 
patronising, or because accepting the questionable information could do no harm. Therefore even 
though they had doubts, even though they could refuse to be such 'hoping' subjects, they chose not to 
do so. Or as some argued, if one questioned the paradigm-shift discourses, it would not change the fact 
that one still needed to receive HE. The questioning or doubt would not stop those who cram for the 
CEE and fight for access to HE. As interviewee No. 1 said 
`I did not question it, because from the perspective of the (social) system in China, and the (educational) 
tradition, I didn't even think about (the authenticity of) the information. Although society is now 
developing, I think, regardless our questioning, our doubts, one must still go to university. This is taken 
for granted. Or you may say you can choose to work (instead). But I believe for the majority of Chinese 
students, this is a determined path'. 
This idea of 'a determined path' indicates a wide and ready acceptance of the prevailing set of HE 
truth. In this case, the discourse participants, HE candidates in China, represented by these 
interviewees, form their beliefs of the prevailing truth of HE as a paradigm shift almost 
unquestioningly. Subjects' appropriation of truth, in this case, is greatly shaped by a number of linked 
factors — first, the heavy academic pressure of high school that was intended to realize the full potential 
of each HE candidate; second, the fact that HE still serves as the primary means of social selection and 
social mobility, something that 'everyone does and believes'. A hegemonic account of HE emerges at 
the local centres of power relations, and circulates within the local events such as repeated 
employment of the truth of paradigm-shift. There is a noticeable absence of any alternative idea within 
the current truth regime of HE for subjects to appropriate, at least not as persuasive and promising as 
the prevailing set identified above. I have asked my interviewees whether they would choose work 
after high school instead of HE, and few would do so. The reasons given varied slightly, such as 'HE 
was a more promising way of investing one's youthful years, and work can wait', or 'those without HE 
degrees are not well-paid in the job market', or 'work after high school is an option for those who are 
not (academically) good enough for university'. These discursive components, this rationality, 
perceived reality, these judgments come together as a powerful technique that suffocates other 
competing truths against the prevailing set of paradigm shift, and present it as 'forcefully' persuasive. 
Although there are few variations in the appropriation of the truth of 'paradigm shift', the interviewees 
did report different beliefs in other perspectives of HE. I want to illustrate this 'multiplicity of diverse 
interpretations' that perspectivism acknowledges by making reference to the 'truth' revolving around 
the 'exemplary campus'. In my discussion in Chapter 4, I have engaged with the idea of HE space, 
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including the configuration of university campus. I also asked my interviewees to recall their 
imagination of campus setting before their arrival in universities., the image of a university campus 
was not alien to the interviewees, perhaps the most familiar apparatus component of HE of all (others 
covered in the interviews include teaching, learning, teachers, student societies, preparations of 
employment, etc., please refer to Appendix 2 for all the interview questions), and they were able to 
articulate their respective ideas of campuses. However, unlike the truth of paradigm shift, the truth of 
campus was where some competing beliefs emerged. One group takes on a modern image of 
campuses, with new buildings, advanced multi-media facilities, laboratories, gymnastic equipments 
and spacious lecture rooms, etc. The other group endorses a classically styled campus, with old-styled 
buildings, long avenues, and interestingly enough, lakes—all of which should contribute to an 
atmosphere of 'academic tranquillity' and 'enclosed romance'. For the former campus model, 
Interviewee No. 25, argued, 
`I think there should be a lot of open lectures and (therefore) big lecture rooms, and every room, like in 
high schools now, should be equipped with computers, big screens, and can accommodate open lectures. 
There should be a lot of computing rooms, and students can have easy access to computers. My idea of a 
campus is based on this vague image. Whether the campus looks new or old – I think the newer the 
merrier. If I am told that this university is rather old, aged, and the beds are in poor condition, I will be 
very much dismayed'. 
While for the latter, interviewee 26 argued that 
`(University paths should be) lined with trees; poplar trees or Platanus would be ideal – this is my wish. I 
want a university with a big book collection, and it should not be too new-looking. I dislike campus 
ground of a cement style'. 
But for some interviewees, HE campus should incorporate modern and classical elements. For 
instance, interviewee No.11 said, 
`I thought a university should have a library with an enormous collection; in terms of campus 
environment, it should have a lot of trees and water, little bridges and flowing streams (xiaoqiao liushui) 
41; it should have superb gymnastic equipments'. 
In this quote, No. 11 included components from both sets: for the former, gymnastic equipment, and 
for the latter, trees, bridges and streams; and she also emphasises the importance of a library and its 
41 This is an exemplary scene of Chinese styled tranquillity, which is widely used in garden designs in the classical period. 
The term is also widely used in classical poetry in China. The most famous reference is Ma Zhiyuan (c. 1250-1321)'s 
Autumn Thoughts (Tianjingsha Qiusi) 'A Withered vine, an ancient tree, crows at dusk; A Little bridge, a flowing stream, 
some huts; An old road, wind out of the west, an emaciated horse; A heart-broken man on the horizon at sunset'. 
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collection. In the light of my previous discussion in Chapter 7 (space) and Chapter 9 (technology of the 
population), one can perhaps understand why gymnasium and library are among the most frequently 
cited components of a campus. The former is an important part of the technology of the HE population 
that aims to optimise the physical capacity of HE students, while the latter is widely understood as the 
most symbolic building in a university campus, as it stands for an access to knowledge and 
empowerment, a path to personal development, power, prosperity and wealth. It was therefore not 
surprising to see that the essential part of university (per the interviewees' responses) was the library, 
which was expected to host not only materials in one's speciality, but also 'a collection of a wide range 
of fields'. 
Furthermore, with regard to the truth of HE campus, what fascinates me is the belief of 'campus lakes'. 
Interviewee 27 said, 
`Ideally there should be a lake, with lotus blooming in it during summer time'. 
The image of lotus blossoms in a lake is renown as a signature view of Qinghua University, as it was 
depicted in an essay 'Lotus Lake in the Moonlight' (hetang yuese) by Zhu Ziqing in 1927, then a 
professor at Qinghua University42. The essay was about Zhu's night stroll around Shuimu Qinghua, 
which was mentioned in Chapter 4, and it is a text familiar to most students in China as it is included 
in the national textbook for Chinese Language (yuwen) in senior high school. It is therefore perhaps 
the most well-known representation of university campus for HE subjects in China. Lake Weiming, the 
counterpart of Shuimu Qinghua in Peking University, was also a widely cited example by the 
interviewees. In my interview with No.7, 8, and 9, I asked why they thought there should be a lake in a 
university campus. Interviewee 9 replied, 
`Because I read in a number of books about the theme that university students do morning readings 
under the willow trees by the lake side, so I thought there should be a lake in a university.' 
Interviewee 8 quoted Zhu's essay and said, 
`It has something to do what we have learnt from our textbooks. We have all read Zhu Ziqing's Lotus 
Lake in the Moonlight'. 
9 added, 
`(We also heard about) Lake Weiming in Peking University'. 
7 recalled, 
42 See http://baike.baidu.com/view/153597.htm#sub6169028 (in Chinese) for detailed introduction of the essay. 
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`A lake in a university has for long been what I desired.' 
Later, No.8 talked about her experience of showing friends around the campus, 
`My schoolmates (from senior high) came and visited me, and I showed them around in the campus. 
They would ask first, "Whereabouts is the lake in Renda? Show us." 
No. 8's experience implies that this belief of 'campus lakes' is shared by many — the campus lake 
become a cultural object upon which subjects form their belief. No.9 went on to explain how this 
belief circulates and emerges as persuasive in the truth of HE, 
`Our seniors would have their pictures taken by the side of Lake Weiming, with an introduction below 
stating their university and department'. 
7 also confirmed seeing photos of similar background, and said, 
`(These pictures are normally taken) by the side of Lake Weiming, and include Boya Tower and Lake 
Weiming both in the picture. That is a classic shot'. 
Such pictures can be found in school bulletins in a lot of senior high schools in China. The collection 
serves as an exemplary image of academic success for those who were preparing for the CEE. The 
`classic' shot was presented as evidences of payoff of academic endeavour, and Lake Weiming, the 
most famous campus lake, was no longer a mere view of a university campus, but a symbol of the 
highest achievement of academic pursuit. Campus lakes are also sites where academic efforts continue 
in HE, as 9 said — they are the places where students do morning readings. 
However, these previous beliefs held by the interviewees, the appropriated truths of paradigm shift and 
campus, were not entirely consistent with their later experiences on campus. In fact, these beliefs were 
put to great challenge. I move on to the fourth notion of Foucauldian truth. 
The Experiential Notion of Truth 
This fourth notion is characterised by distinguishing between what is learned and what is realised in a 
challenging experience. The acquisition of experiential truth is not a 'sudden illumination which makes 
the scales fall from the eyes', but involves 'inquiry to support the deep rethinking of whatever 
suddenly became problematic and caused the epistemological crisis or limit experience', and may be 
`an arduous process extending over a considerable period of time' (Prado, 2000, p. 129). 
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In the process of interviews, I did sense a strong clash between old and newly formed beliefs of HE. In 
contrast to the imagined lifestyle of 'freedom, ease, richness and colourfulness', a large number of 
interviewees complained that in fact this was not the case in real life — they were not given much 
autonomy in time management, neither were they exposed to enough opportunities for self-exploration 
and self-development. In Chapter 8 and 9, I have already discussed the reason why this paradigm shift 
was not in place. HE in contemporary China is still subject to certain technologies of socialist 
governmentality which render subjects of HE as targets of administrative interventions. Therefore, 
university students are still subject to certain regulations and practices that require their presence at 
certain spaces (gymnasium library, or study rooms) during specific times (morning and evening) and 
their participation in certain activities such as morning exercise and self-study. Interviewee N.43 (first 
year student) said, 
`we are in the speciality of Foreign Language (English), and we were asked to do self-study in morning 
and evening. I felt very much uncomfortable about it. I thought ... I had read some books about 
university education and there were some documentaries too, and I thought I could have complete 
control of my time, and class sessions won't be too overwhelming. I am much surprised in this regard 
now. Our speciality is in comparison very heavily loaded, and you have little (time) for yourself every 
day. This is about autonomy in time management, and also it is about exploring what I want to do; for 
example, I enjoy singing, and I could look for an opportunity or a stage to present my talent, but I found 
few chances to do so; they are difficult to find'. 
In No.43's complaint, one can see how the paradigm shift truth was put to great challenge. The self-
study schedule mentioned here has been discussed previously. It was a technique that combined time 
and space governing. Though such a disciplinary technique was not alien to those who had graduated 
from senior high in China, its existence in university was against the prevailing discourses of 
`freedom', and the heavy load of class sessions went against of the discourses of 'ease', while a lack of 
social life after class hours went against the discourses of 'abundance'. In addition, the intensified 
competition of job market also began to affect the campus life and even new entrants could feel the 
pressure from the outside world and the future competition. For instance, Interviewee No.9, whom I 
quote above, commented on his original thought of university as a place of ease, and said, 
`I now find my previous idea very wrong. What I thought was a rather limited understanding of 
(attending) university, and was rather simplistically optimistic. What I discover now that university does 
have a free and easy side, but that is only one side of it. The other side is about academic studies, 
preparation for the postgraduate entrance examination (kaoyan), looking for a job. When I was preparing 
for the CEE, the pressure was from the CEE; now (I am in university) the pressure is from survival'. 
Considering the fact that No.9 had only spent one month in university, his reflection upon the imagined 
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easy lifestyle was fairly radical. University for him was no longer a place of mere ease but was bound 
up with pressure from 'survival'. He was already talking about what he might need to do in four years' 
time, to continue his study at postgraduate level or to look for a job in the market. 
For those reported to be most dismayed by the gap between their previously appropriated truth and 
their experiential truth of HE, I asked them whether they would interfere with this gap — 'if you go 
back to your old schools, what would you tell your juniors, those are now in their final year, cramming 
for the CEE? Would you tell them the reality about university?' This question generally put them to a 
moment of silence. All three interviewees in Group 3 hesitated and pondered upon the question. 
Interviewee No.8 was the first to reply: 
`First of all (I) must give them some encouragement, but perhaps in more realistic terms.' 
Interviewee No.7 then added, 
`you have been through the CEE, you know, you understand how they must be feeling at the moment, 
and you know they hold high expectations of university in their heart, and they hold deep trust in their 
seniors, so we must give them a lot of expectations, and in that way they can have more energy to go on; 
with more expectations, they can be encouraged to complete the CEE' 
Interviewee No.8 also agreed and said, 
`I don't want to destroy the illusion built by themselves'. 
Interviewee No.9 expressed a slightly different opinion. He did not think some more elements of truth 
would cause too much damage. He said, 
`I don't think it is a kind of destruction. As long as it is different (from senior high), it is an 
improvement.' 
No.9 added, 
`As long as it is a different life, no matter what the life actually is, they will trade it (the life of senior 
high).' 
No.7 then concluded in a more neutral tone, 
`In comparison, I will describe it in more optimistic terms'. (Other two nodded on hearing this) But at 
least I won't tell them that university is a place for fun, a place where you go surfing on intemet every 
day, and you wake up to eat. (I would say) university is still a place where you need to work hard. As 
Teacher Zhou of our department said, "You guys should save the fun stuff once you make it into 
postgraduate studies". We have heard this a million times in Year 3 of senior high — you guys should save 
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the fun stuff for university. Now I am aware of the tough competition in TOFEL, graduate entrance 
examinations, graduate recommendation scheme, and employment, so at least I will tell them that 
university is not very easy and relaxing, but at the moment you should focus on getting through the 
CEE'. 
In this conversation, three of the most 'dismayed' interviewees first of all show immediate concerns 
over how the experiential truth they recently acquired would affect their audience in a negative way, 
and they fear to discourage those who were working extremely hard for the CEE, those with great 
expectations, and those who counted on their seniors for 'spiritual support'. Despite their discontent 
with the prevailing truth of paradigm shift, they chose not to challenge it in a straightforward manner. 
To understand this reluctance more fully, I make reference to the idea of 'speaking the truth'. As Prado 
(2000, p.121) explains, 
`Speaking truth is making the right moves in a discourse, where what is right is what is dictated or 
allowed by a truth regime's correctness criteria. That is, a discourse's truths are moves that are 
sanctioned by a discourse's mechanisms for distinguishing truth and falsity and that conform to its expert 
judgments. What makes some moves right and others wrong is the sum total of contributing actions that 
shape a discourse's content. It is also the codification of some right moves as disciplinary principles'. 
Therefore, their reluctance to interfere with the circulation of the prevailing truth, and their 'sympathy' 
towards their juniors, those who were placed in the same 'determined path', show that the same 
disciplinary technique, one that manages to rule out other alternative truths of HE, is still at work even 
after the subjects experience a clash between old and new beliefs of HE. These subjects allow this 
technique to further shape their participations in the discourses of HE — they accept their identities as 
exemplary figures of academic success, and then agree not to bring any major challenges to the 
prevailing truth of paradigm shift. 
But can we say that the interviewees, as representatives of HE subjects in contemporary China, 
manage to acquire experiential truth of HE once they arrive in the 'real' HE setting? Perhaps not. As 
Prado argues, 
`What is important for Foucault is that it is in a limit experience's clash of old and new ideas that we can 
adopt genuinely new perspectives. Otherwise we only change particular beliefs or make adjustments to 
beliefs that remain substantially unchanged. The rigidity of our belief structures, the inertia of 
intellectual habits, and power's ever-tightening control make limit experiences necessary'. 
As this case shows, the appropriation of experiential truth has yet to create a significantly distinctive 
perspective on HE for the subjects interviewed — they only made small adjustments to their beliefs of 
HE but were reluctant to bring further, more substantial changes to their belief structures. For them, the 
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clash between old and new beliefs is a gap between 'apparent' truth of HE and the 'real' underlying 
truth of HE, a distinction that Foucault refuses. They felt 'deceived' in forming beliefs of the prevailing 
truth set, but they also sign up to this very form of 'deception' by either showing understanding of the 
`necessary evil' or not agreeing to participate in the 'deception' process while not interfering with the 
circulation of 'bad' beliefs. In other words, they fail to inquire further into the production and 
sustainment of a hegemonic truth of HE, but instead appropriate the logic of 'necessary evil' which 
inures them further to a hegemonic truth. In doing so, they not only fail to explore their experiential 
truth, but also adopt certain designated subjectivities, and turn themselves into subject forms that a 
certain hegemonic power relation intends to produce. I will investigate more properly into the issue of 
HE subjects and subjectivities in the next section. 
Conclusion 
In this section I make use Foucault's four notions of truth, and explore their implications for the case 
of HE in China. I first examine the criterial notion of truth and the produced truth that HE serves 
primarily as a means of social selection and preparation; I then explore the constructive notion of truth 
and the ways in which the truth of HE as a paradigm shift is produced in discourses; I also explore the 
persectivist notion of truth and explore how HE participant come to hold of different interpretations of 
the HE campus; I finally examine the experiential notion of truth and how HE participants cope with 
the gap between their imagination and the reality of HE life. In the next section, I will focus on subject 
forms of HE. 
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Chapter 11 Subjects 
Introduction 
In a Foucaudian frame, the conception of the subject has two linked aspects — the first is that an 
individual is being subject to regulation by others (individuals, social groups, institutions, and the 
state); the second aspect is that an individual is experiencing subjectivity, meaning that a subject has 
aims, desires, and a sense of who (and what) one is. For the first aspect of Foucauldian subject, I have 
tackled how HE has been deployed as a form of government in various historical periods in China; for 
the second aspect, my discussion in the previous chapter has shown how HE in China has been infused 
with desires and choices. In this section, I make a summary of different subject forms and 
subjectivities constructed through HE in modern China. But before that, I shall elaborate more on the 
process of making subjects. 
Foucault does not clearly distinguish between his uses of 'subject' and 'subjectivity'. A convenient 
way do so is perhaps to understand the former as a member of a governed society and the latter is an 
abstraction drawn from the capacity/condition of creating a subject. Foucault refuses to understand 
subjectivity as a 'given' as it is for Descartes and Kant. Instead, he insists that it is the body43 that bears 
emergent subjectivity, 'in its habits and gestures, in its postures, in its speech, in how it is dealt with'. 
A body is invested with a pattern of subjectivity-determining conducts, and assigned certain attributes 
and a certain status. To illustrate this point, I once again make reference to Zhou Ji's Higher Education 
in China. In the section of 'Students', Zhou(2006, p. 153) writes, 
`Notwithstanding its ever expanding higher education and a gross enrollment rate running as high as 
19%, the college entrance examination still poses a tough competition for aspiring students. Those who 
have made it are luckier than their peers who have failed. They are "God's favorites" in people's eyes, 
the pillars of the country, and the hope of the nation. As a whole, college students themselves likewise 
feel proud and superior with a strong enterprising spirit and a sense of responsibility and justice. They 
are quick-witted, open-minded, and sympathetic. Most of them cherish lofty ideas and study hard. Yet, in 
a fast-changing social environment, they often find themselves in an ambivalent state of mind: they feel 
superior but at the same time upset about the pressure of finding employment; they hope to contribute to 
society but are also concerned with their own personal gain. Obviously, the life and mentality of present-
day college students in China are undergoing profound changes. ' 
43 Here, the idea of a body should be understood in a broader sense than how it is used in my discussion of 'technologies of 
the body'. The former is understood as the entirety of a bearer of certain subjectivities, and the latter is referred to the 
physical existence of human subjects. 
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This 'introductory' text in Zhou's book serves to speak a truth of contemporary subjects of HE, and to 
illustrate a pattern of subjectivity. In Zhou's description, HE students are marked by certain attributes 
such as a sense of superiority (which they 'rightfully' deserve as 'winners' of a tough competition), 
industriousness, and being quick-witted, open-minded and sympathetic. The text also suggests certain 
determining conducts — the idea of a sense of responsibility implies that one should perform certain 
desirable conducts to be regarded as 'responsible', such as being willing to service the needs of the 
state, and the idea of a strong enterprising spirit suggests (although Zhou does not elaborate the use of 
this term) that HE students should act as independent enterprising selves who are ambitious, clear-
minded and capable of self-governance. Furthermore, HE subjects are also problematised — their sense 
of superiority is now challenged at a time of rapid socioeconomic transformations, and their sense of 
responsibility are infused with economic rationality (which implies a clash between a socialist 
mentality and a mentality of market economy). 
Zhou's text, in which a HE body is invested with certain attributes and conducts, only illustrates part of 
the process of subject making. As Prado points out, the making of subjects in a Foucauldian frame, 
also seeks 
`a habit-invested body to adopt a certain perspective on itself and its surroundings. The individual comes 
to experience the world in a certain way as a result of behaving in certain ways, being categorised in 
certain ways, and being dealt with in certain ways. A constructed subject then is an experiencing self of a 
particular sort in that an individual internalizes power-assigned attributes and comes to intend power-
imposed actions (Prado, 2000, p. 58, orginal emphasis).' 
He further explains, 
`a master of subjectivity ...(is realised) in the process of "learning" what one is by internalizing power-
produced truths and ""acting as one should" conform to what is learned about oneself. Constructed 
subjectivity is not a metaphysical emergence but a cognitive result. Becoming a subject is coming to 
hold certain things as true about oneself, saying certain things about oneself, and intentionally acting in 
certain ways'. 
This said, I now begin to outline the different forms of subject and subjectivity constructed through HE 
in the history of modern China. In my previous discussions in chapter 8 and 9, I have also begun to 
tackle some forms HE.subject, such as 'alienated' subjects (in the Republican era), 'desiring' subjects 
(for HE rewards), and 'willing' subjects (to fund their own HE via tuition fees), 'expecting' subjects (to 
enter HE), and 'professional choosing' subjects (in the post-socialist era), etc. In addition to these 
subject forms that emerge from my previous discussions of technologies, desires and choices, I want to 
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in this section bring some other forms of HE subjects to my discussion, and also sketch out the 
formation processes of these various subjects. 
If we are to focus on a historical consistency in subject formation in modern China, or those 
categorised as 'enduring', there are two forms of subjects that stand out as significant across the 
period. The first is the 'desiring subjects', i.e. subjects with desires for access to HE and for its 
attached rewards; and the second is the `meritocratic subjects', or subjects regarded as higher in the 
meritocratic hierarchy after a series of exam selections. 
If we are to focus on historical particularity in this regard, those in the `periodised' category, we may 
be faced with a variety of subjects within the period of 100 years or so in modern China. These forms 
of subjects are closely related to enduring subjects. For instance, the 'expecting' or 'willing' subjects I 
identify can be understood as a contemporary variation of the 'desiring' subjects. The conflict between 
`meritocratic' subjectivity and the significant fall in the market return to HE degrees in the recent 
decade contribute to the shaping of 'displaced' subjects, another form of subjects which I discuss 
below. These subjects may compete with one another at the same time, or be fused together across 
time, presenting themselves in conflict or in peculiar unity. For instance, in the Republican era, the 
infused subjects, HE subjects that bear other identity labels than studentship, were competing with the 
alienated subjects that were largely segregated from the real world outside university campuses. 
Furthermore, the 'professional choosing' subjects identified in the previous chapter can be understood 
as a part of the 'governed' subjects, insofar as professional choosing is a practice of self-governance. 
Moreover, the subject forms in different periods may be connected with one another - the 'governed' 
subjects, for instance, bear some traces of the 'administrated' subjects, as the government of HE 
subjects in contemporary China still deploys certain technologies that were prevailing under high 
socialism. Last but not least, these subject forms may also complement one another — the 'troubled' 
subjectivity justifies the use of socialist administration in campus, which in turn produces part of the 
`governed' subjects. Therefore, it should be noted that subjects forms may compete within particular 
time periods, or share characteristics across time periods. One example would be the 'displaced' and 
`troubled' subjects, which are in fact different ways of describing graduates discovering their degree is 
now worth less in the job market - identifying HE subjects as troubled in this way, shrugs off any hint 
of state responsibility for their being displaced. 
I summarise the subject forms in the following table, but it does not intend to serve as an exhaustible 
list of HE subject in modern China. However, these forms are, I argue, the most significant ones that 
emerged and therefore deserve our attention. 
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Subject Forms 	 Time Scale 
Desiring 	 The entire modern period 
Meritocratic 
Wasted 	 Late Qing 
(previous chapter) 
Alienated (previous chapter) The Republican Era 
Infused 
Administrated 	 High Socialist China 
Expecting/willing (previous Post —socialist Era 
chapter) 
Professionally choosing 
(previous chapter) 
Governed 
Displaced 
Troubled 
Categories 
Enduring 
Periodised 
Table 11, Subject Forms 
Desiring Subjects 
My discussions in the previous section on Desires and Rewards have pointed out that there have been 
prevailing discourses of HE rewards in China, and accompanying discourses of desires for such 
rewards. The articulation of HE rewards can be regarded as a technology of the social, a technology 
that is used to promote and maintain participation in HE and all other educational activities that lead to 
it, also a technology that is used to persuade HE subjects to endure the hardship of studies and to 
persist in making efforts towards eventual success. HE subjects in this regards are desiring subjects, as 
HE is accepted as generally desirable, and the expansion of HE candidateship has further spread this 
desirability into a bigger population; they are also rewarded subjects — once they succeed in the fight to 
access HE, they are entitled to a variety of rewards, such as social mobility, economic returns, welfare 
and job security, etc. These rewards may vary greatly in different historical periods, but they are all 
likely to be related to improvements in life chances in general (see Zhou, 2004 for a quantitative 
investigation of state and life chances in urban China). 
Meritocratic Subjects 
With the history of the Imperial Examination taken into account, it is clear social selection in China 
has for long been based upon formal examinations, with unified procedures and standards imposed on 
every subject. These procedures and standards, for the most of time in history, were designed to be as 
much fair, equal and just as they could. 
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Examinations as such, either the Imperial Examination or the CEE (or other similar forms of 
examinations) are intended to make selection based on 'merits', be they a mastery of classic readings, 
literacy and numeracy skills, or critical thinking (Li, 2005; Liu and Li, 2006). These various merits, 
accordingly, can be identified and measured via (mainly written) examinations, in particular when 
grades, marks, points and scores are widely used to exhibit one's merits in exact digits. If one is to 
accept the premise that examination procedures and standards are set to be equal and fair (at least as 
much as they can be under different circumstances), then at any given stage of formal education, those 
who make the highest achievement in examinations and stay longest in rounds of social selections 
based on such examinations are the most `meritocratic', or with the highest merits, and they are 
accordingly the front runners for selections at the next stage. 
Therefore, those who are identified with the highest merits at one stage of education are to be invested 
with the best forms of education at the next stage (as the logic of the keypoint school system implies), 
in order to secure and maximize such merits. It is under this meritocratic reasoning that students with 
the highest scores in the CEE are enrolled into universities with the highest academic standards. Also, 
as their previous success in examinations, or their proved merits, would indicate industriousness and 
self-discipline apart from their academic capacities, the logic is that that those who receive HE of the 
highest quality (in the most renowned universities such as Peking and Qinghua) will make the best of 
it, and further augment their existing merits. This will be a virtuous circle of merit accumulation. 
In other words, merits can not only be identified, measured, but can also be cultivated and 
accumulated: those who stay longest in the examination selection process, those who are granted 
access to the most competitive universities via the CEE and manage to obtain their degrees after four 
years, are regarded as the most meritocratic, the most capable and hence will receive the highest 
rewards, whatever forms they may take under different circumstances. However, to what extent this 
meritocratic reasoning can be held true in the outside world, in particular the world of the market 
economy, is a different matter. I will return to this shortly afterwards. For now, I explore the subject 
forms that are historically sensitive. 
Infused Subjects 
Although the first modern university in China, the Imperial University of Peking, was established 
under the Qing regime, a proper development of the modern HE system was made possible only 
during the early Republican era. This period witnessed the rise of a variety of modern HEIs, and these 
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institutions were normally modelled after their foreign counterparts – Japanese, German, American—
and hence were embedded with different academic traditions, values, and practices. Accordingly, the 
HE subjects that began to emerge in this period were far from unified; on the contrary, there was a 
regime of competing subjectivities. 
As testimony to the makeup of such a regime, I look at a particular indicator of competing 
subjectivities – clothing. Yeh (1990) identifies three styles of clothing available to HE students in the 
Republican era – the Chinese gown, the Western suit, and the Party uniform. These three different 
styles differed greatly from one another in their materials and•cutting, and they each represented a 
certain subjectivity of HE studentship at the time. Yeh (1990, p. 222) writes, 
`The loose-fitting gown usually in blue cotton was the traditional garb of the educated. The suit, with 
leather shoes, clothed the financial and professional elites of the treaty ports. The uniform, at first 
referred to as the Sun Yat-sen suit ... was urged upon all college students by the Ministry of Education 
during the Nanjing decade'. 
These three different styles of clothing, along with their corresponding subjectivities, rose to popularity 
in turn among HE students under different historical circumstances. As Yeh explains, the scholarly 
gown was favoured by the socialists and anarchists of the late 1910s and early 1920s, as it was a 
symbol of 'leisure, of freedom from manual labour, and of lack of social responsibility' (p. 223); the 
party uniform, became popular in the mid-1920s when the Nationalist revaluation was gathering heat, 
and in comparison to the scholarly gown which was then considered a symbol of weakness and 
indecisiveness, the uniform 'invoked power, discipline, ideological vigour, the collective resolve' (p. 
223); in the late 1920s and 1930s, societal concerns among college students were replaced by 
sentimental attachments, and Western-styled suits rose in favour among HEIs as a result of the 
spreading courtship and romance among students. However, during the Nanjing decade, the meanings 
of three styles changed – the uniform strongly associated with the authoritarian rule of the Nationalist 
Party, the suit with 'the light-hearted and urban affluent', and the gown as 'the remaining symbol of 
cultural identity', of authentic Chinese integrity (p. 226). 
In Yeh's discussion of the clothing styles, a variety of subjectivities began to emerge, and these 
subjectivities competed with each other and also displayed both their positive and negative symbolic 
attachments in turn. A college student in a scholarly gown could claim to stand for authentic Chinese 
cultural identity, but could also be regarded as being physically feeble and socially irresponsible; one 
in a party uniform could claim to be disciplined, vigorous and capable of both doing academic studies 
and defending one's nation, but could also be regarded as yielding to the authoritarian rule of the 
228 
Nationalist Party; one in a Western-styled suit could claim to be romantic and appropriate for the 
laissez faire academia at the time, but could also be regarded as being a dilettante and not concerned 
with the real world. HE subjects in the Republican era were caught in a particular time of warfare, 
social movements and ideological competence, and they were inevitably under the influence of various 
discourses, norms, policies, and practices. In turn, college students may have infused their academic 
studentship with other subjectivities such as 'protectors of Chinese cultural identity', 'patriotic soldiers 
for national defense' and 'front runners of cultural import and integration', 'concerned intellectuals for 
social development', etc., as their national, cultural, social and academic subjectivities were not 
necessarily consistent with one another. 
Administrated Subjects 
Under state socialism, some major changes were introduced to the formation processes of HE subjects. 
First and foremost, the new HE system based on the Soviet model 'transformed the generalist Chinese 
intellectual into a modern specialist (Pepper, 1987, p. 199)'. HE subjects were no longer regarded as 
candidates for a bureaucratic system, but instead they belong to a technocratic system — they were 
`cultivated' as advanced personnel for the industrial and technological development of the new nation. 
The entire HE apparatus was also reconstructed to fit that particular agenda. For example, in terms of 
the curriculum, HE subjects were now excluded from academic studies in almost all humanities and 
social sciences as they were regarded as 'irrelevant to socialist construction'. Instead, the expertise of 
HE subjects was marked by their specialties, which were designed to be narrow, practical and 
immediate for the ongoing nation building projects. The introduction of these new subjectivities were 
first opposed by the old intellectuals, but their resistance and oppositions were largely disarticulated 
after suffering from a series of mass political campaigns and political persecutions. By removing the 
oppositions to official discourses, the authoritarian arts of government helped to impose the new HE 
subjectivities with overwhelming political force. 
HE subjects under high socialism were unremittingly politicised. On the one hand, their class 
backgrounds were used to assist the political agenda of social equality; HE candidates were given 
priorities in admission processes for their working class background, or excluded from HE for their 
`bad' class background (former landlords and capitalists, etc.). On the other hand, all HE subjects were 
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to declare political loyalties to socialist construction (and the CCP44), which was regarded as more 
important than their professional expertise. 
Above all, under techno-scientific reasoning, HE subjects were understood as certain 'human 
products' for nation building, and therefore were targets of political intervention and administration, 
and HE itself was designed to select, cultivate and distribute such products. In order to decide on the 
qualification of HE candidates and to select the most promising, the state gazed into the physical and 
ideological records of all via the personal dossier system, and set up standards and measurements for 
their bodies and minds while introducing unified entrance examinations to decide upon their academic 
and bodily qualifications. Other forms of technologies and techniques were at work to ensure that HE 
subjects, during their HE experience, adhered to the dominant ideologies and standards of personnel 
training such as 'the annual review' system that placed one under the reviews of themselves, their 
peers, tutors and superior administrators. To distribute HE subjects for the tasks of nation building, the 
graduate placement scheme was established and thereupon assigned graduates to positions where their 
`talents' and expertise were needed, instead of where the graduates themselves would prefer. As 
`products' of HE under state socialism, HE subjects did not have authority to make job choices for 
themselves, or choices in many other perspectives such as ideological preference. Rather, they were 
administrated subjects. 
Governed Subjects 
Here, by 'governed subjects', I refer to the fact that HE subjects are both governed by others and 
governed by themselves. In the post-socialist era, HE subjects are faced with combined technologies of 
government, those of socialist governmentality and those of neoliberal governmentality. 
On the one hand, they are still under certain conventional socialist arts of government like the gaze of 
the personal dossier system (and its affiliated techniques such as 'Annual Review Form', 'Bodily 
Qualification Form', and 'Letters of Undertaking'). They are still targets of governmental intervention 
44 Political loyalties to the CCP have been removed from official documents of HE application requirements in recent years. 
In 1977 when the CEE was resumed, this requirement was still clearly stated in the Recruitment Guidance for the CEE 
(reprinted in He and Wu, 1998, p. 1579, my translation), 
`first, (one should) have a clear record of a self political history, and support the Chinese Communist Party, and 
love socialism and physical labour, and be adherent to revolutionary disciplines, and be determined to study for 
the sake of revolution;' 
In the current version of Recruitment Guidance (Ministry of Education, 2010, author's translation), for instance, states that 
`applicants for the CEE must 'comply with the constitution and laws of the People's Republic of China'. This is another 
example of 'government from afar' (Zhang and Ong 2008). 
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and administration, in terms of their bodily qualification and maintenance (health examinations and 
group morning exercises, for example), their ideological adherence and articulation (in self-review 
forms, for instance). 
On the other hand, HE subjects are introduced to some neoliberal arts of government. They are given 
more choices, for instance in university and specialty choice and job choice, and also more autonomy 
in making these choices; they are enjoined to perform self-governance, for instance in how to organize 
and plan their studies and other HE experiences, in adapting themselves to the requirements of market 
professionalism. HE subjects are encouraged to make choices (in a number of domains) for 
themselves, to take care of their bodies and psychological selves, to take responsibility for their 
success and failures in their studies, their social experiences, and their search for employment. 
However, I am not suggesting that the self-governing subjects only began to emerge in the post-
socialist era; on the contrary, some characteristics of self-governance exist in almost all historical 
periods include the pre-modern history. The socialist arts of government, as my previous discussions 
have shown, also include technologies of the self and are intended to produce what I term the 'socialist 
self'. But in the post-socialist era, the socialist self is increasingly incorporated with a `neoliberal self', 
a self that is given more choices and held responsible for one's own choices, organisation, planning, 
management, mastery, and presentation in various domains of one's life, etc. In this regard, HE 
subjects in the post-socialist era are also increasingly governed by themselves; they are encouraged to 
be self-governing subjects. 
Displaced Subjects 
As Zhou's text indicates, the most recent decade has witnessed another round of major changes to the 
HE system, in particular its rapid expansion in the number of institutions and new entrants, but also the 
governmentality of HE, with some neoliberal arts of government introduced. It is during this process 
of infusion of technologies of government, the transformation of HE system from an elite to a mass 
sector, as well as drops in economic returns to HE degrees after HE graduates flooded the job market, 
that new forms of subjects began to emerge, subjects that fmd their previous belief in HE was most 
challenged by a rather alien social 'reality'. They may be called displaced subjects. 
I begin with the challenges to the two forms of subjects that bear the highest degree of historical 
consistency — desiring subjects and meritocratic subjects. First, since the drastic drop in economic 
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returns to HE degrees, and also the equally drastic rise in the cost of HE degrees, the desirability of HE 
is now under question as HE subjects are now much less rewarded, in particular among those who are 
already at an economic disadvantage. Voices from the media have already begun to warn the public of 
the risk of 'educational bankruptcy', referring to the fact that students from low income families may 
not be able to pay off their debts after graduation with HE degree and suffer even further from poverty 
(Brennan, 2004). Other scholars (Liu, 2005; Wu, 2004; Yang, 2008) have also raised their concerns 
that the risks in HE investment will drive away students with financial difficulties. Desires are not 
necessarily persuasive as rewards are increasingly cut off. 
Similar challenges are also presented to meritocratic reasoning. One who follows this line of this 
reasoning would agree that those with HE degrees, including those who are not among the highest 
achievers, are higher in the meritocratic hierarchy than those without HE degrees, and should 
accordingly have higher market values. However, the graduate employment crisis in recent decade puts 
this meritocratic reasoning in great doubt — in comparison to other job seekers without HE degrees, HE 
graduates drastically lost their market values in their competition in the job markets. Media reports 
have payed attention to the fact that in metropolitan cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, HE graduates 
now have starting salaries equal to those of manual workers such as migrant workers on construction 
sites. In other words, their merits proved by examination selections are now not necessarily 
acknowledged by the market. Reports such as Chen and Luo (2007) also cover stories of those with 
HE degrees 'going back' (huilu) to secondary technical schools for diplomas, as it is now believed that 
technical diplomas are gaining popularity among employers — diploma holders are regarded as more 
`employable' as their skills are more relevant to the needs of the market. This case generally opposes 
meritocratic reasoning, as diploma holders are supposed to be less meritocratic than degree holders, 
but their respective popularities in the market are in the reverse order. Merits are no longer a guarantee 
of returns. 
Troubled Subjects 
In tackling the spreading discontent with the existing HE system in China, official discourses, rather 
than targeting the issues of the system and institutions, revolve primarily around the 'trouble subjects', 
referring to HE subjects that are regarded as lacking discipline and a sense of responsibility, and in 
need of 'character building', 'professional ideological education' (zhuanye de sixiang jiaoyu), and 
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`psychological health education' (xinli jiaokang jiaoyu). For instance, Zhen, Jin and Wang (2005, p. 8, 
my translation) writes, 
`University students in contemporary China are mostly the single child of their families; they are a 
special group that bears high expectations of their families and the society. They have high self-regard, 
and strong urge to become talents, but they have limited social experiences, and they are not 
psychologically mature and hence likely to have emotional turbulence ... university students face 
increasing complexity in their social environment, family environment and school environment. They 
bear escalating stress in studies, employment, economics and emotions, and are prone to various 
psychological problems. Therefore, they are in need of psychological counselling and adjustment, and 
psychological health education can help them to build up good psychological character and prepare them 
for future development.' 
Here, Zhen et al present university students as 'psychologically troubled', but these troubles are 
understood as intelligible and open to remedy — they are results of family and social expectations, 
increasingly complex environments and escalating pressures in various domains. Such 'troubled 
subjects' are therefore in urgent need of psychological interventions. As the authors further suggest, 
there should be 'a protection and intervention system for highly dangerous people with psychological 
problems', so these people can be diagnosed, their problems addressed and the dangers eliminated as 
early as possible — 'to prevent the occurrence of suicides or grievous bodily harm toward others that 
result from severe psychological disorders'. To do so, the authors argue, professional counselling 
services should be available on campus, and class tutors should be equipped with professional 
psychological knowledge and intervention skills. Additionally, special attention should be paid to 
students who are most likely to be troubled, including 
`new entrants, graduating students, students from families with financial difficulties, and in particular 
students experiencing difficulties in studies, students who have failed relationships, students with records 
of disciplinary offences, and students who have strange behaviours and speech' (p.9, my translation). 
Here, the authors virtually problematize every single HE subject as having possible psychological 
problems, from new entrants to graduating students, from those with financial difficulties to those with 
learning difficulties, from those who have failed relationships to those who violate regulations. To 
prevent them from getting into trouble, Zhen suggests mobilising some socialist arts of government to 
practice tighter administration and closer observations of HE subjects, such as setting up 
`psychological dossiers' for university students, and having mass campaigns for psychological health 
on campus; second, he suggests enframing psychological supervision and intervention in the 
ideological education system. 
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For the authors, psychological health education should be practiced under techno-scientific reasoning, 
and student psychology is a domain that is intelligible through scientific research and ideological 
guidance. This argument is very much consistent with the recent rise of 'research on university 
students', academic studies that target university students and are intended to build up a new 
knowledge of 'HE subjects'. The Students' Affairs Research Branch of China Higher Education 
Association45, for instance, is a research centre that specialises in such studies. On its website, the 
centre lists the ongoing projects of its members. For instance, the list of 11 'Key Studies of Students' 
affairs of 2011' include 'Theory and empirical studies for ideological education practices among 
university students', 'The attitude towards happiness among university students', 'Psychological health 
among university students and monitoring approaches', 'Studies of subjectivities and career planning 
among university students', and 'The use of emotional intervention in keeping university students from 
internet addictions', etc. These research projects either target the entire HE population or specific 
groups (those who are addicted to the internet, for example), but they all intend to produce a new 
knowledge of HE subjects as a special group, a group of potentially troubled subjects. 
Conclusion 
In this section, I provide a summary of HE subjects in modern China. I first argue that two subject 
forms have been most consistent through the history — desiring subjects and meritocratic subjects. I 
then engage with a number of subjects that are historically sensitive. In the next section, I will explore 
the ethics constructed through HE. 
45 http://www.sarb,cn/About/indexlistasp?SortID=9 
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Chapter 12 Ethics 
Introduction 
In Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1977), Foucault explores the ways in which concrete apparatuses 
of power/knowledge work on bodies of human subjects in modem societies, such as 'the prison with 
its regulated time and space, the school with its hierarchically ordered pedagogy, the factory with its 
constant surveillance and measurement of activity' (O'Leary, 2002, p. 111). In his books The Use of 
Pleasure (Foucault, 1984) and The Care for the Self (Foucault, 1990), Foucault turns to explore the 
idea of self-care and technologies of self. From the perspective of the 'self', Foucault explores the 
process of subject formation as a result 'a process of self-knowledge', subjects as products of an 
`obligation to seek and state the truth about oneself' (Foucault, quoted in Prado, 2000, p. 80). ). Per the 
terms of his treatment, a mastery of subjectivity can be regarded as the ways in which one learns what 
one is by appropriating power-produced truth, and acts according to what is learned about oneself 
(Prado, 2000). 
To facilitate this inquiry into the 'self', Foucault introduces his idea of ethics. Foucault understands 
ethics as a component of morality that concerns 'the self's relationship to itself' (Foucault and 
Rabinow, 2000). For Foucault, an inquiry into a history of morality should move beyond a history of 
codes of moral behavior, and should include a history of the forms of moral subjectivation, meaning 
the ways in which humans constitute themselves as moral subjects of their own conducts. Foucault 
thought of ethics as 'the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself, ... which determines 
how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions' (Foucault 
and Rabinow, 2000, p. 263). 
Foucault's notion of ethics, or the self's relationship to itself, has four major aspects. The first aspect is 
called the ethical substance. It answers the question: 'Which is the aspect or the part of myself or my 
behavior which is concerned with moral conduct?' The second aspect is the mode of subjectivation, 
`the way in which people are invited or incited to recognize their moral obligations'. The third is the 
self-forming activity, 'the means by which we can change ourselves in order to become ethical 
subjects', to moderate our behaviors, to decipher what we are. The fourth part is the telos, which is 'the 
kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral way?' (Foucault and Rabinow, 2000, pp. 
263-265) I summarise these four aspects in the following table. 
This said, I can now go back to the question left from the previous section. The consistency and 
diversity in the subject forms constructed through HE can be accounted for in Foucault's 
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Four main aspects of 
Foucauldian Ethics 
ethical substance 
mode of subjection 
self-forming activity 
telos 
the part of oneself that is concerned with 
moral conduct  
the way in which the individual establishes 
his or her relation to moral obligations and 
rules  
ethical work one performs on oneself in 
order to transform oneself into an ethical 
subject  
the mode of being at which one aims in 
behaving ethically 
Table 12, Four Aspects of Foucauldian Ethics 
conceptualization of ethics. His formulation of ethics allows one to examine the dependence and 
independence among these four aspects, and hence to understand 'the various ways in which 
continuities, modifications, and ruptures can occur in one or more of these four dimensions'. As 
Davidson (2003, p. 131) explains, 
`(i)n some historical periods, for example, the ethical substance may remain constant, whereas the mode of 
subjection gradually alters; or the telos may stay continuous, whereas the self-forming activity is modified. In other 
periods, the ethical substance, mode of subjection, self-forming activity, and telos may be so inextricably 
intertwined that they undergo change together, thereby resulting in an entirely new form of the self's relationship to 
itself.' 
In the case of HE in modern China, the aspect that remains mostly constant, I argue, is the ethical 
substance, while other three aspects undergo some degrees of alteration. The consistency in the ethical 
substance may help to explain the two enduring forms of subject — the desiring subject and the 
meritocratic subject; and the alterations in other three aspects shed some light on the subject forms that 
are historically specific, such as the infused subject and the troubled subject. However, in this section I 
will not perform a genealogy of ethics. This is due to a lack of reference of earlier ethical conducts of 
HE. Instead, I will make use of my interview data and explore the implication of four aspects of 
Foucauldian ethics to mainly contemporary HE ethics. 
Ethics as a practice of Self-care 
In my interviews, I intended to explore the ways in which students in China were trying to identify a 
part of the existence where they were able to show care or concern for themselves. It appeared to me 
that without being given many other opportunities for self-formation, my interviewees found formal 
education, in particular HE, an effective and a persuasive one. A common belief is that through the 
process of HE, one can learn the ways in which one can take care of oneself intellectually, socially, and 
financially. This is not unexpected - as my discussion in the truth regime of HE shows, HE 
participation is widely portrayed and cited in school discourses and practices as essentially a form of 
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self-care, a way (and perhaps the only way) in which one can realise one's potentials, to secure better 
life chances, and to benefits other individuals and collectives in one's social circle (families, teachers, 
and the state). 
To better understand this link between HE and self-care, the process of HE participation can be 
roughly split into three stages - preparation for HE selection, acquisition of 'knowledge and 
capacities' (Zhou, 2006, p. 164) during HE and utilisation of one's intellectual and bodily capacities 
after HE appears most closely related to the few years of senior high school (normally 3 years) and HE 
(normally four years). In fact, the process is linked to one's entire educational life. The preparation 
process actually begins much earlier for the subjects of HE in China. As one of my interviewees 
recalled, 'As early as primary school, we have been repeatedly told to study hard so we can get into a 
good university'. As for the acquisition stage, my discussion in the Technologies section also shows, 
HE itself is promoted as a means of self-care, as students are encouraged to take care their own 
academic and social lives on campus, to manage their own study plans, to attend to their own needs of 
daily lives, to monitor their own conducts with reference to various regulations, codes, and norms. For 
the utilisation stage, the effects of HE participation remain after one's graduation - one's identity as a 
HE recipient stays in one's personal dossier and becomes a permanent proof of self-care, and an 
important criteria in various evaluation of one's intellectual, bodily and social qualification. 
The Ethical Substance 
The ethical substance is the part of ourselves or our behaviours that is relevant to ethical judgment. An 
example given by Foucault is the part of sexual behaviour that is relevant in Greek ethics — 'the ethical 
substance was acts linked to pleasure and desire in their unity'. He further explains 
`(f)or the Greeks, when a philosopher was in love with a boy, but did not touch him, his behaviour was valued. The 
problem was: Does he touch the boy or not? That's the ethical substance: the act linked with pleasure and desire 
(Foucault and Rabinow, 2000, p. 264).' 
The notion of the ethical substance is not limited to the realm of sexuality and can be applied to wider 
socio-cultural inquiries. Linking to subjectivity, Davidson explains, 
`the ethical substance consists of the forms of subjectivity which are imposed on us, and which we impose on 
ourselves, through a range of power/knowledge/self practices. These modes of subjectivity can range from forms of 
sexual identity... to the ways in which we are brought to embrace the ideals of our socio-cultural milieu (O'Leary, 
2002, pp. 107-108).' 
237 
It was clear from a rough overview of my interviews that students regarded their participation in HE as 
testimony to their earnestness in assessing opportunities for personal development and an 
understanding of their capacities in the context of their socio-cultural milieu. But it was perhaps just as 
clear that considerable hesitation, doubt, and divergence existed among students with regard to their 
motivations for regarding HE as a site of ethical engagement, as though 'the ways in which (they) 
were brought to embrace the ideals' had been made friable at the point of their application. This 
situation prompts me to make reference to the 'ethical substance of HE' on a provisional basis in an 
attempt to refine our understanding of student motivations in identifying HE's relevance for ethical 
judgment. 
The ethical substance of HE in modern China, I argue, in the link between HE participation and an 
improvement in one's general life chances, be they intellectual, social or fmancial or alternative 
factors. To test this hypothesis, I explore several questions in my interviews which queried the reason 
why the interviewees decide to 'go to university'46 and engage upon the first step of HE participation. 
My purpose is to determine whether a correlative to 'Does he touch the boy or not?' in Foucault's 
assessment above exists for Chinese students facing the question of HE participation, namely 'Do they 
(choose to) go to university or not?' Since so much of Chinese primary and secondary education is 
oriented around avoiding a definitive choice (see below under 'The Mode of Subjection'), 
problematising a straightforward establishment of an ethical substance, I don't regard this question to 
be trivial, nor does it become any less relevant for being asked after their matriculation. To engage 
simultaneously the nearly ubiquitous certainty expressed among students of the opportunity provided 
by HE and student hesitation and doubt about the limits of those opportunities, I make reference to my 
discussion with interviewees on the expression of 'HE as a belief'. During the interviews, instead 
asking a question directly, I asked students to express their opinions in response to an advertisement 
promoting education. 
During the time of my fieldwork in 2009, an advertisement for a private adult learning company 
appeared at a large number of bus stops in Beijing, including the immediate areas of the universities in 
which I conducted my fieldwork. Its bold strapline was 'Learning is a belief' (xuexi shi yizhong 
xinyang), though the advertisement also provided the anodyne English translation, 'In learning we 
trust'. I asked my interviewees to what extent they would agree that the ad text can be applied to their 
participation in HE, to what extent they would agree on an expression that 'going to university is a 
46 The expression of 'going to university' (shang daxue) is the most common term in the Chinese HE discourses referring to 
one's participation in HE. 
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belief', to what extent they would think this expression was relevant to their own decisions of HE 
participation. By using this advertisement, I hoped that my interviewees would be able to articulate 
their reasons of HE participation more clearly, and it seemed to have worked the way I expected. 
Figure 5, 'Learning is a belief advertisement at a Beijing bus stop, from I n• ,a„ IS I.1 III II/ I III I 
 
It should be noted that, while the translation on the ad is acceptable, the Chinese word xinyang has 
semantic parameters roughly analogous to the Roman fides, incorporating use with respect to religious 
belief as well as more mundane forms of trust. Both are clearly operative in certain student responses. 
For instance, Interviewee 28 said, 'I think education is a belief And like all other religious beliefs, it is 
a spiritual drive and support - with such a support, you can survive the times of great difficulties'. A 
few others suggested the expression that 'a pursuit of knowledge is a belief'. Interviewee 47 argued, 
`I think ... a pursuit of knowledge is a belief. I think going to university is a pursuit of knowledge, therefore it can 
be understood as a belief. I think to some extent, going to university is to acquire knowledge and skills, and to 
improve oneself - this is a rather good belief as well. I think going to university is an act of knowledge pursuit, so 
knowledge pursuit is a belief.' 
In general, my interviewees reported that the expression was actually not alien to them, and they 
acknowledged that it might be popular in the Chinese. For instance, interviewee No.23 said, 
`in China, if you think it as a belief, some people in fact would buy it. Because Chinese families and children have 
already got used to that expression, from the Imperial Examination to the CEE, and believe that (university 
education) is the only way out.' 
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Image redacted due to third party rights or other legal issues
However, in addition to a general acknowledgement of the prevalence of this expression, there was 
also a noticeable variation in my interviewees' interpretations of this advertisement. Those who came 
from urban background were much less likely to sympathise with this expression of 'going to 
university is a belief' (shang daxue shi yizhong xinyang), and they pointed to some normative or 
instrumental interpretations of the values of HE as the underpinning logic of their participation in HE, 
such as better employment perspectives, higher social status, or better life chances in general. For 
instance, all three of interviewees in Group 8 were from urban areas (two from Beijing) and invariably 
regarded this expression as 'pretentious'. In comparison to their counterparts from rural backgrounds, 
those from urban background were faced with fewer challenges in gaining access to HE, and therefore 
for them, going to university is 'just another option to choose in life', 'a step to take', 'a period of 
time', 'an experience to have', rather than a xinyang to follow. Here, those urban interviewees were in 
a sense expressing doubts about the 'spiritual drive' provided by HE attendance, but they remained 
adamant about its instrumental benefits. They attempted to articulate limits to what one should expect 
from HE, citing a set of moral obligations that were more concerned with themselves as recipients of 
HE, while concomitantly reducing the choice to one among many, or to a progression without 
demonstrable emphasis. 
Generally speaking, those from rural areas appeared to be more sympathetic towards this expression. 
Though they too regarded HE attainment in instrumental terms, they tended to see the choice to attend 
HE in a starker light. Interviewee No.3 (from rural background) said, 
`I think it is kind of a belief. In our rural neighbourhood, if one speaks of schooling, it is about going to university 
eventually, and then getting a good job. After all, education is perhaps the only model; you can only choose this 
path'. 
Interviewee No.27 also expressed a similar opinion, 
`in realistic terms, in the rural areas, our parents, they take it as an absolute belief, and majority of the students also 
take it as a belief, because all agree that going to university is a good way to change one's life trajectory — to 
change one's living environment. This may sound secular, but it is very practical; (going to university) can change 
one's family situation, so the parents hold high expectations of it, and the students are under high pressure'. 
Here, the two interviewees from rural background admitted that in their local contexts, such an 
expression tended to prevail among parents and students alike. They were rather comfortable with the 
phrases such as 'the only path', 'changing life trajectory' and to improve 'family (financial) situation'. 
Interviewee 3 said, 
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`in our rural area, when talking about schooling, people talk about going to university, and getting a good job. This 
is after all a rather single model of education. You can only choose this route'. 
Interviewee 4 said, 
`I think it is a compulsory choice. This might have to do with personal development. If one has this vision to be 
realised, going to university is what one can choose, the best route for one to choose - many would choose it'. 
The oxymoronic nature of 'a compulsory choice' cannot be overlooked, but it is not easily explicated. 
For these students, HE participation would lead them away from the 'backward' areas, from heavy 
manual work, and lead them to better life chances in urban areas, and benefit not only themselves, but 
the entire family as well. In other words, the rural participants were citing a slightly different set of 
moral obligations from that of their urban counterparts. These obligations place emphasis on a radical 
transformation (rather than strictly related to security) in one's life chances, and include their families 
as additional beneficiaries of HE. Perhaps as a consequence, they tended to more regard alternative 
`paths' as severely restricted in number, scope, or quality, and to attribute greater credibility to the 
educational path, even adopting their parents' view of this 'belief'. 
What is also important to note here is that despite the variations in their interpretations of this 
expression, the different extent to which they agreed upon the appropriateness of the word 
`xinyang' (or 'belief') in the context of HE participation, my interviewees, it appeared to me, were 
actually articulating and defending their own 'beliefs' of HE. Whether they stated that their HE 
participation was aimed to secure better employment perspectives, as in the case of urban students, or 
to achieve particular forms of social mobility, as in the case of rural students, they all in fact believe in 
the positive effect of HE participation on their life chances in general. They also actively seek 
`evidence' to support such interpretations of HE truth, their own 'beliefs' of HE that are faced with 
severe challenges by their appropriation of other HE 'reality' such as graduate unemployment, or 
campus environment or teaching styles that tend to fail their prior expectations. During my interviews, 
a noticeable proportion of interviewees did state that they were dissatisfied with the HE system they 
found themselves in. The sense of dissatisfaction may be related to the crowded campus environment, 
the rigid university regulations, or their dim opportunities after graduation. But all these issues did not 
stop them from seeing HE as the general domain of improvement. In fact, they appeared compelled to 
defend this link between HE participation and an improvement in one's life chances, even though other 
evidence suggested otherwise. 
For instance, there exists a prevailing discourse that the social status of HE graduates (in comparison 
with other job seekers in the market) has now undergone tremendous changes. In the interview section 
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of social status, I put forward some copies of newspaper reports on the fact that university graduates 
were making similar incomes to those of migrant workers, those without proper education working as 
hard labours. In commenting on these reports, most interviewees appeared less negative, and they 
emphasised the status of 'public intellectuals' attached to HE subjectivity, and regarded themselves as 
`the most important group in nation building' as they were 'in possession of the most advanced 
knowledge'. Noticeably, they comfortably cited the `suzhi' discourses, and largely agreed that 
university graduates in general were higher in 'human quality' than those who received less or little 
education. For instance, in my conversation with Group 10, all three interviewees tended to argue their 
advantages to the migrant workers remained. Interviewee 30 said, 
`in term of social status, one should not be too self confident, but should not be self-defeating either. In fact, I think 
university students are still intellectuals; even with the decrease of their financial values, they are after all 
intellectuals, with a certain accumulation of knowledge. ' 
Interviewee 29 added, 
`I agree that one of the aims of HE is to get higher earnings. But I think what is more important is to improve one's 
suzhi.' 
Interviewee 30 continued, 
`no matter how badly prepared university students get, how low their salaries get, they make a much easier living 
than the migrant workers, and their jobs are better secured... We can expect a rise in salary in a couple of years' 
time'. 
Interviewee 28 further articulated this point, and argued that, 
`I think a university graduate, regardless of his job, his salary, is still advantaged compared to migrant workers... 
For a university graduate, one might be not well-paid and underemployed for his job, but he has potential to be 
realised. But as for a migrant worker, how much potential does he have? He might have potential too, but much less 
in comparison to university student.' 
The quote above shows how students moblised multiple discourses such as `suzhi', 'long-term benefits 
(market rationality)' and 'potential (educational entrepreneurship)' to defend their own beliefs in the 
positive effect of HE - the link between HE participation and an improvement in one's life chances. 
This link is what I believe to be the ethical substance of HE in modern China. My interviewees incited 
themselves as subjects of such an ethical substance. On this point, it is also instructive make reference 
to Foucault's notion of spirituality, by which he means 'the subject's attainment of a certain mode of 
being and the transformations that the subject must carry out on itself to attain this mode of 
being' (Foucault and Rabinow, 2000, p. 294). HE participation is also a form of spirituality - students 
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incite themselves as HE subjects, as performers of moral conduct of HE participation as a form of self-
care, and as defenders of the ethical substance of HE. 
The Mode of Subjection 
Now I move on to the second aspect of ethics — the mode of subjection. This refers to the ways in 
which one establishes one's relation to moral obligations and rules. In this regard, the mode of 
subjection that is relevant to HE in modern China, I argue, is the sense of moral obligation to 
recognise, maximise and realise one's intellectual and bodily potentials through HE participation. In 
other words, if one is qualified for HE by intellectual and bodily criteria (I have explored these criteria 
in previous chapters), one 'should' make effort to participate in its discourses and practices of HE. 
The recognition of one's HE qualification is first made possible by certain evaluation processes in 
schooling, as Interviewee No.44 explained, 
`when the kids start their first year in senior high, they are told that if they are ranked beyond what number in 
exams in their grade, they can go to the Tier-1 universities (keypoint universities), and beyond what number, they 
can make it to the Tier-2 (regular universities), and beyond what number, they can make it to Tier-3 (two-year 
technical colleges). Below that, you may not have a chance. So you have to fight to get into the rank. One is told 
that way from the first year in senior high. So for them, and for us as well, going to university is actually a belief. 
Three years of preparation is just for admission to university.' 
Here No.44 here explained the deployment of examinations as a constant gaze into one's intellectual 
capacities to determine one's HE qualification. Students are repeatedly assessed for their chances of 
gaining access to HE by their performances in a series of exams and tests - every student is informed 
about their chances at all time, and therefore they are held responsible for their improvement or drop in 
studies. On the other hand, the academic performances of all students are made visible in the ranking 
system, and also put under continuous surveillance. Schooling therefore is reduced to a certain ranking 
and racing game for the students — they are made competitors against one another for HE participation. 
There was a sense of naturalism in the recognition process. The idea was that if one is intellectually 
sound, being capable of studying hard, one would naturally want to go to university, or be naturally 
expected to do so. As Interviewee 22 said, 
`I think it is rather natural for one to think about going to university. If you are doing well in school, people would 
expect you to eventually go to university. Your parents and teachers would always remind you that you have to 
study hard, to keep it up, and not to fail others' expectations of you to go to university. Also, nowadays, with the 
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expansion of HE, it is even easier to make it to university (or college) education. So if one is intellectually sound 
yet does not have an ambition for HE, that is rather unnatural.' 
This recognition process is further facilitated by a sense of superiority in HE participation endorsed by 
some my interviewees, in particular those from rural background. For them, HE participation can bring 
a sense of pride and self-esteem, and a university is interpreted as a sort of 'sacred' place. Interviewee 
No. 9 (from rural area) said, 
`many of us have this feeling that if you make it to university, or even to senior high, you see some people in the 
society not in schooling but in employment, you would have this sense of pride. I used to feel that I am different 
from them, and now this feeling is getting stronger when I made it to university. I feel that university is such a 
different place; it is more sacred than any other places.' 
Interviewee No.8, also from rural area, picked up the conversation and cited the educational selection 
in his local area, 
`the dropout rate is fair high in our place. Few of my classmates from primary school are still in education, a few 
from junior high, and some more from senior high. Few of my classmates from primary and junior high are in 
education; most of them already got married. I think, for me, going to university is an indispensable stage of life. If 
I don't have it, I will feel regretful.' 
Here, No.8 implied that to survive a high dropout rate and to make it to university was not easy. 
Therefore, he also felt a sense of pride and self-esteem in comparison to some of his classmates that 
are no longer in education. Those who fail to stay in for longer period of education, in particular those 
who already got married and start their family lives at early ages, according to No.8, were excluded 
from a valuable experience of life and should regret their loss. 
To explore the ways in which students understand their obligations regarding the maximisation of their 
potentials through HE participation, I asked the interviewees to explain (for the first year students) 
what they planned to or to reflect upon (for the final year students) what they had done to achieve self-
improvement during four years in university. The replies to this questions would include a number of 
dimensions - first, to 'study hard', as 'study is the natural responsibility of a student' and in that sense 
`HE is not different from previous schooling experiences'; second, to 'gain self-independence' in 
various aspects of one's campus life, such as catering, sleeping order, and laundry, or in general to 
`take good care of oneself' in everyday lives; third, to 'build up good social relationships with others', 
including ones' peers, tutors, teachers and other administrative staff. The third dimension was widely 
regarded as 'a significant part of one's university experience' - for one thing, 'a university is like a 
small society' and as a member of such a society 'everyone needs to learn to be socialised' as a 
preparation for 'entering the real society' after graduation; for another, 'in Chinese society, good social 
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connections are indispensable for your career perspectives' - 'your teachers may recommend a good 
job to you', and 'your peers are most likely to be the people you collaborate with in the near future'. 
This socialisation process is made possible in a number of ways (or techniques as some of my 
interviewees said), such as joining a student society or club, or to act as a student cadre (xuesheng 
ganbu) and organise social events, or making regular contacts with teachers and administrative staff to 
be integrated into their social circles. In summary, these three dimensions, academic studies, self-
independence, and social relationship are the three major moral obligations to fulfill for the 
maximisation of one's potentials through HE. 
To understand the maximisation of one's potential, how students evaluate the extent to which they 
realise their potentials, I ask my interviewees to summarise (for the final year students) the main 
effects of HE on them. A number of dimension emerged from the discussion. The most significant 
improvement would be, not the acquisition of knowledge, but rather the acquisition of social skills -
'how to greet other in social context, 'how to live with others', 'how to deal with different opinions 
other than your own', which was often understood as an improvement in one's suzhi; secondarily, a 
better understand of oneself, of one's own 'ambition', 'weakness', 'specialty', of 'what one wants to 
do in the future' and becoming 'a complete person' in terms of one's 'psychological, physical and 
ontological existence', and 'broader visions' of the society and the world; thirdly, the attainment of a 
good career perspective, for instance a job in a public sector organisation, as 'HE is a springboard for 
employment'. Noticeably, there is a mismatch between the maximisation and the realisation process -
the role of academic study was underplayed in the latter. This was closely related to the fact that a large 
number of final year students complaint that they 'did not learn anything practical' in their three years 
of HE - 'the curriculum was outdated', 'the teachers are not concerned with teaching', and students 
`were forced to learn things they had not interest in'. Nonetheless, all these complaints did not stop 
them from recognising the positive effects of HE, which in turn further support the ethical substance 
and protect HE spirituality. 
Self-forming Activity 
The self-forming activity refers to the ethical work that we perform on ourselves to transform us into 
ethical subjects. To illustrate the self-forming activity related to the ethics of contemporary HE, I make 
reference to some materials in the student dossiers. These materials are more closely related to the 
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second step of HE participation — the acquisition of knowledge and capacities. In this case, I explore 
the 'capacities' part, which are some behavioural codes that students are conditioned to follow. 
In Mr Y's student dossiers, there are other documents that manifest the working of such socialist 
technologies. For example, there is copy of a Letter of Undertaking of Behaviours in University', 
which include the full text of Codes of Behaviours of Students of HE Institutions introduced by the 
State Board of Education, and a section of 'My Promise', in which students are requested to write their 
promise to comply with the Codes. As a document of personal dossiers, every student will again be 
obliged to show their compliance with the regulations in writing. Once their letters are documented, 
those students are 'subject to the evaluation of their promises in their annual review forms', as the 
Letter regulation explains. 
A more detailed standard of evaluation is presented in a self-review form introduced by Mr Y's 
university, titled Self Review Form of Integrity for Graduate of Year 2004 of XX College. This form 
breaks the notion of 'integrity into a list of self-forming activities for one to be an ethical subject. The 
list includes 'moral discipline' (whether one has a record of lying, gambling, theft, or 'talking after 
lights out', etc.), 'academic studies' (whether one has a record of failure or cheating in examinations, 
or being late for class sessions, or winning honorary titles or scholarships), 'personal life and 
finance' (whether one returns loans from others in time, or pays tuition fee in time, whether one 
dresses in a clean and tidy fashion, or has good habits with regard to personal hygiene), 'Human 
Quality (Suzhi) Development' (whether one actively participate in various forms of collective 
activities, social practices, and morning exercises, etc.), 'interpersonal relationships' (whether one has 
good relationships with peers, and has a record of sleepover of a visitor of the opposite sex47, etc.). 
Students are asked to review their own integrity by answering 'yes' or 'no' to questions of each 
category, and then based on the answers, they are asked to mark their own integrity by choosing from 
one of the five 'scale of integrity' responses, over 90%, 80%, 70%, 60% or fail. Answering 'no' to the 
questions regarding records of offences to regulations, laws, and social norms, such as 'whether one 
has a record of damaging public property' will serve as evidence of integrity, as will answering 'yes' to 
questions regarding compliance with them, such as 'whether one respects one's teacher and obeys to 
the administration (of the university)' and 'whether one has joined any clubs and societies'. 
47 Apparently, staying over of one's same-sex partner is not recognised in this list as damage to one's integrity. In other 
words, homosexuality itself is not recognised in the norms of behaviour codes of integrity. But this issue of the attitude 
towards homosexuality in HE is perhaps worth a dissertation on it own, and I shall not engage with it further here. 
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According to this self-review form, an HE self of integrity should comply with a variety of university 
regulations; mistakes such as 'late returns of library loans' will do harm to one's integrity. An HE self 
of integrity should also actively show, first, concerns of the self, such as dress codes (clean and tidy), 
personal hygiene, and financial reputation (return loans from others in time), etc.; second, concerns of 
the collective, such as good relationships with peers, participation in charity works and social 
activities; third, concerns of one's nation, as rendered visible in the only the first question of the entire 
form — whether one is familiar with big events of the nation. If one is familiar with the big events, 
which are not specified in the form but could mean following domestic news, then one is not only 
politically sensitive, but also an HE self of integrity. 
Apparently, this review form is not difficult to trick. If one is to present oneself as a HE self of 
integrity, he or she only needs to fill the form in line with the normative values that are not difficult to 
understand. As long as one does not have a record of major 'offences' (violations) to university 
regulations, such as committing theft, one can easily achieve an integrity score of the highest scale, 
over 90%, by giving answers that are 'politically correct'. Even if, for instance, one has a record of late 
returns of library loans or 'has arguments over little things with one's peer', one may be confident that 
such minor 'offences' will not be checked; and since this Letter of Undertaking is to be documented in 
one's personal dossiers, it is a wiser choice to lie about one's 'offences' and present oneself an HE self 
of full integrity, or in this form, over 90% degree of integrity. Like other self-review forms, this form 
also incorporated review sections by others, including the head of one's dormitory", the head of one's 
class, the class tutor, and the administrator of the university. But, again, unless one has a record of 
major offences, others would be unlikely to disagree. Mr Y for instance, marks himself as a HE self of 
over 90% integrity, and this result was agreed upon by all others. 
One might regard this Letter of Undertaking as another example of bureaucratic formality, for any 
student can give simple correct answers and be a HE self of integrity. But I argue, by simply filling 
these forms, the subjects familiarise themselves with this list of self-forming activities and may 
consciously engage with them, as these activities are presented as a collection of behavioural codes 
against which one is constantly to evaluate oneself. Also, such form filling procedures are to some 
extent disciplinary in nature — the form is compulsory by the administrative sector of the university, 
and one could jeopardise one's own life chances by not complying with the codes, norms and values 
48 In Chinese HE institutions, students are unlikely to live alone in a room, but normally to share with at least three other 
students or more. The specialization of the university dormitory is in consistence with the socialist governmentality. By 
purposely placing individual students in collective units such as shared dormitories, one is subject to the gaze of others, and 
hence needs to be aware of one's own behaviours in the supposedly private time. This is an interesting issue that perhaps 
needs a chapter on its own, so I shall not include it in this dissertation for mere sake of word length. 
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underpinning the listed activities. To avoid such damage, one should act ethically as the list suggests, 
and to present oneself an ethical HE subject, a self with (almost) full integrity. 
Telos 
The telos refers to the mode of being toward which we aim in behaving ethically. In this final section, I 
limit my discussion to the third step of HE participation, and explore the telos of HE subjects. In 
previous chapters, I have discussed the current graduate employment crisis in China, and how HE 
subjects are directed towards self-governance and market rationality — to prepare oneself for the crisis, 
to be responsible for one's own success and failure, and to properly understand one's position in the 
job market. I believe this would initially suggest the construction of a telos of job-seeking for HE 
subjects, but as we shall see, the construct appears largely of government making, and student 
participation, which determines whether the HE telos may be considered an ethical one, complicates 
matters substantially. In the following discussion, I want to examine to what extent the hegemonic 
account of the HE telos as job-seeking is appropriated by students in China by reflecting on my 
interview data. 
To make a quick review of this hegemonic account of the telos of HE subjects as job-seekers, I make 
reference of Zhou Ji's Higher Education in China. In the section marked 'Employment', Zhou (2006, 
pp. 162-163) writes, 
The increasing expansion in higher education over the past few years has put more pressure upon college graduates 
with regard to employment ... (although) the employment rates have topped 80%, quite a few students have still 
been facing unemployment for a while upon graduation. Under such circumstances, higher education institutions 
have put more emphasis on a scientific career-launching education, guiding students in forming a rational job-
seeking concept, and improving their business start-up capabilities. Previously, the first choice for college 
graduates in terms of employer were state organs, government institutions, state-owned enterprises, foreign-
invested companies, and joint ventures, and in terms of geographical location, large cities. They have become more 
practical and down-to-earth job hunting, and are considering small and medium-sized firms, township enterprises, 
low-sounding institutes, the hinterland and western regions, and small and medium-sized cities. Meanwhile, 
embarking on post-graduate studies or going abroad to pursue further studies have become a means of relieving 
job-hunting pressures and seeking better job opportunities in the future. 
Zhou further argues how this employment crisis shapes the ways in which students engage with 
learning in HE. He writes (164-165), 
`(a)s social development puts a premium on a student's competence and overall character while employers set 
greater store by a job-seeker's independent thinking, power of expression and social communicating skills... 
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Meaning, they act on their own to sit for a variety of professional qualification certificate examinations... they join 
debate contests, social practice, etc., to acquire useful social skills with a view to widening their horizons and 
adding to their qualification for future job hunting.' 
In the passages above, I argue, Zhou's account from a state-directed institutional perspective is less a 
description of the effects of employment crisis on HE learning, and more an indication that these 
activities, practices, and subjectivities are most desirable for the contemporary HE participants as job-
seekers. They constitute the telos of contemporary HE, which is primarily marked by market 
rationality and professionalism. Market rationality endorses a 'practical' and 'down-to-earth' approach 
towards job hunting, which suggests an HE graduate should give up on a prior elitism and accept jobs 
that are less desirable than the posts given to their predecessors, such as the ones in small public and 
private sector organisations and/or in developing regions (other than the coastal region). 
Professionalism suggests that an HE graduate should have a 'proper' understanding of what a job 
market requires of its participants - 'independent thinking, power of expression and communication 
skills', and in order to succeed in market competition, he or she should answer to these requirements 
and improve related 'capacities' and 'skills' through educational and social events and an acquisition of 
additional qualifications. Here Zhou's account of an employment telos treats the capacities and skills 
of a HE graduate as necessary attainments prior to success in the job market, but he regards future 
employment as the most critical aspect of managing HE from an institutional perspective - therein lies 
the anxiety of the state. 
The fact remains, however, that the employment crisis has altered student perspectives on the 
relationship between HE and employment, necessitating a supplementation of the hegemonic account, 
in part because the relationship is something the state possesses only limited capacity to address. The 
question we hope to broach, then, is whether there is an articulation of a field of differential operation 
for student ethical subjectivity to seek an alternative telos, a 'mode of being' beyond job-seeking, or 
whether they are subordinated to the overarching goal of finding a job. 
I now tackle students' assessment of that telos, insofar as they are the ones practicing ethics. Zhou's 
perspective is relevant since my interviewees did pick up on it, but that does not mean students and the 
state are in complete agreement. The anxieties of students are not entirely focused on employment, and 
how they treat the corresponding HE elements, such as suzhi and social status, factors which play a 
role in affirming their belief in HE in the face of market constraints, indicate that they view the 
prospect of unsatisfactory employment differently from the state directives. It would appear that 
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students have prepared themselves for the possibility of unsatisfactory employment. When asked about 
the origin, features and duration of the current employment crisis, the majority of my interviewees 
reported that they were very much aware of certain challenges and difficulties in seeking employment, 
and interpreted this situation as a rather long-term problem', a result of 'the supply of HE graduates 
outnumbering the demand of the market'; and to cope with the challenges in employment, a 
considerable number of interviewees intended to study for a postgraduate degree or/and take the 'Civil 
Servant Exam' (gongwuyuan kaoshi) to increase their chances in the job market. The extension of HE 
participation through further degrees in light of employment problems would of course only be an 
option available to a minority of HE participants, and therefore perhaps a response on the margins of 
HE, but the logic of such a play on the margins reveals considerable insight. Consequently, I think it 
will be important to examine the logic involved in the pursuit of postgraduate studies and then proceed 
onward to treat the outlooks of those whose entry into the job-market is decidedly more imminent. 
For many, postgraduate studies undertaken under China's current employment conditions were not 
primarily aimed at the further pursuit of knowledge, but rather were to reduce exposure to the rise of 
unemployment or underemployment. Such an approach involves reaffirming the value of HE 
subjectivity in light of the aporia of employment, which leads to a rather contorted repositioning of the 
hegemonic goal. For instance, interviewee 30 said, 
`I think studying for a postgraduate degree is also a kind of employment. It points out where you go next. I think 
postgraduate studies and finding a job are the same in nature. I think our aim in life, perhaps not our aim in life, but 
one of of our aims (in life) is to secure a good job, so one can have a stable life. This is the most important. So I 
think, both postgraduate studies and work point to the same direction — for a better life ahead.' 
In this passage we witness the actual reduction of postgraduate enrolment to employment itself, a 
remarkable convergence of the aims alternately treated by Zhou. We note the collapse of a two 
dimensional model education and employment to one dimension in which they are infused together—
there is no transition between them; they are, in fact, one and the same. Unlike in Zhou's account, 
wherein the goal of employment succeeds upon education, here education has to be remarked as its 
own end with respect to employment, as a replacement for the (postponed) goal of employment in the 
market. If this interpretation seems perverse, considering that `secur(ing) a good job' is highlighted, it 
is important to acknowledge how it is brought into play with education. Both are, in fact, subordinated 
to a larger 'aim', which is not that of securing a good job, but having a stable life ('so one can...'), 
which is deemed 'the most important'. It is the larger aim that implicitly underwrites the decision to 
continue in post-graduate studies, a life that provides greater stability than the job market or the 
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spectral trials of the Ant-tribe. Thus, postgraduate studies are a replacement for employment in an 
unemployable terrain. 
This passage appears emblematic of the ethical quandary in which Chinese students participating in 
HE find themselves. We might speculate that those who wish to continue in HE participation for a 
longer period of time disclose an acute awareness of HE's immanent relationship to the quality of their 
life, that they account for a 'superior' telos of HE participation, if only out of need to justify their 
decision not to immediately negotiate market rationality. But the discourse of market rationality still 
acts a subtext to their logic. In fact, even in the passage above, one cannot help but recognize that the 
replacement of employment by HE participation under the rubric of a 'stable life' should also be 
equivalent to the replacement of HE by market employment under the same rubric, if both are to 
achieve the same aim. And indeed, throughout the interviews, it was this latter perspective, the 
diminishment of the value of HE participation vis-à-vis employment, or a subjection to market 
rationality, which predominated. However, it is important to note in advance that the diminishment of 
the value of HE participation vis-à-vis employment gave rise to a development in discourse that 
employment's replacement by further HE participation did not—namely, an eclipse of that to which 
both employment and HE were subordinated in the account of interview 30 above: a stable life. 
Among the interviewees, there was a general acceptance of the telos of market rationality. And even 
among those who saw the aim of employment as potentially distinct from their experience in HE, the 
motivation of market rationality still provided a subtle undercurrent. So, for example, many argued 
that university graduates should have 'better understandings of the job market' and their own 
`capacities' as 'new entrants into the market', and therefore lower their expectations and start from 
some junior positions. Interviewee 30, the same gentlemen who articulated the replacement of 
employment by HE participation above, also stated, 
`we should not think too highly of oneself, and should not be proud of the fact that one went to a certain university, 
a certain keypoint university. You have only learnt some abstract knowledge, and your practical social experience 
cannot be compared with those mature professionals, or those technical graduates. One should acknowledge that 
fact. I think a university student should have a fair evaluation of oneself. Once you have this fair evaluation, you 
won't have the issue of unemployment.' 
Interviewee 12 said, 
`I don't worry too much about employment. It all depends on your own criteria (of employment). Some people 
have rather high criteria to begin with, but the market does not fulfil such requirements, and the salaries are much 
lower than one expected. Some decline the job offers that do not fulfil their high expectations — (I think) this is not 
feasible. If you lower your criteria, you can definitely find a job in the market.' 
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Interviewee 10 drew on his recent experience of seeking internship and made similar comments, 
further emphasising the diminishment of value they have as HE participants: 
`I think the problems of graduate employment are mainly due to too high the expectations of university students 
themselves. University students always think too high of themselves. I am looking for some opportunities of 
internship, and some people I know are looking for jobs. Our feelings are that in fact we are all rather ordinary. We 
thought we were all very competitive and should be readily employed. After several blows, we all learnt to swallow 
our pride.' 
Noticeably, a considerable number of interviewees, echoing Zhou's account of HE learner as job-
seekers, articulated that employment perspectives are to be decided by one's competence and it was 
natural for those graduating from regular universities to be underemployed or unemployed — they are 
simply not prepared for the competition in the job market. This perspective too, it would seem, fits 
into a conception of the diminishment of the value of their HE experience and the life achieved 
thereby, though it vacillates from a critical view of personal inadequacy to that of institutional 
inadequacy. Interviewee 11 argued, 
`I think, first, now a large number of university graduates ended up being unemployed because they did not learn 
much from their HE, and they are not what the market needs. If you are a competitive and fast learner, and you are 
very creative and adaptive to the society, you won't be concerned with the problem of unemployment; second, for 
me personally, I don't care too much about income, or where I go, how much money I can get. I can manage with a 
simple life. Above all, graduates from this university, given its position in the (academic) hierarchy (of HEIs), 
wouldn't end up being too bad.' 
One notes that the invocation of 'life' here is markedly different than what we observed in interviewee 
30's comments above. In his assessment, 'a stable life' was the paramount aim and guided his 
understanding of the equivalence of HE participation and employment. Interviewee 11's 'life', in 
contrast, is not an aim but a means, is subjugated to employment, is 'downgraded' to simplicity , and 
shows little concern for income, status, or location. His reference to student capacities such as 
creativity and adaptability are intriguingly emphasised in this context, but they are emphasised 
specifically to combat the anxiety of (un)employment, not as avenues to alternate subjectivities and 
ethical practice. Moreover, they are themselves subordinated to the competence/status of the 
institution ('Above all') that, we understand, would offer better prospects and thus an opportunity for a 
life which 'wouldn't end up being too bad.' 
It is by comparing the manner in which interviewee 30 and interviewee 11 variously adopt Zhou's 
understanding of HE telos, reflected commonly among the other interviewees, that I believe we are 
best able to assess the potential emergence of a telos of ethics in HE participation beyond the 
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hegemonic telos, a mode of being beyond job-seeking. To preclude the drawing of a false dichotomy, 
it might be conjectured that interviewee 11's articulation has been too strictly considered, that his 
perspective may be contingent, as interviewee 30's is, on the role employment may play in achieving a 
better life somewhere in the future, and we are only provided with evidence of his momentary 
concerns, limited to employment. It may well be that he is willing, as is praised in traditional Chinese 
morality, 'to eat bitterness' (chi ku) for long term gain. I believe such a conjecture would be 
simultaneously relevant and mistaken. It is certainly relevant insofar as it offers a traditional discourse 
that could effectively be mapped onto interviewee 11's articulation; and more importantly, it is relevant 
insofar as it shows the general correspondence of both interviewees' perspectives, insofar as it 
deemphasises a seemingly arbitrary difference. However, it is also mistaken insofar as it adduces 
potential progress made later in the interviewee's career, and a subsequent improvement of his life 
conditions, to the immediate linkage between HE participation and finding a(ny) job, doing so 
precisely at the locus interviewee 11 has, however temporarily, obviated: a concern for a better life, 
one marked by stability. The difference between the two perspectives may signify, but not as the 
difference between concern for a better or more stable life 'now' and potentially 'in the future', for 
that would suggest the difference may be accounted for by a short-sightedness contingent upon 
idealism, and yet we see that only a marginal variance between interviewee 11 and interviewee 30's 
`idealism' obtains. Interviewee 30 agrees, in fact, that one must humble oneself to deal with the 
empirical realities of the market, so that 'you won't have the issue of unemployment'. 
Both accounts of life are marked by a navigation of the question of employment. The 'stable life' is 
achieved by a student continuing his studies, and established as a reason for replacing employment 
with further HE participation. Through a decision to extend his education, the student has acquired a 
reprieve from unemployment, has effectively become 'employed' in his view. The 'stable life' as aim 
is therefore equivalent to a being freed from anxiety over employment. 'The simple life' involves the 
willing subjection of 'life' in the question of employment. Naturally, it would be wrong to suggest the 
student invoking 'a simple life' is seeking a life any worse ('end up not being too bad') than the aim of 
`the stable life', but his articulation of life is as a means and not an aim. The key fact for our purpose 
is that the student's logic indicates being able to live a (relatively) worse life will allow him to secure a 
job. 'The simple life' therefore also indicates the aim of a being freed from anxiety over employment. 
Despite the different manner in which they navigate the question of employment, the aim toward 
which they are directed is effectively the same. 
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As an excursus, I think comparing 'the simple life' and 'the stable life' mobilised by these two 
interviewees may yield additional important insights. In particular, I am fascinated by the manner in 
which 'the simple life' figures as an accepted biological reduction—involving a lack of concern from 
income, status, and location. It appears a type of ascetic existence which practically frees one from the 
various alternative categories by which one can gauge a self. As such, it accords somewhat to 'a bare 
life' treated by Agamben and referenced in Chapter 8 on technologies, of physical being divorced, 
insofar as is necessary, from moral and political being. It is perhaps unsurprising that such a 
perspective carries connotations of Social Darwinism, evident in interviewee 11's passage and 
elsewhere in student responses. We might also observe that, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, a 
relatively 'bare' life here reaffirms a belief in the HE subjectivity formed by HE participation, the 
qualities of being 'competitive', 'a fast learner', 'creative', and 'adaptive to society'. The biological 
reduction is entwined with these qualities, as it is with the institutional competence, 'above all'. 
But our immediate concern is to conclude this section on the establishment of an ethical telos, a 'mode 
of being' that students aim to achieve through ethical HE practice. To that end, we've seen from 
student interviewees an articulation of concerns that largely agree with Zhou Ji's hegemonic account of 
the HE telos. In line with his view that 'embarking on post-graduate studies or going abroad to pursue 
further studies have become a means of relieving job-hunting pressures and seeking better job 
opportunities in the future', we have interviewee 30's rationalization of continuing postgraduate 
studies. In line with observation that `(students) have become more practical and down-to-earth job 
hunting, and are considering small and medium-sized firms, township enterprises, low-sounding 
institutes, the hinterland and western regions, and small and medium-sized cities', we have a number 
of interviewees, including interviewee 11, articulating a willingness to lower their expectations, 
assessment of their own talents, and even conception of 'life' to find gainful employment. However, 
what is of special interest to us is the slight displacement which occurs whereby students regard their 
lives in relation to securing employment. In neither case we examined did students precisely articulate 
an aim of job-seeking, though its influence is palpable. It appears, rather, that they are looking past 
that point and either assuming employment leads to a preferred mode of being (a stable life) or 
assuming that a subjection of their lives to market demands, the mobilisation of a simple life, leads to 
employment. No matter the degree to which market rationality impacts students' attitudes toward HE 
participation, no matter how realistic or 'down to earth' they are, their aim would appear best 
expressed as being free from anxiety over employment. This distinction, while seemingly small, is, I 
believe, a more precise account of the ethical telos. 
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Conclusion 
In this section, I make use of Foucault's idea of ethics, and explore the implication of its four aspects 
to contemporary HE in China. By using my interview data and some other materials, I explore first the 
ethical substance of HE, the link between HE participation and an improvement in one's life chances; 
second, the mode of subjection, the ways in which students in China recognise, maximise and realise 
one's intellectual and bodily capacities and one's participation through HE participation; third, self-
forming activity, the behavioural codes for HE participants to follow in order to be ethical HE subjects; 
and fourth, the telos, the mode of being which HE participants aim to become, wherein lies a slight 
misalignment between the state directives and students' assessment. In the next chapter, which is also 
the final chapter of this thesis, I will review the contribution and limitation of Foucauldian perspectives 
and also make suggestion for future research. 
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Chapter 13 Concluding Thoughts 
Apparatus, Government and the Present 
In this thesis, I have conducted a multi-faceted investigation into the emergence and deployment of HE 
in modem China. I have shown in Part II the ways in which HE as a concrete apparatus is built upon 
its various components - principles, systems, curriculum, pedagogy and space, and also the ways in 
which a variety of technologies and techniques are invented and deployed to shape the outlooks of HE 
apparatus in modem China. My inquiry in Part III has displayed the ways in which HE serves as an 
effective and persuasive form of government over populations and individuals, through the 
corresponding rationalities, authorities, technologies, desires and choices. Part IV explores the ways in 
which various truth sets, subjects and ethics are produced through HE, and by integrating my 
fieldwork data, this Part reveals the ways in which students in China today appropriate a social 
`reality' through the lens of HE, and in turn construct their relationships with HE, with others, and with 
themselves. In this final chapter, I first summarise the contribution of a Foucauldian frame to my 
inquiry in this thesis. I also discuss Foucault's limitation in this regard. I further explore alternative 
accounts of HE in contemporary China, and what I believe can be alternative ways of understanding 
and configuring HE. 
Foucault's Contribution and Limitation 
The research perspectives and tools introduced by Foucault and his followers have been most useful to 
my inquiry in this thesis. The approach of genealogy, in particular, contributes greatly to answering my 
questions concerning 'a history of the present' of HE in China, its emergence as an apparatus and its 
deployment in governing the subjects. Foucault's idea of apparatus underpins the inquiry in Part II of 
this thesis, in which I examine the emergence and development of five apparatus component of HE, 
including principles, systems, curriculum, pedagogy and space. His idea of government, which is later 
developed by Dean and Rose, underpins my inquiry in Part III, in which I examine a number of 
perspective of HE government, rationality, authority, technology, desires, choices, and subjects. 
Following Foucault, I question some of the taken-for-granted knowledge of HE in China, and open 
them up for reexamination and further inquiry. For instance, I point out in Chapter 5 that the privilege 
of HE over other public educational sectors, which establishes HE as the ultimate goal of schooling in 
contemporary China, was established firstly by the fact that public schools were set up in the late Qing 
primarily to provide HEIs with adequate candidates, and this privilege was sustained in later decades 
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by the belief that HE was more capable of producing skilled personnel for the use of national recovery 
and development; such a belief was put to question for only a short period of time during the Cultural 
Revolution, but remains dominant in today's China. I also point out in Chapter 5 that a hierarchical 
educational system in contemporary China, with HE at the top and being the most exclusive of all 
educational sectors, is not a result of a 'natural' development, but is shaped by a number of policies 
that targeted the transition rates between sectors; in other words, the HE sector was designed to be 
exclusive in order to remain effective in its role of social selection. 
However, though the Foucauldian frame proves fruitful in this thesis, it does have its limitations in 
accounting for some of my other findings. First of all, the frame seems insufficient in accounting for 
the development of HE in China which is more likely to be shaped by certain hegemonic powers than 
the others. Foucault would refuse to suggest that HE is a mere reflection of dominant ideologies, and I 
also hesitate to regard HE in China as a simple ideological state apparatus. My starting point of this 
inquiry is to understand HE as a complex assemblage made of multiple power relations, discourses and 
practices that are often in conflict with one another. However, my discussions in the previous chapters 
indicate that the state, or the political regimes in power, seem more successful than other actors in 
establishing hegemonic accounts of HE most of the time. It was only within a brief historical period in 
the early Republican era, a period without a strong and stable central government, that alternative 
accounts of HE, those of academia for instance (Chapter 8), managed to play a more significant role in 
the development of HE. With the situation of contemporary China taken into account, one would find 
it difficult to deny that in the case of Chinese HE, the state has been more overwhelming than any 
other 'stakeholders' in directing HE toward certain 'desirable' objectives (national salvation, recovery, 
development and global competition), shaping it after certain models and formats (Japanese, European, 
American, Soviet, and now a fusion of many), and governing it with certain rationalities (social 
equality under state socialism and social Darwinism under market economy) and technologies 
(medical examinations of HE candidates, morning exercises and evening studies), etc. At this stage, I 
hesitate to provide an account for this hegemonic success , as it may require an extensive examination 
on its own from a number of perspectives that are not tackled in this thesis. If I were to provide some 
clues for further research, I would point out that this hegemony may have emerged out of particular 
historical contingencies (warfare till the first half of the 20th century in particular), contingencies that 
may have produced a high degree of consensus between the state and the general public over what HE, 
and perhaps education in general, should primarily serve. Once established as a legitimate apparatus 
and a form of government, HE has its hegemonic rationalities deeply imbedded in the public discourse 
and practices, which remain largely unchallenged and hence taken for granted. 
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A related point to the issue of hegemony is that of continuities. Although the framework is useful in 
revealing the emergence, abruption and discontinuity of certain practices, such as the introduction of 
medical examinations for HE candidate as a technology of the population, it does not, I argue, provide 
much explanation for certain continuities in HE discourses and practices in modern China. As early as 
Chapter 4, I point out that the emergence and development of HE in modern China has been 
continuously shaped by certain principles over others — for instance, HE should primarily serve the 
needs of the collective, in many cases, those of the state, rather than those of individuals, and also, HE 
should prioritise science and technology over other disciplines. Another example of such continuities is 
a sustained public belief in the value of HE, which survives the radicalness of the Cultural Revolution. 
Similar continuities can also be applied to the shaping of HE subjects, which I point out in Chapter 10. 
Certain subjects, such as the desiring subjects and meritocratic subjects, remain fairly consistent across 
time. Once again, although I am able to identify these continuities, I do not have much room in this 
thesis to provide a comprehensive explanation; to account for these continuities may require different 
frameworks or approaches in another thesis. 
At this point, I would like to further discuss the limitations of Foucault's work in general, and also with 
application to my thesis. There have been been a number of charges upon of Foucault's work from 
other scholars, most noticeably from Habermas (1987), Baudrillard (2007), Noris (1993), Taylor 
(1986) and Walzer (1986). Habermas, for instance, in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 
(1987), charges Foucault of three forms of skepticism related to his theory of power: presentism, 
relativism and arbitrary partisanship. This is well summarised in Olssen (2004, Chapter 6). My 
discussion in this regard will be organised according to these three charges. 
First, by presentism, Habermas argues that Foucault lacks a standpoint to establish any forms of 
assessments from, or certain objective standards to perform any judgment upon. As Habermas points 
out, Foucault 
`can only explain the technologies of power and practices of domination by comparing them with one another... In 
doing so, one inevitably connects the viewpoints under which the comparison is proposed with his own hermeneutic 
point of departure (1987, p277)'. 
This criticism may also apply to my investigation in this thesis. By using a genealogical approach, I 
have revealed a number technologies in operation, may they be technologies of the social, the 
population, the body or the self. But so far as I can analyse the ways in which these technologies are 
introduced, developed and adjusted, I do not introduce or establish any standards to assess the 
legitimacy, validity, efficiency or necessity of these technologies identified. Therefore, I would find it 
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difficult to either justify or undermine the operation of these existing technologies. To certain extent, 
my analysis, though being able to reveal an 'awkward' and 'uncomfortable' present of HE in China, 
may fall short of criticality in term of assessing to what extent and why one should accept or resist 
such a state of the present. 
Second, by relativism Habermas refers to 'an analysis ... that can understand itself only as a context-
dependent practical exercise (1987, p 276)'. For Habermas, Foucault's historicism produces an 
unescapable 'self-referentiality'. He writes, 
`(n)ot only are truth claims confined to the discourses within which they arise, they exhaust their entire significance 
in the functional contribution they make to the self-maintenance of a given totality of discourse ... this basic 
assumption of the theory of power is self-referential; if it is correct, it must destroy the foundations of research 
inspired by it as well (1987, p2'79)'. 
What Habermas argues is that the 'subjugated' knowledges revealed through Foucault's genealogical 
historiography can not claim more or less validity than those of the dominant discourses of power that 
they attack, for 'they , too, are nothing else than the effects of power they unleash' (1987, p281, italic 
in the original). With application to this thesis, I point out that throughout the history of modern China, 
there exist alternative accounts of HE to those of hegemonic political regimes. These alternative 
accounts may be regarded as the 'subjugated' knowledges of HE. However, the question remains 
largely unanswered - to what extent, and by what standards, can we claim that these alternative 
account, or the 'subjugated' knowledges of HE, are more legitimate than their hegemonic 
counterparts? To complicate this question even further, these alternative accounts are also likely to 
diversify among themselves as well, and then based on what criteria should we choose among them as 
`the way out'? For instance, to what extent and why can we claim that the theories and practices of HE 
during the first half of the Republican era, the short span that is most closely associated with 
liberalism, are better alternatives to those of the contemporary Chinese HE system? If so, what are the 
standards or criteria that support this judgment? 
Third, by arbitrary partisanship, Habermas refers to 'a criticism that cannot account for its normative 
foundations' (1987, p2'76). He writes, 
`genealogical historiography is supposed to reach behind discourse totalities (within which alone disputes over norms 
ad values occur) with a strictly descriptive attitude. It brackets normative validity claims as well as claims to 
propositional truth and abstains from the questions of whether some discourse and power formations could be more 
legitimate than others. Foucault resists the demand to take sides... For him, there is no "right side"... Foucault 
understands himself as a dissident who offers resistance to modern thought and humanistically disguised disciplinary 
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power... (but his) criticism is based more on the postmodern rhetoric of his presentation than on the postmodem 
assumptions of his theory( 1987, p282)' . 
It also may seem that in this thesis I, too, avoid to 'take sides' - to endorse or establish standards for 
assessments of the emergence and deployment of HE in modern China. But I would hesitate to admit 
that my analysis, in the fashion of a genealogical historiography, is 'strictly descriptive' - rather it is 
critical in a different way. The criticality of Foucault's genealogical historiography lies in its 
reexamination of what is familiar and taken-for-granted, rather than providing an immediate 'cure' to 
the problems of the present. In fact, Foucault shows little interests in the latter, and this inevitably 
becomes the limits of what a Foucauldian frame can achieve. Following Foucault, my priority in this 
thesis is to unsettle a taken-for-granted present of HE in modem China, and to open up space for 
further investigation and assessment. In a sense, my thesis reveals, if only partially, the web of power 
relations through the operation of HE, and provides future research with 'hints' and 'clues' as to where 
one could proceed in an inquiry into HE in China, with one's own sociological curiosity and 
imagination. 
Moreover, to a certain extent, I agree with Habermas in pointing out that Foucault does not intend to 
`refine the language game of modem political theory ... and turn it against the pathologies of 
modernity' but only to 'undermine modernity and its language games'. Through my analysis in this 
thesis, I hope to have undermined modernity of HE in China and its language games. However, as 
Habermas argues, this stance may suffice for performing a genealogical historiography, as the one that 
I carry out in this thesis, but it may not be sufficient to serve as 'a tactic and a tool for waging a battle 
against a normatively unassailable formation of power'. And in terms of normative foundations, I do 
not discuss, in the fashion of philosophy of education, the schools of thoughts, theories, experiments 
and practices that are historically associated with the operation of HE in modern societies in this thesis, 
but I would be misleading to suggest that such a discussion is not necessary for the 'design' of a better 
future for HE in China - it is simply not the priority in this thesis. Such a discussion will certain benefit 
future studies on the development, improvement and reforms of HE in China, as it is from such a 
discussion that certain normative standards can be established. 
Habermas further puts forwards a question that I think is rather difficult to answer within a 
Foucauldian frame. He writes 
`if it is just a matter of mobilising counterpower, of strategic battles and wily confrontations, why should we muster 
any resistance at all against this all-pervasive power circulating in the bloodstream of the body of modem society, 
instead of just adapting ourselves to it? ... why fight at all? "Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought 
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domination to be resisted? Only with the introduction of normative notions could he begin to tell us what is wrong 
with the modern power/knowledge regime and why we ought to oppose it" (1987, p284)'. 
In terms of 'fight' or 'struggle' against the present, I sense from my fieldwork that students in 
contemporaries Chinese HE institutions hold various degrees of dissatisfaction of, and sometimes even 
resentment towards, certain norms and practices of the HE system they find themselves in. But in 
general, students lack an alternative assemblage of HE to compare in order to demand an improvement 
of the current system. For this reason, they often limit their fight or struggle to the degree of mere 
complaints and an unwilling acceptance of the 'fact' that 'this is how things are in China'. From time 
to time, I was confronted with the argument from my interviewees that 'if we can not change what we 
do not like, why fight at all?' My analysis in this thesis may shed some light on where one can start a 
fight against the hegemonic account of HE, for instance by resisting the operation of certain 
technologies or via a better understanding of the nature of certain desires and choices. However, the 
Foucauldian frame adopted in this thesis may not suffice in arguing a necessity to wage a battle against 
whatever produces these complains and resentments. 
A related point to this necessity to fight, I argue, is that the Foucaudian frame, though powerful in 
revealing the 'awkwardness' of our present, provides us with limited supports in terms of agency and 
resistance, and in seeking the possibilities of the alternatives to the existing order. Although agency 
and resistance have for long been important issues to philosophers and social scientists (Apple, 1982; 
1993; Giroux, 1983a; 1983b). Neither is particularly emphasised in Foucault's work, though he does 
talk about possibilities of resistance (Foucault, 1998) and his fellow scholars such as Judith Butler 
(1990; 1993) explore the notion of discursive agency. 
There is no easy solution to these listed limitations of Foucault and in particular his genealogical 
historiography. As Olssen (2004, p79) points out, a lack of standards of assessment is perhaps the key 
problem of Foucault, and it is also not easy to develop such standards within a Foucauldian frame. He 
writes, 
`(o)ne of the key problem for Foucault is how to derive standards of assessment, comparison, and evaluation, without 
falling headlong into an ahistorical and essentialist epistemology. There can be no assuredness in terms of 
foundations. All that provides security or assuredness of belief is not any timeless conception of truth but a simple 
correspondence between discourse and practice, and a coherence between discourse and other (more mature) 
discursive systems... Foucault believes that the attainment of truth within limits is compatible with a strong 
ideological bias. In this sense, the criterion of validity and assessment of the adequacy of statements depends on, or is 
relative to, the assessments of circumstance of the users, and the rules of agreement and criteria of truth are internal 
to a discursive system and a given society. Explanations accept the burden of a pragmatic and normative criteria of 
adequacy. Explanation stops at the point where questioning by the relevant local consensus ceases and there is no 
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sense attached to the idea that some standards or beliefs are truly rational as distinct from merely being accepted as 
such within a given historical period, except on pragmatic grounds'. 
It is, however, not my intension in this final chapter to propose a solution to Foucault's limitations. But 
rather, I want to point to a simple fact that all theories and research methods inevitably have their 
limitations - Foucault's work is no exception in this regard. Such limitations do not entirely undermine 
the contribution of Foucault to my inquiry in this thesis - it only suggests that there is a limit of what a 
Foucauldian frame can do for a critical analysis of HE in modern China. Neither do I intend to 
introduce standards of assessment or ways of improvement with particular application to HE in China -
such a project is perhaps what I can proceed from here. The focus of my inquiry in this thesis, as I state 
early on, is not upon establishing an alternative account of HE that is capable of overcoming its 
existing problems, and my discussion of HE in Part II and III perhaps do not particularly read of a 
story of agency and resistance to the hegemonic forms of HE discourses and practices in modern 
China, neither does my presentation of fieldwork data in the previous chapter. It is not my intention to 
underplay the space and possibilities of agency and resistance, or to simply sound negative; I only 
intended to reveal the emergence and deployment of HE in a way that is both intelligible and valid. My 
discussions of the apparatus components and elements of HE government only serve to discuss the 
existing HE assemblage in its 'effect' format — how HE is assembled from all its components and 
elements in this 'effect' history of the present that I brought to lights, how HE comes to establish itself 
as a complex social apparatus and a persuasive form of government, and how the subjects of HE come 
to understand their relations to HE, to their peers and competitors, and to the wider society in the ways 
they do. I am not suggesting, this 'effect' format of HE, or its hegemonic accounts, or its dominant 
discourses and practices are irresistible — on the contrary, I believe that much can be done to establish 
an alternative assemblage of HE. But before we set out to seek these alternatives, we must be aware of 
what we are fighting against, of what we are trying to establish alternatives to, so that we can better 
understand the targets that we are aiming at in our pursuits of alternatives. That is the reason why I 
focus on aspects other than agency and resistance in this thesis. However, at this point, I would like to 
address this issue briefly in the following sections. 
Alternative Accounts, Principled Accounts 
I now turn to discuss some of the principled accounts of HE in contemporary China as examples of 
resistance to the hegemonic forms. As I discussed above, there has been an imbalance of power in the 
field of HE authorities — the alternative authorities are competing against an alliance between the 
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hegemonic authorities and the derivative authorities, and for the moment, the alternative authorities 
have not been very successful in designing and developing their own format of HE in terms of a 
persuasive assemblage of apparatus components and government elements that could compete against 
the one that is presided by a hegemonic state. Nonetheless, the alternative authorities, in particular 
after the rapid expansion of HE in recent decades, launched some criticisms over the existing HE 
system in forms of principled accounts of HE. 
My use of principled accounts is borrowed from Ian Hunter (1994, p. XV) in his book Rethinking the 
school. In this genealogy of popular schools in the UK and Australia, Hunter argues that academic 
discussion of the school system in various stances — whether from the disciplines of sociology or 
philosophy or history, or inclined towards liberalism or Marxism or social democracy, invariably tends 
to be highly principled. He points out that such a discussion 
... treats the existing school system as the (partial or failed) realisation of certain underlying principles. There are 
several such principles — democracy, equality, rationality, liberty — but they all cohere around the notion of an ideal 
formation of the person. This is a formation that, through its freedom from extrinsic purposes and constraints, results 
in a "complete" development of faculties and thereby allows the person to know and govern their own conduct. We 
shall meet this ideal of the completely developed person in a number of guises. It is most clearly visible, of course, in 
liberalism' self-reflective individual subject, but we also find it in the collective personae favoured by Marxian and 
dialectical thought: the emancipated class, the self-governing community and the rational "public sphere".' 
The principles around 'the complete development' held by different academic traditions may vary, and 
in a similar manner, the partial or failed realisations of these principles also tend to differ. Hunter 
(1994, p. XV) further explains, 
`(f)or the liberal philosophy of education the supposed gap between principle and actuality is largely a matter of the 
relation between rational faculties of judgment lodged in the individual and whatever impediments these meet in 
their worldly exercise: personal irrationality, governmental repression. For dialectical (mainly Marxian) educational 
sociology the relation between the idea and the real school system assumes a slightly different form. Here it is 
"history" or "community" rather than the individual that is charged with bringing the principles of democratic and 
egalitarian education to fruition; although ... the goal of this development is remarkably similar to the liberal one: a 
school system capable of realising the "full" or complete development of the person, the touchstone for which is the 
person's free and rational choice of the form of the system itself.' 
Similar principled accounts of HE can be found in contemporary China. On the one hand, the liberal 
accounts argue that HE fails the mission to produce intellectuals that are capable of doing critical 
thinking and original creation, which can only be achieved by full and complete development of 
human faculties; on the other hand, the dialecticians argue that alongside the seemingly successful 
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expansion of the HE system, the issue of social inequality in access to HE, is becoming ever worrying 
and demanding immediate attention and action. 
Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend) is a weekly publication that is best known in China for its 
traditionally liberal tone and is perhaps also one of the rare places that one can find liberal 
interpretation of HE in contemporary China. Among the liberal advocators, Hao (2011, my translation) 
argues that the ideas of HE should be the cultivation of complete and full humans, the exploration and 
production of knowledge, and the service to societies. He further quotes the 'three doctrines' of Qian 
Mu, a renowned scholar from the Republican era, and explains, 
`(these three missions) echoes to what Mr. Qian Mu said about the unification of the "three doctrines". "The doctrine 
of human" focuses on how to educate students to be humans, and it also involves how academics and scholars should 
conduct themselves as humans; "the doctrine of learning" focuses on how teachers and students conduct scholarship 
together, exploring and producing knowledge, seeking the truth; "the doctrine of conduct" explores the utilization of 
what one learns in the real world, how to apply the knowledge and truth one has been exposed to in university to the 
practices of reforms in politics, economy, society, science, culture and education, etc... These three ideas of 
university are the values underpinning the three functions of university — education, research and service'. 
Hao's liberal interpretation of contemporary HE represents a prevailing account of its kind. The 
principle underlying HE, for Hao and his fellow liberals, should combine the full and complete 
cultivation of human faculties with the research function and the promotion of civic duties. 
Nonetheless, the very foundation of HE should be resolving around the cultivation of humans, the full 
and complete development of human faculties. However, in contemporary China, Hao argues, the 
liberal characteristics are being marginalised, due to a number of problems such as the loss of public 
morality and the prevalence of self-serving doctrines — all these problems may surface as academic 
corruption and plagiarisms, a lack of concern with social issues, and scientific instrumentalism in 
academic research and socio-economic development, etc. 
Hao's argument sheds a light on the possible contribution of liberal education for contemporary HE. 
However, one should not be too readily optimistic of what liberal education can achieve, as Liu Dong 
(2009, my translation), a professor at Peking University, usefully points out in Deep Concerns of 
University, Liu further puts forward a number of questions upon the nature and relevance of liberal 
education, which overlaps with my genealogical inquiry, 
`Is the evolution history of western civilisation, including its ever-evolving education history, essentially an open, 
contingent, and heterogeneous process, or is conducted towards a single permanently correct principle? Hence, is 
liberation education a predetermined, universally applicable and ever correct pattern of civilisation, or a resolution 
that is born out a lengthy historical struggles and a balance among various interests? Therefore, considering the 
ongoing labour division, bureaucratisation and stratification in human societies and the high expense of liberal 
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education, will this form of education be applicable to the entire society or exclusive to the elite group? The last but 
not least, although liberal education as such appears close to a western ideal, is itself still subject to perhaps 
sublation?' 
Here, what Liu seems to suggest is that liberal education is perhaps better understood as one of the 
forms of HE that has been practiced in history, rather than a superior principle that HE in China should 
blindly follow and work towards. He further warns against a form of essentialism that one can readily 
find a solution from the origins of western civilisation to the problem of HE in contemporary China, 
which leads to a blind adoption of some outdated principles of HE in the west. In other words, it is 
neither desirable nor constructive to simply refer to western principles of HE as the ideal and superior, 
while totally disregarding the emergence and assemblage of these principles and also the fact that these 
very principles might have been discarded already by their home societies. As my analysis in the 
previous section in this chapter has shown, the HE principles throughout the century have been closely 
associated with immediate adaption of certain western models, Japanese, American, Soviet, etc., but 
perhaps the criticisms put forward by the League of Nation Report that China failed to understand the 
function of modern universities largely hold true today. What has been missing from the debates upon 
the principles of HE in China is perhaps a preceding debate upon the ever-evolving nature of HE and 
its relevance to the contemporary Chinese society, the connection between HE and its home society, 
the role of HE within and beyond the demands of its home state, and alternative ways and means to 
conduct HE towards principles that are yet to be discussed and articulated. 
As for the dialectician account, HE in contemporary China, in particular after the expansion of the 
system, is subject to severe criticism over the issue of educational equity. Xie (2003) present a search 
result of the keyword 'equality in education' in eight newspaper and journals — the number of this 
keyword rises from 5 in the year 1990 to 1290 in the year 2005, the number of articles on educational 
equity rises from 3 to 303 within the same period. They divide this period into three stages. During the 
first stage, 1993-1997, the debates of educational equity resolve around the abolishment of fully 
funded studentship and the introduction of tuition; during the second stage, 199-2003, the debates 
focus upon, in terms of HE, the challenge of the system expansion to a fair distribution of HE 
opportunities; during the third stage, 2004-2005, the debates are primarily concerned with graduate 
unemployment and underemployment that is believed to be triggered by a radical expansion in the 
previous years. As one can see, the principled account of social equality, in Xie's term educational 
equity, is assembled from reflections upon a series of historical contingencies that introduce challenges 
to the normative understanding of HE. Unlike the principle of liberalism , the principle of educational 
equity is less articulated in history, and may surface as a rather contemporary pursuit of social goods. 
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This is partly true. But I would also argue that this principle could be better understood with reference 
of the principle of HE under state socialism that conducts a positive discrimination toward the working 
class in the distribution of HE opportunities. The challenges to the principle of educational equity are 
posting further threat to the traditionally disadvantaged social groups in educational access — the 
working class, the rural residents, those who were regarded as the primary concerned of the state under 
high socialism but are now increasingly less supported by the state since the 1980s onwards. Primer 
Wen Jiaoban, is quoted in Wang's report (Wen in Wang, 2010, my translation), who says, 
`in the past when we went to universities, students from rural areas account for 80% (of the total), perhaps even 
higher; the situation is now different, and the ratio of students from rural areas decreased.' 
Also, Xie, as the pro-principal of Qinghua University, is a strong believer in educational equity. He 
(2003, my translation)argues that educational equity should be the imperative order in education. 
`Such an "imperative order" needs no explanation, even no attribute, adverb, or adverbial. It is unconditional, a 
sacred imperative embedded in everyone's mind. We have no reason not to explore and understand this educational 
equity, and we should invest our lives and practices to experience and appreciate this educational equity; this is the 
imperative order of educational studies... 
The most vital value of education is educational equity. Needless to say, if equity is absent from the 
cultivation of the younger generation, this form of cultivation will only be in service to a minority, 
even a mechanism to protect social inequity. This form of education cannot and should not be 
respected and admired by the society. Educational equality is to enable youngsters from various class 
backgrounds to grow and process together, free from the constrains of their social background and 
factors; it also changes the social status of those in disadvantaged positions, and offers them equal 
status with others to engage with the society and their lives.' 
Some would perhaps argue that Xie has formulated a discourse of educational equity by turning its 
most ideal appearance and its most desirable effects into its absolute necessity — in other words, the 
logic of Xie is that educational equity should be the underlying principle of education, including HE, 
because without it, education can do more harm than good. 
Let us return to Hunter's genealogy of modern school system for now. If we are to follow his lead, we 
would say that HE in modern China does not have educational equity as the underlying principle, at 
least not in the sense that its contemporary meaning suggests, so it would be unfair to judge the current 
system against an assembled principled or a formulated principle by the contemporary critics such as 
Xie. It may very well be true that HE in modern China is informed by other underlying principles 
through its emergence, development and deployment, such as the production of personnel for 
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diplomacy at the time of national crisis or of technocrats for scientific and technological advancement 
for a newly born regime, and these actual principles at work may have been better realised than the 
principled accounts of the liberal and the dialecticians. 
When it comes social equality, one can readily establish the legitimacy for such claims in the name of 
social justice, but it is not merely a question of the rise or fall in the participation rate of one social 
group in HE in comparison with that of others, but a question of 
`whether and when to begin channeling young people into academic and vocational streams so as to 
maximize opportunities for them in a way they will accept as fair, but also in ways that are appropriate 
for what their societies need and their economies can afford' (Pepper, 1990, p. 5). 
Hence, in the light of quantitative research in social equality and HE participation, it is legitimate to 
claim that students from working class background are increasingly vulnerable in their competition for 
quality HE against their counterparts, for instance, from urban middle-income families, but it is 
important for policy makers and the public to understand the limits of what HE can do to reverse social 
inequalities that do not originate with education. It is perhaps not very constructive, again, to use the 
recent past, such as the era of state socialism, as an ideal for HE development in terms of the pursuit of 
social equality. Such a past is in itself of great socio-political controversy that remains to be clarified, 
and it is also unwise to deem the radical and extreme policies invented under a particular historical 
contingencies as being readily effective and therefore desirable. 
Again, we are faced with a dilemma that revolves around the limited resources of HE available, limited 
forms of social selection and screening that are fair, efficient and economic, and the presiding effect of 
social background upon educational achievement. Nonetheless, it is significant for policy makers and 
the general public to be concerned with social equality in HE but one should also not rush to claim one 
single ideal solution to such a complex issue. As Pepper (1990, p. 5) usefully points out, 
`Clearly, there are no ideal solutions. Since these problems all interact and compete with one another for the scarce 
resources necessary to solve them, the most that any government can do is try to work out strategies that balance the 
costs and benefits of particular kinds of education, in different proportions, for different kinds of students, at any 
given time and place. Acceptable and affordable strategies also tend to change as ruling coalitions shift and as the 
dynamic of development itself produces changing interests, expectations, and demands among different sectors of the 
population.' 
Seeking Alternative HE Assemblages 
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From the conventional sociological and educational perspectives, some claims and criticisms in the 
principled accounts I quoted above may very well hold true, but my concern here is not to examine the 
extent to which they are valid. Instead, I want to point out that our pursuit of an alternative HE 
assemblage can perhaps go beyond the existing frame of HE studies, and to explore possibilities of a 
HE assemblage that is not necessarily patterned on the existing 'effective' format. Although the focus 
of this thesis is not to design such an assemblage for future development of HE in contemporary 
China, I do wish to briefly discuss the possibilities in doing so at this point. 
In recent years, a number of American (Harvard and Yale, for instance) and British (Oxford for 
example) universities upload video clips of some introductory lectures given by distinguished teachers 
and scholars on YouTube as free open lectures to users worldwide, for instance Yale's lecture series 
`Death' and Harvard's lecture series of 'Justice'. Although YouTube is banned in mainland China, 
these programmes found their ways to Chinese audiences through other channels. These open lectures 
soon became popular among young students and adults in China to the extent that Sohu, one of the 
portal websites in China, collaborates with a subtitle team YYeTs which firstly introduced these 
lectures on their own websites, and brings together a variety of these courses in its 'education tv' 
section. Each video clip of the open lectures is now equipped with full subtitles in Mandarin. In this 
way, these open lectures from renowned universities are now made available to a wider range of 
intemet users in China, predominately to university students and graduates as they receive English 
language education and have interests in a wide range of disciplines such as philosophy and politics. 
Professor Shelly Kagan at Yale University, for instance, became popular in China as a result of his 
open lectures 'Death'. An article on Yale Bulletin quotes a report of China National Radio and writes, 
`China National Radio in September noted: "Kagan lectures the students while sitting on the podium 
with legs crossed and wearing jeans and sneakers. His image, resembling that of an 'immortal' in 
Chinese mythology, has made him a 'star' closely followed by the youth in China. Ever since Kagan's 
philosophy class 'Death' appeared on the interne through Open Yale Courses, many young people in 
China scramble for the lectures given by this unconventional professor who could have been considered 
`out of line' according to the traditional Chinese standard of teaching style and manner. 
"To teach and inspire the students, one doesn't need to read off a textbook and follow all the doctrines," 
added China National Radio. "Kagan's way and philosophy of teaching should be learned and drawn 
lessons from by many college professors in our country".' 
Kagan's classroom manners, or perhaps his appearance in general, provide Chinese students with an 
alternative format of the ways in which HE can be conducted differently in classroom settings from 
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what they perceive as 'in the line'. But I argue that open lectures as like Kagan's may have achieved 
more than providing alternative ways of configuring HE pedagogy. Open lectures as such are perhaps 
an example of alternative HE assemblages — they do not specify any particular aims of HE, but allow 
users to choose the ones that fit their personal interests; they do not follow the conventional ways of 
social selections based on meritocracy, but are made available to a large population who have access to 
the internet; they go beyond the conventional pedagogical relationship between teachers and students 
but nonetheless create spaces of interaction, in particular among users themselves — for instance there 
are now a large number of forum groups of open lectures on social websites in China with ongoing 
discussions among group members; they do not impose certain ways of evaluations at the end of 
course as they do in their hosting universities, so that the audiences are not under pressures to adopt to 
certain ways of learning in order to 'succeed' in final examinations; although they were videotaped in 
classrooms, the virtual teaching and learning manage to go beyond the boundary and confinement of 
enclosed campus space's; etc. 
Apart from the open lectures from foreign universities, some local attempts were made recently in 
seeking alternative HE assemblages. In their report 'University in its earthly form', Fang and Li, 
journalists of Nanfang Zhoumo, describe a different form of HE. They write (Fang and Li, 2011, 
webpage, my translation), 
`This university named "Li Ren" is a rare existence in the history of Chinese education — it does not have 
its own school buildings and can only borrow student hall and classrooms of a junior secondary school, 
the facilities of which are rather backward; it does not have a principle or a full time managerial team, 
and its funding comes from small amounts of public donations; its first session is a summer school which 
only lasts 15 days, with no more than 80 students. But it has a faculty that is much admired by many 
regular universities, and it has a grand vision — to expose students to authentic university education and 
to explore the possible formats of private HE in an liberal and open way.' 
This 'Li Ren' College is an educational programme organized during the summer of 2011by a group of 
liberal academics and public intellectuals. It is not strictly a HE institution by the standards of the 
existing HE assemblage in China. It does not have a fixed campus, and its faculty is only a group of 
like-minded intellectuals; its curricular materials were recommended by its temporary faculty member; 
its pedagogy was not 'carefully' planned; above all the college does not have the degree granting 
authority etc.. Nonetheless, its programme sheds some interesting lights on the seeking of alternative 
HE assemblages. For instance, the enrolment for the 2011 programme departed from the conventional 
written examinations, but used personal statements revolving around open questions such as 'what do 
you expect from this programme? Why do you decide to participate in the events organized by Li Ren 
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College? Why do you think you will be enrolled?' Perhaps we do not need all the conventional 
apparatus component and government elements for HE to be carried out, and we can go beyond the 
conventional ways of doing HE for the alternatives to be possible. 
In an interview, the principle organiser of Li Ren College, Li Yingqiang, explains the intention of 
himself and his fellow participants. He says, 
`our aim is not to compete with Peking and Qinghua, to fight against the existing universities. What we are doing is 
rather small — some willing to teach, and some willing to learn, and that is all. We do not have grand objectives, not 
to produce personnel for the future development of the nation, but only to provide a possible alternative for those 
who want to study... 
A real university revolves around "human"; to be human is an aim, not a means. What we do is a form of exploration 
... perhaps (what matters) is not what Li Ren College can achieve, but what our exploration helps other to achieve. 
Maybe some rich blokes see that people with few resources like us are not doing private HE, and they decide to join 
us, and then this (aim of ours) is achieved (Li laughs).' 
It is not difficult to see that Li underpins his notion of 'real' university education with liberal traditions. 
But at this point, I do not intend to comment on the appropriateness of such an underlying philosophy 
for contemporary university education. But instead, I argue, attempts at educational explorations made 
by Li and his fellow participants, are admirable in their courage and determinations to seek alternative 
HE assemblages. HE without proper facilities and buildings, contracted faculty members or students 
selected by exams is perhaps a good starting point for our seeking of alternative HE assemblages. This 
is also what future research in this regard can build upon. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Annual Review of Academic Year of 	 and 
Month Day 
Name Gender Department Dorm 
No. 
Speciality 
Student ID Current 
Student Cadre 
post 
Political 
Status 
Self Review 
Review of the class 
Record of Awards and Punishments 
Score of Moral Education of the student 
Category *ideological and political character *moral and civilised *discipline *extra-curricular activities *bonus point 
score 
Score 	 * 
* 
* total 
Review of the tutor 
 
Opinion of Department 
Appendix 
Year 
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APPENDIX 2 
Interview Questions 
Part 1 Entrance 
1, How would you describe your perception of a university life before your enrollment? How would 
you understand the idea of 'freedom' in university life? To what extent does this idea have value? 
2, What are the sources of the elements that construct your perception? 
3, How did your family, and your high school teachers respectively, explain the idea of 'going to 
university' to you? To what extent did you believe in their statement? Have you ever expressed your 
doubt? And if so, how did they respond? Under what conditions specifically would you opt not to go to 
university? 
4, Would it be fair to characterize your faith in higher education as unshakable faith? 
Does that mean your subject of study is worthy of your religious devotion? 
Part 2 Experience 
5, How did you picture university teachers and teaching to be before your enrolment? Why so? Did 
you regard the characteristics you attributed to teachers and their teaching methods a result of their 
personal methods or styles, or conversely a result of school regulated curricula and departmental 
demands? Did you expect to be inspired by teachers? 
6, To what extent do you believe performing well in university learning requires any adjustment to 
your learning approaches developed in high school? 
7, Can you describe what type of relationship you anticipate with your university professors and 
tutors? Why would you hold that expectation? 
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8, How did you plan to explore your personal interests in university? 
9, How did you plan to build up your own social network in university? 
10, What would be your requirement on school environment? 
Part 3 Exit 
11, How would you expect your employment perspective to be given the current graduate 
unemployment problem? More generally, do you believe opportunities are limited for merely a short 
period of time, or do you see the unemployment problem as a perpetual issue of concern in the future? 
12. Can you imagine a time in the near future where you'll have to return to school to make yourself 
more competitive in the employment market? 
13, How would you expect university education to prepare you for employment? In which ways do 
you believe your university education is responsible for formulating a career perspective for you? How 
would your university education affect your choice of profession, employment region, etc? 
14, How would you characterize your social status as a university student given the fact that graduates 
earn the same as 'migrant worker'? 
15, How do you and your peers understand 'university education' with regard to its function and its 
influence on you in particular? 
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